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Witnesses. Father Manuel. “I hitched my wagon to a star”.

“I am totally paralysed, but I feel a fullness of mind and heart that surprises me, and I dream of an accomplishment that I have
not yet experienced… This wheelchair has become the best of
the pulpits for me”.

Manuel Joao Pereira Correia was born on 27′” October 1951, in Penajoia, a village on the banks of the Douro River, in northern Portugal. He entered the Comboni Institute at a young age and went through all the required training courses, in Portugal and Spain. In 1970, he took his first religious vows.
In 1973, he was in the Comboni Scholasticate in Rome for the study of theology. He took his final vows in March 1978, and was ordained a priest on 15th August of the same year. Soon after, the superiors assigned him to the Comboni community of Coimbra, Portugal, where, for seven years, he dedicating himself to the missionary and vocational animation of young people, and to the formation of new postulants.

In 1985, he went to Ghana, in West Africa. He recalls: ” My first destination was Liati, in Ghana. There I had to face the real difficulties of missionary life. The mission had about thirty communities scattered in a mostly Protestant or animist context. The communities were rather small, all characterised by poverty of means and of personnel. When I went to visit them, I felt all the weight of carrying the Word of God. The smile, which I never missed, often hid the suffering I felt inside. In the end, however, I became convinced that everything is grace. Even mistakes and weaknesses. The mistakes ‘learned’ in real life are worth much more than those never made”.
In 1993, Fr. Manuel was called to Rome to co-ordinate the formation of young candidates in the Comboni Institute. He returned to Togo in 2002, where the confreres chose him as Provincial Superior of the Comboni Province of Togo-Ghana-Benin.

At the end of 2010, a sudden and unexpected event happened that shock him. In a letter to his friends, he explained: “Next December, I will leave Togo and return to Europe, without knowing what is in store for me. I have been diagnosed with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS). It is a neurological disease, which has not yet a cure. It slowly deprives the person of muscular movements, reducing the body to become a prison of the soul and the spirit. It will follow its course and will invite – or force – me to take a different look at life.”
In another letter, he spoke of his forced return to Europe as a new opportunity and a new beginning: “I return calm and serene, certain that the Lord will continue to be faithful to the promise he made me: ‘I will always be with you, Manuel, to give meaning to your life!’ I return convinced that the best is yet to come!”
The disease progresses rapidly, affecting in particular the legs, thus limiting dramatically his movements. His mind, however, remains lucid and is far from being paralysed. His desire to work for the betterment of mission is unstoppable. He tells the superiors: “Give me a commitment in which I can still offer my contribution”.

The superiors take him at his word, and assign him to the Comboni Curia, in Rome, as a member of the team that co-ordinates the ongoing formation of the whole institute.
He resists the aggressive course of ALS by moving first with crutches and then with a wheelchair, defying the stern prognosis of the doctors. His fingers are flying fast over the computer keyboard, preparing booklets and leaflets to be distributed to all confreres.
In 2016, the worsening of the disease obliges him to leave Rome and go to the Comboni Nursing Home of Castel d’Azzano, near Verona. Once again, Fr. Manuel informs friends: “Here I can be better cared for, because my inseparable companion, the ALS, will not let me go. Now I need specialised attention and treatment.” He describes the new stage of his life as “a response to another call from God to depart from my security and to embark on a new mission. This is the ‘penultimate mission’: the last one will be the one that will be entrusted to me in Paradise. I am ready and willing to live it with the commitment and generosity of the workers of the last hour of the Gospel parable”.

In the course of 2018, there is another ‘turning point’ in his journey. He tells his friends about it: “I had a serious breathing crisis and I had to be in hospital for four weeks. They carried out a tracheotomy on me. Now, I am breathing with the help of a machine and it is with difficulty that I can make myself understood by words. Anyway, I have not lost my good humour. I am fine. Above all, I feel serene – this is a gift that God keeps granting me, thanks to you and your prayers. Now I am completely paralysed. Yet, I can still smile. It comes naturally to me.  I am in a good frame of mind, and I praise God every day for the gift of life”.
Not being able either to use the keyboard, or to dictate, he learns to use an “eye tracking device” in order to access his computer by using his eyes as a mouse. He is enthusiastic about it: “The device, connected with the computer, can follow my eyes, with amazing accuracy, to see where I am looking on the screen. So, I can select the item I am looking at by dwelling on it and blinking my eyes. In other words, I can write with the eyes. Oh, the marvels of technology!”
Fr. Manuel’s missionary spirit is still flying, and his heart continues to expand to the measure of his dreams. He continues to smile.

Fr. Manuel Augusto Ferreira

A Journey into Islam in Senegal.

More than 90% of the population of Senegal, an officially secular country, profess the Islamic faith. Besides being Sunnis (like the majority of Muslims), the dominant form of Islam is Sufi: this means it belongs to the mystical trend whose adherents (talibé) of the brotherhoods (tariqa) follow the directives of the spiritual guides (sheikhs, better known as ‘marabouts’) to follow correctly the ‘Path that will lead them to God’.

This path, apart from some small differences in the practice of the cult, is based on the Koran and the Sunnah (traditions and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed) and the central rite of Zikir (or Dhikr), repetition of the principle of the unicity of God, “ʾilāha ʾillā -llāhu.Senegalese Sufism has, however, its differences in understanding the meaning of ‘adherent’ who was traditionally a hermit who renounced material life but is now a disciple in search of God, immersed in ordinary daily life.

The specific element of Senegalese Islam, both of the brotherhoods and the Marabouts, lies in the importance acquired by the religious leaders who are spiritual guides but also masters of life, who introduced Islam to the area but adapted it to cultural context. The result: a sort of Islam which is living and variegated, moderate and open, based upon peace, tolerance and traditional African values and on relationships of co-existence with Christian and animist minorities.

There are four Senegalese brotherhoods: Qadiriyya, Tijaniyyah, Muridiyya and Lahiniyyia. The first two, which are more ancient and exogenous, are schools of Islam that helped to Islamise Senegal between the XVIII and XIX centuries; the others are more recent and autochthonous, having been founded at the end of the XIX century. While the Qadiriyya may boast of being the oldest brotherhood, the Tijaniyya is the one with the largest number of faithful; the Muridiyya is the better known while the Layene is the only one to tie itself to a single ethnic identity, Wolof. Some are internally fragmented but each tariqa (brotherhood) has its General Caliph, its wird (a collection of prayers and invocations said using beads), places of worship and pilgrimages, as well as its own means of diffusion and iconography: the images of their holy founders and Caliphs are to be seen everywhere, painted on walls and in shops and hanging
in buses and taxis.

The Qadiriyya Brotherhood. One way, two souls.
In the XIV century, the Qadiriyya spread to other countries besides Arabia, North Africa, Mauritania, Mali, and Senegal. It was founded by Abdul Qādir al-Jilani (1077-1166), a learned Sufi ascetic who preached at the then renowned Islamic centre of Bagdad. In Senegal, the propagation of the first and oldest brotherhood came about through two personalities who gave rise to two groups of Qadiri.

