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Qhapaq Ñan. Symbol of integration.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

The Qhapaq Ñan is an extraordinary set of roads constructed by the Incas. This network connects several Andean villages and sites that highlight the Inca ancestral architecture. This road system was a route of trade and it contributed greatly to cultural exchanges.

The Qhapaq Ñan is a set of roads, which is said to be more than 60000 km long, and that was used for several centuries by the Incas for communication, trade and defence. Based partly on pre-Inca infrastructure it reached its maximum expression in the period of Tawantinsuyu (Inca empire) when it spread across the length and breadth of the Andes in what are nowadays Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. The network is based on four main routes, which originate from the central square of Cuzco, the capital of Tawantinsuyu. These main routes are connected to several other road networks of lower hierarchy, which created linkages and cross-connections. The four routes allowed travel through the conquered territories: the Chinchaysuyo to the north, the Collasuyo to the south, the Antisuyo to the east and the Contisuyo to the west .

The Qhapaq Ñan or Inca road is expression of the ancestral Inca architecture; in fact, while travelling along the whole path, one can admire different architectural designs: ramps, stairways, chacas (suspension bridges),which show the knowledge of our ancestors. This network of roads allowed the trade, between the towns of the highlands and those of the valley, of the agricultural production, on which the economy of the Inca empire was based. However, the Qhapaq Ñan not only exhibits important processes of interchange of goods, but also of communication and cultural traditions.
The chasquis by travelling through the Inca roads brought news and notices from the Inca king to the local authorities of the four suyus (regions) and vice versa. The chasquis were the great communicators of the important historical, military and social events.
While the wise spiritual Yatiris travelled through the Qhapaq Ñan to reach villages or sacred places, they performed healing rituals or celebrations, such as that of the Andean New Year or the Inti Raymi,
or the Sara Raymi.

Unfortunately, during colonial times, the great Qhapaq Ñan, was used for other purposes; it was used to invade and destroy the Tawantinsuyu, to invade villages, to impose the natives the colonizers’domination, and to take the indigenous slaves to the mines of Cerro Rico (rich hill) in Potosí, Bolivia. The Inca road was then forgotten in modern times. But the populations of the nearby towns did not lose the significance of the Qhapaq Ñan, and its archaeological works raised new interest in the meaning of this extraordinary road system. In this regard in 2001,the government of Peru began to promote the multilateral postulation of the “Inca Trail” as a World Heritage site to UNESCO.

This cultural itinerary, in fact, meets the six criteria of exceptional cultural value, because: first, it represents a masterpiece of human creative genius; second, it attests to a considerable exchange of human values; third, it provides a unique, or at least exceptional, testimony about a cultural tradition of a civilization; fourth, it is an eminently representative sample of the type of construction, architectural or technological complex and landscape, which illustrates a significant period of human history; fifth, it is a prominent example of a traditional form of human settlement and land use, representative of a culture; and sixth, it is directly associated with living traditions, ideas and beliefs that have exceptional universal importance.

Since then, cultural revitalization has been carried out in order to make the Qhapaq Ñan regain its original meaning. Currently the Inca Trail has become an element of intercultural, spiritual, political and social binational integration between Peru and Bolivia. In fact, every year in June, the authorities of both countries make a journey through the Qhapaq Ñan and promote activities in the border towns.

Jhonny Mancilla Pérez

Towards a New Governance of Mining Resources.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

The United Nations Environmental Assembly has opened a consultation period on the governance of mineral resources
in June 2020.

This consultation is an opportunity to develop an international treaty requiring all countries to better manage mineral resources in a way that respects human rights and the environment. The development of telecommunications, technology, transport, industry and the economy is largely due to the current relevance of minerals, which in most cases have become a double-edged sword.

On the one hand, mineral resources are a source of economic income for (developing) countries rich in mineral resources. But on the other hand, the ease of obtaining money from the export of mineral resources has created an economic dependency for these countries, preventing them from diversifying their economy. In general, mineral resources have not been a blessing for developing countries but have become the now famous the natural resources curse, causing bad governance marked by environmental crimes and human rights violations.

Minerals are undoubtedly necessary for economic development. Good management of these mineral resources can contribute positively to the achievement of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provided that their extraction is carried out in compliance with environmental standards, assessing the risks caused by their extraction and implementing the necessary measures to repair the damage caused. Likewise, the minerals will help to achieve the SDGs if their use is put at the service of a clean technology that does not generate CO2 emissions into the atmosphere and that is put at the service of the integral development of people.

The needs.

Firstly, the good governance of mining resources must primarily include standards relating to respect for the environment and ensure the implementation of measures that protect people’s health throughout the process of extracting, washing, smelting, refining and processing the minerals.The standards for good governance must require rigorous environmental and human health impact assessments and demand the use of the least polluting extraction techniques. It is the responsibility of governments to establish binding legislation requiring appropriate measures, but it is the obligation of mining companies to carry out measures that counteract the environmental impact during the extraction process, such as the treatment of waste water, control of air quality and the management of waste generated by the exploitation.

Second, in addition to environmental rights, governance of mineral resources requires due diligence that underlines respect for human rights throughout the supply chain. There are a number of repeated conflicts in mineral resource extraction that require efforts to ensure the human rights of workers and affected communities. These rights include labour rights, fair wages, social and health rights, compensatory measures for affected local communities and the fight against child exploitation. In many cases, communities are abandoned by local authorities and companies forget their compensation obligations when mining activity causes the displacement of communities. In addition, the economic commitment of extractive companies must be proportional to the benefits obtained annually. We cannot lose sight of the fact that local communities are the legitimate owners of the land and therefore of the mineral wealth found in the subsoil, especially in Africa.

Thirdly, due diligence requires progress in the accountability of companies so that they assume their responsibility for the transparency of the economic transactions carried out. Accountability is not enough in the countries where the mineral companies have their headquarters; transparency requires comparing payments made throughout the supply chain: contracts, public procurements, prospecting, extraction, smelters, taxes, commissions, intermediaries, etc. In this way, it will be possible to have a better picture of the company’s real expenses. In addition, this transparency will allow the fight against corruption as well as promote the fair payment of taxes following the model presented by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative that seeks the global standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources.

