The mid-year conference held in Bonn (SB62), in June 2025, served as a thermometer for what will be at stake in Belém.

Each year, the subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC – the SBSTA (Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice) and the SBI (Subsidiary Body for Implementation) – produce drafts and reports that, in theory, should help pave the way for consensus.
Yet in Germany, once again, the process revealed its limitations: provisional formulas failed to reach conclusions and central issues were pushed forward to the Amazonian stage.
The Historical Balance: Progress and Gaps. The recent history of COPs has been marked by significant steps forward, but also by their limits. In 1997, COP3 in Kyoto inaugurated the first binding regime for emission reductions, though restricted to developed countries. In 2009, COP15 in Copenhagen launched the promise of USD 100 billion annually in climate finance –  a commitment that would only materialize decades later.

In 2015, the Paris COP21 summit saw a major turning point: for the first time, almost all nations agreed to limit global warming to well below 2°C, ideally 1.5°C. Photo: UN Climate Change.

In 2015, COP21 in Paris represented a watershed moment: for the first time, nearly all nations united around the goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C, ideally 1.5°C, sustained by voluntary commitments known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). In 2023, COP28 in Dubai brought the creation of the Funding for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), but still without clear resources, alongside a Global Stocktake (GST) that fell short of expectations.
Within this historical arc, each achievement seems to evoke its own incompleteness: regimes are created, but remain fragile; targets are announced, but lack implementation. This contradictory legacy is
what Belém will have before it.
Climate Adaptation. Metrics in Dispute, Plans on Hold. On the climate adaptation agenda, the debate focused on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) – conceived under the Paris Agreement to track global progress in building resilience. The process of distilling thousands of proposals resulted in a list of about one hundred key indicators, covering areas such as agriculture, water, health, biodiversity, infrastructure,and community resilience.

The mid-year conference held in Bonn, in June 2025, served as a thermometer for what will be at stake in Belém. UNFCCC

In Bonn, however, a sharp divide emerged: developed countries favoured generic indicators detached from resources, while developing countries insisted that without financing, technology, and capacity building – the so-called “means of implementation” (MoI) – the GGA would risk remaining merely rhetorical.
Another central issue was the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), designed to guide each country’s strategy on the matter. Many have yet to be submitted and among those already in place, the process is marked by insufficient technical support and funding.  This connects to the broader challenge of adaptation finance, which remains far below global needs. Reports estimate that adaptation costs in developing countries could reach US$215–387 billion per year, but current financial flows cover only a fraction of that demand.
Thus, Belém faces a triple challenge: consolidating global indicators, strengthening national plans, and expanding the reach of financial instruments, so that adaptation moves beyond abstract narrative and becomes an effective axis of climate action.
Climate Finance. The deferred promise. In the field of climate finance, negotiations continue to expose the gap between commitments made and the means to implement them. At COP29 in Baku, parties agreed on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), designed to succeed the US$100 billion target in the post-2025 period. The so-called “Baku–Belém Route” projected the mobilisation of US$1.3 trillion by 2035, equivalent to roughly US$300 billion per year.
However, during the Bonn sessions, discussions failed to advance on the mechanisms needed to make this commitment viable – such as sources of funds, disbursement schedules, and responsibilities – postponing decisions to COP30 in Belém.

At COP29 in Baku, parties agreed on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), designed to succeed the US$100 billion target in the post-2025 period. Photo Cop 29

The deadlock is not only about the volume of finance. A dispute persists over the nature of resources: developed countries tend to favour market-based instruments and loans, while developing countries call for grants, concessional funds, and debt relief mechanisms. Technical reports also warn of the difficulties in tracking private flows and ensuring transparency. This structural asymmetry – between promises, actual resources, and real needs – keeps climate finance as one of the regime’s greatest credibility tests. Because of the disputes surrounding the means of implementation of the new NCQG, the Baku–Belém Route is expected to stand at the centre of COP30 negotiations, serving as a litmus test of the multilateral process’s ability to turn commitments
into tangible outcomes.
NDCs and the Revision of Ambition.  The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) were expected to be submitted by COP29, but only a fraction of countries met the deadline. In Bonn, the absence of new pledges was perceived as a sign of stagnation.

President Lula called on world leaders to treat COP30 with seriousness to advance the Climate Action Agenda. Photo: Ricardo Stuckert / Presidency of the Republic.