Abdul Qādir al-Jilani, founder of the Qadiriyya Brotherhood.

The largest group of Qadiri faithful in Senegal has its centre of worship in Mauritania, at Nimzatt. The faithful refer to the Fâdil dynasty whose initiator was a direct descendant of the Prophet, Sheikh Muhammed Fâdil; the existence of so many groups of Qadiri scattered throughout Western Africa is explained by the fact that he had sons. The spread of different ethnic groups in Senegalese territory came about through his son Sheikh Saad-Bouh, whose descendants became not only the Caliph of Nimzatt but also the Qadiri families in various parts of Senegal. Even though the Senegalese locality of Guéoul (North) may consider itself the national reference point, the capital of worship and the residence of the Caliphate nevertheless remain at Nimzatt.
Another branch of the Qadiri disciples, whose adherents describe themselves as ‘Qadiri of Senegal’ or ‘of Ndiassane’, traces its origin to the Kounta family. The initiator of the dynasty was Sheikh Sidy Moctar Al Kountiyou (1724-1811), a sapient who was stationed on the present border between Mali and Mauritania, but it was Sheikh Bou Kounta who settled in Senegal and founded Ndiassane, in the north of the country a few kilometres from Tivaouane, built a mosque there together with schools for the formation of disciples and set up the Caliphate.

Worship and Pilgrimages
After each of the five daily prayers, the Qadiri order requires the recitation of a series of formulas asking God’s forgiveness and prayers of the Prophet that are repeated 200 times, ending with the Zikir.
The Senegalese Qadiri are also noted for the traditional musical accompaniment of five different drums that are used during the various ceremonies. Even though the two groups of Qadiri in Senegal are united by the wird (a collection of prayers), they are distinguished by their different ascetic styles and daily life. In fact, the Qadiri of Ndiassane respect the autochthonous dress and customs; the members of the Fâdil family bring together the Senegalese and Mauritanian cultures of dress, furnishings and their way of making tea.

Places of pilgrimage indicate certain differences. Each year the Qadiri Fâdil go to Nimzatt to receive the blessing of the Caliph on the day of the korité (the feast of the end of Ramadan). At the same place, the faithful gather on 22 July each year to celebrate the anniversary of the death of Sheikh Saad-Bouh.
In Senegal, the Qadiri Fâdil celebrate the Gamou (the anniversary of the birth of the Prophet) at Guéoul, on the same day that it is celebrated by the Tijane at Tivaouane. The Qadiri of Ndiassane, instead, celebrate the baptism of the Prophet a week after the Gamou in their own villages, which become, on that day, the goal of their pilgrimage. At the present time, 8% of Senegalese belong to the Qadiriyya Brotherhood. (L.d.M.)

The Layeniyya Brotherhood. The Meaning of Equality.

On one of the Atlantic beaches of Yoff, rises the Great Layene Mosque-Mausoleum. The low cube-shaped, white building surrounded by golden sands and crowned with a green cupola, contains the tomb of the founder of the Brotherhood, Seydina Limamou Laye and his two sons, Seydina Issa Laye, the first Khalif of the Brotherhood (1909-1949) and Seydina Madione Laye II, a brother and successor to the latter (1949-1971).

The small Layene community is made up of the Lebou, of the Wolof ethnic group.  For the Layene, nothing is the result of chaos but everything derives from destiny seen as the divine plan. This includes names. While Limamou means ‘the guide’ (Al Imam), the name of his son Issa is the Wolof version of Jesus.

Seydina Limamou Laye, founder of the Layeniyya Brotherhood.

Born in Yoff about the middle of the XIX century, Seydina Limamou Laye, aged forty, called by God, declared himself Mahdi, ‘the awaited’ in the Islamic tradition. His community rejected him and then, after being exiled to Gorée by the French, he moved to a place a few kilometres away on the shore where he founded the Layene community at Cambérène. Limamou Laye died in 1909 and the work was continued by his son Issa, aged thirty-three: the age Jesus was when he died.In accordance with Muslim belief, which assigns a fundamental role to Jesus among the five chosen prophets sent by God (after Noah, Abraham and Moses but before Mohammed), Jesus would have been called by God to be concealed in Heaven while waiting to return to earth. According to the Layene, Jesus did so in 1909, in the person of Issa, to complete the mission and have descendants and a tomb like all human beings and more besides.“In the New Testament and in the Koran, explains Macalou Cissé, a Muslim researcher who became a Layene, Jesus affirms that he is the ‘star of the morning’ announcing a new day and would return at the end of time. Therefore, just as in the first mission, Jesus came to announce the future coming of the ‘Sun’, the universal prophet Mohammed, at the beginning of the last century he returned to confirm the reward of Mohammed in the person of the Mahdi, and definitively conclude the prophetic cycle. And just as the morning star and the sun rose in the west, they must also set in the east. The place where we are at present corresponds to the most western point of Africa and, in our view, of the world”.

The cave of Ngor, near the sea and next to Yoff, is the goal of a pilgrimage that celebrates yearly the Call of Limamou Laye. In the cave, a place of recollection, Limamou Laye said he waited more than a thousand years before coming into the world. And Cissé: “In the Koran it is written that Mohammed said that, after his death, he would have stayed in the tomb for three days and would then have taken a ‘step’, even though it is not specified in what direction: our belief is that it is right here in the most western part of Africa and of the earth, in this cave on the Atlantic seaboard, that we can find the spot referred to by Limamou Laye”. Calculations show that, from the death of Mohammed to the birth of Limamou Laye, 1211 years passed. The Layene community is presently represented by the fifth Caliph, Abdoulaye Thiaw Laye.
The principles that form the structure of Layene thinking and practices are clearly defined: solidarity, equality, tolerance and purity of spirit. There are no differences of class or social status: those with economic resources bestow their donations anonymously on the Brotherhood to help brothers in difficulty. Equality is a well-founded and radical value. White clothes prevent dress from becoming a symbol of riches.

Yoff, Ndigala, and Cambérène are the three main holy cities for the Layen. Though they are located just a few kilometres from Dakar, the capital, they are real independent districts where religious principles determine the norms to be observed.  Today, it is estimated that around 6% of all Senegalese belong to the Layeniyya Brotherhood.
What does the future hold for the Brotherhoods? According to various analysts, the power of the Marabouts is slowly diminishing due to secularisation, urbanisation and migration. The globalisation and social media processes are playing an increasingly important role among the youth who are starting to reject rules and submission dictated by the various Brotherhoods.
On the other hand, there is also the birth of more integralist groups which, though minorities, may one day grow and begin to question the Senegalese model.

Luciana De Michele

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Niger. Elections on the frontier of jihad.

The country is at the crossroads. Presidential and parliament elections are scheduled for the next 27 December in a country which is facing a number of serious challenges including jihadism, climate change, migration and the fall of uranium prices.