What we are missing.

The current rate of economic growth and demand for mineral resources is unsustainable. And therefore, it is necessary to change the paradigm of how we understand a green and circular economy in developed societies. There is a need for binding legislation on the governance of mineral resources that is more restrictive, that helps to make extractive policies more sustainable and that supports the circularity of the economy. Voluntary policies and guidelines advising good practice in the extractive industry, especially in the formal mining sector, are not enough, forgetting about the artisanal mining on which millions of people live in mining areas. Good governance of mineral resources is inclusive all sectors of both formal and artisanal mining as well as encouraging the shift from an energy transition economy to a green and circular economy.

The transformation of the economy requires the commitment of governments, investors, extractive industry and civil society to achieve sustainable management of mineral resources. International legislation must ensure environmental control of mining operations by the governments all over the world. No mine should be abandoned because of poor profitability or the depletion of mineral resources. All mines require an environmental restoration plan with the obligation to rehabilitate contaminated sites and working groups must be set up to determine the least polluting extraction mechanisms with the least impact on human health.

Developed countries cannot simply consume responsibly, live in green economies and abandon resource-rich countries to their environmental fate. The circularity of the economy requires the effort of all to behave in an environmentally responsible way.
The economically developed countries are responsible for what happens in the Global South and must provide the human and material means to enable a governance of natural resources that helps to create a green and circular economy at the service of people, respectful of human rights and the environment. An economy that benefits everyone and not just investors and companies.

José Luis Gutiérrez Aranda,
Trade Policy Officer,
Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network (AEFJN)

Ibadi Islam and Diplomacy.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

Oman is distinctive in the Persian Gulf context because it has been traditionally ruled by an Imamate system based on the Ibadiya School. And, some 75% of all Omanis practice Ibadi Islam.

The Ibadiya survives only in Oman and a few pockets in North Africa mostly Algeria. a man’s body identity is Central to the countries geopolitical profile setting it apart from its Gulf neighbors which largely share a Wahhabi orientation. In this sense, and also sets itself apart from Yemen and the Shiite Giants of Iran on the other side of the Gulf. The Ibadi faith has also had an impact on domestic politics and the formation of society in the country.

Ibadi Islam (al-Ibadiyyun in Arabic), or Ibadi Khawarij are said to be a kharijite sect, which goes back to the early decades of Islam, and often described as a compromise or middle ground between the Sunna and the Shi’a branches. In this respect it’s worth noting that in Islam the main divisions are three rather than two. There are Sunnis, Shiites and Kharijites. It’s also worth stressing that the reasons for the initial division (or factionalism) owe more to political considerations, and struggles, of succession after the death of Prophet Muhammad. The theological and religious differences came after. Kharijites have typically distinguished themselves for moderation – intended as a repudiation of violence.
From a theological point of view, the Ibadi Islam of Oman has more in common with Sunni rather than Shiite tradition.
Their principal tenet is that the leader of the community, the Imam, need not be a descendant of the Prophet; he needs merely be the worthiest. After a period of expansion (especially in southern Arabia), small communities of Ibadi kharijites exist in Algeria, Tunisia (especially the island of Djerba), and Libya (in Zuwara, just west of Tripoli and Jebel Nefusa). But, it is the official Islam practiced in Oman (and Zanzibar), where many Ibadis found refuge after clashing with al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, who governed Iraq during the caliphate of Abd-al-Malik (685-705).

If sectarian clashes have characterized many Middle Eastern societies – though triggered and fueled by socioeconomic and political factors; especially, during periods of power struggles – Oman has always managed to avoid them. Extremists of any kind are not tolerated. And, the Omani Ibadi faith, followers are encouraged to pursue productive activities beyond the faith. To be a ‘good’ Ibadi, believing in God and following the precepts of the Sunna is not enough to be considered a ‘good Muslim’. It’s essential to be a good citizen and worker. But, the most congenial aspect perhaps is that while the Ibadis’ rituals are similar to those of Sunnis, they welcome prayer with all other sects – and they also welcome inter-sect marriages. The Ibadis reach beyond the concept of tolerance. They embrace the other sects; and this is especially unusual in the context of the strict precepts in the rest of the Arabian Gulf. Ibadism has also shown openness to non-Muslims for centuries.

And it is this tradition of tolerance, shaped over centuries, that allows the Omanis to the only people in the Gulf, able to maintain friendly relations with all of the main players in the region, from Saudis to Qataris and Iranians as well as Americans, British or Chinese. And even Israelis – before the UAE or Bahrain. Oman has quite simply deployed its ‘soft’ Islam, and the tolerance it encourages, as its main selling point. And, the Omanis’ famous tolerance has made their country a focus of trade, harmonizing with the country’s geography, marked by its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz with access to both the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Alessandro Bruno

Chokepoints: the vulnerable doors of the Middle East.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

Chokepoints are of huge geostrategic importance to the Middle East, where there are three of the most important maritime straits: the Suez Canal, the strait of Hormuz and the strait of Bal el-Mandeb. Strong economic, political, and military interests are at stake.

Main facilitators of international freight transport activities, and therefore vulnerable to various factors, chokepoints are narrow channels along the busiest global shipping routes and today they represent the cardinal principles of global security. Their location is strategic in many ways, from the energy sector to the food sector.
For example, the daily flow of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz in 2016 was around 18.5 million barrels per day, representing 30% of all crude oil traded by sea.

As for the food sector, over a quarter of world soybean exports pass through the Straits of Malacca (a marine passage in the Indian Ocean that separates Indonesia from Malaysia). Chokepoints are highly vulnerable to disruption due to conflicts, terrorism, and piracy. But also, these constricted passages can be closed to traffic by states and others with a desire to do so, conditioning, in this way, the economy of the countries receiving the goods, be it oil or wheat.

Suez, Bab El-Mandeb, Hormuz.
The three top global chokepoints, the Suez Canal, and the straits of Hormuz and Bal el-Mandeb are located in the Middle East. The Suez Canal and the SUMED Pipeline are strategic routes for Persian Gulf oil and natural gas shipments to Europe and North America. Located in Egypt, the Suez Canal connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea. The Bab el-Mandeb strait is located between the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The Bab el-Mandeb.

