TwitterFacebookInstagram

The Giraffe. The Queen of the Savannah.

Lessons, strategies, and curiosities. What we know about the giraffe, the tallest animal in the world… with a big heart. It is an icon of Africa, known for its long neck, its unmistakable spotted coat,
and its elegant bearing. But the giraffe is an animal with other exceptional characteristics that never cease to amaze. Too bad
it risks disappearing.

Ndlhulamite: “Tallest of the trees”. This is the name that Zulu and Matabele gave to one of the most iconic animals of the African continent, the giraffe (Giraffa camelopardalis), with its elegance and majesty, has always fascinated explorers and travellers. Unmistakable for its long neck and spotted coat (the design of which is a unique distinguishing feature between individuals, also, the 8 subspecies present in Africa),
it can reach five and a half metres in height – the tallest
animal in the world.

A perfect body
But such a body – that of the male can weigh more than a ton – is not easy to manage. So, the giraffe had to develop an enormous, exceptional heart, weighing up to 12 kilos, to irrigate the highest parts of its body with blood effectively. Despite its large heart muscle, height and the force of gravity can be a problem. When we stand up suddenly, our head spins a little: we are not two meters high and yet the movement already creates an imbalance in blood pressure.

The tallest animal in the world. Pixabay

Imagine a giraffe, when having finished drinking with its head at ground level, it returns to an upright position: in the space of a second its brain rises by 5 meters… Any other animal would faint instantly, but not the giraffe. In the same way, when it lowers itself to drink, the pumping of the heart, added to the force of gravity, would create such an increase in pressure as to cause cerebral vessels to burst. This does not happen to a giraffe. And think of how many people need to wear tights for varicose veins: the giraffe, despite its height and blood pressure combined with the force of gravity, does not seem to suffer from it at all. Even in this case, its anatomy provides formidable solutions: in the highest part of the neck, just under the skull, there is a complex network of blood vessels that acts as an instant pressure regulator and allows the animal to make rapid and wide movements of the head, up or down, compensating for the change in pressure and preventing the animal from fainting or suffering a stroke. Furthermore, the shape of the skin that wraps around its legs works exactly like supporting tights, compressing the blood vessels, preventing them from dilating excessively due to pressure.

At the table with giraffes
Giraffes are grazing herbivores, that is, they feed on leaves, shoots, and pods, which they select with their long, bluish tongue (which is up to half a meter long) – they have rarely been seen grazing grass. As ruminants, they have four stomachs, in which digestion occurs by fermentation. Their height allows them to access food niches closed to many other herbivores, and for this reason, they can be seen associating with other animals such as zebras and wildebeests, with which they do not develop any sort of competition.

As ruminants, they have four stomachs, in which digestion occurs by fermentation. Pixabay

Giraffes are dependent on water and drink regularly. As ruminants, they cannot lie down, due to the risk of suffocation by gastric fluids. For this reason, they rest crouched in the typical posture that we find in cattle, or standing, often resting their head on the fork of a branch. Another interesting characteristic is the habit of “chewing” bones. It is not uncommon to observe a giraffe picking up a white bone from the ground with its tongue and chewing it like chewing gum: this practice provides it with the mineral salts it lacks in its usual diet.

Societies with no ties
Giraffes emit very few sounds, limited to snorts, sometimes guttural in the male, while the young have a more varied and audible range of calls. The scent glands are also poorly developed and limit olfactory communication. A deficiency compensated by their height and extraordinarily acute eyesight, which allows giraffes to maintain visual contact even at great distances. It seems that a giraffe can spot a predator almost five kilometres away.

A high-ranking male imposes his status simply with his posture and presence. Pixabay

A gregarious animal, the giraffe does not live in stable herds or family groups, but temporarily associates with other individuals and then leaves the group at any time to join another; only the young remain permanently in the vicinity of the mother until weaned. Males only compete during the females’ oestrus, engaging in spectacular fights with their horns, carried out violently by their long, flexible necks. Generally, however, a high-ranking male imposes his status simply with his posture and presence. Young males associate in small bachelor groups and abandon their native territory, migrating to new areas, thus ensuring genetic exchange within the species. As they mature, they tend to become more solitary.

How a giraffe is born
Giraffes do not have a specific reproductive period during the year, although births are more frequent in the rainy season. Males, who reach sexual maturity at around seven years of age, wander from group to group looking for receptive females: courtship takes place through the approach, tasting the female’s urine (to check her receptivity), and a ritual march in which they proceed in pairs.