The parliament elections and the first round of the presidential elections are due on the next 27 December, after local and regional elections which will be hold on the 13 December. If necessary, a second round of the presidential election will be organised on the 20 February 2021. The stakes are high since over the last three years, elections have been postponed several times, owing to floods and the need of setting up a credible voters’ registry.
The EU has pledged Euro 4.5 million to finance a “credible, inclusive and transparent” ballot by strengthening the capacities of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and civil society organisations which will monitor the elections.
The vote is seen crucial in Brussels, owing to the strategic role of Niger, as a main migration corridor to the EU and as a major uranium producer and as a pillar of the struggle against jihadism.

Niger’s President Mahamadou Issoufou.

Since President Mahamadou Issoufou has declared that he would not run for a third mandate, the ruling Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism, has chosen the Minister of Interior, 60 year old Mohamed Bazoum as its candidate. Bazoum, an ethnic Arab, a polyglot and a doctor in Philosophy, started in June an intense electoral campaign, insisting on good governance and rural development
His main rival is the former Prime Minister Hama Amadou. But this 70 year old politician has a major handicap. Indeed, he may not be eligible. According Article 8 of the electoral, the one-year prison sentence for his complicity in a case of human trafficking does not allow him to run. Hama Amadou has been accused in 2014 by the Nigerien Justice to have been involved with his wife in a network which buys new-borns from a baby factory in Nigeria.
Other candidates appear to have even less chances to win. The list includes former President Mahamane Ousmane, who is also 70 and 69 year old Seini Oumarou who presents himself as an ally of the incumbent head of state, Mahamadou Issoufou. The former Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Yacouba (49) and the former Minister of Transports, Omar Hamidou Tchiana are also candidates alongside with the journalist, Salou Gobi and the 55 year old four stars general, Salou Djibo, who is the author of a coup in February 2010. The problem, says the Nigerien political scientist, Elisabeth Shérif, is the lack of consensus between the 15 presidential candidates about the rules of the competition.

Opposition leader Hama Amadou

The opposition has rejected as invalid the voters’ registry despite its approval by International Organisation of Francophonie experts. It claims that the electoral commission (CENI) is unable to guarantee transparent elections and that both the CENI and the Constitutional Court are biased.
Another problem is that the campaign is not only about issues but also about ethnicity. His rivals want Bazoum to be excluded from the race because he was not born in Niger allegedly. which, according to the Constitution, makes him ineligible. It also blames Bazoum who was the former Defence Minister for the alleged embezzlement of EUR 116 million earmarked for the purchase of military equipment.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the election can be held in all parts of the country. In at least four regions (Diffa, Tillaberi, Tahoua and Maradi ) the security of the local population can hardly be guaranteed, warned the UNHCR in September  2020. Accordingly, in six months, 1,200 incidents including murders, rapes and kidnappings were registered in these areas

France has classified Niger as a no-go area for its citizens on the 13 August, except for Niamey, after the killing of six French aid workers and their Nigerien driver, on the 9 August, at 60 km from the capital, in the Kouré National Park.
On the 17 September, the Islamic Stat claimed responsibility for the attack. Since early 2020, according to the UK NGO Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 957 people died in similar incidents.
This security deterioration will pose a serious challenge to the new President in a country where the government already allocates 18 percent of its national budget to the restoration of the security and which is threatened on three fronts by jihadists.

To the West, Niger has suffered  attacks from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and by a coalition including Ansar Dine and the Macina Katiba led by a Malian Fulani imam called Amadou Koufa who recruits also among the Fulanis from Niger. The country has become particularly vulnerable because of the total loss of control by the Malian state of the north and the centre of its territory. In December 2019 and January 2020, jihadist attacks killed 160 soldiers in the Western area of Tillaberi. To the South-East, the threat of the Nigerian group Boko Haram is permanent. And there might be a third front in the North because Niger is getting caught in Libya’s civil war between the UN and Turkish-back government of Tripoli and Marshall Khalifa Haftar’s army, warns the French political scientist and economist Olivier Vallée.
Indeed, Niger took sides in this conflict in June 2019 by accepting the installation on its territory of a military base by the United Arab Emirates which support Haftar.
According to a report from the International Crisis Group from June 2020, none of the options tried by Niamey to contain the jihadists, from force to persuasion, has worked so far.
The jihadist groups are growing stronger. The military push has led to an alarming escalation in alleged killings of civilians by security forces, which the jihadists try to exploit. In 2017, Niger authorised operations by Malian Tuareg armed groups against targeted Peul groups accused of collaborating with the jihadists. Moreover, locals often perceive the Islamic State as an authority competent in resolving land disputes and protecting livestock against raids.

As a result of the increasing insecurity, 3.2 million Nigeriens are needing humanitarian assistance in 2020 as against 2.3 million in 2019. Only 41 percent of the needs are being financed, warned the UN in September. Besides, about 450,000 refugees are caught in Niger where hundreds thousands of citizens were by the floods in 2019. The country is particularly hit by the consequences of climate change including erratic changes of flows of the Niger River.
The insecurity and the consequences of the Covid 19 pandemics have forced the authorities to review the GDP growth forecast down from 6.9 % to 1% in 2020, in a context where huge efforts must still be accomplished to reduce the extreme poverty which still affects 41% of the 23 million inhabitants. The challenge is particularly difficult since Niger is also hit by the fall of the price of its main export product, uranium since the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011 and Germany’s decision to stop the production of its plants by 2022. The authorities hope however that perspectives might improve if the country manages to increase five-fold its crude oil exports by 2021 with the completion of a 2,000 km pipeline between Agadem and the Atlantic Ocean in Benin by a Chinese corporation.

François Misser  

 

The real aims of the United Arab Emirates in Africa.

The country invests its capital also to diversify its oil-based economy. To contain Turkey, Qatar and Iran may cause an increase in the instability of the continent.

For some years now, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been seen as a relevant geopolitical actor on the African scene. Many believe this to be a good opportunity for the development of the continent, given that the UAE has funds available and is the second-largest investor in Africa after China. But what are the real aims of the Emirates? It has three main identifiable aims.

The first is geo-economic: the continent of Africa represents a considerable opportunity for the Emirates to invest its petrodollars and so diversify its economy presently based on income from oil sales. There are many companies presently operating on African territory in the infrastructure, real estate and industrial sectors.
They are also present in agriculture since this Gulf country is almost totally dependent upon imports to supply its food needs.According to data provided by the Emirates ministry of finance, in 2018, the volume of commerce with Africa was worth around 161 billion dollars and this is bound to increase.

Its second aim is geopolitical. By means of its militarised diplomacy, based upon money, the government of Abu Dhabi is seeking to acquire its own zones of influence. In Egypt, it supported the 2013 military-led coup that brought General Al-Sisi to power. Today, it is still actively supporting General Haftar in the bloody Libyan conflict. However, it was chiefly with the start of the war in Yemen that the UAE monarchy made its military presence felt by its military intervention in that country, close to the Horn of Africa, using its military bases in Eritrea and Somaliland. The latter, a separatist region of Somalia under UAE influence, is being used to destabilise the government of Mogadishu. For the same reason, the UAE gives financial support to the local political opposition.