Approximately 6 million barrels of oil per day flow through this gateway toward Europe and Asian markets such as Singapore, China and India. Finally, the Strait of Hormuz, which divides the Arabian Peninsula from the coasts of Iran, connecting the Gulf of Oman with the Persian Gulf. This strait is the most important chokepoint for global oil supplies, especially because the oil tankers that collect oil from various ports of the Persian Gulf must pass through it. The equivalent of about a third of the world’s marine oil trade transits the Hormuz strait. The supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which represents one third of all global LNG trade also passes through this gateway.

The Suez Canal.

There is no doubt that the inability of oil to transit these major chokepoints, due to their closure, even temporarily, would lead to substantial supply delays and higher shipping costs, resulting in higher world energy prices. The alternatives to get around these chokepoints are, to date, very limited. One of these is the pipeline in Saudi Arabia, which the state-owned company Saudi Aramco recently renewed and extended; thanks to this pipeline crude oil from the Persian Gulf arrives directly in the Red Sea, and then enters the Mediterranean.

Preventing vulnerability
Major oil exporters should set some priorities in the economic planning of the next decades, such as strengthening port and maritime cooperation, ensuring military protection of chokepoints and, above all, preparing massive investments. Something has already been planned, such as the creation of new security agreements (Red Sea Alliance) and the commitment by both NATO and the EU in the seas from Suez to Aden and the Persian Gulf. However, these initiatives must not be isolated, but coordinated with each other in a broader strategic vision, in order to prevent external actors such as Asian powers, considering their broad commercial interests, from increasing their presence in the area.

the Strait of Hormuz

The Iran-US tensions are also a cause of vulnerability and a threat to the infrastructure and income of the countries of the Middle East. The Islamic Republic could have some interest in ‘closing’ the Hormuz strait in order to hurt the United States (this explains the massive presence in the area of both the US and British navies) but, at the same time, the interruption of oil shipments may also represent a risk, since world large importers may decide to look for other providers and reduce their dependence on the Middle East. All this confirms that the security of ports and of these chokepoints represents an economic priority in today’s Middle East.

Alessandro Manda/CgP

Sudan. Missionaries involved in education.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

Since the start of the evangelisation of Sudan, education has been a priority for missionaries. And continues to be so for the local Church.

A warm morning in Khartoum. In the heavy chaotic traffic, we can only drive slowly. Our destination is a technical school but we are not sure of its exact location. Then we stop to ask a young lad who is selling water by the roadside. As soon as he hears the word Comboni, he immediately shows us the way. Curiously, the school we are going to is run by the Salesians. “In Sudan, all the Catholic schools are known as Comboni schools, even though many are not aware that Saint Daniel Comboni was the first bishop of the then Vicariate of Central Africa whose seat was in Khartoum and everyone associates the Catholic institutes of education with his name”, Spanish Comboni Father Jorge Naranjo tells us.
In 1867, Mons. Daniele Comboni worked out his Plan for the regeneration of Africa, placing education at the centre of his work and opening a number of schools in Sudan. Comboni died in 1881 at the age of fifty and, four years later, Mohammed Ahmed Al-Mahdi [1844-1885] successfully waged war against the Ottoman-Egyptian military government and gained a notable victory over the British. He then created an Islamic state which wiped out the Christian presence. His successors, called ‘Mahdists’, led by his successor (khalīfa) ʿAbd Allāh al-Taʿāysh, were defeated by the British in 1898. Soon afterwards, the missionaries could return to Khartoum.

In 1900, the first two schools after the Islamic revolution were opened in Omdurman: the Comboni Boys and St. Joseph’s Girls School.
Even today, both schools are continuing their work of education. The girls’ school is now called Comboni Girls’ School, and there are 160 pupils in the nursery school, 915 in the primary school and 97 in the secondary school. The Headmistress, Comboni Missionary Sister Cristina Maestroni tells us: “Judging by the number of applications for admission that we receive every year, we may say that the school is highly regarded for its educational standard”.
Fr. Jervas Mayik , Headmaster of the Boys’ School emphasises: “The school has always been considered a centre of excellence. We have many applications every year”. In order to respond to so many requests, the Combonis have opened three large schools in the outskirts of Khartoum. Father Salvatore Marrone, manager of the schools comments: “In reality the periphery schools came about as emergency schools in the eighties when the war in the South caused an enormous influx of South Sudanese to Khartoum and Omdurman. With time, we managed to order and consolidate the educational situation. At the moment, the pupils, boys and girls, number 1424”.

Today, in the Archdiocese of Khartoum alone, around 26,000 students frequent the 59 schools that bear the name of Comboni. Among the various educational institutions, Comboni College of Khartoum (CCK) stands out.The CCK began as a quality secondary school. The British colonial government, with a document issued in 1929, authorised the school only for non-Sudanese students. It was inaugurated that same year with just fifteen students.
The school enjoyed immediate success and the school authorities of the time began to pressure the British government to allow Sudanese students to attend the school. The British gave in in 1936 and the Sudanese enrolled en masse: many of them would make up the section of society that achieved independence in 1956.

The present Headmaster, Father Norberto Stonfer, recalls that, “in the CCK alone, there were 24 Comboni Missionary Brothers and Fathers, totally dedicated to teaching. They gave a very sound formation. Those were the golden years that forged the ‘Comboni Trademark’ which still continues to this day”. For many years, the examination results of the CCK students were the best in the country and the students immediately found work. An example of the appreciation of Comboni College occurred in 1964 when the Sudanese government ordered the expulsion of all the missionaries in the country with the exception of those working in the College. Father Norberto is in no doubt that it was the former students of the CCK who appealed to the government over the expulsion. They saved the mission”.
This year, the school has 1,100 students who may study in Arabic or English, even though it is a challenge to find Sudanese teachers with a good standard of English. In 2014 a female section was opened with 300 students to allow South Sudanese adolescents, who fled from the bordering country due to the civil war of 2013, to continue their secondary education.

