This year many African countries will go through a phase of instability and conflict. Some of them even risk of being torn apart by ethnic tensions and political rivalries.
These tensions and rivalries run deep. There is no sign of change in some of these situations, but a change is possible.

In this historical moment, elections in some African countries are not an element of a democratic process, but a cause of instability. They do not help solving problems of governance and insecurity, but contribute to creating or worsening them.
A recent and relevant example of that is Ivory Coast. A contested presidential election on 31 October 2020 reopened the wounds left by the internal conflict fought in 2010-2011. The candidacy and the victory of outgoing President Alassane Ouattara are not accepted by the opposition which then organized protests. Protests that turned violent, before and after the vote.

Guinea’s President Alpha Conde wins third term amid violent protests.

The President reached out to his opponents and talked with one of his main rivals, Henri Konan Bédié, on 11 November. These talks seemed to bear some fruit, but peace is not around the corner and the flame of violence could be reignited in 2021.A similar scenario is taking place in Guinea, with a contested outgoing President (Alpha Condé) who won again, and an opposition that took to the streets trying to chase him out. But the economic role of Ivory Coast in the region is bigger and the troubles in that country could have a deeper impact on the area than the tensions in Guinea (with all due respect).
The 27 December 2020 presidential elections in Central African Republic will not solve the multiple problems of this country. The armed groups that control the territory will not cede their weapons or the areas they exploit to the institutions. Ethnic and religious fights will continue, and external powers and groups will still intervene to get (legally or not) their share of the riches of the soil.

Protests and mistrust
In October, protests against the police brutality in Nigeria degenerated into riots, vandalism, and deaths in many states, but especially in Lagos. These acts of violence worsened the already high level of insecurity in the country and increased the mistrust towards the institutions (first of all the security forces). Soldiers have been accused of killing protestors in Lagos, and an investigation is ongoing.

Manifestanti #EndSars ad Abuja (Credit: dailypost.ng)

Demonstrations are likely to continue in 2021, adding up to the long-term security issues, such as a rampant criminality and the attacks by jihadist groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP).
In Cameroon, the internal conflict in the Western regions will likely continue, on and off. It started after the anglophone community took to  the streets to denounce exclusion and the menace of assimilation by the francophone majority. The armed groups formed by members of the English-speaking minority will keep on fighting against the security forces in 2021.

They even proclaimed the birth of an independent state (Ambazonia) in 2017, but their declaration was apparently rejected by the international community. The intensity of their action will depend on several factors. Will they be able to find relevant external supports in terms of money, weapons, etc.? Will they coalesce in a single group or front or will they continue to fight each other? In any case, they will not be the only threat to the existence of Cameroon. In 2021 the Northern regions (especially the Extreme North region) will still be the theatre of operation of jihadist groups, like Boko Haram. These two dynamics, and the tensions within the ruling class, will weaken the Cameroonian institutions.

New and old
A conflict broke out (quite unexpectedly for some) in Ethiopia in early November. The confrontation between the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the elite of the Tigray ethnic community escalated until a full war started in early November. Ahmed has been excluding from power the Tigray elite after years of preeminence. Addis Ababa has tried to solve the problem militarily as quickly as possible but, in any case, the underlying ethnic tensions will likely continue to poison the Horn of Africa country in 2021.

This conflict brought also an unexpected change of front. The Eritrean government, which used to quarrel with Ethiopia before reaching an agreement in the last years, joined the old enemy against the Tigray rebels. Therefore, the war is slowly spilling over into Eritrea.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo will remain a hotspot of conflict in 2021. At this moment there is no credible sign of change in the root causes of the country’s multiple crisis: ethnic rivalries, foreign intervention, corruption, etc. And the tensions within the ruling coalition are deepening and some cracks have emerged. The fight between the ruling President Felix Tshisekedi and his predecessor Joseph Kabila is stepping up. The two joined their forces to win the contested presidential election of 30th December 2018, and according to the press reached an agreement based on political alternance. But Tshisekedi is trying to disengage from his ally and to enlarge his power base, also by reaching out to the opposition.

 Democracy is not the problem
What happened on 13 November 2020 in Western Sahara, where Moroccan security forces started a military operation against the POLISARIO Front members in the buffer zone of this contested territory, proves that at any moment a conflict could restart, even after months of apparent calm.

The crisis and conflicts described before are the consequences of old issues that will continue to have negative effects, at least in 2021. The international community, and especially the African Union and the other regional groups, intervened to defuse tensions and support dialogue. But, so far, the results are not encouraging.
It must be said that, even if some of these crises are the apparent consequence of a democratic process, democracy itself is not the problem. One of the sources of these evils is the will of keeping power by dubious means while pretending to respect the elements of democracy (such as elections and the rule of the majority).
Some politicians claim that Western democracy is not fit for Africa. That may be true for some aspects (as an example, the way of choosing a legislative assembly) but democracy can be adapted to African culture and society. The problem is that not all the politicians are ready to take part in a fair democratic process.

Andrea Carbonari

Ten years after the popular uprisings in North Africa, what has changed? What remains of the movements behind them?

