TwitterFacebookInstagram

Cyril Ramaphosa and the struggle for reform in South Africa.

Respected by public opinion and the international community, Ramaphosa has to fight against the various factions and groups within the ANC. The economic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic  are hampering further reform efforts.

It is now just over three years since Cyril Ramaphosa became president of South Africa, taking over from Jacob Zuma, whose nine years in office were marked by corruption, the weakening of important state institutions, and a general disrespect for the rule of law and for constitutional values.
Mr Ramaphosa’s election, first as head of the African National Congress (ANC) in December 2017, and then as national president three months later, was widely welcomed. He has a reputation for integrity and moderation, and is a careful and constructive political operator. He is also a highly intelligent and articulate person; indeed, when Nelson Mandela retired in 1999, it was his personal wish that Mr Ramaphosa should be his successor.

Former South African president Jacob Zuma.

If Mr Mandela’s wish had been honoured, Mr Ramaphosa would have taken over a fairly united governing party, a state with relatively strong democratic institutions, and an economy that was performing solidly, if not spectacularly. Instead, nearly 20 years later, he came to power as the head of a deeply divided and corrupted party, and with the economy continually faltering on the edge of recession.
Even though the ANC won 57 per cent of the vote in the last election (2019), giving it an outright majority in Parliament, Mr Ramaphosa governs like someone in charge of a very unstable coalition. He continually has to keep different groups and constituencies happy – but these groups are the factions in his own party, rather than rivals from other parties.

No control of the ANC
Essentially, the internal battle in the ANC is between those who see politics as a public service, and who want to build the country, and those who see it as a route to self-enrichment and acquisition. Jacob Zuma epitomised the latter tendency, and he and his supporters still exert a strong influence in the structures and branches of the party, most importantly the national executive committee of about 80 people, and the ‘top six’ group of office bearers. Mr Ramaphosa has a small and uncertain majority support among the 80, but only one other of the top six is a strong ally. Two are clearly against him, coming from the Zuma camp, and the remaining two are likely to swing opportunistically to whichever faction is in the ascendancy.

The logo of  African National Congress.

From all this it can be seen that President Ramaphosa has had a hard time in his attempts to reform the ANC and to undo the damage caused by his predecessor. However, he has succeeded in some significant ways. One of his first steps was to appoint new heads to many of the state institutions that had been undermined by Mr Zuma; for example, the National Prosecuting Authority, the Revenue Service and the Police Service. He also instituted independent commissions of enquiry, led by judges, to examine numerous allegations of corruption and governance failures. These are now beginning to bear fruit, and a number of criminal prosecutions have been launched.
But Mr Ramaphosa has also managed to change the overall approach of government. There is a much greater sense of accountability, and of respect for the Constitution and for democratic institutions. Most importantly, perhaps, he has shown a determination to end the practice of ‘state capture’ whereby corrupt private interests, working with politicians and government officials, were able to take control of state bodies, including major state-owned companies, and exploit them for financial gain.Regrettably, apart from the internal political problems described above, two other factors have hampered Mr Ramaphosa’s efforts – the country’s weak economy and, of course, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Poverty and inequality
For many years South Africa’s economic growth has not matched its population growth. The unemployment rate has risen steadily and is now over 30 per cent. Government debt, although still relatively low by international standards, has increased significantly and the tax authorities, weakened by state capture, have not brought in as much revenue as they should.
All this makes it difficult for the government to meet its spending targets in areas such as health, housing, education, land-reform, and social welfare. Poverty and inequality remain serious problems, leading to outbreaks of social unrest, and young people, especially, are questioning whether democratic politics offers them any hope for a better future.

Soweto Township.

Given this already difficult political-economic context, the COVID-19 pandemic constituted yet another difficult challenge for Mr Ramaphosa and his government. Not only was the economy effectively shut down for most of 2020, but money had to be found to pay for increased social grants, and to equip the health sector to cope with tens of thousands of victims of the disease.
To his credit, Mr Ramaphosa has shown great leadership qualities during this crisis. He comes across as calm and in control of the situation. He regularly addresses the nation on television and radio, communicating the seriousness of the situation, but also giving reassurances that the authorities are managing it competently. Most medical experts believe that the government has worked effectively and proactively to deal with the virus, and there has been good co-operation between the state health authorities and the country’s strong private health sector.

The ‘anti-Ramaphosa’ faction
South African presidents are limited to two full terms in office; this means that Mr Ramaphosa could be president up to 2029, since his first full term began only with the general election of May 2019.
If it was certain that he would serve for such a long period, we could be confident that he would achieve many of the most needed political reforms, and perhaps also that he would be able to make significant economic progress.

Unfortunately, there is no such certainty. The ‘anti-Ramaphosa’ faction in the ANC is fighting very hard to undermine his efforts to build clean and accountable government. Many of this faction’s leaders know that, if Ramaphosa succeeds, they will go to jail for their corrupt dealings. Others in the more junior ranks of the party resent the fact that they have not yet had the opportunity to fill their pockets; for them, a political career is a way to become wealthy and they have no interest in supporting a leader who promotes the politics of service.
In December next year the ANC will hold its five-yearly national conference, at which the party’s leadership is elected. In 2017, Mr Ramaphosa won by a very narrow margin. Despite his many achievements, and despite his great personal popularity across all sectors of the population, there is no guarantee whatsoever that he will win again.  The next 20 months could be perhaps the most crucial in South Africa’s democratic history.

Mike Pothier      

 

 

DR.Congo/Nigeria/Ghana. Towards new life.

On a hill in the city of Bukavu in the south of the DR Congo, a centre has been built to take in girls accused of witchcraft. In the deep south of Nigeria, a Sister fights against ancient beliefs and in a rural diocese of Ghana, the Church works to give hope to many children.

Her face is serene and smiling as she caresses one of the little girls she looks after at the Ek’abana house on one of the hills of Bukavu, in the Kivu region in the south of the country.
The centre has become a place of refuge for many little women who one day were called witches. Some are only five, some about twelve or older. Some have been beaten, others thrown out of their homes and others were subjected to attempted lynching. Sr. Natalina takes all of them in and listens to them. Every day, these little girls present a problem whether great or small to which she gives a solution, especially by encouraging, urging, calming and reassuring them. She is aware that her task is to bind up their broken hearts. Ek’abana has two meanings in the Bashi language: ‘The home of the children’ and ‘The children have a home’. Natalina Isella is a seventy-year-old Italian Sister who has spent more than forty years in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Sr. Natalina says: “Sorcery is a way of finding an explanation for a life of suffering. Of course, it is not the only explanation. There is also the break-up of families and the child of a previous marriage of the husband or wife is often accused; there are also the little ones born on the roads from extremely poor and girls who have been raped; ignorance, too, makes people accuse the neighbour’s girl of causing some illness or death. Most serious of all, there are small sects led by greedy pastors who mix Christianity with a lot of superstition and presumed spiritual powers. Behind these accusations of sorcery, there is almost always one of those fake saints”.
They have deep wounds, these little girls. They have been told: “It was you who killed your mother”; “It was you who made your playmates sick”. They are treated like the condemned and thrown out onto the street.
What takes place in the minds and hearts of little girls when they are called sorcerers? In years to come, will they ever forget such a traumatic experience? Sr. Natalina says: “These are the questions that we must ask ourselves when we are faced with these children and hear the stories they cannot tell without being overcome with emotion.”
Sr. Natalina is a member of the Women Disciples of the Crucified, a small religious Institute of the diocese of Milan founded by Barnabite Gaetano Barbieri in 1964. She first came to the Congo in 1976. First, she used to look after poor families, and then she took care of former child-soldiers, after which she worked in a literacy programme for women.  The missionary Sister recalls: “It was 22 January 2002 when they brought me a group of nine homeless girls accused of witchcraft. What could I do? Leave them to sleep on a piece of cardboard? I took them in and began this work of mine. We had a small house and we arranged to be what we now call Ek’abana. In a matter of a few months, thirty more girls came to us: it was like an explosion”.

Today Ek’abana has about fifteen girl residents. Their number changes continually since their stay here is just the first of many stages on the long road to recovery. Each of them needs a family and each one is a particular case: some need to restore relations with their parents and siblings while others need to find grandmothers, aunts or cousins to take care of them. They need to go to school and learn a trade. In the past nineteen years, more than 450 girls have passed through Ek’abana and are now enjoying a ‘normal’ life. The house is also home to about twenty tiny unfortunate infants who were abandoned or left as orphans.
The tiny but tenacious missionary Sister has created a close-knit network of solidarity which provides the resources not only for Ek’abana but also a group of social workers who accompany the girls in their homes and collaborate with the police to sensitise the population against violence, abuses and accusations of witchcraft against minors.