It is important to remember as well the primary school that is part of the CCK and was founded in 1949. At present it has 1150 pupils in 23 classes, with an average class size of 50. The Headmaster, Fr. Diego Dalle Carbonare, says that this limit has been established to improve the standard of teaching, “since the average class size in Sudanese schools is between 70 and 80 pupils”.A third of the students are Christian – mostly from South Sudan – and the rest are Muslim. Besides being a compulsory subject, religion carries most points in the official exam after primary school. Students in Catholic schools may choose either Christianity or Islam but elsewhere the only option is Islam. “This is to force them to study the Koran and there are also exams, which is a way of inducing Christians to convert”, Father Diego asserts. Nevertheless, it is possible that things may change in September this year with the introduction of the new academic curriculum which is more universal and is open to interreligious dialogue.

Students at Comboni College of Science and Technology.

Since 1999, a group of CCK teachers have been insisting that those in charge should provide a broader range of courses. With the support of some Sudanese Muslims and that of Cardinal Gabriel Zubeir, the Catholic higher institute of education in Sudan, Comboni College of Science and Technology (CCST), was established.
From its beginnings, the CCST was open to boys and girls regardless of origin or religious affiliation, and it stands out as a centre of interreligious dialogue and encounter. It is the only university with chapels and rooms for Muslim prayers. Over the years, the CCST has opened new courses. Today it offers four university qualifications, two three-year specialisation courses, courses of ongoing formation in Italian, Spanish and English, teaching techniques, informatics, and a pioneering course in Sudan on palliative care for health workers.

Enrique Bayo

Oman. The legacy of Sultan Qaboos.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

The Sultanate of Oman is in the Middle East, on the south-eastern end of the Arabian Peninsula. Throughout its history, Oman, has experienced historical periods and events that have formed the character and shape of the current Arabian Peninsula.
Oman is best characterized as having a unique Foreign Policy in the context of the Middle East.

In late October 2018 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Oman. The visit to Muscat took observers by surprise. This is mainly because Oman has traditionally been close to Iran. It is a relationship that tends to get stronger when Iran is under pressure as it is now. Therefore, there are concerns that by embracing Israel Oman is compromising its relationship with Iran one of its closest allies.

Then-Omani leader Sultan Qaboos (R) and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.

Iranian officials such as President Rohani understand well Oman’s diplomatic role. After all, the Islamic Republic maintained the same close ties to Oman that Iranian monarchy had established. Oman’s dialogue policy ensures that no matter how difficult a diplomatic crisis becomes, the Middle East can count on a regional. It was in Oman that talks began between the United States and Iran in 2013, leading to the ‘nuclear deal’ (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA power (JCPOA). And it was Sultan Qaboos who received a visit from Israeli PM, Benjamin Netanyahu in 2018. Qaboos has also kept his distance away from the Saudi-Emirati-led war in Yemen; in 2017, and it has refused to participate in the diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar, led by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi towards Qatar.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) holds its annual summit.

Oman joined the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at its inception in 1981. Oman has participated actively in all aspects of the GCC. But this involvement has not meant that Oman has acquiesced entirely with GCC policies, especially as these have focused almost entirely on the interests of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in recent years. Indeed, Oman has distanced itself from the Saudis and UAE in three main areas: first, Oman has continued to maintain a good relationship with Iran unlike Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent the UAE. Second, Oman has remained neutral in the dispute that has pitted the KSA, UAE and Egypt against Qatar. In many ways, Oman sympathizes with Qatar. Third, Oman has opposed the Saudi-UAE led war in Yemen on both humanitarian and geopolitical grounds. Oman, which shares a border with Yemen, cannot afford to allow its neighbor to disintegrate. Oman is even said to have facilitated the shipment of weapons to the Houthis in Yemen.

Oman’s Main Regional Partner
While Muscat and Riyadh enjoy close relations, both at the bilateral and GCC context, Oman’s closest regional partner is Iran. Rather than obstructing or putting pressure on Washington and other members of the Security Council to scrap the Iranian nuclear deal (The JCPOA), Oman encouraged it. Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said facilitated the US-Iranian rapprochement with a view to achieving an agreement. Oman also rejected the Saudi idea to militarize the GCC in order to challenge Tehran. Oman’s ties to Iran are not merely for goodwill, even the goodwill can often translate into practical benefits.

Oman and Iran have agreed to build a gas pipeline linking terminals in both countries.

Understanding that trade thrives in contexts of peace, Oman and Iran have agreed to build a gas pipeline linking terminals in both countries. Iran started building the pipeline in June 2020. The pipeline allows Oman to easily secure natural gas, and reduce its reliance on domestic oil supplies for power generation. Iran, meanwhile, will increase gas production and gain a new hydrocarbon market.
In fact, not only can Oman serve as a final buyer, it can also serve as an intermediary for gas sales to third parties.
Throughout its history, Oman, has experienced historical periods and events that have formed the character and shape of the current Arabian Peninsula. Chief among these is the advent of Islam, which changed the course of the entire region and beyond. Oman has also experienced a significant Portuguese domination, one of the rare occasions before 1799 (Napoleon in Egypt) when a European power managed to take over a Muslim territory. However, to understand modern Oman, and how it differs from its Gulf neighbours and partners (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain) the rise of the Al-Bu Sa’idi dynasty is the most important aspect. The Sultanate of Oman has over the past few centuries also expanded to influence East Africa – Zanzibar in particular – shaping that region’s character. (A.B.)

What causes Africa’s coups? That is the question.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

The near unanimous condemnation of the mutiny in Mali followed by the forced resignation of president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta
questions the consensus around unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.

In a rare alignment, various international peace and security actors condemned Mali’s 18 August coup d’état. They also called for a return to constitutional order, despite Keïta’s resignation and his dissolution of Parliament and government. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) went even further with targeted sanctions to coerce the coup plotters out of power.

This new appetite for sanctions from African organisations seems surprising, given the AU’s tendency to criticise international sanctions against African states. Why has unconstitutional change of government become the red line of African statutory norms on democracy
and governance?

The Lomé Declaration of 2000 and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2007 both define aspects of unconstitutional change of government. These include: a military coup against a democratically elected government; mercenary intervention to replace a democratically elected government; replacing a democratically elected government by dissident armed groups and rebel movements; or refusal of an outgoing government to relinquish power following defeat in free, fair and regular elections.