The third motive is ideological/religious. The UAE is seen as a ‘tolerant’ country from a religious point of view. It has excellent relations with the Vatican State, as shown by the visit of the Pope to Abu Dhabi in February 2019. Last August, they established historical diplomatic relations with Israel. It is actually a very conservative country where religious practice is based upon Salafist Sunniism imported from Saudi Arabia and practised by al-Qaida and its offshoots. Its doctrine rejects all forms of religion different from Salafism and considers the Muslim Brotherhood and Shiites as unbelievers.

This also holds for followers of other faiths. By means of its intense political activism in Africa, the UAE seeks: to stem the religious influence of the Muslim Brotherhood represented by Turkey which, in turn, is spreading its tentacles over the continent; to undermine the political interests of Qatar, an ally of the Turks and supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood; and to oppose the increasingly important presence of Iran – a geopolitically powerful country – on the continent fearing the possible mass conversion of African Muslims to Shiite doctrine.

Mostafa El Ayoubi

Power Games at the expense of Libyans.

What has become of Libya? Nine years ago, NATO launched a military offensive that destroyed the country. A country now without a state.

Before 2011, Libya was the most prosperous country in Africa. Today basic supplies are in short supply and water and electricity are lacking.
In the past eight months, oil production, a primary resource, diminished by 90% and there is a shortage of petrol.
Before NATO intervened, it was a destination for immigrants. It is now a country where people emigrate.

Due to the grave crisis instigated by the war, hundreds of thousands of Libyans and African migrants left the country to start a new life mainly in Europe. Politically, the situation is equally dramatic. Libya is divided. There is a transitional parliament and government – required by the UN – based in Tripoli. There is also a parallel parliament in Tobruk, Cyrenaica, a region under the control of a military junta, the self-proclaimed Libya National Army (LNA).

General Khalifa Haftar, the founder of the LNA, was a comrade of Gadhafi in the military revolt of 1969 that brought down the pro-western monarchy of al-Sanusi. He later became a CIA collaborator (and an American citizen). In 2011, he returned to Bengasi, the city where the so-called February 17 evolution took place.

Today, Haftar controls Cyrenaica and part of the region of Fezzan. Most importantly, he took over a large part of the oil sites of Libya, while the government headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood movement, is confined to Tripolitania.
Let us see the conditions of these two poles. Supporting the government of al-Sarraj are Turkey, Qatar, and Iran, while it has the direct support of the governments of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. France and Germany also lend some support.

The United States, instead, has one foot in each camp. No matter who wins this conflict, they will carry out the wishes of Washington. Nevertheless, the failure of Haftar to conquer Tripoli is changing the situation in Cyrenaica. There is ongoing political conflict between Haftar and the parliament in Tobruk.
An ally of his, Aguila Saleh Issa, president of the Tobruk Parliament, some months ago presented an inclusive opening the way for dialogue with the government of Tripoli, something that the head of the LNA has always refused to do. Indeed, at the end of April, Haftar proclaimed himself head of state and declared null and void both parliaments and the government of al-Sarraj. This move proved disastrous after the military defeat in June.

NATO is following these new developments with interest and is thinking of collaborating with the government of Tripoli, as recently affirmed by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg. This ought to be seen from an anti-Russia perspective. Turkey was the architect of the defeat of Haftar. The move by NATO seems to be a gesture of approach to Ankara, in the hope of distancing it from Moscow whose government is becoming increasingly present on the Libyan scene. Western governments fear that the Russian experience of gains in Syria may be repeated in Libya. In the meantime, the real flesh and blood victims of this geopolitical war are the Libyans themselves.

Mostafa El Ayoubi

Ghana. Togoland and the future of the nation.

In September, separatist attacks took place in the Volta Region of Ghana. These events represented an escalation in terms of action for the autonomist movement. They are the consequence of historic grievances and of an increase in political violence in the country. The competition for the 7th December presidential and political elections could worsen this situation.

During the night between 28th and 29th September 2020, a group of militants attacked a State Transport Corporation bus station in Ho, the capital of Volta Region. In the same region, on 25th September, police stations were attacked in Aveyime and Mepe and several roads were blocked by barricades. Militants stole weapons from police armouries and exchanged fire with agents. Radio stations were occupied. One person died and five others were injured. Security forces intervened to restore order. About 31 presumed militants were arrested shortly after the events and dozens of others were later apprehended.

Responsibility for the attacks was attributed to a separatist group, the Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF). HSGF’s supposed political wing, the Western Togoland Restoration Front (WTRF), issued ultimatums to the institutions during the 25th September offensive. WRTF is led by Togbe Yesu Kwabla Edzuzi I. But the leader of HSGF, Charles Kormi Kudzordzi (known as Papavi), in a video message denied any implication of his group in the attacks. Papavi stated that HSGF is a peaceful organization that cooperates with the police.
According to local press, HSGF is a movement founded in 1994 to reclaim the independence of Togoland from Ghana. Togoland (Western Togoland or British Togoland) is a territory located between Lake Volta and the Ghana-Togo border. According to separatists, it encompasses the Volta and Oti regions and parts of the Upper East and Northern East regions. Togoland was an African territory colonized by the Germans that was split after the First World War. With the division of German spoils, part of it went to France to form what is modern Togo. The other part went to the United Kingdom which attached it to the Gold Coast to form a territory that, in 1957 became independent Ghana. But separatists claim that Togoland is historically and culturally different from the rest of Ghana. And they denounce economic and political marginalization due to the politics implemented by the institutions. They declared the independence of Togoland in 2017 and in 2019. On 16th November 2019 they announced the birth of Western Togoland.

Ghana military airlift 31 arrested suspected Western Togoland secessionists to Accra.

Separatist violence could spread to other parts of Ghana. On 8th October, the Ashanti Regional Security Council (REGSEC) denounced the infiltration of Togoland separatists belonging to HSGF into the Ashanti Region. This phenomenon is made possible by the presence of people with ancestors in Volta Region. Other independentist entities emerged. In a video broadcast in mid-October, a group called the Dragons of Western Togoland military army claimed to have 4,300 militias ready to enter Volta Region territory and spoke of its fusion with the Gorillas, another independentist group. Extremists claim they received training abroad and have external support but gave no details. In September, their attacks were not particularly sophisticated.

7th December Elections
With the background of these events, there are the 7th December 2020 presidential and political elections. Will the separatists influence the vote in terms of a political agenda? And will the militias be able to disrupt polling operations in Volta and other regions? These relevant issues have brought about an increase in political tension.
The leadership of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), accused the ruling one, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) of tolerating if not exploiting the separatists to influence the December vote in Volta. For its part, the NPP downplayed the separatist danger claiming that militias are in reality only a handful of people and that the security forces will deal with them.

What happened in Volta Region must be seen as a part of a broader picture. In recent years, an increase in political violence has been observed in Ghana, which is still considered a model of democracy in West Africa. Coinciding with elections (local elections, political by-elections, etc.), clashes between supporters of different parties took place, first of all in major cities, even if not on a large scale. Vigilante groups threatened politicians and political activists and tried to disrupt the polls with violence. Both the NPP and the NDC have apparently created their own militias to intimidate their rivals. These dynamics caused people to suspect a hidden hand behind the September attacks, but no real evidence was provided.To reduce these tensions, in 2019 the government introduced the “Vigilantism and Related Offences Act”, that increased the penalties for those committing acts of political violence. But only after 7th December will it be possible to determine whether this law produces concrete results.