Nigeria. A nun cares for abandoned children labelled as witches
Three years after taking in the little girl Inimffon and her younger brother, Sister Matylda Iyang finally heard from the mother who had abandoned them.
“Their mother came back and told me that she (Inimffon) and her younger sibling are witches, asking me to throw them out of the convent”, said Sr. Iyang, who runs the Mother Charles Walker Children Home at the Handmaids of the Holy Child Jesus convent. Such an accusation is not new to Sister Iyang.

Since opening the home in 2007, Sr. Iyang has cared for dozens of malnourished and homeless children from the streets of Uyo, the state capital of Akwa Ibom, in South Nigeria; many of them had family who believed they were witches. Witch profiling and the abandoning of children are common on the streets of Akwa Ibom.
If a man remarries, Sr. Iyang said, the new wife may be intolerant of the child’s attitude after being married to the widower, and as such, will throw the child out of the house.
“To achieve this, she would accuse him or her of being a witch”, Sr. Iyang continued. “That’s why you can find many children in the streets and when you ask them, they will say it’s their stepmother who drove them out of the house”.

She said poverty and teenage pregnancy can also force children into the street. At the Mother Charles Walker Children Home, where most of the children are sheltered and sent to school on scholarship, Sr. Iyang demonstrates the Catholic Church’s commitment to protecting child rights. She said most of the malnourished youngsters the order receives are those who lost their mother during childbirth “and their families bring them to us for care”. One of the important activities for Sr. Iyang is tracing and reunification. The process begins with parental verification by gathering information about each child and their location prior to separation. With the information in hand, an investigator drives to the child’s home village to verify what has been learned.
The process involves community chiefs, elders and religious and traditional leaders to ensure that each child is properly integrated and accepted in the community. If that fails, a child will be placed in the adoption protocol under government supervision.
Since opening the Mother Charles Walker Children Home in 2007, Sr. Iyang and the staff have cared for about 120 children. About 74 have been reunited with their families, she said.
“We now have 46 left with us”, she said, “hoping that their families will one day pick them up or that they will have foster parents”.

 Ghana. A new chance at life
“I was about four or five … I came here because I was accused of witchcraft and I was condemned by my family and my community”, said Sarah, aged 12. When Sarah was four years old, she was wrongly implicated in the deaths of fifteen people in her community, simply because she had a speech impediment. In accordance with local customs in parts of northern Ghana, some people in Sarah’s community believed the little girl to be a ‘spirit child’. Under these customs, any child born with a disability or whose mother dies during their birth may be considered a bad omen, and their lives placed at risk.

Many in Sarah’s community, including her own family, became furious at her inability or unwillingness to speak and defend herself against the allegations, casting her out and threatening to kill her.
Thankfully, Sister Stan Therese Mumuni and the local Church were made aware of the imminent danger Sarah was in. Sister Stan recalls fighting – almost physically – to save Sarah from a terrible fate and give her a new chance at life.”When a child is born with a physical defect, they think it is a child with an evil spirit, and they have to get rid of such children; and we say that this cannot be done”, explained Bishop Vincent Sowa of Yendi. To rescue children from this practice, the diocese supports the Nazareth Home, run by Sister Therese Stan.

“These children have a wide variety of disabilities: malformations, blindness, Down syndrome, syphilis. All these children have been accused of witchcraft and have been thrown out of their communities and families, and have been threatened with death”, explained Sister Stan. The home rescues these children and takes full responsibility for them.Sister Stan has dedicated the last decade to running the Nazareth Home for God’s Children in the Diocese of Yendi in Ghana, a haven where children like Sarah are given shelter, nutritious meals, healthcare and education as well as unconditional love.
At the Nazareth Home for God’s Children, the children receive quality education so that they may one day gain employment and provide for themselves. Sister Stan’s dream is that one day they will return to their home communities and show how the love and support of the Church has empowered them to develop and reach their goals.

Rose Mary Mutesa

 

 

 

 

Cote d’Ivoire. Old and new challenges.

Former President Laurent Gbagbo has received the green light to take back his role on the political scene of Cote d’Ivoire.
Apparently, he has now the possibility to engage again in the fight for predominance that he has been fighting for thirty years. A fight that risks tearing the country apart.

On 31st March 2021, the International Criminal Court (ICC, headed on this occasion by a Nigerian judge, Chile Eboe-Usuji) definitively acquitted Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, one of his ministers. They had been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the civil war fought in Cote d’Ivoire in 2010-2011.

Laurent Gbagbo, the former President of Côte d’Ivoire.

After he lost the presidential election in 2010, Gbagbo refused to concede defeat and resisted. He was chased by rebel groups that supported the winner of the election, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, with the help of foreign troops (primarily French) in April 2011. Gbagbo and Blé Goudé were brought to justice in front of the ICC in The Hague. But the prosecution team, led by a Gambian judge, Fatou Bensouda, did not succeed in proving they were guilty. They had been acquitted for the first time in 2019, but the prosecutor had asked for another trial.
Gbagbo’s former wife, Simone, who was charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in Cote d’Ivoire, was also acquitted in 2017 before an amnesty in 2018.
There is an ongoing debate regarding Bensouda’s responsibility, her strategy, and the structural weaknesses of the prosecution.
But the political consequences of the March 2021 sentence seem quite clear: Gbagbo can go back to Cote d’Ivoire. And this can have a deep impact on the politics of the African country.
The former President still enjoys some popular support even if his party, the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), split due to the quarrel between Gbagbo’s supporters, who wanted to boycott any political process until his liberation, and the wing led by Pascal Affi N’Guessan, who challenged Ouattara by participating in elections. The two wings still did not become reconciled, and in the 2021 political elections, they competed separately. Gbagbo’s supporters ran as Ensemble pour la Démocratie et la Souveraineté (EDS) while their former partners ran as FPI. They won 8 and 2 seats respectively.

The danger of ivoirité
Gbagbo has been the main actor on the Ivorian political scene since the ‘90s. What happened in Ivorian politics since the death of the founding father of the republic Felix Houphouet-Boigny in 1993 can be synthesized as a turf war between Ouattara, Henri Konan Bédié (leader of the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire – Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, PDCI-RDA) and Gbagbo.

President of Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara.

These three men have been fighting for power for thirty years. Often, two of them would join forces against the third. At the moment, Bédié and Gbagbo are allied against Ouattara who was confirmed in 2015 and 2020. They created a joint list for the 2021 election that gained 50 seats, in addition to the seats gained by their respective parties. When Ouattara and Gbagbo clashed after the 2010 presidential elections (for some months the country had formally two heads of state), Bédié supported Ouattara against Gbagbo.
This fight has had a deep impact not only on the political scene but also on Ivorian society in general. The rivalry is also rooted in ethnicity, with cleavages between the ethnic groups living in the North and those based in the South. The first were basically excluded from power within the institutions (especially the armed forces) before Ouattara’s ascent to power. The ethnic factions, that date back to colonial times and Houphouet-Boigny’s policies, degenerated in the ‘90s when Bédié introduced the idea of “ivoirité” (that can be translated as “the characteristic of being Ivorian”) to beat Ouattara. With this new concept, to sum up, there was a distinction within the country between the “real Ivorians” and those who could not claim this right. The “real Ivorians” were identified basically with the ethnic groups living in the south while the descendants of the groups that migrated from the North, especially from the territory that is now part of Burkina Faso (but which was a French colony like Cote d’Ivoire), were considered more or less as permanent strangers.

The age gap
Another fracture exists between the leadership and the young generation. In Cote d’Ivoire, 60% of the population is under 25, while Ouattara is 79 years old, Bédié 86 and Gbagbo 75. In the last years, two younger leaders emerged, Hamed Bakayoko and Guillaume Soro, but things did not go well for them. Bakayoko was a member of Ouattara’s circle that succeeded in emerging as a leader with a clear personality. Due to his flamboyant style, he had broad support within the young. But he was a smart politician that had the ability and the connections to reach out to opponents in times of political tension.
In July 2020, Ouattara chose him as a Prime Minister and some analysts saw him as a possible successor to the head of state. But he died of cancer at 56 in March 2021.

Guillaume Soro was the Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire from April 2007 to March 2012.