The systematic mention of ‘democratically elected government’ illustrates both the context and spirit behind the Lomé Declaration. At a time when democratic constitutionalism was new in Africa, the aim was to protect the authority of civilian political institutions from the ‘authoritarianism’ of military interventions.

Since 2000, the citizen debate on democracy and governance in Africa has evolved. Priorities have shifted to the quality of electoral processes, the value of term limits, but also legitimacy, performance and accountability in political and economic governance. Social discontent, largely expressed through protest, has been met with varying degrees of suppression, co-option and consolidation of the status quo.

On key governance issues, regional organisations have generally remained silent, despite the development of an African Governance Architecture (AGA) in 2011. With only 17 countries having signed and six ratifying the 2014 African Charter on the values and principles of decentralisation, local governance and local development, only ink-service is paid to core values like responsiveness, transparency, accountability and civic responsibility.

In 2014, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) noted that unconstitutional changes of government originated from ‘deficiencies in governance. Greed, selfishness, mismanagement of diversity, failure to seize opportunities, marginalisation, human rights violations, unwillingness to accept electoral defeat, manipulation of constitutions and their revision through unconstitutional means to serve narrow interests, and corruption are all major contributors to unconstitutional changes of Governments and popular uprisings.’

The council’s call for ‘a zero tolerance’ for government policies and actions that may lead to a resort to unconstitutional means to overthrow oppressive systems’ has not changed the dominant norms and actions. Despite the clarity provided by the PSC, in practice the AU and regional organisations have reduced democracy to the holding of elections and selective respect for term limits.

Meanwhile the quality of electoral processes is a recurrent trigger point, as was the case with Mali’s delayed and allegedly rigged March 2020 parliamentary elections. On elections, the AU and regional organisations routinely resort to observer missions.
Their conclusions rarely challenge official results, even though emboldened civil society and judiciaries identify rigging. Recent elections in Kenya and Malawi are reminders.

On governance monitoring, the relevance of the AU’s African Peer Review Mechanism can legitimately be questioned. Despite being around for two decades, its impact on the evolution of governance is
hardly visible.

Against this backdrop, the concept of unconstitutional change of government has become AGA’s main focus, while all the other dimensions of legitimate and responsive governance have been systematically scuttled by member states. In places like Mali, prioritising a symptom – i.e. the coup – over addressing root causes such as dubious legitimacy and corruption, makes the AU and ECOWAS’s response look like a protection of incumbency.

Both organisations have been silent about government inertia on inequality, the rule of law and fair electoral governance. The African and international approach seems to privilege the ‘legality’ over the legitimacy of sitting heads of state. This approach systematically puts intergovernmental organisations at odds with those countries’ citizens.

Africa’s peace, security and governance norms and instruments will increasingly be tested by complex challenges. Reports from early warning systems and civil society organisations often correctly predict governance failures. Without political commitment to conflict prevention, the AU and regional organisations will increasingly react rather than pre-empt crises. It then becomes politically expedient to condemn a coup rather than take bold political steps to address the causes of
social discontent.

The focus on unconstitutional changes of government reflects simplistic approaches to governance crises. Urgent calls by international parties for elections to restore constitutional order are questionable – particularly when constitutions or voting systems could be part
of the problem.

Mali’s recent history shows that expediting the electoral timetable can reproduce weak governments. Such solutions favour existing political elites, who are often complicit in nurturing the crisis of confidence. Hasty elections often hamper negotiations that stand a better chance of reflecting a country’s socio-political dynamics.

The political crisis in Mali is an opportunity to review African conflict prevention instruments, particularly regarding governance issues. Instead of focusing on elections and unconstitutional changes of government, other dimensions such as mediated dialogue and inclusive crisis management should be given greater attention.

In the absence of a more holistic concept of democratic governance, banning unconstitutional changes of government risks being misconstrued as a bonus for sitting presidents who want to stay in power. The challenge for the AU and regional organisations is to build bridges with civil society and develop effective capacity to prevent political crises.

Paul-Simon Handy, Senior Regional Adviser, ISS Dakar,
Fonteh Akum, Programme Head, ISS Lake Chad Basin
and Félicité Djilo, Independent Analyst

Africa. Unsafe roads.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

The continent has the highest percentage in the world of deaths in road accidents which kill many more people than viral infections. The causes are many with bad roads, insufficient policing, drunkenness and old vehicles.

In Africa, the increase of mobility with automobiles, people moving from place to place, and roads under construction, brings a corresponding increase in fatal accidents. Roads kill more people than tuberculosis or HIV/AIDS. At least this was true before the Covid-19 pandemic.
The Sub Saharan continent is the one with the highest rate in the
world of road deaths.

It amounts to 26.6 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants as compared with 9.3 in European countries. This is more than 20% of the world total. This means – the Africa Transport Policy Program reveals – that there are 650 deaths every day, half of which concern pedestrians (39%), cyclists and motorcyclists. The negative effect on the economies of the states must also be taken into account. It is calculated that many countries have lost (and will lose) up to 3% of GNP as a result of road accidents.

Reasons for unsafe roads
The latest world report on road safety also underlines another fact: the relationship between the risk of dying in a road accident and the economic level of countries. The lower the income (and GNP) the greater the risk. These are the main reasons: failure to implement norms and controls; a fleet of cars that lacks even the most elementary services (vehicles are often imported second or third hand from abroad). Some countries, like Ruanda, have set up inspection centres to check the condition of cars. The state of the roads, the shortage of adequate first aid, ambulances and centres for assistance and rehabilitation must also be taken into account.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) notes that Africa is the second worst geographical area of the world (after South East Asia) as regards medical workers – something that obviously does not facilitate any rapid response when accidents happen.
A study carried out and published by the WHO indicates that, of 44 countries studied, only 16 have a national emergency number. Furthermore, the WHO notes, the African continent has only 3% of the world’s medical personnel with an average of 4.5 doctors for every100,000 inhabitants.
Nevertheless, road transport is still the means most used due to the shortage of railways. Obviously, transport movement is easy or difficult (and relatively safe) depending upon whether the area is rural, or urban. The problem is complex and involves various factors.