Giraffes do not have a specific reproductive period during the year, although births are more frequent in the rainy season. Pixabay

After a gestation period of up to 15 months, mothers give birth to a single calf. The newborn can stand on its legs within the first 15 minutes of life. During the first weeks, mother and calf live in isolation to strengthen the bond and allow the calf to learn to recognize the unique pattern of its mother’s coat. The calf is breastfed until 3 or 4 months old, after which it begins to ruminate, becoming independent when it is a year old. While an adult may be considered relatively invulnerable to predators (only a large and experienced pride of lions can take down an adult giraffe), young animals are easy prey.
As a result, they spend a lot of time immobile, both to avoid being spotted and to try to divert energy towards body growth rather than to compensate for useless energy expenditure.

In danger of extinction
Once widespread throughout the semi-arid savannah regions, the giraffe has now disappeared from many of its native territories, resulting in extinction in vast regions of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In Africa, this decimation is proceeding at an alarming rate: according to the latest estimates, 117,000 remain (of which 68,000 are adults), a decline of almost 40% compared to thirty-five years ago.

In Africa, the decimation of elephants is proceeding at an alarming rate. Pixabay

Although it is not difficult to encounter them in the main tourist parks, they have completely disappeared in seven African countries, prompting the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to raise the alarm and classify them as a “vulnerable species”. Some subspecies have been declared endangered or critically endangered (for example, there are fewer than two thousand Kordofan giraffes).
What is decimating the population of the world’s tallest mammals is, above all, the deprivation of space and resources: in the last three hundred years, giraffes have lost 90% of their natural habitat due to deforestation, the expansion of agricultural and livestock activities, and to a lesser extent, due to uncontrolled hunting, plus political and social instability in some regions of the continent. (Open Photo: 123rf)

Gianni Bauce/Africa

African Union. Time to choose.

Change at the top. The new Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) is fifty-nine-year-old Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the foreign minister of Djibouti. He faces an organization marked by internal divisions, regional rivalries, and a strong dependence on foreign funding. The AU stands at a crossroads: to strengthen its presence on the continent or remain a prisoner of its contradictions.

The African Union (AU) has made significant progress in its mission to unite the continent and propel it towards a prosperous future. Over the years, we have seen important advances, especially in areas such as regional integration. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is one such achievement that promises to transform Africa’s economic landscape. However, while the AfCFTA lays the foundation for economic cooperation, deeper issues remain that impede real progress, particularly regional rivalries and disputes that threaten to undermine these efforts. A critical obstacle to regional integration is the flawed application of the principle of subsidiarity in Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This principle, which gives regional bodies a leading role in conflict resolution, is undermined in practice by the overlapping mandates of RECs, which compete rather than collaborate.

Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the new Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC). Photo AU

In the interventions of neighbouring countries, national interests trump regional peace efforts for simple reasons: political gain or historical territorial and ideological disputes. These dynamics hamper the AU’s peacekeeping mechanisms, with states instrumentalising subsidiarity to prevent independent interventions or manipulate regional responses.
This distortion has led to an ineffective approach, as demonstrated by the cases of the Sahel (where Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have left ECOWAS) and the unresolved conflicts in Sudan and the DR Congo. Rather than facilitating peaceful solutions, the Communautés économiques régionales (CERs) see their influence limited by member states that exploit neighbouring conflicts to strengthen their own positions, weakening regional bodies and hampering the AU’s effectiveness.

What sort of integration?
In addition to conflict, overlapping and competing regional economic blocs undermine the AU’s ability to drive integration. The multiplicity of CERs with different mandates – ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, COMESA and IGAD – generates inefficiencies and policy inconsistencies. The DR Congo, for example, belongs to multiple CERs, each with its regulations and structures, creating complexity that undermines efforts for a unified trade policy under the AfCFTA.

Misera (The Gambia) and Senoba (Senegal) border post on the South of Trans-Gambia Corridor. Photo: IOM/Lamin W. Sanneh

Without clear alignment and a defined roadmap, Africa risks seeing its integration agenda bogged down by bureaucracy and power struggles.
Border closures for security reasons or political disputes hinder the movement of goods and people, contradicting the principles of the AfCFTA itself. There are many examples. Two in particular: the Nigeria-Benin tensions have caused periodic blockades that limit trade and cooperation; Kenya-Tanzania disputes over non-tariff barriers have disrupted trade flows within the East African Community (EAC).
The root of these difficulties is often a lack of trust and unresolved historical tensions. Many states still face colonial demarcation issues that influence current policies, fuelling suspicion and rivalry. Resolution requires diplomacy and impartial mechanisms recognized by all parties. The AU could take a more proactive role here, mediating pre-emptively and providing the CERs with robust tools to manage disputes.