Guillaume Soro was the political leader of the rebel forces who brought Ouattara to power in 2011. He was subsequently appointed first Prime Minister and then President of the National Assembly. But he became a possible rival to Ouattara and was forced to leave the country. He is 48 years old and has joined the opposition.
At this moment Ouattara’s power seems to be sound. He controls the state apparatus and his party, the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP), has a majority in the National Assembly. But within his front, there are rivalries, first of all about who will be Ouattara’s successor. There were tensions between Bakayoko and older members of the party and when he was Prime Minister, Bakayoko was flanked by Patrick Achi who was put in that place by Ouattara presumably to control him. After Bakayoko’s death, Achi (who is 65) became premier. The president had chosen Amadou Gon Coulibaly as his successor at the 2020 presidential elections. But Coulibaly died in 2020 and Ouattara chose to run again. So, the issue of the succession to Ouattara is still open.

Past and future
Gbagbo’s acquittal creates problems on the Cote d’Ivoire political scene and does not provide answers to such questions as who is responsible for the atrocities committed during the civil war. These facts are not fake news debunked by the judges. According to the ICC, Gbagbo did not commit them. Or rather, there is no convincing evidence of that. So, who did commit them? And what about the allegations of atrocities made by Gbagbo’s supporters against Ouattara’s forces?

It seems that at this moment the answers to these questions will be set aside to favour some sort of political agreement between the three major political leaders. But they presumably will be ready to break that agreement and to shift from one side to the other if it suits them. The enemy of today can become the ally of tomorrow, so it is better not to raise problematic issues. However, these enduring issues may exacerbate tensions and bring about political and ethnic violence.

Andrea Carbonari

Somalia. Tensions rise with Kenya over offshore oil-rich areas.

The weakness of Somalia’s state has incited neighbours to make steps to tap its maritime resources in search of oil and fishing grounds, adding to other tensions which create a dangerous climate.

The chaos that reigned in Somalia after Siad Barre’s overthrowal in 1991 has encouraged predators to take advantage of the weaknesses of the Somalian state to defend its natural resources. Until recently, Somalis accepted this fait accompli. But things changed in 2014, when the Mogadishu authorities filed a complaint to the Hague-based International Court of Justice (ICJ) over the maritime boundary with Kenya, accusing Kenya of encroaching on its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). As a result, Somalia says it is deprived from an area of some 160,000 sq km or 62,000 square miles which hosts lucrative fishing grounds and possibly, huge oil resources.

Kenyans consider that since the colonial period the border line runs alongside a parallel to the line of latitude to the East, which goes through the Lamu archipelago and continues inside the Indian Ocean. Somalis argue that the border must be equidistant from both sides of the coastline and must be the continuation of the terrestrial border and seem determined to boast from what they consider their riches.
In 2019, the Mogadishu government decided to auction oil blocks in the disputed waters at an oil conference in London, organised by the British prospection company Spectrum Geo which conducted a 2D offshore seismic survey in the disputed area. Such decision infuriated Kenya which fears to lose 26 per cent of its EEZ and 85 per cent of the continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical miles limit.
Just before the date of the hearings at the ICJ, Kenya’s Attorney General Kihara Kariuki informed the Court, on the 17 March that the Kenyan authorities would not take part in oral submissions in The Hague. Kenya argued that the case should be delayed while it briefed a new legal team. It also cited the coronavirus pandemic as an excuse to postpone the hearings and also objected to the presence on the ICJ panel of a Somali judge, which according to Nairobi should recuse himself.  Based on international maritime law, the ICJ is expected to rule in Somalia’s favour, guess observers. “Possibly the Kenyans withdrew also because of an expectation that they might just lose,” told the political scientist Stig Jarle Hansen, from the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, in an interview with the Deutsche Welle radio.

Kenya President Uhuru Kenyatta (L) and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo”, president of Somalia. (Credit: thebrief.co.ke).

The court’s president, Judge Joan Donoghue, regretted Kenya’s decision not to participate in the oral proceedings and the ICJ ruled that the case should be heard virtually. Somalia was thus allowed to submit its final conclusions on the 18 March 2020. On that occasion, Somalia’s Deputy Prime Minister Mahdi Mohamed Guled said: “We hoped that it would be possible to settle our dispute with Kenya bilaterally, through negotiations. Unfortunately, that proved impossible”.
Then, on behalf of Somalia, the American Attorney Paul Reichler, stressed that the parallel of latitude proposed by Kenya as the common maritime border results from no known or recognized, or judicially sanctioned, method of delimitation, and fails to produce the equitable boundary that the law requires. In contrast, the equidistance line results from the standard process which the Court has regularly employed in the delimitation of maritime boundaries, he argued.
His British colleague, Edward Craven urged therefore the ICJ to “declare that Kenya, by its conduct in the disputed area, has violated its international obligations and is responsible under international law to make full reparation to Somalia”.
The stakes are considerable. Kenya argues that changing the boundary as Somalia demands would mean the loss of crucial fishing areas. About 90% of the 150,000 inhabitants of the Lamu county depend on fishing. According to Nairobi, the loss of this maritime territory would mean a 50 percent loss of the fishing ground.

But the major stake is oil. The Somalia government is considering to award 15 blocks in a licensing round this year. Seismic data acquired by the Norwegian company TGS estimated that the resources of the Somali basin may reach 30 billion barrels or the equivalent of the current Nigerian production during 40 years! The existence of such bonanza is known to British Petroleum (BP) which carried onshore and offshore explorations in Somalia before the ousting of President Barre.
Somalia’s intentions to auction these oil blocks during an oil and gas conference organised n London in February 2019, increased tensions between both neighbours. After the conference, Kenya recalled its ambassador to Somalia and asked the Somali ambassador in Nairobi to leave the country for consultations.

Fish market in Mogadishu. (Photo: AMISOM).

There is also irritation in Mogadishu where authorities resent the fact that Kenya has already awarded earlier three oil and gas blocks in the disputed area to Italy’s oil major ENI. Other players are joining the scramble. One is Norway whose company Statoil is at odds with Kenya since its expulsion from exploration plans in 2012. The French major Total has been offered a block by Kenya in the disputed maritime zone. The Somalian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources also agreed on a roadmap with Shell and ExxonMobil in 2020 to exploit offshore oil resources and convert a concession to a production sharing agreement.
Somalia’s lawyers complained at the ICJ that Kenya violated Somalia’s rights by authorising oil firms to explore fossil fuels in the same area and awarded oil blocks to at least five oil companies. According to the British lawyer Edward Craven, Kenya accepted that in 2007 the oil company Woodside drilled a deep-water well on Somalia’s side of the equidistance line and concluded that Kenya must annul such concession.
On top of these grievances, the maritime boundary dispute is particularly difficult to settle because of other bones of contention. Theoretically, both countries are allies against the al-Shabab Islamist group, which controls larges rural areas in Somalia and carries out attacks in Kenya. But in December 2020, Somalia accused Kenya of interfering in its internal affairs and severed diplomatic ties – resulting in a mutual recall of ambassadors after Kenya’s red-carpet reception of the self-declared Somaliland’s president.

Aerial view of a Kenyan Navy launch just off the coast of the Somali port city of Kismayo.

Somalia also accuses Kenya of backing the administration of the Jubaland regional state against the federal government whose President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed aka “Farmaj” wants to centralise power and remove Jubaland’s President Ahmed Mohamed Islam, aka “Madobe”. Mogadishu has also accused Kenya to have interfered in the 2019 election in Jubbaland. There were even clashes at the time between the Mogadishu and Jubaland troops, backed respectively by Ethiopian and Kenyan soldiers. Eventually, Madobe, was re-elected. The federal government immediately nullified the poll. But Kenya continued to support Madobe who reneged on the September 2020 election agreement. Then, in December 2020, Mogadishu also deployed troops at the border of both countries
The maritime dispute adds to this bitterness. On the 19 March 2021, Kenya’s Foreign Ministry said: “The government and people of Kenya feel betrayed that Somalia had brought the case before the ICJ after repudiating a maritime boundary that it had consented to for over 35 years”. “Somalia has to normalize its relations with Kenya before it can engage on any platform anywhere in the world with any person and or agent of Kenya through any proxy,” added the Kenya Foreign Ministry. Mediation attempts failed last March after a Djiboutian fact-finding mission sent on behalf of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGGAD), concluded that there wasn’t enough evidence to support Somalia’s claims of Kenyan interference. In the end, Somalia rejected the mission’s conclusions claiming that they weren’t impartial.

Young men look on as they walk down a street in the centre of the port city of Kismayo, southern Somalia.