Implementing the Road Safety Charter
The question is where to start. By implementing the Road Safety Charter adopted by African countries in 2016, affirms the Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy of the Africa Union Commission (AU), the Egyptian Amani Abou-Zeid. To come into force, the document must be ratified by at least 15 of the 55 countries of the AU. To date, there are only 13 signatories.

The 31 articles of the Charter are a reference framework which, among other things, requires the member states to reinforce preventive measures and post-accident hospital services. This plan of action is proceeding very slowly. Similarly, it is clear that the goal set by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which plans to reduce by 50%, before the end of 2020, deaths and injuries due to road accidents, will not be met. Paradoxically, it has been found that the number of properly registered vehicles in Africa amount only to 3% of the world total.

Demographic explosion in the cities
What will happen in the future with the pace of urbanisation we are witnessing? It is estimated that, by the end of 2040, there will be at least an increase in half a billion in the urban population. Only a handful of countries have norms – in agreement with the discipline established by the WHO – that regulate speed limits on urban roads; the same is true for the use of helmets and safety belts. More tragically, there is a widespread tendency to break all such laws in the certainty that there will be no prosecution. In some countries, it is not hard to bribe the police, even if road checks are continual and organised.

The problem is that ‘an agreement’ is often reached and so cars, lorries and public transport vehicles are stopped, ‘checked’, and then allowed to proceed, even though they are a danger to everyone. Another factor that increases the number of deaths in road accidents is drunkenness for which no country has regulations – except Burkina Faso, which has laws according to standards set by the WHO – or the total lack of safety measures for children who are travelling (only Angola has laws aimed at the protection of children in cars and it is forbidden to have them sit in the front). With such complicit or futile checks, it can happen that one may drive around without a licence. In the month of May alone last year, in Lagos, there were 60,000 cases of people driving without a license.
Apart from personal responsibility, much of the problem of road safety is connected to the state of the roads and the lack of road maintenance. There are in the pipeline, at present, as many as 391 large road construction projects with an investment value of 467.6 billion dollars. Others are also being planned. The realisation of such infrastructure is therefore experiencing a boom in almost all Sub Saharan African states. The projects are being financed by governments (with the help of investment programmes of the World Bank), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and China, which is investing an amount equal to 23.8% of the total, and also agencies, institutions and countries with close bilateral agreements.

Antonella Sinopoli

Rely on one own strength first.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

We are in Pikine, a Dakar suburb, Senegal. Father Armel Duteil, is the one telling the story. He is an 80-year-old Spiritan missionary. French by origin, he spent much of his life in Africa – Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast and finally Senegal. Many missionaries do not believe in emigration as the answer to Africa’s poverty.
The solutions are to be found there. With imagination, goodwill, and collaboration of all, one does not always need to flee for a peaceful, happy and dignified life.

When I arrived at Pikine, there were three problems. For most people, the Parish Caritas was an organization to distribute money, food, clothes or medicine. The purpose of Caritas, for them, was to help Christians.
The parish, the members of Caritas, like Christians in general, were centred on themselves and little involved in the neighbourhoods
and civil society.

Our first step was to make people understand that Caritas was not a Church’s activity to help Christians, but Christians were to help every needy person and family, Christian as well as Muslim. The second was to stop counting on donations from outside, which create dependency, begging, and lead people to seek solutions from outside. Relying on our own strengths first and seeking to act on our own with our small means and projects, was the third step.

It was therefore necessary to review the composition of Caritas. We moved from a small team of generous people who used to gather only by themselves without any impact on the parish and Christian life, to the CEBs (Communautés Ecclésiales de Base in French) the grassroots Christian communities. Each CEB would choose a delegate in charge of a parish Caritas and the same would do each of the various parish groups and movements (scouts, choirs, servers and readers of mass, Catholic women, youth groups, etc.).

At the meeting of the parish Caritas, the delegates bring the problems from the grassroots and the concrete cases worthy to be helped. In the other direction, they bring directly from Caritas into their groups, the reflection and the proposals for actions.

The parish receives many requests for help of all kinds: food, clothes, medicine, housing, work, etc. They are passed on to CEBs where people are known to be in real need or not and where they know what to do to help them effectively. If ever the needs were too great, for example for an expensive surgical operation, the parish would collaborate or send the issue to the diocesan Caritas. However, each time the CEB must do something first: Christians thus learn to welcome, support and help each other in their neighbourhood.

In this way, each CEB had a call to start even a small community project, such as cultivating a vegetable garden, raising chickens, goats or ducks and all that is possible in a courtyard or on a terrace, in town. The parish supports the production projects – animal husbandry, gardening, crafts, etc. -, but the business ones only for groups of poor women or widows. The parish also tries to find work for the needy or to provide them with the means for a living activity, which allows them to support themselves.

Alongside material support, Caritas provides moral support. It helped widows, for example, to come together so they can get to know, meet, advise and help each other. Caritas supported them to start activities and launched a reflection, at the parish level, on customs concerning widows. In most ethnic groups, widows suffer from injustice: often they are abandoned, frequently chased away with their children from their husbands’ house, sometimes subject to numerous interdictions.

These experiences pushed the parish to work at the formation level. To make people understand first that we have to help everyone, because Jesus Christ said, you are the salt of the earth (not only of the parish), you are the light of the world (not only of the Church), you are the leaven in the dough, therefore immerse in the neighbourhood and in society and not just in the parish.

At this level, Caritas works in conjunction with the Justice and Peace, and Ecology reflection committees. It also promotes concrete actions such as the neighbourhood cleaning, tree planting at home, having trashcans and washing them when they are emptied, not throwing dirty water in the street and garbage in the gutters, which clogs them and leads to flooding in the rainy season.

This work has come to involve the Pastoral Youth Coordination of the Parish, the SOPPI JIKKO association, which helps people abandon drugs, and civic training on Decentralization, which is the basis of the parish’s action in civil society and collaboration with municipalities.

To conclude, Caritas encourages and supports, together with the association of Catholic women, technical training in dyeing and the manufacture of artisanal soap and, in connection with the Pencum Mariama group, sewing and meal projects especially when religious and civil festivals approach.

