Over the years, President Putin has attentively observed the political, economic and military strategy of the United States and China
in Africa.

For the United States, Africa represents one of its geostrategic priorities for two sorts of reasons: the first is connected to the control of energy and mineral resources and the second is of a strategic military kind. As to energy and mineral resources, the United States competes for control with China which, in the last fifteen years, has notably implemented relations with African partners, increasing its revenue from investments. Concerning strategic questions, Washington, finding its way closed to the Euro-Asian space, found in Africa a territory in which it is possible to find ample room for manoeuver where it can re-launch its military might on a global scale in order to compete for primacy with the Asian powers.

In the USA strategy there is a preventive motive related to the policy it follows in the southern hemisphere which has as its primary purpose to influence the South-South axis developed between the African, South American and Asian countries.
The action of the United States is such that it has already produced remarkable results in Latin America with the overthrow and weakening of all those leaders and forces that worked to render the region independent of USA influence.
For a better understanding of the importance of the South-South axis, we do well to refer to the important the IBSA Dialogue Forum, an international tripartite grouping for promoting international cooperation among these countries. It was set up in 2003 by India, Brazil and South Africa which were already members of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). However, both these organisations suffered setbacks following the election victory of Bolsonaro in Brazil who will, no doubt, review the strategic alliances of the country, reverse the route of his predecessors and return to the South-North route to reinforce the partnership with Washington.

To counter the proliferation of these new alternative centres of power to that of the United States, Washington has equipped itself with some instruments which concern both the military (including AFRICOM, the United States Africa Command created in 2007) economy-finance and communications. In particular, as to its military profile. The penetration of the United States seems to favour eastern Africa since that region may constitute an important factor in the strategy of control of the Indian Ocean where the Chinese maritime Silk Road passes.
The US arms industry is the main rival to that of Russia in the whole of the African continent. Nevertheless, between the five-year periods 2006-10 and 2011-15, there was an increase of 19% in imports by African states from Russia.
Research has also shown that, in 2017, Russia exported around 15 billion dollars in arms around the world and that Africa bought 13% of Russian arms sold in the last five years. This shows that both the market and competition is growing since the sale of arms is also a means of control over the armies of the purchasing countries.
Besides the arms, there are also numerous operations involving Russian soldiers through military agreements to send instructors and advisers including civilian contractors.
Military analysts say that Russian security contractors could be around 10,000 across Africa, including Sudan, South Sudan and Libya.

China has a different role in the African continent where it of crucial importance for investments in mining but also in opening up new markets for its products in very populated states such as Ethiopia and Nigeria.The role assumed by China in Africa in recent years is due to the fact that, in the course of history, relations between China and the African states followed a different development from those with the USA and the European states and Sino-African relations are the crowning of a long diplomatic effort that has its roots in the proces of decolonisation. During that period, the People’s Republic of China supported the independence movements in those countries where decolonisation reached levels of conflict with the former colonialists. An example of this is the FLN in Algeria which received supplies of arms from China, or Guinea which, outside the sphere of French influence, found in China a new partner. We must also include Zimbabwe and Angola which looked to Beijing to go beyond the civil wars and rebuild a new state. We also have the case of Egypt and Nasser who was the first African leader to open diplomatic relations in 1956 with the People’s Republic of China.
Besides supporting the process of decolonisation, China, from as far back as the sixties, began to invest in infrastructure such as the railway line between Zambia and Tanzania, TAZARA, sponsored by Mao himself, and obtaining in exchange their support in international organisations and at the United nations where the new states diplomatically supported the recognition of the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan.

Nevertheless, the turning point came in 2000 when relations between China and the African states received a boost with the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), devised by the then Chinese President Jang Zemin. This was followed by a massive growth in Chinese investments in African countries that led China to become, in 2008, the largest commercial partner of Africa. The investments in mining, besides being of enormous strategic relevance for China which relies greatly for oil imports on Angola and on plans for new offshore oil wells in the Gulf of Guinea, guarantee the political stability of the states of the region.
Last September during the 2018 Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing. Chinese president Xi Jinping pledged $60 billion to the continent in loans, grants, and development financing. Xi also announced different initiatives aimed at improving Sino-Africa relations, including investments in healthcare, education, security, cultural exchanges, and increasing non-resource imports from Africa.