A disunited front on the global stage
The second major challenge is Africa’s fragmented and ineffective voice on the global stage. This is particularly worrying at a time when geopolitical dynamics are rapidly changing and Africa’s potential as an economic and political force is greater than ever. Instead of presenting a united front in international negotiations, Africa’s position is often divided, reducing its influence and bargaining power. Whether it’s climate negotiations, trade talks, or efforts to reform the international financial system, Africa’s approach often revolves around asking for more aid, without challenging the structural barriers that continue to hinder its development.
For example, in climate negotiations, the African position has typically focused on demanding more financial support, even if promises made in previous agreements have not been kept. This focus on aid, rather than regulatory reforms that would support long-term industrialization and economic transformation, keeps Africa trapped in a cycle of dependency.

Ordinary Session of AU Assembly. Photo: AU

The current debate over renewable energy and critical minerals highlights this: Africa is again being positioned as a mere supplier of raw materials – lithium, cobalt, rare earths, green hydrogen – needed for global transitions, rather than being empowered to develop its own industries and value chains.
World powers, in particular, continue to treat Africa as a resource base to fuel their green energy ambitions, without recognizing that Africa must not only be a supplier of raw materials, but also a global player in technological innovation. The weakness of Africa’s negotiating position is also evident in global financial negotiations.
While institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) continue to dictate financial terms for many African countries, the continent has yet to achieve significant structural reforms in global financial governance. The AU needs a more proactive strategy to push for debt restructuring that goes beyond short-term relief and instead addresses the underlying inequalities of the global financial system. Further complicating the picture, Africa also lacks a united diplomatic front. Even during critical global events – such as the annual UN General Assembly or G20 summits – African nations may present conflicting proposals or fail to coordinate their negotiating positions, diluting the continent’s collective influence. Greater investment in diplomatic training is needed.

Financed by external donors
The third issue concerns the effectiveness and sustainability of the AU, which is still dependent on external donors, which limits its autonomy and its ability to implement its strategies. Without financial independence and more efficient governance, the AU will remain vulnerable to external pressures and unable to meet citizens’ expectations. Another critical issue is the limited inclusion of civil society, the private sector and young people in decision-making processes. While dedicated forums exist, concrete tools to transform recommendations into policies are often lacking. The greater involvement of young people, who are drivers of innovation and entrepreneurship, could give new impetus to the AU agenda. Building a more robust African Union also requires stronger accountability and oversight mechanisms.
Currently, allegations of mismanagement or corruption within certain departments can be difficult to fully investigate. The creation of an independent ethics commission or ombudsman office could enhance transparency and help restore public trust in the institution.

An active role and valuing young people
If the AU is to realise its true potential, it must stop being a passive observer at the global table and start actively shaping the future of the continent and, indeed, the world. This requires bold leadership, a renewed commitment to regional integration, and a fundamental rethinking of Africa’s role in global governance.

University students in Mozambique. With an average age of 19, the continent has the youngest population in the world. File swm.

Critical to this transformation is harnessing the dynamism of Africa’s youth. With an average age of around 19, the continent boasts the youngest population in the world, offering immense potential for innovation, technological entrepreneurship, and social transformation. By prioritizing education, skills training, and digital infrastructure, the African Union can unlock this demographic dividend.

Intercontinental partnerships
Another area ripe for expansion is that of intercontinental partnerships that respect African sovereignty. The AU could, for example, spearhead agreements with China, the European Union, or other global powers that emphasize technology transfer, local manufacturing, and skills development rather than simple raw material extraction. These partnerships must be rooted in transparency, mutual benefit, and long-term capacity building.
Ensuring that such agreements include clauses on environmental protection, labour standards, and equitable revenue sharing would further protect African interests and promote sustainable development.

Troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia. Photo: AMISON

Africa’s recent inclusion in the G20 provides a platform for the continent to raise its voice, but it also brings heightened responsibility. The AU will need to coordinate and promote a range of policy priorities—from infrastructure development to debt restructuring—ensuring that these discussions translate into tangible results on the ground. If used effectively, G20 membership can help shift the narrative from viewing Africa as a place of permanent crisis to recognizing it as a continent of global opportunity.
The AU is, therefore, at a crossroads. It can seize this moment to address its institutional shortcomings, unite its members under a shared vision and assert itself on the world stage, or it can continue to be weakened by internal fragmentation and external exploitation. The stakes are high.With the right leadership, adequate resources and strong political will, the AU can become the linchpin for Africa’s renaissance in a rapidly changing global order. (Open Photo: African Union flag and African flags. Shutterstock/patrice6000)

Carlos Lopes

 

 

 

Somalia. A fragile equilibrium.

After fifty-six years, Somalia returns to the polls. In June for local elections and in September for legislative elections. Many challenges. The Somaliland issue.

