The Tigray conflict has dampened the enthusiasm raised by the Ethiopian Prime Minister and Nobel Prize Abiy Ahmed three years ago. The UN wants massacres of civilians by the Ethiopian and Eritrean armies to be investigated.

On the 4 March 2021, the UN Security Council was warned of a dire humanitarian crisis in the Tigray region by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mark Lowcock, Accordingly, 4.5 million Tigrayans out of a population of 6 million need food assistance and much of the area is inaccessible. Lowcock spoke of a high risk of famine and escalating violence, four months after the conflict broke out in Tigray, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ordered troops to respond to an attack on military bases by forces allied with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) which rules the region. By early March, the death toll amounted to at least 52,000, according to opposition sources and over 61,000 Ethiopians had fled into Sudan according to the U.N.

Tens of thousands of Ethiopians have been displaced by the ongoing conflict in the Tigray region. (UNICEF/Zerihun Sewunet).

On the same 4 March 2021, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet called for an investigation into the atrocities which took place during the conflict including mass killings, rapes, abductions of civilians, destruction of offices, churches and monasteries. She corroborated information about the indiscriminate shelling of the regional capital Mekelle and of the towns of Humera and Adigrat during the Ethiopian offensive of November. On the 26 February 2021, another massacre was perpetrated in the village of Dengolat, North of Mekelle. According to Bachelet, such violations could amount to “war crimes and crimes against humanity”. Possible perpetrators include the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, the TPLF, the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF), the forces of the neighbouring Amhara region which side with Addis Ababa and allied militias.In February, Amnesty International published a report which accused the EDF to have killed hundreds of civilians “including monks in the monasteries” in a “coordinated and systematic” manner in order “to terrorize the population into submission”, on the 28 and 29 November 2020 in Axum. “The massacre was carried out in retaliation for an earlier attack by a small number of militiamen, joined by local residents armed with sticks and stones” says Amnesty. According to a deacon at an Orthodox Church who spoke to the Associated Press, at least 800 people were killed on that weekend.

Church of Our Lady St. Mary of Zion, the most sacred place for all Orthodox Ethiopians in Axum, Ethiopia.

These events in Axum were the culmination of a wave of violations carried out since 19 November, when Eritrean and Ethiopian forces entered in the city, after shelling the city and firing at those who tried to flee, says Amnesty. The report was denied by Eritrea’s Minister of Information Yemane Gebremeskel who called it a “fabrication”, reported the Voice of America on the 27 February. Ethiopian and Eritrean officials also denied that Eritrean forces were involved in the Tigray conflict, despite accounts who identified Eritrean soldiers by their dialects.
“Eritrean Defence Forces must leave Ethiopia, and they must not be enabled or permitted to continue their campaign of destruction”, said the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. But the UN Security Council failed to reach consensus on the issue on the 4 March 2021. Previously, the United States also called on Eritrean troops to withdraw from Tigray, while the EU declared that their presence was “exacerbating ethnic violence” in the region.

A man stands beside a damaged building in Tigray region of north Ethiopia/ CFP

However, to some extent Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray conflict is  “explainable”, claims Nathanael Tilahun, assistant professor of Law at Coventry University. First of all, the relationship between the TPLF and Eritrea are bad. At the beginning, they were intimate movements.
Both were led by Tigrayan Christians and were Marxist. They remained allies since the creation of the TPLF in 1974 during their common war against Colonel Mengistu’s DERG regime. EPLF troops helped the TPLF during its victorious offensive of 1991.
But relations became tense when both movements became rulers of their respective countries.
The EPLF which claimed to be an older and better run organisation, and the TPLF, ruler of a much larger country did not sort out their ” big brother-little brother  quarrel “. Things ended up with a border conflict launched by Eritrea in 1998. It was only in 2018, with Abiy that Ethiopia and Eritrea set normal relations.
Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray conflict was foreseeable after the TPLF attack on the ENDF headquarters in Mekelle and on the four other military bases in Tigray on the 3 November 2020. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed accused the TPLF of dressing its soldiers in uniforms resembling those of the EDF to “implicate the Eritrean government in false claims of aggression against the people of Tigray”. Then, the likelihood of Eritrea’s involvement increased after Prime Minister Abiy told the Ethiopian Parliament that ENDF soldiers who survived the TPLF attack of the 3 November had been ordered to withdraw into Eritrea.

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed (L) with Eritrea’s President, Isaias Afwerki.