Peace and reconciliation
As Samuel Adjei stated in a column on Ghanaweb on 22nd October, Ghana had a basically peaceful life since its independence. The African country did not have to cope with internal conflicts like some of its neighbours (e.g. Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire).  That is to say, Ghana could not be prepared for a prolonged and destabilizing conflict, if the attacks in Togoland continued to escalate.
Therefore, the effort to establish peace had to be a priority, first of all for politicians but also for society in general.

In his video message Papavi stated that he tried twice to reach out to the Ghanaian institutions, and especially with the head of state, but to no avail. If the unity of the nation is rightly a precondition for the government, a dialogue with separatists could help to unify the country by co-opting a disenfranchised part of the population. This dialogue could be difficult, also because it seems that there are different competing factions of separatists.
Trying to solve the problem by force alone will prove a wrong strategy. Restoring public order is something undoubtedly good, but recent history has shown that force alone cannot respond to the demands of people (for food, for jobs, for political participation, etc.). And those requests, if unanswered, can feed the violence.

Andrea Carbonari

 

Special Report/Iraq. Cultural Heritage in Peril.

The wars in Syria and Iraq are (mostly) over, but the region’s rich cultural heritage remains at risk.

Mosul, Aleppo, Baghdad – whose Iraqi Museum was looted after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 – Damascus and Palmyra are some of the oldest cities in the world. Life and civilization have continued and evolved in those same areas for at least five millennia. However, after surviving multiple invasions from Alexander’s armies in the IV century BC to the Romans, the Muslims, the Mongols and the Turks, in the first twenty years of the 21st century, they have become symbols of unbridled vandalism. War and ideological fanaticism have combined to destroy the lives as well as the heritage of average Syrians and Iraqis. While some of the artistic and architectural monuments were destroyed as collateral damage during the course of battles, others were destroyed deliberately in fits of fanatical fervor.
The disregard that modern armies (and the policies guiding them) have shown for the culture of Syria and Iraq has also had the effect of reminding the world of the depth and significance of that heritage.
At an archaeological level, the wars were only the latest and directly destructive element. The damage began much earlier. Iraq’s conflicts 1990-91 and 2003-2018 were preceded by periods of intense sanctions, which deprived the State of vital resources to fund even the most basic of services and infrastructure. And, in that sense, as the country focuses on reconstruction now, Iraq’s archaeological heritage will most likely not reach the top of Baghdad’s list of priorities.
Therefore, the effort to protect Iraq’s considerable artistic and cultural heritage, spanning at least 40 centuries and multiple civilizations, faces considerable risk from basic neglect.

If Iraq’s heritage is to be saved, hope rests that foundations and donors from outside – and from a moral perspective those in the countries that contributed to the excessively harsh conditions that Iraq’s people were forced to endure – might be the actors of last resort. Indeed, the lack of financial self-sufficiency and the need to rebuild the country, physically and politically, might represent the biggest threat to Iraq.
The geopolitical risks, considering the continuing tensions between Turkey and the Kurdish militias, and the oil revenue redistribution disputes between Baghdad and Erbil (capital of the Autonomous Kurdish Province) can only mean one thing: the level of risk for Iraq’s heritage is very high. For nationalistic reasons – and upon visiting the site of ancient Babylon, some 70 km. south of Baghdad in 1989, the author of this article witnessed firsthand a painting featuring a portrait of Saddam Hussein and King Nebuchadnezzar and the stela of Hammurabi’s legal Code with its clear message of continuity.

Ba’athist Iraq invested considerable funds to restore major Iraqi archaeological sites. Then, during the embargoes and wars, the institutions in charge of protecting heritage sites were entirely defunded. The Americans and ISIS were just the latest to inflict damage – though it was the most intense damage. Even if the fighting is over now, Iraq’s economic problems perpetuate material difficulties, while the socio-political conditions that fueled the divide between Shiites and Sunnis (which helped foment ISIS) remain, even if temporarily buried under the proverbial dust. Iraq’s State Board of Antiquities and Heritage is highly competent. But the institute needs funds and technical collaboration from abroad to manage the sheer extent of Iraq’s artistic heritage.

Mosul, Ancient Nineveh, and Hatra
Almost two years since the end of ISIS in Syria and Iraq (at least since President Trump declared ISIS to have been defeated) the artistic heritage in the lands of former Mesopotamia bears witness to the cultural and human devastation that this region has witnessed in one form or another since George W. Bush decided to invade an already humiliated and weak Iraq in 2003. Indeed, quite apart from the damage inflicted during the American military invasion, the occupation itself is responsible for the emergence of ISIS and its radical ideology, which encouraged iconoclastic excess and looting.

Golden Lyre of Ur (the world’s oldest known stringed musical instrument, ca. 2,600 B.C.E.), destroyed in a storeroom of the Iraq Museum in 2003.

Mosul, the ancient Nineveh, Assyrian capital built by Sennacherib, son of Sargon II, in the VII century BC, suffered significant losses. The palace, which survived countless invaders over the centuries, was looted with abandon. Prof. Peter Miglus from Heidelberg University reported significant theft having occurred at the Palace of Sennacherib. ISIS removed reliefs, sculptures, structural pieces to sell them on the black market. And of course, it would not have been possible to establish such functioning sales channels without a high degree of Western complicity.
Indeed, it’s not just Nineveh. Babylon, other royal cities in Assyria, Ur – home of Sumerian civilization – and museums in Iraq and Syria have suffered serious damage.
And while the damage perpetrated by ISIS attracted dismay and attention, the disappearance of archaeological artefacts and damage to many sites have gone unnoticed. One of these is Hatra.

Hatra, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, located about 80 km south of Mosul is one of Iraq’s most important archaeological sites. Hatra – known as al-Hadr now – is one of the main examples of Parthian civilization that have survived. In its time (approximately 100 BC to 300 AD) it was the capital of the Kingdom of Araba and served as a religious and trade center on the edge that separated the Roman and Persian empire – and often a focus of the conflict between Romans and the Sassanid (who succeeded the Parthians). Hatra’s ruins cover – or better, covered – some 300 hectares of land featuring extant and well-preserved fortifications.

An Assyrian relief displayed at the Iraqi national museum in Baghdad.

Until ISIS damaged them, Hatra also boasted temples similar to those found in the towns with which it was linked (such as Palmyra). An Italian archaeological mission, funded by the Aliph Foundation has taken advantage of the relative calm in post-ISIS Iraq to evaluate and repair the damage caused by the recent wars. Of course, at Hatra, as at Nineveh, unless significant efforts are made toward securing the sites, there will always be incentives for people to steal the many artefacts – some in gold and other precious metals. ISIS raided these areas, but also discarded many objects, which may have proven too small or ‘worn’ to serve their needs. And many of the reliefs have survived. It seems that much of the iconoclastic rage, was actually masking a more practical kind of looting, aimed at securing funds.
Much of the archaeological heritage in Iraq and Syria has survived, but UNESCO has noted damage at least at 66 sites.

