A further crucial element in the balance of power in the Black Sea is that of the control of the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

In past centuries, these passages represented the largest prize in the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and Turkey. On the basis of the Montreux Convention of 1936, passage through the straits is controlled by Turkey. The Convention, which guarantees access to the ‘hot seas’ by Black Sea states, also serves the interests of Russia by allowing Moscow to extend into the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean its commercial and military power.
This constitutes an objective essential to Russia given, from the perspective of commerce, that 38% of all oil exported by sea passes through the straits while, from the perspective of security, the straits constitute a defence against the penetration of the United States into Russia’s back yard.

Big container ship in Dardanelles strait, Turkey.

The Convention of Montreux, with all its limitations, less severe for Black Sea states, is for Moscow an unquestionable element of guaranteed security whose defensive benefits exceed effects of the limitations imposed on it. All the more reason why, considering that, in the perspective of the United States, whose plan was to make the Black Sea a NATO lake, the fortification of Russia in that area could constitute a troubling element but not a real problem since it enjoys a net superiority in the Mediterranean. In particular, in the Aegean, the United States, after signing an accord with Greece, is increasing its naval air force presence in Crete, Tessaglia, and Alexandroupolis, for the purpose of increasing pressure on the straits and making Greece the new military hub in the eastern Mediterranean. The port of Alexandroupolis, in particular, counteracts the influence of Moscow on the port of Salonica, recently privatised by a consortium of which the Russian oligarch Ivan Savvides is a member.

To the contrary, the Turkish strategy relative to the straits is rather more terrestrial than maritime. Ankara, in fact, is investing in important infrastructure connecting the two banks, implementing the vision of Turkey as a bridge between Europe and Asia.
Moreover, there is also the plan to carry out a massive project consisting of an artificial canal, as an alternative to that of the Bosphorus, 43 km long, with room for 163 vessels per day, with eight bridges and an underwater metro serving the city of around half a million inhabitants, to be built along its banks. The new canal should run parallel to that of the Bosphorus, connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara.
The project could take on strategic importance militarily since it would provide a way around the Montreux Convection and allow Turkish ships to pass freely, but also Russian and American vessels, further reinforcing its role and its variable strategy. According to some analysts, Turkey could also use this new passage to affect the income from Russian oil exports, by diverting Russian tankers towards the new canal and increasing the cost of passage, an increase already announced for 2023. In this vein, the episode that occurred in February 2019 seems relevant, being a possible prelude to the new ambitions of Erdogan. That month, the ships directed to and from the Mediterranean, passing through the Turkish straits, recorded a delay of more than two weeks, which may be interpreted as a message for Russia concerning the new system by which Erdogan intends to manage the straits.

The aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman leads a formation of ships to Mediterranean Sea.

Nevertheless, the massive military presence of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean, obliges Russia and Turkey, rivals in every sense of the word, to find a tactical connection in this area of vital importance to their geopolitical interests. Putin, especially, aware of the danger that Ankara may function as a bridgehead for United States interests in that area, is busy trying to discover forms of collaboration and, to this end, is sponsoring some projects, one of which is the Baku, Tbilisi, Erzurum gas pipeline and the Baku, Tbilisi, Kars (BTK) railway line, to prevent the United States from penetrating the Black Sea, and using to his own advantage two anti-Russian projects initiated with American sponsorship.

Filippo Romeo

The Black Sea is situated in the centre of the vast geographical area that runs from the Adriatic to the Caspian Sea. Together with the Maghreb, the Mashreq and the Balkans, it constitutes one of the sub-regions of the Mediterranean Sea.

The different strategic priorities of the countries facing the basin with their heterogeneous historical and religious cultures render it a unique area of crucial importance. After the Baltic and the Mediterranean, the Black Sea represents the third European sea in strategic importance since it connects the Euro-Mediterranean space to Central Asia and the Caucuses; it is also the border between NATO and the Russian Federation, as well as being a fundamental crossroads for energy, commercial, and military interests in a continual state of mutation.