Before that, in the run up to the conflict, elite Ethiopian army units were sent already into Eritrea as part of a security pact between both states, wrote the former Eritrean Defence Minister Mesfin Hagos in an article published by African Arguments on the 4 December 2020. These units were expected to be the hammer and the ENDF Northern Command the anvil to strike the TPLF. Then, more ENDF troops were airlifted into Eritrea after the outbreak of conflict.  Local sources in Asmara counted 30 military airplanes flying in thousands of Ethiopian soldiers, before TPLF’s rockets hit the Asmara on the 14 November.
The Eritrean army’s response was massive. Eritrean support units provided intelligence and logistics to the Ethiopian troops’ offensive into Tigray, before taking part massively in combat. According to Mesfin Hagos, at least three Eritrean mechanized divisions and eight Eritrean infantry divisions entered into Tigray.
Without Eritrea, it would have been difficult to defeat the TPLF and regain control of the main cities of Tigray by end of November 2020, say Abiy’s supporters. When the war broke out, the TPLF was a ” formidable military force taking possession of more than half of the country’s military equipment “, reminds Tilahun. The TPLF could have marched on Addis Ababa, without much resistance.
Clearly, the Eritrean President, Isais Afworki finds now himself in a position of king saviour, say analysts. De facto, Abiy owes him the survival of his government. According to Alex de Waal, the executive director of the World Peace Foundation, ” It’s now clear that Afwerki saw the peace deal as a security pact with Ethiopia to eliminate the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF) leadership”.

Displaced people in Adigrat town, in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia. (WFP/Leni Kinzli).

Another consequence of the war is the damage inflicted to the image of the Ethiopian Prime Minister who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, for having brought to an end the military tensions with Eritrea. He is now under the pressure of the West, namely United States whose ambassador at the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield declared that “The onus to prevent further atrocities and human suffering falls squarely on the Ethiopian government’s shoulders”.  The European Union suspended its budgetary support to Ethiopia in February which disappointed Ethiopian Diaspora Associations in Belgium and Luxembourg. In an open letter sent by their coordinator, Zerihun Assefa, to the president of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, they express their concern after a debate on the situation in Tigray on the last 11 February and deplored the “unfounded accusations that the government of Ethiopia was using humanitarian aid and sexual violence as weapons of war”.
The letter went on: “We were also disappointed after waiting in vain for anyone to point out that the conflict in Tigray was an insurrection by the TPLF in which scores of unsuspecting EDF personnel were gunned down in their sleeps and their weapons and supplies confiscated. Neither have we heard even a passing remark about the callous massacre of innocent civilians in Mai Kadra by TPLF-associated militia”, who are suspected to have killed 600 people mainly from the Amhara ethnic group.

Ethiopian refugees rest and prepare food near UNHCR’s Hamdayet border reception centre after crossing into Sudan. (UNHCR/Hazim Elhag)

These tensions with the West and the UN add to the Ethiopia’s diplomatic problems. Relations are indeed becoming very tense since mid-December with neighbouring Sudan. whose authorities deplored that a border patrol unit was ambushed by “Ethiopian forces and militias” in the disputed area of Al-Fashqa. Then, in mid-February, Sudan summoned home its ambassador to Ethiopia, while both sides were accusing each other of seizing territory by force. The Sudanese authorities reported at least a dozen deaths, including some soldiers, due to incursions by Ethiopian militias.
All this context may not bode well for the future of the difficult negotiations concerning the filling of the reservoir of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, between Egypt and Sudan on the one hand and Ethiopia on the other, as both Arab countries want to involve alongside with the African Union, the EU, the US and the UN which are all at odds with Ethiopia over the Tigray issue.

François Misser

An interwoven series of criminal gangs, terrorist groups, traffickers of all sorts, networks of illegal commerce, African gold passes through the Emirates. 

Gold represents the best investment during great economic and financial crises. The past fifteen years have been characterised by a dizzying climb in the price of this product which has given rise to the creation of several ‘artisan mines’ in the countries of eastern and central Africa.
Such enterprises, in unstable or conflict zones as in the case of Africa, represent a greedy segment that must be divided up and controlled, of criminal gangs, terrorist groups, traffickers of all sorts and networks of illegal trading. The business is even more greedy when there is a large amount to be extracted as is the case in the areas in question where the value of the gold extracted is around $3billion a year.

The ore produced represents a considerable source of revenue for the estimated 19 million workers of the artisan mines and the communities to which they belong. Although the work is very heavy, done with no protection whatever and involving women and children – the children, being physically small, are able to crawl into the narrow tunnels – the workers receive but a tiny part of the earnings.
Research carried out by The Sentry, a US organisation that aims at unmasking the economic sources that foment and support armed conflicts, examined the four countries richest in gold reserves – Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo – whose common characteristic is that they have been the scene of decades-long conflicts.