Filippo Romeo

It is a fact that Libya is of fundamental importance for the Russian Federation since it is geographically embedded between the Mediterranean and the Sahara and also between Egypt and Algeria, historical Russian allies in the region.

On the Libyan chessboard, despite the reigning chaotic situation due also to the interests of multiple actors, Russia is moving silently and prudently, and so gaining a position of respect.
The strategy used by the Kremlin is that of favouring dialogue with the various interested parties without ignoring the support for Haftar – the strong man of Cyrenaica – wishing to emerge as a mediating and necessary power in all possible circumstances.

Libya’s history has allowed the Kremlin to further strengthen its relations with Egypt and with Haftar who represents the point of contact. Putin, in fact, makes use of relations with Cairo to support the Marshal of Tobruk. Today, relations between Putin and Abdel Fattah Al Sisi are at their best ever. The two share many ideas regarding the Eastern Mediterranean front of North Africa. For the Kremlin it is essential to have Egypt on its side, not only because of Libya but also the entire Middle East.Libya is of interest to Russia for various reasons of which the main one is strategic. Moscow has always needed outposts in the Mediterranean. Access to the warm seas is fundamental to the maritime strategy of the Kremlin.

Besides these military interests there are also enormous economic interests. On the whole, there are three factors that determine the development of Russian policy in Africa and in the Middle East: energy, infrastructure and arms. And it is also upon these three factors that Russian policy in Libya is built. The Libyan Minister of Economy and Industry Nasser Fadhlallah al-Darsi, recently confirmed in Moscow the agreements with Russia for the construction of Bengasi-Sirte, in an area still controlled by Haftar. The $2 billion contract will bring development to Libya and create better connections between the different parts of the country.Russia is obviously interested in seeing that its companies are involved in Libyan reconstruction but infrastructure is only a small part of Russian economic interests.In February 2017, Rosneft and Libya’s National Oil Corporation signed a cooperation agreement. The Corporation is formally headquartered in Tripoli, but the bulk of its oil fields are located in the country’s east, near positions occupied by Field Marshal Haftar’s soldiers — which could explain why Moscow is now apparently doubling down on its partnership with Haftar.
Together with Rosneft are Gazprom and Tatneft which are already involved in the North African country, especially at Sirte and Ghadames. These three colossi are the means by which Russia wants to re-enter the Libyan game after years of exclusion. It is also for this reason that the USA has again begun to be active in Libya also on the energy front: the question also affects Washington’s interests.

Algeria is the other important Russian partner in the region. Relations between the states go back to the period of the war of independence against France when the Soviet Union took the side of the independence movements, providing them with economic aid, and military and technical assistance. In October 1960 Russia became the first state to recognise the de facto provisional government of Algeria, three years before the de jure recognition of March 1962. Relations with Algeria were resumed in 2001 on the occasion of the first official visit of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to Russia to re-launch strategic relations between the two countries. In 2006 President Vladimir Putin went to Algiers where he signed various agreements in strategic sectors – commerce, economy and finance – and established with the Algerian authorities the modalities of the repayment of loans obtained during the Soviet era. Today, the two countries exchange high-level visits
at least once a year.

Another basic fact is the extraction of energy and mineral resources. The Alrosa, Gazprom and Lukoil companies have been used as instruments for penetrating the continent. Following the usual strategy of placing public and private interests together, Moscow succeeded in (re)obtaining billions in concessions for mineral extraction and infrastructure. Regarding energy and mineral questions, the strategy of Moscow is based on two aspects: on the one hand, to acquire the mineral resources not available at home (This explains its penetration in Namibia because of the uranium and in Zimbabwe because of the platinum), and, on the other, to place obstacles in the way of other international actors, in greater need of such resources, of doing the same. In addition, various minerals and agricultural products from Africa are in demand in Russia.
One of the initiatives taken by Moscow relating to Africa has been the cancellation of more than 20 billion in debts owed by African states.
The Kremlin is also investing greatly in training, as shown by the numerous programmes of scientific and educational cooperation agreed with Ethiopia, Mozambique and Rwanda; it also maintains worldwide food programmes from which it assigns 5 million dollars of aid to Africa. Among these there is also the project of the Unido agency for the development of agriculture and fishing in Ethiopia. (F.R.)

Moscow began to take its first steps in the African context during the “Soviet period”.