To make things even more complicate, all these disputes and tensions coincide with the withdrawal from the country, last January of the US forces which supported the troops of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in line with former President Donald Trump’s order. Such withdrawal raises concern both in Mogadishu and in Nairobi. Indeed, in Somalia, U.S. troops’ drone strikes and other operations against al-Shabaab had managed to disrupt significantly jihadist activities. But as showed an attack of a Mogadishu hotel on January 31, when the group killed at least five people, including a former Somali army commander and two civilians, the jihadist organisation remains resilient.
Kenyan Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary Macharia Kamau expressed also concern that the U.S withdrawal might create conditions for the resurgence of al-Shabaab in the areas from where it had been retreating. In such gloomy context, Somalia sent however a signal of compromise. At the ICJ hearing, on the 18 March, its representatives said that Mogadishu was seeking “remedies” for any future boundary dispute and added that it would not necessarily demand compensation from previous violations. Yet, cynics point out that it may take years for the ICJ to rule on the maritime dispute and that it has no power to enforce its rulings.

François Misser

Mexico. Weaving culture.

Within the priceless cultural heritage that is preserved among the Indian peoples of Mexico and includes such important areas as language, rites and world views, pride of place goes to the production of textiles. Textile traditions characteristically reflect extraordinary cultural diversity. A journey among the indigenous peoples of some regions to learn about their rich textile culture.

Chiapas is one of the states of the Mexican republic that has the highest percentage of indigenous people. Tzeltals, Tzotzils and Tojolabals speak languages of the Maya family. Among the Maya of the Highlands, clothing is still an element of cultural identification. In the different villages, items of clothing are produced that have particular characteristics – mainly in the matter of colour and design – which enable those who wear them to show they are different from other members of the same ethnic group.

The validity of the original meaning of the characteristics of the cloth which functions as an identifying sign, has led to the preservation of ancestral techniques among the weavers of the Maya of the Highlands in the manufacture of cloth itself as well as in decorative motifs and last but not least, in their meaning. This does not mean that the weaving tradition of this region was not transformed by the conquest, since the coming of the Spaniards brought with it some raw material such as wool, more suitable to the climatic conditions. Today, in a large number of localities, traditional clothes are produced such as huipiles, belts and capes, as well as other items of western origin such as blouses and shawls and articles like tablecloths, carpets and satchels.

A good proportion of products are woven using the strap loom, with various embroidered or brocaded motifs. Cotton thread is usually used though some areas are distinguished by their use of wool. An important characteristic of the textiles of this region is the sort of decoration used which derives from a view of the world and its inhabitants which frequently predates the Spanish epoch. Among the elements that are found in the textiles of the Highland Mayas are: diamonds, toads, fields of grain and flowers, especially bromeliads. Other motifs represent the sky and the Sun, whose symbol is the butterfly, corn and cornfields.

Oaxaca. Great variety.
No other region possesses the ethnic riches that characterise Oaxaca. In this harsh and diversified territory – which also includes parts of Guerrero as well as the actual state of Oaxaca – there live the Amuzgos, Chatinos, Chinantecs, Cuicatecs, Huaves, Mazatecs, Mixes, Mix-Tecs, Tecuates, Tlapanecs, Triques and the Zapotecs. This richness gives rise to a vast array of cultural expressions, including the textile tradition. Among the characteristics that render the textile production in the Oaxaca region one of the best known in Mexico is its great variety: every region has its distinct attributes and it is believed that there are 300 different items of clothing woven in cotton, wool or silk.

Women’s clothing usually consists of a huipile (a straight, sleeveless shirt), which may vary in length: down below the knee among the Zapotecs and the Mistis of the northern uplands and some Mixtecos; above the knee among the Mazateks and the Chinantecs and also to be found among the Zapotecs of the isthmus. The clothing is completed by a skirt wound round the body from the waist down, of different lengths; the Tehuan women wear long, broad skirts.
Another characteristic element is the unchanging method of production that goes back to pre-Hispanic times.

There are many communities where materials are woven on a backstrap loom and in some of them the spinning wheel is still used to make thread. There are communities in which natural dyes – made from cochineals, indigo and the purpura snail – are still used to colour cloth. In general, the textiles of these regions are decorated splendidly with embroidery showing various motifs, of which some are clearly pre-Hispanic and connected with the indigenous world view.

Nahuas. Trending towards urban dress
This is the largest indigenous group in Mexico: there are almost a million and a half Nahuas-speaking people scattered in various regions. Even though these groups have their language as a common characteristic, it is true to say that their specific cultural expressions vary considerably, based mainly on their post-conquest history.
While the Nahuas in regions such as Mexico City are identified only by their language and some social customs, those in more remote regions, such as Guerrero and Puebla, have preserved a broader array of indigenous cultural elements.

Nahua woman. (Photo: Pueblos indígenas.com)

One of these is the production of textiles. The proximity of many Nahua towns to the large cities caused them to adopt the clothes (shirt and trousers) that the Catholic missionaries considered more modest than the old male loincloth. Today, the Nahuas wear factory-made clothes like all city dwellers. Only in remote places do they wear, with variations, colonial dress. Women’s pre-Hispanic dress was more within the missionary rules and this is why it was perpetuated with fewer changes: a loose skirt, gathered in at the waist, covers the lower part of the body. Above it they also wear a rather long huipile or a cape (quechquémitl).

Since the women would often remove their huipile or quechquémitl at home, from colonial times, long or short-sleeved blouses were adopted which had elaborate embroidery around the neck. Nahua women demonstrate their art and manual ability by making these items of clothing. In Nahua localities where textiles are produced, it is not uncommon to find belt looms and techniques such as gauze, brocade and curved weaving. In some places, the threads are coloured with natural dyes such as indigo and red cochineals. The motifs that decorate these products are varied and reflect a view of the world, the environment and, in a certain way, the cultural transformations of the Nahua groups. They include geometric elements such as circles and rhombi, stars and suns, images of the sky, the wind and streams, maize and corn plants, animals such as serpents, jaguars and birds,
to name but a few.(P.S.)

China global leader in Rare-Earth elements.

China not has only reached 62% of the mineral production, around 90% of its overall subsequent refinement and 36,6% of world reserves of rare-earth elements. Chinese strategy for the control of rare metals has historically shown itself successful from the economic and geopolitical viewpoints. Somewhat less fiscally and environmentally.

1975-1990: how it started? China has been exporting products derived from processing rare-earth minerals since 1975, though in rather small quantities (150 tons). However, after a few years, in the early eighties, both Japan and the United States increased imports considerably. By 1985, Chinese production of chlorides and mixed oxides had increased to 10,000 tons per annum.
The Chinese government, through the National Rare-Earth Development and Application Leading Group, from 1975 to 1990, worked to encourage the development of the nascent mineral industry, especially exports. Exports then qualified for the refund of export duties which further stimulated production. Between 1985 and 1990, production almost doubled from 8,500 to 16,500 tons, with an annual increase of 14%.During this phase, on account of the strong competition between the large number of Chinese producers, prices fell drastically despite an increase in demand. Problems quickly ensued and illegal production became commonplace. Consequently, illegal products were added to the market (at lower prices and avoiding taxes while ignoring environmental standards). All this contributed to the lowering of prices.

Rare-earth mining in China. (Photo/VCG).

1991-1998: a totally Chinese niche. With the boom in the high-tech industry of the nineties, the Chinese government became aware of the importance of the advantage accumulated over the years in the processing of rare-earth minerals. The strategy of the People’s Republic then sought to exclude foreign investors from the sector and exercised rigid control over the issue of mining rights to companies. Only those most qualified and capable of following government norms would be given a free hand to mine and export rare-earth minerals. Furthermore, in 1991, China declared ion clays to be ‘minerals whose use is in the national interest’.  In this way it created an exclusive supply channel reserved only for state mining companies and a few others which became large multinationals close to the government of Peking.

Functional rare earth materials produced by Northern Rare Earth Group (NREG) is one of China’s six state-owned rare earth groups. They are used to make mobile phone screens. (Photo/ CGTN)

Despite numerous restrictions, during this phase the largest increase in overall production occurred (65,000 tons in 1998) with an annual increase of 22%. However, the government measures did not succeed in eliminating the phenomenon of illegal mining in southern China, a problem that exists to this day.
Numerous studies have sought to quantify the illegal component of rare-earth mining in China. Most of them estimate that abusive production since the year 2000 has ranged from 30% to 50% of the legal total registered and placed on the market by the Chinese government. With reference to the lateritic clay quarries (containing rare-earth minerals) it is calculated that illegal activity amounts to 40% of regulated extraction.
Those illegal businesses have an extremely significant impact on economy and ecology: they cause large-scale tax evasion as well as considerable environmental damage.
There is also an aspect of waste and mismanagement of natural resources: illegal mining, in general, extracts only high-quality reserves from the mines and then abandon them.