Alessandro Bruno

Special Report/ Syria. Destruction, Looting and Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Assets.

Syria is the Arab country that has best preserved the physical evidence of its pre-Islamic past: from the proto-Semitic cultures of the Levant (such as the Phoenicians to Mesopotamians and Assyrians) to Greek and Roman (the city of Palmyra, as well as Damascus and Aleppo, exemplifying this multifaceted aspect of the Syrian heritage).

In fact, Syria has also preserved the finest examples of western attempts to reconquer the Islamic Middle East such as the Crusader fortresses, and Craq de Chevaliers in particular. Regardless of their faith, the Syrian people have generally not lost awareness of their past. The war in Syria has left some 500,000 deaths according to some estimates.
Aleppo possesses many architectural treasures from the various Muslim periods, from the Umayyad’s to the Ottomans. Palmyra, one of the cities built in the Hellenistic period and linked to the Decapolis, a route connecting present day Syria to present day Jordan and northern Saudi Arabia, passing through Baalbek, Jerash, Pella, and Petra, is marked by some of the grandest temples in the Middle East. These sites testifying to Syria’s rich heritage have also come to symbolize the iconoclastic destruction by ISIS.

The Temple of Baal Shamin at Palmyra was attacked by ISIS fighters using improvised explosives.

While the media highlighted the damage in Palmyra, other sites of no lesser significance also incurred the ideologically fueled wrath of ISIS. Mari, a site of primary importance for the understanding of ancient Assyria, was also attacked. Mari remains one of the most important sites of the Bronze Age in the Middle East. Mari, located in present day Tel Hariri in the Deir ez-Zor area (one of the most affected by the war), rose around the same time as Uruk, at the end of the fourth millennium BC. The city was located at the confluence of important river trade routes along the Euphrates river, linking Sumer with Syria. Mari thrived for centuries and reached its peak in 1761, when King Hammurabi destroyed it. Mari has become very famous for its palace, which yielded a valuable collection of state correspondence in Akkadian, which helped historians understand invaluable archaeological information about geopolitics in the early 2nd millennium BC. Mari, and its palace especially, suffered considerable ‘illegal excavation’, i.e., looting, in the period from 2011 to 2018. ISIS destroyed thousands of manuscripts with the justification that many historical documents or artefacts represent pre-Islamic culture believed to be idolatrous.

Archaeologists and curators have worked to protect, preserve and rebuild these places. But, as with everything else, funds are needed to support restoration projects. In late 2019, the same Russian government which intervened at Damascus’s behest, signed a memorandum to restore Palmyra, which was recaptured by government forces in 2016. ISIS executed Palmyra’s curator Khaled Assas who refused to give up some of the most precious artefacts from the site.
Now, under the direction of Mikhail Petrovsky, from St. Petersburg’s Hermitage, Russia will help fund and organize the restoration of Palmyra and of Damascus. Ideally, the Russians will also welcome Syrian experts in order to ensure the sustainability of the restoration and preservation of Palmyra for more centuries.

Khaled al-Asaad, the Director of Antiquities and Museum in Palmyra, in front of a rare sarcophagus.

The wars in Syria and Iraq have shown that cultural heritage can serve as a target for destruction, looting and illicit trafficking of cultural assets. Cultural heritage is a legacy of the identity, or identities, of the peoples to which the artefacts are linked. The cultural heritage of the Near East is not new to conflicts or theft of artefacts – one need only visit a few famous museums in Europe or North America to realize that. But the asymmetric warfare that has marked the war in Syria has made it more possible and ‘acceptable’ for looting to occur.
No single solution can be adopted to protect the heritage of Syria and Iraq, but toughening laws on smuggling and being more intelligent about intervening in wars that quickly go out of control, helps. The sociopolitical and cultural tensions that emerged during the Syrian war remain; they have not been resolved. But, even if the more extreme elements have been defeated, it’s incumbent on those professing to be civilized now (the West for example) not to aggravate Middle Eastern scenarios for their own strategic games. That might be the best way of all to preserve the legacy of the ancient Near East.

Alessandro Bruno

 

The Muridiyya Brotherhood. “The Disciple”.

Touba, the holy city of the Muridiyya Brotherhood, situated in the centre of the country, though a religious city, stands out for its commercial character which comes from the popular motto of Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba, founder of the city and of the Mourides: “Pray as if you were to die tomorrow and work as if you were to live forever”. Prayer as a means of coming close to God and gaining Paradise and work as a means to satisfying material needs: this is the life in which Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba educated his disciples.

Touba, founded in 1888, rises at the intersection of the three historical Wolof kingdoms of Cayor, Baol and Yolof, about 200 kilometres to the east of Dakar. It is said that Ahmadou Bamba wanted to create his brotherhood on that spot, just seven kilometres from his native village of Mbacké Baol, following a vision.
It was in 1883 that thirty-year-old Sheikh Amadou Bamba made a pact of fidelity with the Prophet who appeared to him and ordered him to guide his disciples on the right Way to God. It was at that point that this great man of culture and strict orthodoxy claimed independence from the Qadiri Brotherhood, whose wird he practised, to create his own: this is how the Muridiyya (from the Arabic mourid, ‘disciple’) at Mbacke Cayor, in the Senegalese hinterland north-east of Dakar came about.

Senegal. Mural on a wall in Dakar showing leaders of the Mouride, including Ahmadu Bamba (right, in white) and Ibrahima Fall (right, blue), and El Hadj Malick Sy (left), or Mouhamadou Fadilou Mbacké.

Sheikh Amadou Bamba created a number of villages in the heart of the same region before founding Touba, where the largest mosque in Sub-Saharan Africa was built with the contributions of all the talibés, especially those of the United States and Europe. Each year, millions of the faithful throng the city for the great mourid pilgrimage, the Great Magal.Well versed in the Koran, Amadou Bamba, known as Serigne Touba (Sheikh of Touba), composed more than seven and a half tons of writings in theology, Sufism, grammar, law and good etiquette: some of these he buried or threw into the sea so as not to reveal to others all the secrets gained from God, while another part is kept in the library of Touba located close to the mausoleum. Reading verses of these texts (khasidas) and part of the Koran is the foundation of the Mourid wird.

Consistent with the values of non-violence and forgiveness, Sheikh Amadou Bamba was known for his peaceful opposition to colonisation and to have survived, unlike all his religious predecessors, being abused and exiled by the French authorities. Both legendary anecdotes and factual evidence show what Sheikh Amadou Bamba had to endure during thirty years of persecution, combatting the colonialists by means of his faith alone. He never denied his faith even under threat of death when, in 1895, the French governor in Saint-Louis, the colonial capital in those days, convoked him and another 83 religious leaders, demanding that they abandon their faith. The only response Serigne Touba gave was to recite two series of Islamic prayers. To this day, in Saint-Louis, each year on 5 September a pilgrimage is held (the Magal of the two rakkas) to commemorate the event.
After several years’ exile in Gabon to which he had been condemned by the French governor, other exiles to the Congo and Mauritania and the guarded stays in Thieyene and Djourbel, the French gave in, recognised his qualities and raised Sheikh Amadou Bamba to the rank of Knight of the Legion of Honour.