John Paul Pezzi, mccj
VIVAT International NGO
with consultative special status at UN

Herbs & Plants. Lantana camara. A Therapeutic Plant.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

Plants have been a source of effective therapeutic agents for various diseases. Globally, there is a growing interest in the development of drugs of plant origin. Lantana camara (Family Verbenaceae);
common name lantana, is one of the plants known to have great therapeutic potential.

It is an erect or subscandent, vigorous shrub which can grow to about 2-3 m in height forming a dense thicket in a variety of environments. The leaf is simple, ovate or ovate oblong, and arranged oppositely along the stem. The leaves are bright green, rough, finely hairy, with serrate margins and emit a pungent odour when crushed. The flowers are in clusters consisting of numerous small tubular flowers.
These flower clusters are borne on stalks and can be in a wide variety of colours (white, cream, yellow, orange, red, pink, and purple) and are usually made up of three circles of florets with each one commonly of a different colour. The fruits are fleshy, ovoid, purple or black when fully ripe and about 5 mm long.

Despite its tendency as an invasive plant species, Lantana camara is known to be an important medicinal plant with several medicinal uses in the traditional medication system. Its preparations are used in folk medicine for the treatment and management of numerous disease conditions including skin itches, leprosy, rabies, cancers, chicken pox, measles, asthma, ulcers, swellings, eczema, tumours, high blood pressure, bilious fevers, catarrhal infections, tetanus, rheumatism and malaria. The infusion of the whole plant is used to cure bronchitis. In parts of its native range, Lantana camara is used as a source of medicine for treating stomach disorders.

The stem bark of Lantana camara is astringent and used as a lotion in leprous ulcers and other skin eruptions. The freshly harvested leaves are boiled and applied externally to alleviate body swellings.
The leaves are aromatic with a minty taste, they have a cooling nature, are antiphlogistic (have potential to reduce inflammation), anti-dermatosic, diaphoretic, febrifuge, pectoral, stimulant, tonic, and vulnerary. An infusion of the leaves and flowering tops is used in the treatment of fevers, constipation, tuberculosis, and bronchitis. Furthermore, the leaves are also used to treat cuts, rheumatisms, ulcers, catarrhal infection, tetanus, malaria, cancer, asthma, swelling, tumour, sores, cold and high blood pressure. Combined with the leaves of Cymbopogon citratus, the leaves are used as an infusion to treat colds, high blood pressure and malarial fever. Externally, the leaves and stems are used as a wash to treat dermatitis, eczema, pruritus, measles and chickenpox rashes. They are applied as a poultice to treat sprains, wounds and contusions. As a douche, they are used to treat inflammations of the uterus.

The root is sweet and bitter tasting, refrigerant, antifebrile. The decoction of the root is used to treat influenza, cough, mumps, incessant high fever, malaria, cervical lymph node, tuberculosis, asthma, toothache, headache, inflammation, gonorrhoea and leucorrhoea. The powdered root in milk is given to children as a cure for stomachache and as a vermifuge. Similar to roots, the flowers also have a sweet taste, mildly cooling and haemostatic. The decoction of the dried flowers is used in the treatment of haemoptysis and pulmonary tuberculosis.
Lantana camara oil is used in the treatment of skin itches and as an antiseptic for wounds. The oil decoction is externally applied to treat and manage leprosy and scabies. It is applied as a poultice on rheumatic joints. The oil is spread on leaves, warmed over low flame and applied on the affected part.

The Lantana camara plant has been observed to possess antimicrobial, fungicidal, insecticidal and nematicidal activities. The medicinal potential of Lantana camara may be attributed to some of the chemicals in it, including Lantanoside, linaroside and camarinic acid, caryophyllene-like bicyclic terpene, lantanine, and verbascoside.
The aromatic leaves are used to make tea. The sweet tasting drupaceous ripe black fruits are eaten in handfuls especially by children as a snack. However, some reports mention the toxicity of the unripe fruits. The plant stalks are used as raw material for paper pulp. It is used as a hedge to contain or keep out livestock and the twigs and stems serve as useful fuel for cooking and heating in homes.

Richard Komakech

How history shaped Oman.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

During its history, Oman has been known by different names. Arab tribes, who emigrated from the territory of ‘Uman in Yemen for agriculture or fishing, which boasts an ancient civilization, are likely responsible for the current name of ‘Oman’.

And Oman was well known in antiquity. Sumerian tablets describe a land like that of Magan, a name that refers to copper in antiquity. And Sumerian navigators could have settled in ancient to extract copper and to build boats. Mezoun, another name reported for Oman, is a derivative of the word muzn which designates overflowing and abundant water. Indeed, a millennial irrigation system, known as falaj is still in use. In classical Arabic, the term means “to divide in parts”.
In Oman the falaj allowed water to circulate from houses to cultivated land through an ingenious system of channels dug in the ground, drawing water from phreatic or wadi sources.

Falaj irrigation system.

The name befits the land of Oman, which has remained to this day more fertile than its neighbors. Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian Achaemenid dynasty, conquered Oman in 536 BC, naming the land Mazoon. The Arabs of Oman then took refuge in the interior and the coast south of present-day Muscat. In the middle of the V century AD, the Arab tribe of Azd, led by Malik ibn-Fahm, expelled the Persians from the country in 640. But, almost 1,000 years of Persian domination have certainly left their mark on the territory.Oman is thus one of the first nations of the peninsula to embrace Islam, and this just before the death of Mohammed in 632.
Oman has often been dominated by foreign powers. The famous Arab historian Ibn Batuta traveled there in the 14th century during the period of the Nabhanid dynasty. The young explorer in his twenties described a land of “pretty mosques” and “beautiful markets” and ports.

Al Jalali Fort. It was built by the Portuguese under Philip I of Portugal in the 1580s.