Rare earth in China’s Inner Mongolia (Photo/VCG)

1999-2009: protect the environment or the rare-earth minerals market? During the first years of the twenty-first century, rare-earth minerals came into their own, on a par with other productions, within the contrasts that characterise Chinese economic growth. For the Chinese government, economic growth dominated politics at least until the end of the millennium. Nevertheless, the problems of environmental sustainability were known (partly due to uncontrolled illegal mining). Peking then introduced export quotas (even a reduction of 40%, in 2009), production ceilings, and export duties. It then placed further restrictions on foreign investment in rare metals. It explained that the manoeuvre was required ‘for reasons of environmental protection and policies for the protection of the country’s natural resources’.

Chinese President Xi Jinping inspects the JL MAG Rare-Earth Co Ltd in East China’s Jiangxi province. (Xinhua Photo).

2010-2018: international controversies and an atmosphere of tension.  The Peking government justified the increased restrictions commenced in 2005 by the need to protect ecosystems. However, diplomatically, for many, the real reason was a contentious (as yet unresolved) dispute with Japan. At the core of the dispute is sovereignty over the Senkaku islands (and the vast petroleum deposits in the surrounding waters). At first, the question involved only the island nation but then widened to include Europe and the United States as well. A reduction of Chinese supplies would have endangered, if not wholly paralysed, the high-tech industry in these countries. Meanwhile, rare-earth mineral prices had risen by 300%, with peaks as high as 4000%. The controversy was resolved by the WTO which recognised that China had violated international law. But it was not until December 2014 that the Peking government removed export limits, normalising the situation.
The international community nevertheless launched a series of initiatives to reduce chronic dependence on Chinese rare-earth minerals. The European Union, which cannot rely on new deposits, is seeking to establish accords with alternative trusted producers.
More recently, to boot, the United States tried to distance itself from Peking. The question originated when China threatened reactions due to the economic war launched by the US. The possibility of a break in the supply chain of the electronic industry gave rise in the USA to the emergence of the need to invest heavily in research and the development of alternative materials to rare-earth minerals.

A machine extracts rare-earth materials at the Bayan Obo mine in Inner Mongolia, China. (Photo/VCG).

China and rare-earth minerals today: consolidated leadership? The economic and geopolitical affairs involving China and its strategy and control of rare-earth minerals are therefore many. Nevertheless, it is believed that Peking will probably succeed in maintaining its leadership of the market, for two reasons in particular.
Firstly, even after 2018, the silent Chinese tactics for the monopoly of rare-earth minerals does not seem to have changed. Increasingly severe norms for mining and exporting minerals, as well as a reduction in production are still the basis of the government programme. In this way, Peking has a hold over a large part of the large hi-tech companies. This means that prices rise and any reason is sufficient for reducing exports (like at present, due to transport difficulties caused by the pandemic).
The second reason is that, even though they are not ‘rare’, as the name would suggest, the work of mining and processing these elements is very expensive. Most of all, it is complex and not easily replicated. In other words, China can depend upon incalculable expertise. “The rare-earth elements are peculiar in that their deposits were formed in a completely different way.
Therefore, the mining methods cannot be replicated or exported to other countries”, explained Rodrìguez-Blanco, a geologist and professor of micro-mineralogy at Trinity College Dublin. “An example: the manner of separating the minerals at the Bayan Obo sites in Mongolia would be completely useless in an Australian or African quarry”.

Vittoria Mamerti/Valori

Rare Earths. Future prospects?

How does the rare earth market work? Which are the more desirable elements and which companies are best positioned to exploit and sell them on? Will China’s dominance be challenged one day?
We asked Nikolas Toleris, Senior Equity Research Analyst at Metals & Mining of Mirabaud Securities Limited, a Swiss investment company based in Geneva. 

How would he describe the rare earth market from the financial
point of view?
The market is very much concentrated on the finished products, the oxides. From 80%-85% of the oxides are produced by Chinese companies, whether legally or illegally. Only 15% of the total is produced outside China, especially in the United States, Australia and Malaysia. Due to the growing demand for rare earth over the last decade, a consequence of the rapid change to a greener economy, new deposits are being sought to increase and diversify what is on the market.

What exactly is extracted?
Today, extraction is essentially concentrated on two elements, neodymium and praseodymium which are the most used and the most expensive. They are used especially in wind turbines and electric cars. They are the future of the rare earth market.

How is rare earth used in the finished products?
Wind turbines use forty times the quantity of neodymium and praseodymium than that required for an electric car, for every Megawatt (MW) of installed capacity. Considering that a turbine has a capacity of around 3 MW, we may say that every turbine requires 120 more neodymium and praseodymium than what is required for an electric car.

Do wind turbines dominate the market?
Yes, up to now. However, we must bear in mind that today there are 550,000 MW of capacity installed in wind turbines worldwide, but the number of turbines will not increase as fast as the demand for electric cars where the market is just beginning while that of the turbines is already consolidated. Consequently, even if each electric car uses much less neodymium and praseodymium than wind turbines, the number of electric cars being sold in the world will increase much faster than that of the wind turbines. Today, there are already 4-5 million electric vehicles but in the medium to long term, the number will reach 50 – 100 million. To understand the future of the rare earth market, we must concentrate on the evolution of the electric car market and not
on that of wind turbines.

In which companies quoted on the stock exchange could one invest?
Today, the market centres upon the finished products which are the oxides, and it is almost completely controlled by China. There are only two companies outside of China that extract rare earths (basically neodymium and praseodymium) and process them to trade in the oxides: these are the United States MP Materials and the Australian/Malaysian Lynas companies. They are the only large companies outside China that have facilities capable of processing the extracted minerals and transforming them into oxides that can be used in industrial production.

Is it not possible to invest in Chinese companies?
It is indeed possible but we have never considered doing so. They are too volatile, risky and mostly not quoted on the stock exchanges of Europe or the United States and their transparency cannot be compared to that in western countries. Their businesses are often found too volatile as well.

In what way?
It often happens in China that a mine may commence zinc extraction, for example, and then, if it happens that the price of copper goes up, zinc extraction ceases and is replaced by copper extraction. It is something like what happens in agriculture: one year, potatoes are grown and harvested and the next year carrots are grown. An institutional investor cannot take such risks. A fair part of the Chinese companies in the rare earth sector are involved in the production of ‘concentrates’, a much simpler process. Very few of them produce oxides.

What does ‘concentrates’ mean?
Neodymium and praseodymium are present in a concentration of around 3% in the material extracted from mines. The next step is ‘concentration’: a process that increases the percentage of the raw material up to 30%. Many companies stop at this stage.

And the next phase?
The extraction of the oxides follows. This is the more complex phase and requires substantial investment due to its cost and has to be treated with large quantities of toxic chemicals that create serious environmental problems. In China, where a large part of the production of oxides of neodymium and praseodymium takes place, environmental legislation is still very bland and the dangers are not sufficiently monitored. However, this advantage in regulations is not expected to last long since it will eventually be necessary to introduce stricter regulations even in China. In China, but also in Mongolia, they have today a huge problem with the toxic waste resulting from processing rare earth.

Rare earth metals firm Pensana is exploring a partnership with China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) to develop its flagship mine in Angola.

How is it possible to compete with China?
In the rest of the world, it is today very difficult to set up factories to process rare earth and produce oxides. An attempt is being made at the moment by the British company Pensana Rare Earth (PRE), which plans to extract rare earth in Angola and is constructing a facility to process them and produce oxides in Great Britain. For the time being, Pensana Rare Earth aims to extract and ‘concentrate’ neodymium and praseodymium, two processes that are neither costly nor particularly complex. The real challenge lies in producing the oxides.

And what does Pensana intend to do?
Plans have been made for an investment of $120-$150 million. But this is only the beginning. They will need much more investment in the future since the market is very complex and there are high barriers at the entrance. The aim of Pensana, in the meantime, is to gain 5% of the market in wind turbines with the first and only facility for processing rare earth (for the production of oxides) in Europe.

Why has the price of rare earth increased?
The increase in the price of rare earth (neodymium and praseodymium) is due to the expected increase in wind turbines and electric cars in the future. Since the pandemic started, in mid-2020, there has been the expectation of a more rapid transition towards an economy of lower emissions of CO2 and this has forced the price of rare earth upwards. The investors now believe that it will take less time to move to electric vehicles and more decisive investment in renewable energy.

