North Korea’s growing military ties with Russia reflect a strategic pivot to gain resources, technology, and relevance in a shifting global order.

In June 2024, North Korea and Russia signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, marking their most significant military cooperation agreement since the 1961 Mutual Assistance Treaty between North Korea and the Soviet Union.

Article 4 of the new treaty stipulates that if either party is subjected to an armed attack, the other will “immediately provide military and other assistance using all available means,” invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter and the domestic laws of both states.

This provision laid the groundwork for North Korea’s subsequent decision to send nearly 12,000 troops to Ukraine, framing it as a response to Ukraine’s strike on the Russian city of Kursk following the military escalation triggered by Russia.

On June 17, 2025, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang and met with Kim Jong Un. The visit resulted in an agreement to dispatch an additional 1,000 North Korean engineering troops and 5,000 military construction personnel to support reconstruction efforts in Kursk. These actions suggest a level of strategic alignment and military cooperation between North Korea and Russia that is deeper and more enduring than previously assumed.

This closer alignment cannot be understood in isolation from North Korea’s shifting foreign policy trajectory following the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi summit with the United States. The failed negotiations, in which North Korea was ready to commit to dismantle parts of its Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for the partial lifting of sanctions (which were imposed on the civilian sector in 2017), left Pyongyang politically vulnerable.

The abrupt end to the talks without any tangible outcome not only discredited Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic gamble but also dashed any immediate hopes of economic recovery through engagement with Washington. This made his political position vulnerable. However, Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un and deputy director of the Publicity and Information Department, said that the US should first abandon its hostile policy towards North Korea for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to be possible. This suggests that North Korea was willing to engage in further negotiations with the US until at least 2020.

In the aftermath, North Korea moved decisively away from its previous diplomatic posture. In 2022, it enacted a nuclear policy law that legalized the use of nuclear weapons under certain conditions. On 31 December, 2023, North Korea redefined its traditional ethnic-based approach to inter-Korean relations—once framed around future unification—as a hostile and adversarial relationship, effectively embracing a two-state framework that recognizes North and South Korea as permanently separate and sovereign states. It also amended its constitution to formalize the “hostile two-state theory,” signaling a full break from its longstanding policy of national reunification. These internal shifts coincided with North Korea’s perception of the changing international balance of power.

North Korea understands the world order as no longer unipolar and led by a US hegemon, but as a multipolar world. North Korea increasingly frames the current geopolitical moment as a “new Cold War,” one shaped by US-led policies to consolidate a trilateral alliance with South Korea and Japan against China, Russia and North Korea.

The 2023 Camp David summit among the three allies (South Korea-US-Japan), which introduced measures such as the Nuclear Consultative Group, further reinforced this perception. Against this backdrop, North Korea’s turn toward Russia mirrors earlier historical patterns—most notably, the 1961 alliance with the Soviet Union, which was also a response to perceived threats posed by the tightening US-Japan security alliance, the introduction of nuclear weapons into South Korea (and Japan) by the US, and the emergence of a military regime in South Korea.

Beyond geopolitical signaling, the military partnership with Russia is also motivated by more pragmatic considerations. With avenues for economic engagement severely limited by sanctions, North Korea seems to see the deployment of military troops to Russia as a rare opportunity
to earn foreign currency.

According to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, Russian mercenaries typically receive around $2,000 per month, plus enlistment bonuses. If North Korea were to maintain an annual deployment of 10,000 personnel, it could generate approximately $260 million in foreign currency — an appealing prospect for a heavily
sanctioned regime.

This is a good opportunity for North Korea to earn money from Russia, as it lost the chance to open its market and trade with the rest of the world following the failure of the Hanoi summit meeting. Also, trade with China has declined. For example, North Korean exports to China in 2016 were $2.6 billion, but decreased to 0.2 billion in 2018 and only 50 million in 2020 due to the pandemic.

Military utility is another factor. North Korea’s armed forces have not engaged in live combat since the Korean War. Deployment to the Russia-Ukraine frontline provides soldiers with exposure to modern warfare tactics, including drone operations and electronic warfare—experiences that would be difficult to replicate and obtain domestically.

Most significantly, the military manpower deployment could be in exchange for acquiring nuclear technology from Russia. North Korea has already conducted six nuclear tests over the years and is now aiming to advance further its nuclear technology. In particular, Russian support is essential for the refinement and advancement of nuclear technology, including fuel solidification, lightweighting, simplification of transportation methods, ICBM redevelopment technology, and nuclear-powered submarines.

This evolving partnership is also unfolding amidst political change in South Korea. The impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol conducted a hostile and aggressive policy towards North Korea based on so so-called “global pivot state” strategy, whose foundations were the promotion of the democratic values mediated by South Korea and its tightening alliance with the US and Japan. However, the newly elected President Lee Jae-myung has adopted a more pragmatic diplomatic approach. His administration has already halted cross-border loudspeaker broadcasts across the DMZ, and North Korea has also ceased broadcasting messages to the South.

This could mark the beginning of a process to re-adopt a military agreement similar to the one signed on 19 September 2018 by the South and North. At the same time, the Lee government has expressed an interest in improving relations with North Korea, China and Russia, while maintaining strong cooperation with the United States and Japan. This suggests that Seoul may be seeking to ease regional tensions without compromising its broader strategic alliances.

North Korea’s growing entente with Russia thus reflects a complex interplay of strategic necessity, domestic legitimacy, and technological ambition. In a moment of renewed great-power rivalry and reconfigured global alliances, Pyongyang is repositioning itself not as an isolated outlier, but as an active player in an emerging multipolar order. For policymakers in Seoul, Washington, and beyond, this alignment poses new challenges that demand careful recalibration of deterrence, engagement, and a regional security strategy. (Open Photo: The flags of Russia and North Korea on a khaki military-style background.123rf)

Hee Kyoung Chang
University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany
ISPI