Now, it is expected that by Belém more countries will present updated targets, under the pressure that they be aligned with the 1.5°C limit. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva went so far as to call on countries to submit their NDCs in Belém, signalling that this will be one of the key credibility tests of the conference.
Loss and Damage: between mechanisms and gaps. The Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and the Funding for Responding to Loss and Damage Fund (FRLD) returned to the table in Bonn amid discussions on their scope and integration. Created in 2013, the WIM carries three functions – generating knowledge, coordinating institutions, and promoting action and support in finance, technology, and capacity-building – yet it still struggles to turn these mandates into tangible outcomes. Its third review sought to assess this performance and to discuss ways of articulation with the Executive Committee (ExCom), the Santiago Network -designed to support developing countries in identifying technical needs – and the LDF. The goal is to avoid overlapping mandates and the dispersal of efforts across different structures, which can undermine the effectiveness of these mechanisms.

Civil society actions. An important role in Belem. UNFCC

The most recent estimates suggest that global loss and damage needs in vulnerable countries may reach US$395 billion annually by 2025, with a range between 128 and 937 billion, while actual commitments amount to only a few hundred million dollars. The central dilemma is whether the WIM will remain confined to the technical field or advance toward a role of resource mobilisation. COP30 in Belém will be decisive: if it succeeds in advancing guidelines to operationalise the LDF, articulating it with the Santiago Network, and adopting clear timelines for disbursement, it could represent a leap in functionality. Otherwise, there is the risk of perpetuating a cycle in which vulnerable countries continue to bear the impacts of the climate emergency on their own.
Just Transition: a concept in dispute. The debate on just transition gained momentum in Bonn, stemming from the recognition that it is not only about retraining workers in the energy sector but about driving transformations across “the whole economy” and “the whole society.” This includes principles such as human rights, intergenerational equity, gender justice, workers’ participation, respect for Indigenous peoples, and social protection systems. The dispute, however, remains unresolved: industrialised countries tend to narrow the concept to the spheres of labour and energy, while developing countries argue for a broader approach that encompasses health, social inequalities, adaptation, and food sovereignty.

African Delegates in Baku at COP 29. Participation of women in decision-making. UNFCC

The discussions also highlighted the need for clear means of implementation – financing, technology transfer, and capacity-building – so that just transition does not remain a mere abstract promise. Belém will have to determine whether this program will be consolidated as an operative instrument, integrated into NDCs and national plans, capable of generating decent jobs and expanded social participation, or whether it will continue to be invoked as a principle without practical
force to guide policies.
Gender and a New Action Plan. The gender agenda was present in Bonn with the first discussions on renewing the Gender Action Plan (GAP), whose revision is scheduled for COP30. The plan aims to integrate a gender perspective into all climate policies, recognising that women and girls are disproportionately affected by the climate crisis yet play a central role in building solutions.
In Bonn, debates highlighted the need for disaggregated data, gender-responsive budgets, recognition of care work, and stronger participation of women in decision-making. However, disagreements persist over language, resources, and institutional responsibilities. In Belém, the expectation is to adopt an updated version of the GAP, with clearer mandates and financing links, making gender a cross-cutting axis of climate action rather than a peripheral annexe to negotiations.
Expectations for Belém: the promise of implementation. The Bonn negotiations made clear that COP30 inherits a long list of unresolved tasks. The challenge of consolidating global adaptation indicators, unlocking the new financial goal, capitalising the loss and damage fund, advancing the just transition program, and renewing the gender plan forms a dense, interconnected agenda. Each of these points reflects both the fragility and the resilience of the multilateral process: technical advances were achieved, but without political decisions or the resources needed to give them practical force.

Putting life itself at the centre of climate politics. 123rf

Not by chance, many actors now call Belém the “Implementation COP.” The normative architecture of the climate regime is largely in place: mitigation targets, adaptation mechanisms, compensation funds, and transition plans. What remains is to turn this structure into reality – mobilising resources, operationalising programs, and tying commitments to verifiable deadlines. The risk, however, is that “implementation” becomes just another label, repeated without changing the logic of deferred promises.
This contradiction is clearer when looking at global resource allocation. In 2024, military spending reached about US$2.7 trillion, while climate and humanitarian flows stayed far below estimated needs. The contrast shows the issue is not only new targets or normative frameworks, but how global priorities are set and sustained.
It is in this deadlock that other forces emerge. In times of weakened institutions, transnational movements question fragile solutions and offer alternatives rooted in territories. In Belém, the thermometer will not be only in negotiation rooms but also in the vitality of Indigenous, grassroots, and interreligious mobilisations. As Pope Francis emphasised in Laudate Deum, this is a multilateralism built from the bottom up, putting life itself at the centre of climate politics. (Illustration: COP 30/Brazil)

(L.D’A)