But are the prices of rare earth negotiable?
The rare earth markets are not regular and there are no continually negotiated prices. This is due to the fact that there are only a few producers, 85% of whom are located in China. However, we can give some figures. In mid-2020, the price of neodymium and praseodymium varied from $40 to $50 per kilogramme. It is now $70 and I think that by early 2022, it shall have reached $100. We are therefore speaking of a 100% increase in little more than a year.

Do neodymium and praseodymium cost the same?
Yes, they cost more or less the same. Neodymium is the more expensive and is quoted today at $85-$90 per kilogramme, while praseodymium is priced at around $60. Then there is the commercialisation of an oxide that is the outcome of a mixture of neodymium and praseodymium. When I speak of the prices of these two rare-earth elements, I am referring to the neodymium-praseodymium league that fixes the prices of both these elements.

Is it possible that Latin America or Africa may eventually overtake China?
Rare-earth elements are to be found everywhere. What matters is the concentration of neodymium and praseodymium in the mines. It is therefore impossible to say if Latin America or Africa, or both of these, may become important competitors of China in the future. At the moment, both outcomes are possible.

Mauro Meggiolaro/Valori

Kenya. Rose Wanjikũ Mũriũ. Karate girl.

She wants to make history: to be the first Kenyan Karate Woman to take part in the Olympics.

Rose has always done things differently from other girls. Growing up, she hung out with her three older brothers and their friends, taking part in all manner of antics – from stealing a neighbour’s maize to hunting and cooking game meat. She did everything with such passion that she became a leader in the group, deciding the most daring schemes the group would do.She became one of the boys, fighting whenever an opportunity presented itself. Being short and thin, she was always defeated. She hated loosing. So, she decided that, if forced to fight, she would use all her strength.

One day, she spoilt her brother’s paper ball by mistake. When he found out, a fight ensued, and she hit his stomach as hard as she could. Her brother fought back and won. The next day, as they were chatting, her brother confessed that his stomach still hurt. This was the first time she had an inkling of how lethal her punch could be.
Had Rose gone to an all-girls high school, as is usually the case, she probably would not be the popular ‘karate champ’ she is today. In her school, to get girls’ attention, the teenage boys would grab something belonging to one of them and ask her to collect it later from his desk, thereby giving him a chance to talk privately to the girl. The boys enjoyed the game. The girls did not.
Rose hated it.

She decided to join the karate club to learn to fight. Assuming she would beat anyone at the slightest provocation, the boys did not touch her things. How wrong they were! They did not know that karate abhors violence and encourages karatekas (karate practitioners) to make peace in an altercation rather than fight.
Initially, many girls joined the karate club, but only a handful persevered. They could not bear the body pain that came after each training session.
Rose, instead, did not mind it, and gradually became a good fighter.
Rose loved the sport and decided to pursue it as a career. This meant that, after high school, she had to leave home, in Mũrang’a County, and go to Nairobi. Why? Since she wanted to take karate to a professional level, she needed to train under a teacher recognised by Kenya Karate Federation (KKF), a kind of expertise that could be found only in the capital.Unlike many other women who approach karate to learn the ABCs of self-defence, Rose decided immediately that this would be her ‘sport’.
She was introduced to KKF Secretary General, Gabriel Mutuku, who was training karatekas in Nairobi. Gabriel has been in karate since he finished high school. His career spans over 20 years. As a young man, he joined the Police Force and soon started looking for opportunities to compete in the sport, asking for time off to take part in matches. His interest was so evident that the Force sponsored him to participate in different tournaments.

This helped him nurture his talent. Eventually, after participating in several tournaments, he made it to the Kenya Karate National Team, where he represented his country, until he was 35, the maximum age allowed for competitive fights.
Rose would train with Gabriel three times a week. Her brother, who owned a shop, supported her, and when she was not training, she helped him. After sometime, she got a part-time job as a karate instructor of kids. She perfected her skills, while waiting for the Kenya Karate Open Tournament, held once a year, where she would have an opportunity to get into the national team.
Her coach tried to dissuade her, because she needed more training before becoming proficient. And he was dead right! Rose, still a ‘green belt’, would be competing with ‘black belts’. Her chances to get to the national team were slim. Rose, however, who had never backed down from a challenge since she was a child, decided to go ahead. She kept telling herself: “It will be competitive, but I have been training and I am determined to make to the team”. She knew that the Federation gives equal opportunity to fighters who want to be part of the national team. If a young fighter manages to beat one who has been in the team for years, it is the ‘newcomer’ to enter the team, since he or she is seen as more ‘hungry’. And that is exactly how Rose got into the team.

In countries where karate is popular, national federations look after the welfare of the national teams, making sure they get state of the art training equipment and paying salaries for the athletes and coaches. KKF, instead, does not have sponsors. Gabriel has always a hard time convincing potential patrons and promoters. It is a question of numbers: advertisers would invest their money to support popular sports – like athletics or football – rather than a sport, like karate, whose supporters can hardly fill a stadium during championships, though the entire ‘karate fraternity’ in Kenya is participating.
Some karatekas in the national team, who are lucky to be hired by the government like Gabriel, are allowed time off to train, while still getting a salary. But this applies only to half of those in the national team. The other athletes of the team train when they can get time off work, normally, early morning, evening and Saturdays. The only time they get a full day training is when the government sponsors a camp, which normally is held two weeks before international championships.
Rose’s first international karate tournament was in South Africa in 2014. She was expected to fight a woman from France, and she felt intimidated. This fear increased when she watched them expertly
win their fights.
Rose closed her eyes and told herself: “Juts fight as you always did when you were a child, facing an indomitable opponent: strike first with a powerful punch”. And when the referee gave the start signal, she launched herself to the attack and hit the opponent with a devastating punch in the stomach. It was clear that she had taken the blow.
Rose smiled inside. She had found a way to beat her. Rose’s strategy was to get her out of the ring four times, which would amount to a defeat. Karate is not like other sports where skill determines the winner. Karate greatly rewards the fighter’s ability to resort to cunning moves. And Rose’s wiles helped her win.

Rose does not cry easily. Yet, that day, her eyes were glazed over, and she had to strain rather hard to hold back her tears. It was the proudest day of her life. She had won the gold medal for her country.
Rose is now training for the Olympic qualifying fights, since Karate will make its debut at the 2021 Summer Olympics Games in Tokyo, Japan. She trains three times a week for about three hours with the team, before going to work. When she gets home in the evening, she goes on the Internet to practice the moves she found difficult during training. She works hard with what she has, not dwelling on the lack of proper equipment or enough hours to train. She wants to make history: to be the first Kenyan Karate Woman to take part in the Olympics. With a bit of luck, she might win the gold medal for Kenya, as she did in South Africa.

Marie Mulli

 

Rare Earth Elements. Latin America and Africa. Great dreams.

Latin America has reserves of rare earth and ‘technological metals’ estimated to amount to 50 million tons. This is around 40% of the world total. In Bolivia alone, resources (potential reserves) of lithium, used in making batteries and electric cars, may be as much as 21 million tons. The second in line is Argentina with 17 million tons and then Chile, with 9 million. Brazil is the major world producer of niobium with 59,000 tons mined in 2019 and 11 million tons of reserves certified. Then there is coltan, a crucial component in mobile phones and video cameras, extracted using out-of-date techniques and indigenous labour in Columbia, which has 5% of global reserves.

These are but a few examples of the wealth of rare metals deposits to be found in the subsoil of Latin America. On the surface, however, there is Amazonia, the Bolivian Highlands and the desert of Sonora: territories that are rich in culture and biodiversity. For these, the mines represent an opportunity but also a threat.
“The risks involved in the extraction of rare earths in Latin America are very clear and common to all mineral extraction activities”, says Julie Klinger, a lecturer in geography at Delaware (USA) University, who in 2017 published a book entitled “Rare Earth Frontiers: From Terrestrial Subsoils to Lunar Landscapes”. “This involves – she continues – high social and environmental risks.

The fact is that but a small part of the earnings go to the extraction and production countries because the benefits are mostly exported”.
Those gaining most from this are China or, generally speaking, the countries of eastern Asia. The raw or minimally processed material is exported and processed in factories run by foreign companies in eastern Asia. Once the raw material has been processed, it is reimported in the form of batteries, solar panels or generators which have added value and therefore cost more. The system is also used by the United States: processing costs much less in Asia where the environmental regulations are less demanding.

Africa. Huge potential
The Steenkampskraal mine, 350 km from Cape Town, in South Africa, was opened in 1949. From 1952 to 1964, it was used to extract thorium, a radioactive metal used as nuclear fuel. It was then discovered that within it there was also monazite, a mineral containing rare earth minerals in large quantities. Then neodymium and praseodymium that are essential elements in many industrial applications, and also very expensive, were found to be present.