The fall of three North African dictators took place in a matter of a few months, in early 2011, under the impulse of the popular revolt. The first to fall was the Tunisian Ben Ali, on 14 January. A few weeks later, the Egyptian Rais resigned. Gadhafi was killed in October after Libya turned its back on him.
In Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President since 1999, did not recognise the movements present in nearby countries, believing them to be simply widespread unrest caused by union agitation. In Morocco, the long wave of revolt reached the kingdom in 2011, where the ‘20 February movement’ openly challenged the monarchy for the first time. King Mohammed VI anticipated its demands by introducing a new Constitution, thereby nipping the protests in the bud.

In Egypt, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has consolidated its power.

Now, ten years later, what power system is the driving force in the countries of North Africa? King Mohammed VI is still on the throne; the Algerian Bouteflika relinquished power only at the beginning of April 2019, after twenty years in power,  swept along by the popular, nonviolent movement Hirak (movement in Arabic), while a yet-to-be-initiated transition has brought President Abdelmadjid Tebboune to power.
In Egypt, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has consolidated its power; in Tunisia, a reluctant transition has seen a succession of democratically elected presidents within a very unstable political context. In Libya, the vacuum caused by foreign bombing campaigns and the death of Gadhafi have led to foreign interference and the de facto division of the country.

What has changed?
Apart from their names, with the exception of Morocco, what has really changed in the leadership of these states? The most typical case is that of Mohammed VI: even though there is a parliament, the Moroccan monarchy is one with absolute power and the king governs. The protest movements are continually repressed by Mohammed VI.  The media are strictly controlled.
In Tunisia, the extremely poor attempts at government since 2011 have increased mistrust of political parties. The election in October 2019 of the most recent president, Kais Saied, like that of his predecessors, is not the expression of a party and even the new parliament has been dominated by abstentions and fragmentation.

Military vehicles in front of the cathedral of Tunis on the Habib Bourguiba lane during the Jasmine Revolution. (Photo: M.Rais).

The power of the president is limited by the Constitution of 2014 to avoid a return to the past, but due to a serious lack of stability, he has assumed an increasingly active role, imposing his will on parliament in the formation of governments (two since he came to power), and so distancing himself from his ministers. His interventions, especially in the social field, have multiplied. Despite the economic crisis, aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic, the president’s popularity remains high: it has been estimated to be as high as 73%, far higher than all other politicians. This confirms the rejection of party rule by a large part of society who identify with the authoritative and responsible figure of the president who consequently seems to have the strength to resist the attacks which the fundamentalists of Ennahda and the businessman Nabil Karoui have been conducting against him.

Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune.

In Algeria, President Tebboune, elected after the resignation of Bouteflika in polls that were questioned by protestors, has adopted, for the time being, the priority of preventing Hirak from returning to the streets, especially after the referendum of 1 November, which has consecrated the new Constitution that leaves the system still in power. The reform of the Constitution was approved with the lowest electoral participation rate in history, as only 23.7 percent of 24 million citizens have the right to vote.
In Egypt, al-Sisi has created for himself an irresistible position with the army and in contrasting the government of Mohamed Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood, used to stifle the popular uprising. With the support of the army ensured, the General discarded Morsi, deposed in July 2013, championing those protesting their dissatisfaction with the fundamentalist government and presenting himself as the only alternative to save the nation. Since then, al-Sisi has exercised his power as sheer violence with the instruments of a military dictatorship.

The movements and the coronavirus
While the political-institutional picture ten years after the uprisings is a desolate one, what remains of the movements behind them? It must be said, first of all, that even before the Covid-19, there were all the basic elements that served to foment the revolts of 2011: the young people (2/3 of the population are less than thirty years old), youth unemployment and increasing inequality, and, of course, the failure of progress in the field of democracy, with the partial exception of Tunisia. Countries initially shielded from protests, such as Algeria and Sudan, entered the field last year, while dissent movements, more fragile and fragmented with the single exception of Hirak in Algeria, continued to come out into the open until the lockdown took place.

The pandemic provided a pretext to outlaw the protests that had characterised the season. The more original case is that of Algeria; the most numerous, nonviolent and continuing popular movement, which started in February 2019, responsibly decided last March, in line with their declared values, to suspend public appearances. Those in power took advantage of this to launch oppression against activists and against the media and journalists who use the internet and social media. Basically, this is the terrain most feared by those in power who ostensibly rule it with new laws ‘to restore order’ in the sector, while really trying to prevent the spread of protests by means of the social media, to identify activists and to present a version of events that excluded mention of popular dissatisfaction. In brief, those in power also rule the virtual streets with 2.0 tanks, a common policy that characterises all the North African political regimes. Will the end of the pandemic again spark off protests? This is the great question being asked by the movements today.

A partial answer comes from the emergency itself. The Covid has spied upon the persistence of economic and social discontent, with localised but significant revolts. The crisis of the informal economy that characterises more than a third of all the economies on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, of the tourist sector in Tunisia and Morocco, the financial difficulties of all the countries have struck not only the poorest but also the middle classes. The movements represent the spontaneous response of society to the failed renewal of the political class and the parties, the inability of the old élite to represent their needs and provide an adequate response.
The new movements, especially those that are more mature such as the Algerian Hirak, are neither demanding immediate elections nor proposing new institutional models, but, before all else, demand the dismantling of the security systems that, from Egypt to Morocco, constitute the real obstacles to democracy.

Luciano Ardesi