Turkey in the Israel-Iran confrontation, between strategic balancing and internal issues.

In the reshaping of the Middle Eastern balance of power following the events of October 7, 2023, Turkey has adopted a balanced and pragmatic posture, reflecting its complex national interests, internal security priorities, and a geopolitical ambition expressed through a foreign policy that oscillates between assertiveness and containment.

The escalation of the conflict between Israel and Iran, culminating in the kinetic phase of mid-June 2025 and still unresolved at the political and diplomatic level, has forcefully exposed the strategic tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv, once military partners and now regional rivals. In this context, Turkey is pursuing a policy of “conditional neutrality,” aiming to prevent the Islamic Republic’s implosion, contain the risk of an Israeli-Kurdish alliance, and simultaneously strengthen its position as a privileged interlocutor in Syria and the redefinition of the regional order.

Ankara, although historically opposed to Iran’s nuclear program, has avoided supporting any plan that could lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime, fearing multiple repercussions: instability on its eastern borders, new waves of migration, and a resurgence of Kurdish irredentism. Turkey’s stance, particularly evident during the US raids on Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow, has been characterized by a largely measured tone.

The Foreign Ministry avoided any explicit condemnation of the attacks, emphasizing Turkey’s willingness to contribute to de-escalation. This is a somewhat more cautious stance than the vehement statements against Western operations seen in the previous decade, partly attributable to the personal convergence between President Erdoğan and his US counterpart Donald Trump, but also to Ankara’s desire to preserve its own room for manoeuvre in sensitive matters.

The relationship between Iran and Turkey is part of a centuries-long historical course marked by imperial rivalries, indirect conflicts, and strategic similarities. Since the 17th century, after centuries of conflict between the Ottoman and Persian Empires, the two nations have avoided direct confrontation, establishing a silent mutual respect for each other’s spheres of influence. However, the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons signifies, for Ankara, a historic disruption in the delicate regional balance of power, already challenged by Israel’s
de facto (nuclear) status.

With a nuclear Iran, symmetric deterrence would be compromised, leading to an increase in strategic insecurity for Turkey, which, like other regional players such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, would be unable to resist pursuing a similar uranium enrichment process for military ends, dragging the region towards uncontrolled proliferation. Fear of a “definitive asymmetry” remains a key factor driving Turkish diplomatic activity concerning Iran.

Overall, while officially supporting the need to prevent a nuclear Iran, Turkey has in the past adopted approaches that are not aligned with those of its Western allies, such as indirectly violating the sanctions regime through banking transactions with Tehran. In any case, Ankara has strongly opposed, at least rhetorically, the possibility of a large-scale military attack against Iran by Israel, which it interprets as an uncontrollable destabilization of the region, especially if power vacuums were to arise in the Islamic Republic.

At the same time, Turkey’s rivalry with Israel has become increasingly structural, fuelled by competition for influence in Syria and disagreements over the Palestinian and Kurdish issues, as well as the progressive strategic rapprochement between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. The era of strategic cooperation between Ankara and Tel Aviv, culminating in the 1990s with military agreements, intelligence sharing, and industrial collaborations, is now a distant memory. The deterioration began with the AKP’s pro-Hamas shift and intensified after the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010.

The recent war between Israel and Iran has further fuelled the Turkish narrative portraying Israel as a destabilizing power, prone to extraterritorial military projection and the construction of anti-Turkish tactical alliances, including indirect support for the Syrian Kurds. Today, the rivalry is also fuelled by competition in the Syrian theatre, where a new political course has been established since December 2024, influenced by Ankara. However, Israel plays a key role in countering Turkish pressure and preventing any possible return of Iranian influence, severed by the collapse of the Assad regime.

A core element of Turkey’ s current security doctrine is managing the Kurdish issue both domestically- regarding relations with the internal minority- and across borders, concerning YPG in Syria and PJAK in Iran. Ankara views the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), officially announced in May 2025, as essential for strengthening the “domestic front” and preventing Iranian instability from being exploited by Kurdish factions to reintroduce a separatist agenda.

In this context, the prospect, suggested by the pro- government press, of a future alliance between Israel and Kurdish movements in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, ranks among the most feared scenarios for Turkish security. Statements by Israeli officials advocating closer ties with Kurdish communities have reinforced this perception. The official Turkish narrative, echoed by prominent figures such as Devlet Bahçeli (leader of the nationalist MHP party), depicts Israel as a country attempting to “encircle Anatolia” and destabilise Turkey’ s internal cohesion, thereby fostering ethnic secessionism.

Currently, the Syrian front remains the primary arena of strategic rivalry between Ankara and Tel Aviv. While Turkey advocates for a centralised, functional, and controlled Syrian state to prevent the PKK and its affiliates, mainly the YPG, from gaining influence, Israel favours a weakened and fractured Syria, easier to contain and less likely to become a hub of Iranian influence. The fall of the Assad regime has increased uncertainties but also provided Ankara with an opportunity to enhance its political and military influence, while Israel has intensified its air operations and collaboration with alternative local actors.

This situation also reveals areas of potential convergence: both Turkey and Israel have a shared interest in avoiding uncontrolled escalation and the rise of new hostile actors. The “Turkish vision” of a Syria that does not threaten its neighbours offers a potential point of contact, which could serve as a basis for the United States to establish a channel for bilateral dialogue. The Trump administration’ s recent decision to suspend sanctions on post- Assad Syria was welcomed by Ankara, which saw it as aligned with its own stabilisation objectives. Aware of the growing Israeli- Turkish tensions, Washington could play a facilitating role by fostering pragmatic cooperation between the two allies to prevent the risk of a proxy war on Syrian soil.

In this context, Turkey observes with growing concern the possibility that regional tensions could escalate into a broader proxy war, capable of further destabilizing the region. An unstable Iran or one experiencing a power vacuum could not only generate uncontrollable migration flows toward Turkey, but also facilitate the emergence of new armed non-state entities on its eastern borders. It is no coincidence that Ankara appears inclined to support diplomatic and sanctioning measures coordinated by the United States, provided they do not result in a large-scale military intervention. The stated objective remains to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons without provoking the collapse of its state. This orientation reflects both a pragmatic vision of Middle Eastern stability and a strategy of containing internal risks.

Turkey’s current posture can be summarized as tactical neutrality, articulated along two parallel axes: on the one hand, containing Israeli pressure without provoking a direct conflict; on the other, maintaining dialogue with Tehran, while preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear power status. In this context, the tactical alliance with Washington, based more on Erdoğan-Trump personal harmony than on structural convergence, allows Ankara room for flexibility, but also limits its autonomy in the event of a future escalation.

Ankara pursues a dual objective: positioning itself as a stabilizing actor in the eyes of the United States and the European Union, and at the same time as the leader of a non-aligned regional sovereignty, pursuing its own interests both in the Levant and beyond the region (Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia).

While Erdoğan aims to contain the risks of uncontrolled regional escalation, he is also using the crisis to strengthen domestic consensus, reviving a security-focused nationalism that includes a “tactical peace” with the Kurds. Turkey’s balancing act is therefore based on a balancing act between two regional powers (Israel and Iran), both perceived as potentially threatening but also as inevitable interlocutors. (Open Photo: People passing by portraits of Kemal Ataturk and Erdogan, the current president of Turkey. 123rf)

Alessio Stilo/CeSI