Due to its central position, it has been, in the course of millennia, a theatre of conflict between great empires and powers. Proof of this is the legendary war of Troy, between Greeks and Trojans, whose real motivations would seem to have been the conquest of that strategic ‘City of Gold’ built on a height from where it was possible to control the entrance to the Straits of the Dardanelles, at the point of passage between the Aegean and the Black Sea, and the ‘windswept’ surrounding plain. The shores of the Black Sea reach Bulgaria and Romania on the west; Georgia and Caucasian Russia (that spur of land that connects it with the Caspian Sea) to the east, Ukraine to the north and lastly, Turkey to the south which, by means of the Bosphorus Strait, the Sea of Marmara and the Straits of the Dardanelles, guarantees
access to the Mediterranean.
The area constitutes a macro geopolitical region with variable outlines, in which the major international actors are present. In this ‘Great Game’ are intertwined geopolitical questions of absolute relevance for global equilibrium even, as the Rumanian historian Gheorghe Brătianu believes, to the extent that, “The theatre provided by the Black Sea favours (…) considerations that go beyond the regional problems and become relevant to the forces that act upon universal history”.

Romania. Port Constanta

Apart from the global powers, the participants in the ‘Great Game’ include the non-littoral states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia and Greece – expressing their protagonism derived both from their geographical proximity and their consolidated historical, religious, economic, and cultural connections that are shared by the littoral states.
In the period between the end of the Second World War and the early nineties, consigned to history as the ‘cold war’ between the Soviet and United States blocs, the area of the Black Sea was considered a static zone in that it was almost entirely under the control of the Soviet Union, with the exception of Turkey, a member of NATO since 1951.
With the end of the USSR, the geopolitical order underwent a drastic mutation that permitted the gradual penetration of the USA into the region. Countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia and Ukraine – that up to then had been under the unquestioned ‘Soviet umbrella’ – moved their political axis towards the west, guaranteeing the USA consistent influence in the area of the Black Sea and to set up a western
outpost which  would have allowed it to control the area
of the ‘Great Middle East’.

Bulgarian and NATO navy ships take part in a Bulgarian-NATO military navy exercise in the Black Sea, east of Sofia.

The Rumanian and Bulgarian post-communist élite showed immediate enthusiasm for supporting the American policy in the Middle East and, with the support of their countries within NATO, determined the incorporation of the Black Sea into the ‘operative zone’ mentioned in article 5 of NATO (mutual defence). This explains why, if a crisis occurred in the area – that endangered Euro-Atlantic stability, possibly affecting the security of the members of NATO – the military forces of the Alliance, activating a joint and combined task force (a deployable multi-national and multi-role force, with a land-based component and similar air and sea components), could have recourse to article 5 to activate military operations in response to any attacks. However, the ambitions of the USA were broader, consisting of integrating the Black Sea area within a regional space including the entire south-east Europe; a veritable bulwark of defence on its eastern flank situated on the borders of the Russian Confederation. Nevertheless, the project was severely curtailed by various factors, such as the enduring instability of the Balkan area, the weakening of the European project and the new protagonism of Turkey and Russia. Two actors who, in the last fifteen years, made their influence keenly felt by embarking on forms of collaboration in some areas and sectors. In this regard, it is thought that the acquisition by Ankara of the Russian S-400 air defence system creates a number of problems for the USA and the Atlantic Alliance.

Russian troops in Crimea. (Credit: Viktor Drachev)

In particular, Russia, by annexing Crimea in 2014, considerably consolidated its presence in the area, creating new security challenges and compelling NATO to review its strategies which in this phase are shown to be increasingly contradictory, also due to the attitude adopted by Turkey. This situation, to which we must add the constraints of the Convention of Montreux – which imposes definite limits on the presence of military vessels of non-littoral countries which, in peacetime, may not exceed 21 days and with a fleet of not more than 40,000 tons – is making this area the Achilles heel of NATO since the poor cohesion among the allies leads all the littoral countries to act independently. To the contrary, the Convention of Montreux, affecting Russia to a lesser degree, even if it imposes limits (less severe since Russia is a littoral country) to the expansion of its military extension into the Mediterranean, represents a guarantee of its own security. In the meantime, despite historical precedents also regarding the question of pacts between Russia and Turkey, at present there is a convergence of interests aimed at reducing USA pressure on its vital maritime spaces. (F.R.)

It was the conflict that broke out between Russia and Georgia in 2008 that challenged the balance of power imposed by the United States in the area of the Black Sea.