It has emerged from this study that, within this chaotic universe, the criminal groups are free to control the supply lines by taking the place of legal intermediaries, due also to connections with foreign companies looking for easy earnings which, by using qualified traders, succeed in obscuring their ties with armed groups and bring the gold to the legal market. In more detail, it is apparent that in eastern Congo, where each year 10 to 20 tons of gold are mined, thanks to the work of about 250 miners employed in the sector, about 70% of the mines is controlled by smugglers and armed groups. The situation in the Central African Republic is not dissimilar where 27 armed groups control the smuggling of 90% of the annual production which recently showed a significant increase, reaching 5.7 tons per year, worth around $235 million.
Then there is Sudan which, with its production of 90 tons of gold per year, makes it the third-largest producer in the world, where production is on an industrial scale with only a minimal presence of artisanal mines. Despite this, the rules in force are the same as those in other producer countries since a good proportion of production is managed by the Sudan Liberation Army -Abdul Wahid – and by the Movement of Liberation of the north of the Sudanese people which, with funds generated by the artisanal mines, finance their activities.

In South Sudan, activity is in the hands of the two main armed groups, the Movement for the Liberation of the People of Sudan/Army of opposition and the National Salvation Front. The gold produced by these territories ends up on the global market: in the United States, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. However, before reaching it, 95% of production passes through Dubai where it is mixed with other gold from the legal market so as to eliminate any traces of its origin and then place it ‘legally’ on the international market. This practice is facilitated by weak legislation in the UAE concerning the subject and poor inspection practices regarding the origin and certificates of purchase of the mineral, as well as the possibility of making the transactions in cash or by exchange. These factors are decisive for the large international intermediaries which are devoid of scruples and make Dubai the main sorting-house for illegally produced gold. Gold is, for the economy of the Emirates, a strategic asset and exports in 2019 were valued at $19billion, not far behind the petroleum companies.

From Dubai, the gold is taken to India, China, Switzerland and the Middle East, in what is in essence a process of recycling, for which other countries, especially Switzerland, must certainly bear no less responsibility. Switzerland, in fact, gives fundamental support to this strategy of triangulation with other destinations. There, the gold coming from Dubai undergoes further refinement and then goes to the United Kingdom, making it a world-level importer.
Returning to the start of the journey, it is observable that, as indicated by a study led by the Director of Africa Confidential Patrick Smith, that from Bukavu in South Kivu, 300 kg of gold pass every month towards the Gulf, while officially only 5 kg are declared. According to Mario Giro, the former Italian vice-foreign minister, the refineries present in the area of the Great lakes produce as much as 330 tons and one of the largest refining companies is the Ugandan ‘African Gold Refinery’, capable of refining 219 tons per year, and the Rwandan ‘Aldango’. Both have in common the fact that they are the bases for a Belgian company whose sales office is located in Dubai.
The Sentry report also shows export data together with those of imports and, here too, the emerging anomalies clearly show that the Emirates declared they import from the African countries a quantity of gold superior to what those countries declare they have exported.
In this regard, significant cases are those of Sudan which declares that it exported, from 2010-2014, 152 tons of gold to Dubai which received, during the same period, 248; that of Uganda which declares it produces 3 tons of gold per year while declaring that it exports around 9 tons to the UAE; of Rwanda with official production of between 0.03 and 0.36 tons while the data show it exported more than 18 tons. The same is true also for Kenya, Burundi and Chad.

A cause for some concern is the situation in the area of Sahel where Jihadist groups are trying to gain control of the greatly expanding market with the combined annual production of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso amounting to around 50 tons per year. In Zimbabwe, on the opposite part of the continent, a declared exponential increase in production gives rise to suspicions that it concerns South African gold illegally bought and sent to Dubai.
Within this framework, another element that strikes the eye of analysts and which needs to be focused on is the partnership between the Eastern African countries and the Emirates which, through massive investments exceeding $250 billion, gained control of ports and infrastructure, thus participating in the African section of the Chinese Silk Road. This has made them become actors in local political life by interfering in the internal crises of various countries, and support by way of money and arms to various local groups.

Filippo Romeo

John Campbell, a Senior fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently wrote a book on Nigeria (“Nigeria and the Nation-State – Rethinking diplomacy with the postcolonial world”). A career diplomat, Campbell has written a work that is well worth reading and briefly examines the historical, political, and cultural roots of the actual situation of Nigeria.

The main thesis of this book is that Nigeria is not a nation-state as we are used to see within the international community. According to Campbell and some scholars, Nigeria is an ensemble of authorities that coexist within the formal borders of the state, like islands in an archipelago. During his tenures as a diplomatic in the country and his travels there, he noted that there were “structures of authority that often commanded deeper loyalty than the government of Nigeria and its capital, Abuja. Tribe tended to be more important than national identification.

Traditional rulers and institutions, whose power was based on custom rather than on statute of European model, exercised informal or extra-legal power. Hundreds of traditional rulers in Nigeria, among them the Sultan of Sokoto, the Shehu of Bornu, the Oba of Benin, and the Ooni of Ife, appeared to exercise authority parallel to that of the formal state and in some cases nearly its equal [page X].” According to the author, the “most powerful islands” are actually Abuja, the so called “Lagos-Ibadan corridor”, Port Harcourt in the oil rich Niger Delta and some other capitals of the states of the federation. He applies to Nigeria an idea elaborated by the US National Intelligence Council in 2005 to describe the “governed space in African countries” in general.