In this aerial photo, pilgrims from the Mouride Brotherhood arrive at the Grand Mosque of Touba during the celebrations of the Grand Magal of Touba, in Senegal, Oct. 6, 2020.

The preaching based on the values of peace in total submission to God and on ethics of work gave the Mourid faithful, who had rapidly grown in number through many conversions from the Tijani faith, the distinction of being the most active emigrants in the world and an economic power in the country. Apart from being the best known and most mediated brotherhood, it is also the most influential, politically speaking, because of the popularity of its many religious leaders who became so out of merit or because they are descendants of Sheikh Amadou Bamba. Being Marabouts, they, in their turn, obey the General Caliph of Touba. Since 2010, that post has been filled by Sheikh Sidy al Moukhtar Mbackè.
Recently, the General Caliph Al Moukhtar Mbackè invited the Moslem faithful to pray and recite the Sacred Koran for an end to the Coronavirus pandemic. In the edict, those Koranic schools with a large number of students are asked to complete the recitation of the entire Koran three times throughout the day while medium-sized schools were asked to recite the Sacred Book twice in one day. Small Koranic schools with just a few students were asked to do so once only.

The Baye Fall, Sufis, ‘The Heretics’
Ibrahima Fall was still young when a voice in a dream suggested he seek out Sheikh Amadou Bamba and dedicate himself entirely to him. Having left everything and travelled much, in 1884 this brilliant student of Islamic studies found his master. From then on, Ibrahima Fall would serve his guide devotedly through reverential submission, until Serigne Touba himself ordered him to withdraw and found his own community.
It was then that Bayefallism (in Wolof baay means, ‘father’) came into being, whose disciples, called Baye Fall, often gather around their Marabouts in genuine communities.
They do not know the meaning of intolerance and have no time for any form of fundamentalism. They make no distinctions based on race, religion, or colour. They are distinguished most for their respect for every human being and their outright pacifism.

They esteem women as much as men: they do not demand they wear the veil and believe education must be equally available to all. They see themselves as totally Islamic. Sometimes criticised within the Senegalese Islamic community for their non-observance of two of the pillars of Islam (the Ramadan fast and praying five times a day); the Baye Fall have nevertheless accentuated the importance of the Zikr. Its repetition has given rise to nocturnal songs in which the talibé, marching in a circle around the drums, try to reach a state of trance. The Mecca Pilgrimage is substituted with that to the great mosque of Touba where the tomb of their founder Ahmadu Bamba is located.
The Baye Fall are proud of their culture and detest all external influence. They have a very strong sense of community.  Individual Baye Falls do not own material goods but place all they have at the disposal of the Marabout, the spiritual guide.

The Baye Fall have also instituted the Caliphate among the descendants of Sheikh Ibrahima Fall, based in Mbackè, at the gates of Touba, even though their Caliphs still submit to the General Caliph the Mourides.
Bayefallism presents itself as a real sub-culture, rich in symbolic elements: one can recognise a Baye Fall from their Rasta hairstyle, their ndiakhass (coloured patchwork) tunics, their thiaya (baggy trousers), large belts and black or brown woollen caps with pompoms.
Besides the Great Magal of Touba and the Magal of Saint-Louis, often during the year, there are smaller pilgrimages corresponding to the anniversaries of the deaths of the Caliphs who succeeded Sheikh Amadou Bamba (his children and nephews) and of his mother, Mariama Bousso, whose mausoleum is to be seen in Prokhane (close to Kaolack). In Djourbel it is possible to visit the homes of Sheikh Amadou Bamba and Sheikh Ibrahima Fall. (L.d.M.)

How the Phoenix got her fine plumage.

A very long time ago before men had learnt how to hunt and set traps, all the birds lived together peacefully in a great forest. Theirs was a happy and carefree existence, the forest supplied all their needs.

There was a plentiful supply of nuts, fruits seeds and berries for the birds to feed on and they had no enemies. Because food was to be found everywhere in seemingly endless supplies, the birds came to be rather wasteful. One would pick at a pear here, another would take a bite out of a blueberry there, dig a few seeds out of a guava, and discard
the rest of the fruit. They all shared the same carefree spirit, except for one, the phoenix.

The phoenix was a real worrier. She was always telling the other birds to be careful and to prepare for a time that food might not be so plentiful. All the other birds ignored her; some even started calling her nasty names. Eventually nobody wanted to have anything to do with phoenix; they thought there was something not quite right about her, always scolding them and giving out advice they considered useless. They carried on with their usual wasteful habits.

Whereas most of the birds had colourful plumage, phoenix was quite ordinary to look at. Some might say a little ugly, even. Her head was a little bit too big compared to her body. Her feathers were a dull brownish grey. She worried about the future.

What if something bad were to happen tomorrow? One day the fruit might stop growing on the trees, or the trees might drop their leaves, or just fall over, even! She determined to prepare for the worst and started collecting all the fruits and berries and seeds other birds discarded. She stowed them away in places like hollow trees, buried them in the ground or underneath the roots. At first one or two of the others were a bit curious, but then they just got bored. They laughed whenever they spotted phoenix scavenging, and mocked her.

One day a great storm hit the forest, and what phoenix had been worrying about all these years came to pass. Leaves and whole branches were blown off the trees and carried far away by the powerful wind. Some trees were blown over altogether, and with the protection of the dense foliage now gone, the heat of the sun penetrated the forest and dried everything up! Suddenly the birds found they had to fight each other for the odd berry or a stray nut.

They pecked at the hard, dry tree trunks, hoping to extract some nourishing sap. Phoenix started sharing out all the scraps of food she had stored up all over the forest. Now every single bird, large and small, wanted to be her friend. Thanks to phoenix all the birds had something to eat every day. Eventually the gods sent some clouds over the land, which cooled things down a bit, and some rain fell.
Green sprouts started to appear again, just as the food stores phoenix had built up started to run out. Slowly the forest returned to its old self, and the birds recovered.

But they didn’t forget their new friend, phoenix. To show their gratitude every bird in the whole forest selected its most beautiful and colourful feather and presented it to phoenix. When they were finished phoenix had been transformed into the most fantastic and multi colourful creature in the forest.

At least that’s what I’m told. I’ve never seen phoenix myself, and I don’t know anybody who has. The friendly bird from the forest who told me this story also told me that phoenix stays hidden deep inside the forest, where no human being can ever penetrate. Perhaps that’s just as well, because if any human ever laid eyes on her, the sheer brilliant beauty of phoenix would surely blind that person’s eyes.

Folktale from Uganda

Islamic Finance. Not Just for the Islamic World Anymore.