Georgia, after winning independence in 1991, adopted a pro-western stance with the aim of joining the North Atlantic Treaty. This induced Tbilisi to promote the transit of energy on its soil with terminals on its territory and in Turkey, excluding Russia and Armenia, its ally.
The political-economic options chosen by Georgia started to bear fruit in 1999, with the inauguration of the Baku-Supa oil pipeline that runs from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, thus ending Russian hegemony over the exportation of Caspian oil.
In the new international context, which came into being after 9/11, Georgia was of crucial interest for the US strategy of strategic and military redeployment in the Caucasian region, whose epilogue was the ‘Rose Revolution’ which brought about the fall of the elderly leader Shevardnadze. That ‘Revolution’ opened the path to a process of geopolitical change in the region – known as the ‘Colour Revolutions’ – pursued successfully in Ukraine, Kirghizstan and Moldova.

On November 23, 2003, Georgia’s Rose Revolution took place – a key event in the country’s modern history which defined the course of its development for many years.

The aim of the new government in Georgia was to regain the entire national territory by annexing the three separatist regions of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjara, the only region Tbilisi succeeded in retaking peacefully since the spring of 2004, forcing the local president, Levan Abashidze, to seek refuge in Moscow.
To counteract Georgian claims on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, those in power in the two separatist regions – inhabited by non-Georgian populations – asked several times to be incorporated into the Russian Federation, but such an annexation of territories legally belonging to Georgia, was persistently rejected by Moscow, due especially to the severe repercussions, both internal and international, which an operation of its kind might have provoked at that time. However, the unilateral recognition of Kosovo by the United States, which took place in February 2008, provided Russia with the perfect excuse and the separatist regions with an example to be followed.

The frigate Admiral Essen of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) passed the Black Sea straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and entered the Black Sea.

During those years, the USA tried to incorporate Georgia into NATO but the attempt failed during the Bucharest Summit in 2008 during which they succeeded in imposing their plans for the deployment of missiles in Eastern Europe and in obtaining the legitimisation by the Alliance of the bilateral accords with Poland and the Czech Republic, at the cost of expanding NATO to include the Ukraine and Georgia.
Russia was quick to take advantage of the situation and, following an airborne campaign launched by Georgia against Tskhinvali, the main city of South Ossetia, sent in the tanks.
The conflict ended with Russia taking control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which put an end to the US strategy in the region that tended to make the Black Sea an exclusively NATO lake.  Moreover, Moscow directed in its favour the geopolitical upheavals of the following years, reinforcing its presence in the eastern Mediterranean, by keeping Assad in power, and also in the Black Sea after the annexation of Crimea. The latter move, carried out during the Ukraine crisis of 2014, allowed Russia to increase its military concentration in the area, stationing there a force of more than 32,000 men with sophisticated arms and naval vessels such as frigates and submarines of the Soviet Fleet in the Black Sea, armed with ‘Kalibr’ Cruise missiles. And also to assume control of the Kerch Strait on which it built an 18 Km bridge connecting Crimea to Russia. This has also reduced access to the Azov Sea, creating difficulties for the larger ships serving the ports of Ukraine.
This situation created considerable tension between the two states to add to that of November 2018 when the Russian navy intervened
and blocked three ships of the Ukraine navy, towed by a tug,
from crossing the Strait.

Turkey, meanwhile, was left alone in Syria by the western allies to face a complex situation within a situation so irregular as to render it impossible to emerge from. At the same time, as Moscow was increasing its influence in areas of undoubted strategic value such as those of the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey was forced to revise its geopolitical posture, to redefine its framework of alliances and, therefore, to come to an agreement with Russia and Iran to extricate itself from Syria.
It was this new balance of power, together with the business of Turkey including the attempted coup in July 2016 against Erdogan, that brought about the purchase by Turkey of the Russian S-400 land-air defence system with which Turkey intends to develop a hybrid system partly NATO, partly Russian and partly national. According to analysts, it would reflect its real geopolitical collocation: no longer totally coinciding with the vision of NATO but differentiated and with varied formations.

President of France Emmanuel Macron and President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

At the time of writing, we have heard that president Erdogan is said to have asked Macron, during a telephone call reconciling the two, to approve the sale of the Italo-French Samp/T missile system, an effective land-air system that could function as an effective alternative to the Russian S-400. The reasons for such a move may lie in Ankara doubts regarding the updating of Russian software or, more simply, in the desire of Erdogan to consolidate the ‘hybrid position’ and try to balance matters relative to Moscow. At the same time, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has again broken out, within which Ankara, with the support of the United States and Great Britain, is playing a leading role, promoting the despatch of combatants from Syria and of exponents of the Grey Wolves. There is no doubt that the outcome of the conflict will further define the balance of power in the entire area. (F.R.)