Oil rig in the yards. Apapa, Port of Lagos, Nigeria.

The second characteristic is that this archipelago is based on a prebendal-type power system. That is to say, the elites have access to the government revenue (in Nigeria, it is revenue generated by oil) and can share it both with their patrons and with their clients “not because of their services to the state, but because they are entitled to do so [page XII].” This relation is not exclusive to the elite, but it is expanded throughout society. In the eyes of Nigerian leadership, the country is not a failed state “because it successfully distributes national oil wealth to the national elite; this is what it [is] supposed to do. For most Nigerians, the state provides little, and they in turn have little loyalty to it. Alienation from the state is a common theme among the insurrections that are undermining the state [page 8].”

Three crises
This situation, according to Campbell, is the main consequence of British colonial rule in this territory. British officials aggregated different entities in a single territory that morphed into Nigeria “to maintain an “acceptable” level of security by balancing ethnic and regional groups. Divide and conquer was central to British colonial policy in Nigeria and elsewhere, though within a context of law and regulation. It was a policy whose explicit goal was to prevent indigenous people from forming common bonds […] [page 71].” The British did little to develop a Nigerian national identity and basically abandoned it when it was not useful anymore. “The British […] abruptly brought Nigeria to independence – not because of the strength of local agitation or in response to the overwhelming demands of a powerful national independence movement but because Britain had lost confidence in the entire colonial enterprise and determined to withdraw from many parts of the world as fast as possible [page 37].” And Nigerian leadership also did little to develop a Nigerian national identity since independence. Therefore, “most Nigerians primarily identify with and are loyal to their family, religion, and ethnic group [page 94].”

Due to several factors this process of identification with family, religion and ethnic group is getting worse, and the islands of power are starting to withhold cooperation. According to Campbell, there are three concurrent security crises that endanger the survival of Nigeria. In the North East, jihadist groups are challenging government control of the territory. In the central part of the country (the Middle Belt) a plurality of ethnic conflicts is fuelled by the growth of the population and environmental degradation. In the South, autonomist movements inspired by the Biafra secession and armed groups of various origins could put at risk the oil industry, the main source of revenue for the government. These three crises must also be considered in a context of lower international oil prices, a pandemic outbreak and a deep social and economic transformation of Nigeria due to rapid and unmanaged urbanization.

A dangerous strategy
Campbell wrote this book to change the US perception of Nigeria and to influence the US foreign policy in general and the relations between Washington and Abuja in particular. Therefore, he exposes in detail several proposals for the US Administration and the Department of State to deal with the Nigerian crises that were elaborated according to the dynamics of the US apparatus. Since they are focused on the American reality, these proposals are specific and can be judged correctly by people that have a deep knowledge of American politics. But Campbell’s multidimensional analysis of Nigeria is useful also to non-Americans, who share an interest in Nigerian issues.

Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari.

Nevertheless, it is legitimate to have doubts concerning one of these proposals. Campbell’s fundamental suggestion to US leadership is to change its strategy with Nigeria, shifting from an exclusive relation with the federal government to a relation with all the different centres of power. “The accelerating decentralization of political power in Nigeria suggests that US engagement, too, should include state, local, and traditional centres of power. Abuja is likely to view with suspicion closer US ties with the states, whom it will feel it cannot control, but such concerns should not derail a new approach; instead, efforts should be made to allay these suspicions through yet-to-be cultivated relationships and spearheaded by a US ambassador with a strong relationship to Aso Villa [the official residence of the President of Nigeria] [page 199].”
But this strategy is potentially dangerous for Nigeria, at least to an external observer. Campbell states that “Washington should support the unity of Nigeria, even if it is loose, or even chaotic. The alternative, a breakup of Nigeria into ethnically denominated politics, would be a humanitarian disaster, almost certainly involving the United States in ways difficult to foresee [page 195].”

People in the street in the city view of Lagos, the largest city in Nigeria (Photo: Jordi Clave Garsot/123RF.COM

But the proposed strategy goes in the opposite way. Dealing directly with traditional and local powerbrokers will likely further weaken Nigerian institutions. Traditional rulers will be emboldened by their direct relations with Washington and will ignore or resist Abuja. And the US could be tempted to by-pass the Federal Government to pursue their political goals with the help of traditional or local players. In the medium to long term, this could result in a further fragmentation of Nigeria.
At this moment, as previously seen, there are centrifugal forces that are pushing Nigeria into disintegration. Adding another force could be fatal, even if in the long term. With all its problems, strengthening the Federal Government must be put in first place by foreign governments when planning a strategy towards Nigeria.

Andrea Carbonari