To build an alternative financial model. To employ profit-loss risk-sharing arrangements. To invest in solid assets. To encourage favorable changes for Western consumers and new business opportunities for Western institutions.

The appeal of Islamic finance, which in its modern form began in 1963 in Egypt through the Mit Ghamr Bank according to the ideas of economist Ahmad el-Najjar, is increasing as a tool to ‘fix’ finance. ‘Islamic finance’ addresses the general problem that excessive debt leads to financial crises. Islamic finance refers to all legal institutions, financial instruments or businesses that conform to the principles and traditions of Shari’a – Islamic Law.
The idea of adapting their economies to the Islam might also be interpreted through the range of Islamic nationalism (for lack of a better term) in the wake of the post-colonial reality of the 1950’s and 60’s.

New States, suddenly launched into the world developed a self-awareness or identity that marked the break with the past while having to confront their once ‘colonial masters’ in the world economy that the latter created. Thus, Islamic financial systems rose in large part to nationalisms borne as a reaction to European colonialism.
It’s estimated that the total value of assets compliant with Islamic finance was valued at some $2.2 trillion in 2020. While, the growth rate of such assets has slowed, as has much financial activity in 2020, Shari’a compliant financial activities are expected to grow in the coming years. This is not just because there are about 1.5 billion Muslims worldwide. Rather, as many begin to question the ‘reliability’ of traditional finance, a considerable number of finance scholars have become increasingly interested in studying Islamic finance, adapting some of its key principles to build an alternative model to current Western models.

The main obstacle to the adoption of Islamic finance is that attracting the due consideration, let alone consensus in the West, would require a willingness to forego stereotypes about the countries where this model has evolved. Still, the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the economic blow dealt by the COVID-19 pandemic may encourage economists of varied backgrounds to approach Islamic finance as a viable alternative. Because of its roots in the Islamic religious tradition, Shari’a based finance revolves around a set of precepts that govern economic transactions and trade, devised in order to achieve the highest possible degree of fairness and benefit to the ‘Umma (the community at large).
In practical terms, Islamic finance is never detached from the real economy, and it shuns the phenomenon of financial alchemy that western economies have witnessed in the past forty years – and especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Real Assets Rather than Speculation
The focus on the real economy has shielded countries with strong Islamic finance systems from the repercussions of the 2008 crisis. Islamic finance’s two underlying principles are risk-sharing and making credit available for the purchase or manufacturing of real goods and services with severe restrictions on speculation such as selling debt (options, derivatives), the practice of selling-short (betting that the value of an asset will drop rather than rise), associating the latter to gambling (qimar), which violates the faith.

The overall effect is discipline. Islamic finance favors discipline over excessive risk-taking, thereby instilling more financial stability. This is the opposite of the current Wall Street model. And the focus on stability and the real economy is also why there is no need to be Muslim to adopt or appreciate Islamic finance. While Wall Street has encouraged speculation in paper assets (the Sub-prime crisis involved speculation on high risk mortgages), Islamic financing favors investing in solid assets, a practice that mitigates precarious levels of debt, as in current western models, which are entirely based on limitless debt.
The foundation of Islamic finance is that transactions cannot demand interest rate payments on debt. Rather, they employ profit-loss risk-sharing arrangements while customers can still benefit from savings accounts, as they gain value by participating profit-sharing (as these too are prevented from accruing interest).  As for lending, banks grant funds/resources while the client, in the case of a company or large entity, provides the expertise to favor growth such that profits are produced, and then shared according to an agreed rate. At its core, the main difference between Western and Islamic finance is that the latter tends to discourage excessive risk. Translating this for the benefit of consumers accustomed to western models, Islamic banks act as money managers that attract deposits and then invest them in projects in accordance with (Shari’a based) rules that reduce exposure to risk for either the lender or the borrower.

Thus, the bank does not pay interest on deposits, nor does it charge interest on loans. Rather, in broad terms, an Islamic lender invests in its customers’ transactions, participating in the risks. In order to ensure that earnings comply with Shari’a, banks deploy appropriate boards, made up of Islamic jurisprudence experts, who certify that transactions are carried out in compliance with Islamic law. Evidently, given such a context, religious ethics inform the entire scope of Islamic finance, which at the basis rests on the core tenet that all resources belong to Allah. Thus, economic growth must also reconcile the protection of Allah’s realm, that is all of creation. Islamic finance, at least in theory (if not always in practice) favors investment and profits only if they produce benefits for the whole community. It grants room for competition, but not the kind of Darwinian winner take-all variety that reigns supreme in the West. Thus, it does not tolerate monopolies. Islamic finance works harmoniously with socialist systems, as it welcomes State intervention through policies and subsidies for essential items to reduce inequalities.

COVID Increase Islamic Finance’s Appeal
The economic and financial crisis, which erupted in 2008 in response to the implosion of subprime mortgages created many effects. These effects linger, despite the distraction that the ‘artificially fueled’ (through corporate tax cuts encouraging share buybacks) bull stock market has caused in the United States, fears of another crash, and or another crisis, have raised questions about the sustainability of the capitalist system itself. Therefore, rather an exotic idiosyncrasy, Islamic finance begs serious consideration as more than an alternative, but as an opportunity to the excessively risk-laden finance practiced in New York, London or Hong Kong. The latter have fueled a climate of distrust, encouraging investors to consider Islamic finance, which has earned a reputation for greater degrees of transparency, controlled speculation, social responsibility and relevance to the real economy.

The crisis has shown that ‘Western’ economic development models must change, and that has stimulated an interest in Islamic finance. Far from being a marginal subject for specialists, Islamic finance has experienced a lively phase, which could encourage favorable changes for Western consumers and new business opportunities for Western institutions. More than culture, the main obstacles to Islamic finance in the West are regulatory. Islamic banking relies on different contractual models, which require changes to the fiscal regimes of market-based systems. Until recently, and especially after October 2008 with the Dodd-Frank Act, aimed at infusing additional layers of transparency and accountability – though often excessively reliant on ‘punishment’ through fines and prison sentences. But, these have proven to be ineffective in controlling the financial system’s built-in, and unavoidable, speculative model. Indeed, the main problem is also the main tenet of market systems: the profit motive. The debate for reform has centered around the idea of what kind of reforms might be applied in order to avoid confining the market’s reach to such an extent as to disincentivise markets altogether.

Such a debate is careful to skirt around the main problem: market crashes affect everyone; especially, the part of the population that owns neither stocks, bonds, nor any other financial instrument. Despite having no stake in their performance, they pay a disproportionate price as happened in October 1929, September 2008, or 2020 with COVID-19. Reduced to its theoretical core, Islamic finance, represents an appealing basis from which to improve current neo-liberal capitalism, infusing a much-needed dimension of ethical and social concerns in the market that extend beyond current ideas of ‘sustainability’ (which try to discourage excessive risk taking without the ethical foundations). Ultimately, Islamic finance, as opposed to Western finance, is better equipped to address the aspects of wealth distribution disparities; especially as many so-called rich countries are having to manage ever larger percentages of unemployed and underemployed in their   populations.

Alessandro Bruno

 

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