Somalia is still one of the poorest countries in the world and the impact of drought, plagues, conflicts and volatile world prices directly affects its economic development. According to the World Bank, the salary of two-thirds of the population is 2.15 dollars a day. It is estimated that 54% of the population lives below the poverty line, a much higher percentage among nomadic communities.
In addition, the workforce is minimal: 33% of men and only 12% of women. Despite this, there has been a consolidation of the economic turnaround in recent years, particularly evident in the capital Mogadishu. In 2024, the country managed to emerge from a situation of over-indebtedness, favouring the arrival of new investments and the promotion of social structures such as Baxnaano, the first national social protection program. Moreover, the latest news about oil exploration off the coast of Somalia has attracted the attention of large international companies. It remains to be seen what the effects of this future exploitation will be on the environment and, in particular, on the coasts. All this economic development would not have been possible without the political stabilization of the country.

Somalia Political Map. 123rf

Despite numerous adversities, the situation has been improving since 2012. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) controls much of the south and centre of the country, where it has established an administration and has managed to reduce the influence of the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, which in 2011 dominated significant areas in the south of the country.Besides, since 2013, the different federal regions of Somalia have been formed, which have been the cornerstone of the expansion of the State. Today, Somalia is composed of seven regions and the capital, although Somaliland remains a de facto independent state. Relations between the state and some regions have been tense, especially with Jubaland and Puntland, which in 2021, after extending his presidential mandate, came into conflict with former Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi, known as Farmajo. These regions have their main supporters in two neighbouring states: Ethiopia and Kenya. Meanwhile, the Southwest, Hirshabelle and Galmudug regions are the main pillars of the central government.

Election time
This year, Somalia will hold elections for municipal councils this month of June, while representatives of the Federal Parliament, members of state legislatures and presidents will be elected in September. This is one of the country’s major challenges, as it has not held universal suffrage elections since 1969.
The debate has been ongoing for years: in each legislature, presidents commit to promising that the next elections will be held with the “one person, one vote” system, but this has never been respected. Currently, the parliamentary election system involves the selection of delegates, elected by each of the clans that make up Somalia.

Year of elections in Somalia. In June, for municipal councils this month and in September, for the representatives of the Federal Parliament. Phil Moore/IRIN

These delegates in turn elect the deputies who will vote for the President. Although there has been an official register of political parties since 2017, they are not very widespread, mainly because they have not been active in the country’s political life. In addition, it is often reported as another problem that there are regions where it will not be possible to vote due to the threat of Al-Shabaab. In the meantime, some progress has been made. On November 27, 2024, the Somali Parliament approved the creation of the new Federal Election Commission. The vote took place one day after the executive had approved the creation of the body.

The great challenge
Despite a certain stability within the country and the creation of a government with greater capacity for action, the Federal Republic of Somalia still faces a territorial challenge: one of its regions acts as an independent state. In 1991, Somaliland, in the far north, unilaterally declared its independence and built its own state, becoming one of the most stable regions in the Horn of Africa. Although not recognized internationally, Somaliland has a constitution, a government, its own currency and an army that defends its sovereignty.
Despite negotiations, it was impossible to reach an agreement, as the starting points are radically different: for Somalia, it is just another territory of the Republic; Somaliland, on the other hand, considers itself a legitimate independent state.

Somaliland Independence Monument in Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland. 123rf

Somaliland considers its official borders to be those of its colonial past: its borders are those of the former British protectorate of the same name. However, the eastern provinces of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn are inhabited by a majority of Dulbahaante and Warsangali Somalis who, for years, have felt marginalized by the central government of Somaliland and its majority population, the Isaaq. The first two groups are more closely linked to the Puntland populations, with whom they share the same branch of the Darood clan. In these circumstances, Puntland and Somaliland have clashed on several occasions for control of these territories.
In January 2023, the situation reversed with the start of the so-called ‘Blue Revolution’, a reference to the blue of the Somali national flag. Public demonstrations on the main streets of cities, especially in Las Anod, the administrative capital of the Sool region, prompted the government of Mogadishu to intervene to increase its presence in the area. The unrest has led to a new confrontation, with the military penetration of Somaliland into the region to reassert control over the territory. However, its troops were expelled in the summer of 2023 and effective control of these provinces is very limited.

The prime minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed and Muse Bihi Abdi, the president of SomalilandOffice of the Prime Minister – Ethiopia – Madaxtooyada JSL

In this situation, Mogadishu proclaimed the creation of the federal state SSC-Khatumo. The acronym is composed of the initials of the three provinces in question, while khatumo can be translated as “positive result”. This move by the federal government has generated unrest in both Puntland and Somaliland. The former believed that this was a territory that should be part of their federal state, while the latter argued that it was an inalienable part of their territory. The result so far has undoubtedly been very positive for Mogadishu, which has not only expanded its sphere of influence, controlling territories that were under the administration of Somaliland but has also managed to curb the aspirations of Puntland, which is one of the largest and most powerful states in Somalia.