Following the fall of the Umayyad dynasty in 751 AD, Oman was an imamate, which lasted until the mid- 17th century. Oman’s appetizing geographical position drew Portuguese invaders in 1507, a decade after Vasco da Gama navigated around the Cape of Good Hope. Portugal used Oman as a base from where to control its naval traffic toward India.
The Portuguese conquered Muscat in 1508 and proclaimed it the capital. They settled on the coast, where they built many forts and some of these have survived. In the second half of the 17th century, Portugal lost control of Oman to the ascending Omani sultans.
The Portuguese are said to have both failed to establish good relations with the local populations, and failed to exploit the commercial advantages they had along the Indian route against other emerging European trading powers. The next centuries were marked by periods of great prosperity for Oman. In 1625, Sultan Nasir bin Murshid was the first of a series of enlightened Sultans.
They drove out the Portuguese invaders, and became themselves invaders taking over parts of East Africa including the port of Mombasa, Zanzibar, parts of present-day Iran and Pakistan. By the advent of the 18th century, the Sultanate of Oman dominated naval traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Disputes over succession weakened the Sultanate, allowing the Persians (Safavids) to briefly control Oman between 1737 and 1738. The Omanis repelled the Safavids and in 1749 Ahmad bin Sa’id Al Bu Sa’id became Sultan of Oman. He would be the founder of the dynasty that has controlled Oman until the present day.

During his reign, Oman expanded again, but ran into the British, who by the 19th century had accumulated significant commercial interests in India, making them determined to control trade along the route linking India to Europe. There are important patterns that emerged in the period from the 17th century to the present day. The most notable is the competition between the coast and the interior. The Sultanate of Muscat, concentrated its power along the coast and had a large naval fleet, while the interior was under de-facto control of local Ibadi imams.
In the 1820s, the sultanate on the coast lost most of its territories in the Persian Gulf which became part of the Trucial States (now known as the UAE) under British protectorate. With the advent of steam power, the Omani fleet was unable to compete with the British and Oman lost control of the trade routes with South Asia.
But the British managed to interfere in Omani politics, and after a dynastic vacuum left when Said bin Sultan died without an heir in 1856, it was the British who suggested appointing two al-Said rulers. The first Thuwaini bin Said would rule over the interior imamates. The second would rule over the Sultanate of Zanzibar.The resulting historical division between coast and interior would last for much of the 20th century.

Nizwa, pictured in 1957, was Oman’s capital at one time.

The discovery and extraction of oil in the Persian Gulf in the 1920’s exacerbated the dispute between the Sultan of Muscat (coast) and the imams (interior). The last of the Ibadi imams, Ghalib Bin Ali, sparked a revolt to protest the Sultan’s decision to grant the Iraq Petroleum Company an important concession in the Imamate region. The conflict led to the Jebel Akhdar rebellion, defeated by Sultan Said bin Taimur with continued British military support. Meanwhile, Iraq Petroleum, founded Petroleum Development Oman and eventually merged into the entity now known as British Petroleum, which has played no small role in drawing British government military missions to defend the Sultan since the 1950’s. In 1957, after the outbreak of yet another Ibadi rebellion – backed by Saudi Arabia – British forces bombed Nizwa, capital of the Imamate, overthrowing the Ibadi imams who ruled over it. The Seeb treaty ended the Imamate of Oman. (A.B.)

The Water-Buffalo and the Tiger.

Thursday, 1 October 2020 8:00

Once there lived a hard-working farmer in a small village who had a water-buffalo. Every day, with his plough on his shoulder, he led his water-buffalo to the field. In the month of July there was heavy rain and because of this the mud in the field was soft and sticky. The buffalo was up to his belly in it and he had great difficulty in pulling the plough. In fact, it took him a long time to plough a little
piece of land.

This made the farmer very angry and with a stick he beat him, and cursed him, screaming that he was as slow as a snail. He told the poor buffalo that he should be as strong and quick as the tiger was. The buffalo was quite indignant and asked his master what was so special about a tiger. He wanted to see such an animal.
He challenged his master saying that if he took him to the tiger he would show him who was better.

Next morning the farmer took the water-buffalo to a tiger’s den. When the tiger scented the buffalo he rushed out and was about to spring upon him but the water-buffalo shook his sharp horns and said quite calmly to the tiger that he had come to tell him that his teeth were blunt. He asked him to sharpen them for three days and said that he would sharpen his horns. Then they would have a duel.

With a frightening roar, the tiger agreed and went back to his den. In this den the tiger started sharpening his teeth and continued it for three days. After three days, his teeth were as sharp as the edge of a razor. The water-buffalo sharpened his horns only for one day, and spent two days wrapping his body with layer on layer of straw, until his whole body was covered with a thick padded armour. After that he had a good roll in the mud, so that he was covered with a fine, smooth layer of black mud and no straw could be seen.

The day of the duel arrived. The water-buffalo and the tiger came to the appointed place at the appointed time. When the tiger saw the water-buffalo covered all over with mud, he asked him the reason for it. The buffalo replied that it was his habit to have mud bath for several times a day when it was too hot.

The tiger examined the water-buffalo from head to foot, but could not find any fault with him. He thought to himself that the water buffalo had grown fatter in the last three days and was happy that he was going to get a good and heavy meal.

When the buffalo found the tiger staring at him, he said, “Listen you tiger, you may be able to bully pigs and sheep but you will see! You will not be able to hurt even a hair on my body!”

Hearing this the tiger was furious and told the buffalo that he was ready to kill him. Now that his teeth were as sharp as a razor edge he could kill him with a single bite. Then the buffalo told him that he would lie down on the ground and would let him bite three times. After that the buffalo would butt the tiger three times with his horns.

The tiger agreed because he thought it was an advantageous offer. He accepted it readily, sprang upon the water-buffalo and started to tear and rend him.

After three bites the tiger thought that the buffalo should be mortally wounded, but it was not. The tiger’s teeth had only torn the straw into shreds, leaving the water-buffalo unscratched.

Now it was the buffalo’s turn to strike. He got up calmly, lowered his head and butted the tiger three times in succession. At the first blow, the horns pierced the tiger’s stomach; at the second, they broke the tiger’s back; at the third blow, the tiger’s intestines came out on the buffalo’s horns, and the tiger lay dead on the ground in a pool of blood.

The farmer saw all this with his own eyes and greatly admired the wisdom and courage of his water-buffalo. From that day onward he treated his water-buffalo with love and tenderness, and never again abused him as a stupid animal. Since that day, people respect water-buffaloes for their wisdom, though they may not be able to plough or pull a cart as fast as a horse or run as fleetly as a deer.

Folktale from Chuang People – China

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