Since it had no colonial networks, it relied upon Marxist-Leninist doctrine to give ideological support to the emancipation of Africans from the yoke of colonialism and upon military means to provide them with arms and organise them militarily. Such a strategy allowed the USSR to penetrate the interior of the continent starting, during the sixties and seventies, from the area of North Africa and the Maghreb from where it progressively spread, gaining considerable influence in Central and Southern Africa.

With the end the Cold war and the closure of the Soviet era and its consequences for the present-day Russian Federation, the Africa partnership came to an abrupt halt. Russia had lost the role it once had as a global power.
Since 2000 and the first presidency of Vladimir Putin, Moscow’s involvement in Africa has found new vigour, benefitting from the internal and international process of the re-launching of Russia.
The bilateral approach has been the one preferred by Russia to establish accords of strategic partnership, accords by which cooperation with signatory states is promoted in all fields and contemporaneously in the political, economic, social and cultural ambits. These agreements are generally concluded after a series of regular political consultations and are aimed at creating a close network of alliances with individual states for the purpose of increasing Russian influence on an international scale. To better understand the concrete manifestation of these accords, it is sufficient to examine those under way in Northern Africa: Morocco (where the 2015 partnership agreement created the conditions for the development of cooperation defined as “reinforced”); Algeria (where the “Declaration of Strategic Partnership” goes back to 2011); Tunisia (where in 2015 the launching of a strategic partnership was agreed); Egypt (2015). These form the basis for the numerous accords of sectorial cooperation, including economic and commercial agreements with particular attention to the agricultural-food sector which constitutes an important element in relations with the states of North Africa.

The value of the plans for boosting agricultural cooperation agreed with Egypt (2015) and the organisation of special “Green Corridors” begun with Morocco and Tunisia (2016) consists in facilitating the importation by Russia of agricultural products from those countries. This choice was made also to counter the restrictive measures imposed by western countries followed by a prohibition decreed by Moscow against the importation of a vast array of agricultural products from the European Union. As a result of this policy, the Russian federation began a programme of substitution of imports with the aim of purchasing products coming from countries unaffected by the ban. With the commercial agreement signed with Egypt in 2015, Russia opened up the possibility of extending it to the entire Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
Trade and investment between Russia and Africa witnessed growth of 185% between 2005 and 2015. Currently, Russia’s trade with Africa is less than $12bn.
In perspective, Africa’s large population, forecast to grow to 2.4bn by 2050 and more than 4bn by 2100, provides a massive market for Russian goods and services. The fact that the middle class is growing by leaps and bounds in Africa, makes this market even more attractive to Russian businesses.

As well as the exchange of goods in the food sector, there is also that concerned with the arms sector which, it is certain, constitutes a very important element for North African states. Important supplies of arms were made to Algeria (2015/2016), Tunisia (including information technology and instruments for the fight against terrorism, 2016), and Egypt (with which an accord was reached for a shared programme for the modernisation of the Egyptian armaments industry 2015). Egypt is Russia’s best partner in this sense: from 1990 up to today, the two countries have signed around thirty military agreements by which Moscow has also supplied Cairo with ground-to-air missiles and the associated technology. To this we may add that in recent years Russia and Egypt carried out joint military exercises both naval (June 2015) and land (October 2016). In particular, in 2015 the two governments began an assessment of the possibility of granting Russia permission for a military naval base at Sidi Barrani, on the border with Libya.
In October 2017, Cairo finalised negotiations with Moscow to build Egypt’s first nuclear power plant.
Russia signed at least 19 military co-operation deals with governments in sub-Saharan Africa since 2014, when it came under Western sanctions for annexing Crimea and stepped up efforts to diversify economic and diplomatic partnerships. The agreements are typically valid for five years and renewable and include Russian promises of hardware and training as well as co-ordination in areas such as counter-terrorism and piracy.

Recently, Russia has set foot in the Central African Republic (CAR), which since 2013 has been struggling to contain an ethnic and religious conflict. Moscow sent weapons and around 1,000 private military contractors. Russia also entered into negotiations with militias in CAR to discuss disarmament and distribution of natural resources revenue.
Moreover, Russia is negotiating with Somaliland for a naval base. It will be Russia’s first base in Africa since the Cold War. The location of the base is outside Zeila city. The base is expected to be home to two destroyer-sized ships, four frigate-class ships, two large submarine pens, two airstrips that can host up to six heavy aircraft and 15 fighter jets. In return for being allowed to establish the base, Russia will recognise the Republic of Somaliland. (F.R.)