A Complex Network
While Somalia is achieving significant successes domestically, the situation on the international scene is rather agitated. Relations with its neighbours have been characterized by continuous disagreements and military invasions, especially by Ethiopia, but also by Kenya. The governments of Addis Ababa and Nairobi have acted in Somali territory to protect their own interests and security and have maintained close relations with Somaliland.
Tensions have been increased by Ethiopia’s decision to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland in early 2024, which implied the Ethiopian government’s commitment to recognize Somaliland as a state in exchange for the transfer of a coastal territory for the construction of a port that would give Ethiopia its long-awaited access to the sea.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Office of the president

Mogadishu sees the agreement as a direct aggression. At the same time, the MoU itself has generated great confusion. Addis Ababa intends that the territory be ceded for an indefinite period, while Hargeisa speaks only of an agreement to build a military port in the area. In addition, the signing of the agreement has strengthened regional alliances between Eritrea and Somalia, territories that are under pressure from the Ethiopian threat to obtain a commercial port. They have been joined by Egypt, a traditional ally that defends its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Thus, in 2024, the three countries reaffirmed their mutual cooperation and Al Sisi’s government has committed to sending troops to Somalia to help stabilize it and fight against Al-Shabaab. This development, together with the statements of Somali President Hassan Sheik Mohamud, in which he assured that the government will decide which troops remain in Somali territory, has generated some uncertainty in the Ethiopian army. Addis Ababa was the main contributor to ATMIS (African Transition Mission in Somalia), but due to enmity between Ethiopia and Somalia, its departure seems likely with the launch of the new AUSSOM mission. Relations with its other neighbour, Kenya, have also not been cordial. Its Kenyan government has seen the Somali border as a security issue, stemming from Somali refugee and migration pressure and the threat posed to the country by Al-Shabaab. The terrorist attacks at Nairobi’s Westgate in 2013, with 72 deaths, and at Garissa University in 2015, with 147 deaths, have strengthened Kenya’s position. In addition to tense relations with the Somali government, it has unilaterally intervened militarily and extended its influence over Jubaland, of which it has become the main ally, strengthening its role as an opponent to Mogadishu. This relationship has had a domestic fallout.

President of Jubaland, Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe. Photo: Gov.Somalia

On November 25, Ahmed Madobe, who has led the federal state since 2012, was re-elected president of Jubaland. His election was declared illegal by Somalia, which led to some regional revolts. Relations between the two administrations have always been complex, partly due to the influence of neighbouring Kenya. Finally, Kenya’s rapprochement with Somaliland led to the breakdown of relations with Somalia in 2020, further aggravating the situation. Al-Shabaab has been the main actor opposing the Somali government since 2007. Heir to the Islamic Courts Union, it has radicalised and controlled large areas of southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, until 2011, when it was expelled. Although its territorial presence has decreased year after year, it has not meant the end of acts of violence, which have increased. In October 2017, it committed the worst terrorist attack in the history of Somalia and the second worst in the world in terms of number of victims, only after 9/11. The explosion of a tanker in the capital caused more than 600 deaths. The most immediate effect was the reaction of the population, a part of which had legitimized and supported their actions. Today, the terrorist group continues to lose ground, but the challenge for the government is to contain the terrorist attacks and eliminate the main destabilizing element within the country. In recent years, Somalia has made progress towards economic and political stabilization, reaching a very fragile balance that is at risk without international action. The stability of Somalia depends on regional relations based on cooperation with neighbouring states and on a lasting peace. (Open Photo: Shutterstock/Free Wind)

Pablo Arconada Ledesma

 

How and why Qatar has emerged as a leading peace broker in Africa.

In recent years, Qatar has emerged as a significant peace broker in Africa, reflecting a growing Gulf involvement in the continent’s economy and politics. Sycophants praise the emirate as a soft power with no hidden agenda. However, the reality is not always so rosy.

On 18 March, Qatar made headlines by hosting a meeting in Doha between the presidents of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Felix Tshisekedi, and Rwanda, Paul Kagame. After the meeting, which was also attended by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the two African leaders reaffirmed their commitment to negotiating an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.
Subsequently, delegations from both countries met several times in Doha until the negotiations began to bear fruit. Indeed, on 25 April, the Congolese and Rwandan foreign ministers, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Olivier Nduhungireye, met in Washington with the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, to discuss the terms of an agreement that would guarantee peace and security in the Great Lakes Region while creating a favourable climate for American investment in the area.
The two ministers signed a “Declaration of Principles” to promote peace and economic development in the region and end the conflict in eastern DRC. The Washington agreement also follows a joint declaration on 23 April by the Congolese government on the one hand and the Congo River Alliance and the M23 on the other, who had been negotiating a ceasefire in Qatar at the same time. Time will tell whether the ceasefire will eventually take place and hold, but everyone recognised that bringing the warring parties together was an achievement in itself, as previous attempts by the African Union had failed.
One sign of this recognition came on 19 March, when UN Secretary-General António Guterres thanked the Emir of Qatar for his mediation to end the conflict in eastern DRC.