South Africa. Steenkampskraal mine contains all fifteen rare earths.

For South Africa, it may be like manna from heaven. Trevor Blench, president of Steenkampskraal mine, has declared that, “China, with its own supply needs, is exporting a small and diminishing amount of rare earths. It is therefore vital that other suppliers enter the market as suppliers of these elements to the United States, Europe and Japan. In our location, about 14% of the rock is composed of rare earths. This is an extraordinary grade and nothing like it is to be found anywhere in the world”.On average, mines usually have a grade of 6%. The South African mine is capable of extracting 2700 tons per year at full capacity. It must however be said, as pointed out by Diego Oliva-Velez, and analyst of Fitch Solutions in London, “ The Steenkampskraal mine contains mostly light rare earths such as neodymium and praesodymium which are more abundant in the world and so less sought-after than the heavier rare earths”.Apart from South Africa, there are other countries in the continent that have potentially abundant reserves that have not been touched. In particular, Burundi is a pioneering African state with a mine in Gakara where a British company, Rainbow Rare Earths, is working, controlled by the Greek magnate Adonis Pouroulis. To date, this is the only African mine already functioning. The businessman has signed a partnership with the African state which permits his firm to use the mine for a period not less than 25 years.

Burundi. Aerial view of Gakara.

Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world and its economy depends largely on agriculture which provides work for about 80% of the active population. However, the contribution of the mining industry to the gross national product is still only marginal but yet the object of envy. In recent years, Burundi’s joining the rare earth sector has enabled the mining industry to exceed, in terms of raw material mined for export, two of the main exports of the country, coffee and tea. This has been confirmed by Léonidas Sindayigaya, spokesman for the ministry of mines, in July 2019.
All told, the production of rare earths in Burundi is still but a small fraction of the world total. According to data provided by the USGS (United States Geological Survey) relative to 2019, the quota presently amounts to 0.28%. Also in Africa, the Songwe Hill mine, in Malawi is about to commence production while Gabon is also trying to enter the field with a mine at Mabounié, close to the city of Lambaréné (which, besides rare earths, has important reserves of uranium).
It is also believed that Tanzania and Madagascar may also have significant reserves.

Mauro Meggiolaro – Andrea Barolini/Valori

 

 

 

The Global South Is in Debt Pandemic.

Without a doubt, the Covid-19 pandemic represents the most severe developmental setback in recent history. But while the virus is still ravaging across the Global South, it’s not the only pandemic currently engulfing developing countries.
In fact, a debt pandemic threatens to prevent them from achieving a meaningful- let alone sustainable – recovery.

Between 2010 and 2020, the public debt of developing countries has increased from an average of 40.2 to 62.3 per cent of GDP. More than one-third of the increase, equal to 8.3 percentage points, took place in 2020 alone. This figure is equivalent to a staggering $1.9 trillion – the size of US President Joe Biden’s recovery plan.

To be sure, the debt pandemic had an indiscriminate effect across the globe. But, just like Covid-19, it was especially harsh on the most vulnerable countries. In 2020, public debt increased in 108 developing countries in 2020. And those that entered the crisis with high levels of public debt tended to experience the largest increases.
For a group of 40 developing countries with debt levels above 60 per cent of GDP in 2019, the increase in public indebtedness reached 11.4 per cent of GDP in 2020.

As public debt increased, so did the resources allocated to meet creditor claims. The share of government revenues in developing countries used to meet external debt service increased threefold from 6.6 to 17.4 per cent between 2011 and 2020. In at least 32 countries, governments are now allocating more than 20 per cent of government revenues to debt service.

Paying creditors vs. funding health care

These developments are particularly disturbing when compared to what developing countries spend on health care. While healthcare systems buckled under the strain caused by years of under-investment, and developing countries struggled to procure the resources to access Covid-19 vaccines, they continued to pay their external creditors more than US$ 372bn in debt service in 2020. This figure represents 1.6 times the amount of resources allocated by these same countries to public health expenditure in the same year.

These mind-boggling figures highlight the shortcomings of the ongoing multilateral response to the debt crisis. The G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI only provide support to International Development Aid (IDA) countries and least developed countries. Meanwhile, the G20 DSSI provided a minimum degree of support to participant countries through a temporary suspension of US$ 5.3bn in debt repayments owed to bilateral creditors. To put it in perspective: that’s less than the US$ 6.3 bn in debt service owed to the IMF by eligible countries between 2020 and 2021.

Furthermore, the selection criteria left out most low-middle and middle- income countries. It is precisely these groups of countries which have experienced the highest increase in debt levels. According to the World Bank, more than four-fifths of the total new poor from the pandemic will emerge in these countries.
In short, the multilateral response is as futile as attempting to drain the sinking Titanic with a bucket.

No defaults, but also no recovery

Such an inadequate response is bound to aggravate the crisis. Heavier debt burdens will limit the capacity of governments to support a sustainable recovery going forward. Without multilateral support to address debt vulnerabilities, developing countries will be forced to rely on self-defeating fiscal adjustments.

While the IMF advertises an alleged shift away from austerity policies, the truth is that its country policy recommendations continue to prioritise fiscal adjustment over everything else. That becomes clear from looking at the countries that have received IMF loans in the context of the pandemic—the IMF’s focus on the need for adjustment is just ubiquitous. As a result, without actions to address the debt burdens of developing nations, at least 60 countries will reduce their expenditures below pre-crisis levels to meet creditor claims over the next five years. The prioritisation of creditor rights over the rights and livelihood of the populations of developing countries is a well-known dead-end.

Thus, while a feared wave of defaults has failed to materialise, it doesn’t mean the multilateral response was a success. Ignoring the long-term costs linked to financial distress will inevitably lead to systemic underinvestment. Investment in sustainable development goals (SDGs) where the public sector is expected to play a leading role, such as poverty reduction, food security, health, education and gender equality, are likely to be disproportionately affected by this dynamic.

Containing the debt pandemic

It is becoming increasingly clear that the distinct nature of the present crisis calls for a different approach. The prioritisation of creditor rights over the rights and livelihood of the populations of developing countries is a well-known dead-end. Instead, the international community must recognise that the health and lives of people in the developing world is a basic precondition of a successful economic recovery. It will be impossible to achieve one without the other. This will require at least three elements which are completely absent from the public debate.

First, the democratisation of global economic governance. This process ought to recognise the right of every country to be at the decision-making table. Thus, the right place to discuss and agree on solutions to the crisis is not the G20. It is, by definition, the UN.

Second, making progress towards the establishment of a permanent multilateral framework under UN auspices to support systematic, timely and fair debt crisis resolution, in a process convening all creditors.

Third, the need to overcome the notion of debt relief as an act of charity. Instead, it must be understood as a prerequisite to preserve domestic resources and prioritise their mobilisation towards the accomplishment of the most important goals of the multilateral agenda. Only then will it be possible to establish an ambitious debt relief programme to facilitate the immediate response to the pandemic and actively seek the achievement of the commitments under the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and the Beijing Declaration.

Daniel Munevar is a Senior Policy and Advocacy Officer supporting Eurodad’s work on debt justice.

 

Colombia. Bishop receives death threats.

For months he travels in an armoured car and an armed police escort. He did not ask for protection but the local government, was forced to provide it due to international pressure.  “I am not afraid and I am sure God is on my side”, says Mons. Rubén Darío Jaramillo,
Bishop of Buenaventura, a port city in the department of Valle del Cauca, Colombia.

He received several death threats for having denounced the violence and corruption that afflicts Buenaventura city. “There are powerful groups that do not want their abuses to be denounced. I am acting responsibly”, the bishop says.
The government has taken the threats seriously as has Pope Francis who has sent him several messages and asked the Nuncio to accompany him.  Jaramillo continues to visit all parts and “spends time among the people of God “. But now he does so in an armoured car and three more as an escort. “I am more worried about the safety of the people than my own “, the bishop continues.

Mons. Rubén Darío Jaramillo, Bishop of Buenaventura.

The strategic position of Buenaventura makes it an important city for Colombia’s economy and the Pacific region in particular. The highway between Buenaventura and Cali is one of only two roads that connect the Pacific Coast with larger cities in the interior. The port was expanded with a major injection of foreign investment to become the largest deep-water commercial port in South America and the busiest in Colombia. It is now among the ten most important ports in Latin America. It manages approximately 75% of Colombia’s internationally traded goods, generating large profits for corporations and contributing significantly to Colombia’s tax revenues.
Due to its strategic position and its advantageous road and river transport routes, Buenaventura is also a trading corridor for illegal goods. In recent years, trafficking and micro-trafficking of drugs and arms have increasingly contributed to violence and displacements among local communities.