Democratic Republic of the Congo President Felix Tshisekedi and his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame, meet with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in Doha, Qatar. (Photo: MOFA.gov.qa)

But this mediation is only the latest chapter in a longer saga of similar processes that have established Qatar as a major diplomatic hub. Indeed, the emirate has previously positioned itself as a mediator in a number of other conflicts in Africa.
Its record dates back to 2004, when Qatar secured the release of 100 Moroccan prisoners of war held by the Polisario Sahrawi movement in Tinduf. Qatar was also instrumental in securing a ceasefire between Djibouti and Eritrea in 2010. The emirate also facilitated a ceasefire in Darfur in 2013. Qatari diplomats also worked to restore diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia in 2021. Qatar also mediated peace talks in Chad between the government, rebel groups and political opponents in 2022. Elsewhere, Qatar has been involved in peace efforts for Lebanon and between the Taliban and the US government.

Militiamen Houthis. Doha has mediated between the Yemeni government and the Houthis. 123rf

It has also mediated between Palestinian movements, between Israel and Hamas, and between the Yemeni government and the Houthis. Such an impressive track record, Qatari officials explain, reflects a constitutional commitment to the peaceful resolution of international disputes and conflicts, as expressed in the Emirate’s constitution, which makes mediation a key foreign policy priority.
In the recent case of mediating the conflict in eastern Congo, Qatar’s influence is largely due to its track record, neutrality and economic involvement in both the DRC and Rwanda.
The Paris daily Le Monde recalls the close ties between the Emir of Qatar and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, which are taking concrete form with the construction of a new $1.6 billion airport east of the capital Kigali and the partnership between RwandAir and Qatar Airways. At the same time, in late 2022, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi asked Qatar to mediate in the conflict with Rwanda. The previous year, during Tshisekedi’s visit to Doha, several cooperation agreements were signed between the DRC and Qatar.

Airport terminal building at Kigali International Airport. the Emir of Qatar and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, which are taking concrete form with the construction of a new $1.6 billion airport east of the capital Kigali. Shutterstock/Africadventures

The list includes a framework agreement for economic, technical and trade cooperation to secure future investments, including the modernisation and development of the ports of Matadi, Kinshasa and Boma. Qatar Airways has also offered to enter into a partnership with the DRC’s aviation authority, RVA, for the modernisation, construction and financing of Ndjili and Ndolo airports in Kinshasa and Luano
airport in Lubumbashi.
Qatar is also funding several projects in the Sahel region, such as the Qatar Cancer Treatment Centre in Burkina Faso, inaugurated in 2021. Four years later, the Qatar Fund for Development signed a $50 million loan and grant agreement with Mali’s Ministry of Economy and Finance.
According to Dr Bakary Sambe, director of the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute, Qatar’s mediation expertise could be useful in the coming years in the Sahel region to help these countries find a way out of terrorism. Nina Wilen, director of the Africa programme at the Brussels-based Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, claims in a recent paper that “rumours also suggest that Qatar may be given a mediation role between the Malian military regime and both Islamist and separatist groups in the north.
Several factors may explain Qatar’s involvement in peace processes around the world, particularly in Africa. In the case of the Great Lakes conflict, Qatar is not only a major investor in both countries. It has also filled the gap left by the former coloniser, Belgium. In the past, before the Sun City peace agreement in 2002, Belgium made considerable efforts to bring together all the regional actors and to ensure that the United Nations and the European Union supported the process. This time, however, Belgium has clearly taken sides, urging the EU to impose sanctions on the Rwandan “aggressor”, which finally broke off diplomatic relations with Brussels last March. Moreover, Belgium’s economic influence in its three former African colonies has shrunk considerably, while Chinese and Indian investment continues to soar.

A view inside Khalifa International Stadium in Al Rayyan, Qatar, during a 2022 FIFA World Cup. Helping to find diplomatic solutions to conflicts is also another way of repairing the reputational damage caused by the abuses of World Cup workers. CC BY-SA 4.0/Standardwhale

More generally, soft power diplomacy has been a way for Qatar to break its diplomatic isolation on the international stage after the emirate refused to align itself with the anti-Iran and anti-Muslim Brotherhood positions of other Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates, which severed diplomatic ties with Doha in June 2017, until their resumption in January 2021.
Helping to find diplomatic solutions to conflicts is also another way of repairing the reputational damage caused by the abuses of World Cup workers exposed by Amnesty International and other human rights organisations, and by the Qatargate scandal, which consisted of more than 300 attempts to corrupt members of the European Parliament. According to a report published in December 2023 by the Brussels-based digital newspaper Politico, the actions included secret plans to kill parliamentary resolutions condemning Qatar’s human rights record and working towards a visa-free travel agreement between Doha and the EU.
A parliamentary assistant arrested by Belgian police has confessed that corrupt lawmakers changed the narrative in parliament during a committee hearing in April 2021 on Qatar’s preparations for the World Cup, which have come under intense criticism for the alleged exploitation of migrant workers.

Qatar’s involvement in African conflicts often coincides with an agenda of economic expansion.123rf

Some analysts stress that Qatar’s diplomatic success is due to the perception that the emirate has no hidden agenda. However, Qatar’s involvement in African conflicts often coincides with an agenda of economic expansion. Amid speculation about a future Qatari mediation role in the Sahel, the state-owned Qatar Mining Company expressed interest in gold exploration projects in Burkina Faso in 2022, where the Emir Sheikh promised to finance a US$240 million highway project between the capital Ouagadougou and the Ivorian border. A subsidiary of Qatar Mining Company is exploring for gold and copper in the Red Sea state of Sudan, where Qatar has been involved in several mediation efforts. Qatar Mining has also been awarded four gold exploration permits in western and southern Mali.
Qatar’s soft power policy and significant economic involvement in Africa are part of a wider context of growing Gulf involvement on the continent, argues Nina Wilen. This approach contrasts sharply with that of the United Arab Emirates, which has adopted a more militarised and transactional approach. Indeed, in 2019 the UAE and Mali signed a military cooperation agreement. The UAE also relies on mercenaries, proxies and logistics networks to support Libya’s National Army and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces.
Whatever the nature of their engagement, says Wilen, the Gulf states’ presence is driven by a desire to shape outcomes in a region that offers new opportunities as Western states withdraw. As oil and gas producers are aware of the need for energy transition, the Gulf states also see their involvement in Africa as a way to diversify their economies. (Open Photo: Pixabay)

François Misser

 

The Mediterranean Sea. Global Challenges.

The phenomenon of the territorialisation of the Seas has not spared the Mediterranean area, which is increasingly restricted and at risk of crisis, with areas of high seas drastically reduced.

This situation becomes even more evident in the eastern part of the basin, which is characterised by the high level of conflict determined by the management of borders and the sharing of gas reserves. In this area, there are important gas deposits, including that of Egypt, among the largest deposits in the region, which has allowed it to satisfy its national energy needs and export gas outside the region. In addition to those of Egypt, there are also the Israeli offshore deposits, Tamar and Leviathan, thanks to which the country reaches and exceeds the national energy demand, as well as those discovered by Cyprus in front of its coasts which hold significant quantities of gas.

Istanbul. Turkish Drillship is moored at Haydarpasa Port. The Yavuz ship is owned by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). Erdogan signed a memorandum of understanding with Libya for the definition of a maritime corridor between the two countries. 123rf

The presence of these deposits and the untapped potential of the underwater dimension have pushed coastal states, over the last twenty years, to stipulate territorial delimitation agreements that are at the root of the tensions present in the area. More specifically, Cyprus stipulated agreements with Egypt, in 2003, Lebanon in 2007 and Israel in 2010, aimed at managing the natural resources around the island, ignoring, however, any legal and legitimate rights of the Turkish part in the north. These agreements, opening the way to explorations within its territorial waters, have aroused the ire of Turkey which, finding itself confined to its coasts, has reacted by establishing a border of the EEZ with the northern part of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Subsequently, in 2019, taking advantage of the difficulty of Al Sarraj being besieged by Haftar’s troops, Erdogan signed a memorandum of understanding with Libya for the definition of a maritime corridor between the two countries which, overlapping with some Greek and Cypriot EEZs, divided the Mediterranean into two compartments. This action, which changed the maritime scenarios of the Mediterranean in one fell swoop, was heavily condemned by the US, the EU and Greece, which accused Turkey of having applied the delimitation techniques in a distorted way and of not having taken into account the rights claimed by other bordering states such as Greece, Cyprus and Egypt. In response to the Turkish action a year later, in 2020, Greece signed an agreement with Egypt which, in fact, cancelled the Turkish corridor signed
by Turkey and Libya.