War between the cartels
The 500,000 inhabitants of Buenaventura live in terror of the violence between “Los Shotas” and “Los Espartanos”.  Almost every day, violent deaths are recorded. “ The deaths occur mainly in the life-or-death struggle between two criminal groups, the Shotas and the Espartanos which began with the division of La Local band. Since they separated, the two structures have been putting pressure on children and young people to join one of the groups “, says Mons. Rubén Darío Jaramillo.
” Besides being an important port, this city in Valle del Cauca has a number of estuaries, swampy areas facing the sea, through which great quantities of drugs are sent to the United States through Central America. The criminal are fighting over the more profitable ones. At other times, they kill out of revenge or in retaliation when someone is suspected of having stolen drugs or informing the police.
There are many innocent victims, especially children and old people caught in the crossfire.

The port of Buenaventura is the busiest in Colombia. (Photo: Colombia Reports).

The bishop comments: “ In reality, all the people of Buenaventura are hostages of the bands who have absolute control over the city. The hostage money paid for some kidnappings is as much as two or three hundred million Pesos (€47,000-€70,400). The whole economy of the city is in their hands.” “One band leader controls the meat business and only those who pay him are authorised to sell it “, the bishop says. It is the same in the case of eggs, or onions and all the rest, even the roadside benches. Lawbreakers are fined up to €3,500. The payment of extortion money, now called the vaccine in line with the times  “strangle the small businessmen seeking a better life “. Especially these days when “people have to pay someone day after day “.
The people are afraid to report these crimes “and do not trust the institutions “. Trapped in paralysis and resigned to their fate, they say: ‘It is time to pay up or leave the city’. Their only hope is the Church which accompanies them consoles them and offers help in the form of food, accommodation and various social projects.
It was probably because of this that, when a person in the sphere of influence of the bands was told to kill Jaramillo, he decided to inform a priest. He did this knowing that his own life and the lives of his family were in danger “, the bishop commented.

Against criminal gangs
Moreover, besides the local cartels, the periphery of the city has seen the arrival of the ELN guerrillas, the AGC paramilitary group and the dissidents of the demobilised FARC which have fought for control of the drug routes towards the port and the coastal swamps.  The situation has not improved but has worsened after the demobilisation of the FARC in 2016. Beforehand, “there was just one commander controlling the while area and he was like the state “, the bishop says. It is regrettable that no alternative was offered to the former guerrillas. “If the state does not provide them with work, education and security they will take up arms again as that is the only think they know.

The whole economy of the city is in the hands of the criminal groups. (Photo La Opinión).

At the moment, Buenaventura is the showcase of the whole situation of the Pacific regions and those of the South West. Its natural resources (timber, oil, metals such as coltan), the rivers that run to the sea and the “immense” areas “ that are very hard for the state to police ” have come under the control of criminal gangs. Some have also come from Mexico. It is the area of Colombia that produces the most coca leaves, with 57,897 hectares cultivated, according to a United Nations 2019 report. “This is where arms come into play “.
The bishops of the region have become organised and shown their moral and material support for Mons. Rubén Darío Jaramillo Montoya  “who has been receiving threats to his integrity and life, as well as others who serve the community” . “We extend our solidarity to the different communities which he accompanies in their suffering”,  wrote the bishops of the Pacific and the south west of Colombia who recently met to examine the grave problems of the area.

Buenaventura is also a trading corridor for illegal goods. (Photo: El Espectador).

The bishops of Apartadó, Quibdó, Itsmina – Tadó, Buenaventura, Tumaco, Guapi, Popayán, Tierradentro, Pasto, Ipiales, Cartago, Buga, Palmira and Cali wrote in their communique : “We have been able to approach the situations of uncertainty, poverty, suffering, death and despair generated by the confluence of a different sort which, unfortunately, we perceive and condemn and are continually increasing such as; drug trafficking, the increase in the number of armed groups, corruption, extortion, the loss of faith and values, the ineffectiveness of broad public and private sectors and the abuse of our common home”.
Faced with this difficult situation, the Bishops reiterate: “As Pastors, we are not content to accept these situations; on the contrary, we are commit ourselves and we exhort those in government and all our people to commit themselves to working decisively for global solutions in the medium and long term, that render possible the transformation of this sad and distressing situation. We will continue to act as facilitators of dialogue and peace”. (C.C.)

 

 

 

 

 

African Youth and Migration

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), even before the COVID-19 pandemic, young people were around three times more likely to be unemployed.

The pandemic has further exacerbated those challenges, including disruptions in education, training, employment, while some have endured income losses due to lay-offs and reduced working hours.
For some young people, the inability to find employment opportunities at home means migrating to other countries within Africa or
outside the continent.

According to the UN, the estimated number of international migrants worldwide increased in the last twenty  years, reaching 281 million in 2020. In the past two decades, the international migrant stock grew annually by an average of 2.4 per cent. About 15 per cent of all international migrants in the South, mostly from Africa, were under the age of 20, making Africa the youngest region of international migrants

Within the past two decades, policy discussions of migration have been dominated by images of young Africans taking rickety boats to Europe due to poverty and lack of opportunities including jobs.

The COVID-19 pandemic restrictions on travel and the closure of borders by some countries have disrupted or delayed migration within Africa and outside Africa. However, for young Africans experiencing multiple shocks with little or no social protection, the prospects of migrating may increase, especially for families seeking to mitigate socioeconomic challenges.

While the African migration narrative may be dominated by desperate youth involved in irregular migration, the near-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on them has also increased the migration of certain groups, especially those with skills useful in the health sector of destination countries. For instance, between March and April 2020, some countries in the West offered work or exchange visitor visas to encourage people with medical training and expertise to migrate.

“After completing my nursing training in Ghana, I came across scheme looking for health workers to go work in the UK. On top of offering us a job, they provided us with the necessary support, including accommodation in the UK. Since I arrived in the UK everyone has been supportive, including my family and friends,” says 29-year-old Ghanaian David Kwesi.

Mr. Kwesi’s experience mirrors that of many other young Africans migrating to the West to work in the health sector. Once employed, these migrants play a key role in supporting their families back home through remittances. Yet, the migration process is not that easy for many others. Many young African migrants have been forced to return to their countries of origin amid precarious job conditions and lack of access to a safety net, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Reports have emerged of poor access to healthcare, as well as abuse and scapegoating of African migrants in some countries in Middle East and Asia.    Migrants employed as domestic workers in those regions face an increased risk of abuse, with some stranded in destination countries while others seek the fastest way out.

Ana Abebe, 27, just returned home to Ethiopia after losing her job in Lebanon. “I lost my job and had no money. I could not afford food or even accommodation. If you don’t eat well you can easily die if you contract COVID-19. I decided to return home to my family and spend time with my child,” says Ms. Abebe.

Contemporary African youth migration is shaped by structural factors, including inequalities, a growing youth population, labour market imbalances and unemployment, as well as underemployment. The COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced some of the inequalities in African societies, points out Ismael Mohammed, a Tunisian.

“Initially, it was easy to get a short-term visa to travel abroad, but I have applied for visa to USA and UK several times in the past five years, either to visit, school or even for holiday-worker programmes, but I was denied. Probably it is because I did not graduate from school,”
says Mr. Mohammed.

While migration opportunities may not be easily available for some people, the fact that selective and skilled labour migration, especially for healthcare workers, is available shows the limited migration pathways for low-skilled African youth migrants.

Despite the demand for their low-skilled labour in many wealthy countries, many of them tend to work in informal jobs that have inadequate protection and benefits. The condition of most young African migrants, including domestic workers, who often become jobless, homeless, stranded or deported, has been exacerbated by gender inequalities.

Michael Boampong and Francis Mutesa

Photo Gallery – Snapshots from Africa

Advocacy

Semia Gharbi. Fighting against eco-mafias.

She played a key role in a campaign that challenged a corrupt waste trafficking scheme between Italy and Tunisia, resulting in the return of 6,000…

Read more

Baobab

The swallow brings the summer.

The Black and white swallow flew high up in the clear, blue sky, wheeling and diving, his fast, pointed wings carrying him at a great speed. Swallow…

Read more

Youth & Mission

Pope Leo and the Youth.

Welcoming, listening and guiding. Some characteristics of Pope Leo with the youth During the years when Father Robert Francis Prevost was pastor of the church of Our…

Read more