A ship in the Mediterranean Sea near Cyprus. Greece, Cyprus and Israel have signed an agreement that provides for the construction of the large East Med gas pipeline.123rf

The phenomenon of territorialization, however, besides the eastern part, is extending to the entire area of the basin as demonstrated by the action taken by Algeria with the extension of its EEZ in the vicinity of central-western Sardinia, overlapping with the Italian-Spanish continental shelf.
Again, in the western area, the tensions in place are not limited only to aspects related to exploration but also to those related to the transport of hydrocarbons. More specifically, Greece, Cyprus and Israel have signed an agreement that provides for the construction of the large East Med gas pipeline. An infrastructure that, developing on a route of about 1900 km of underwater pipes, starting from the Israeli offshore deposits, would reach Greece passing through the islands of Cyprus and Crete. From Greece, it would then connect to the offshore section of the Poseidon gas pipeline for a further 210 km that would connect it to Italy. Together, the two pipelines would constitute a mega fossil fuel infrastructure, promoted by the Italian Edison (controlled by the French EDF) and the Greek DEPA, united in the joint venture IGI Poseidon.
Turkey, which was excluded from this project, has created a competing project, the Turk Stream, aimed at bringing Russian gas to Turkey through the Black Sea and to Europe through the Balkan region which, to date, is the only active route for Russian gas supplies to Europe.

Greece. The port of Piraeus with the cruise terminal and the peripheral road under a blue sky. The infrastructure is managed by the Chinese company Cosco. 123

Last but not least, in addition to energy issues, the coasts that border this stretch of sea host military and civilian infrastructures. On the Syrian coast, in particular, the Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim air base are still present, despite the sudden change of regime. While the Chinese are busy with their private or state-owned giants such as the Shanghai International Port Group, China Merchants or COSCO, (China Communications and Construction Company) managing logistical activities in various port infrastructures in the basin including Port Said and Damietta in Egypt, Piraeus in Greece, Kumpart in Turkey and Haifa in Israel, where the Indian group Adani is also present, but also in Valencia in Spain, el-Hamdania in Algeria and Zarzis in Tunisia, which is still under construction. Finally, through its corporations, only semi-independent from the Government of the People’s Republic, such as China Merchant, it has also acquired stakes in the ports of Marseille, Malta, the new Moroccan port of Tanger Med, the port of Sines in Portugal, Rijeka in Croatia and other Italian ports. A geo-economic framework, as described so far, is very unstable and not without sudden changes determined both by the evolution of global changes, but above all by local ones, since the area in question is the scene of some of the major crises on a global scale. (Open Photo: Passing through the Strait of Gibraltar).

Filippo Romeo

India and Pakistan. It was not a surprise; it was deja vu.

On 7 May, at 01:05 a.m. local time, the Indian Armed Forces carried out a limited strike operation, named Sindoor, targeting a total of 21 sites located mainly beyond the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, in Pakistan’s Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.

The operation, which lasted approximately 25 minutes in total, primarily involved the use of Indian Air Force aircraft operating within national airspace, from which long-range precision stand-off strike munitions were launched. These targeted only selected camps and infrastructure reportedly linked, according to Indian authorities, to the militant groups “Jaish-e-Mohammed “(JeM) and” Lashkar-e-Taib”a (LeT), which New Delhi holds responsible for the 22 April terrorist attack on Hindu tourists in Baisaran Valley, Jammu and Kashmir.

Specifically, Indian security services have attributed the Pahalgam attack, which resulted in 26 fatalities, to “The Resistance Front” (TRF), a proxy linked to LeT and also implicated in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Among the sites targeted by Indian forces was the city of Muridke in Punjab province, where Indian intelligence identified the presence of JeM leader Masood Azhar. However, he may have escaped the strike, while some members of his family are believed to have been killed.

The highly limited nature of the bombing campaign, both in terms of duration and magnitude, despite at least 25 reported fatalities and about twice as many wounded, and the absence of any Pakistani military facilities among the targets, indicate a carefully calibrated operation aimed at minimising the immediate risk of escalation.

The current flow of information concerning the operation is subject to the rules of the “fog of war”, with both sides engaging in a large-scale campaign of misinformation and disinformation, seeking, on the one hand, to downplay the adversary’s capabilities and, on the other hand, to amplify their own.

Against this background, India’s use of advanced stand-off munitions with minimal collateral damage, along with the deployment of unspecified unmanned aerial systems, is countered by Islamabad’s progressive claims of having downed an increasing number of Indian aircraft during the operation.

The probable loss of some fixed-wing assets, particularly if not due to technical malfunctions, would have occurred within Indian airspace, suggesting a plausible Pakistani cross-border defensive counter-air action using air-to-air missiles.

Notwithstanding the assertiveness in the strategic communication adopted by Islamabad and the artillery exchanges along the entire LoC in Kashmir, which remain consistent with a mere intensification of the recurring positional engagements that have characterised the period since the 22 April attack, a retaliation from Pakistan seems inevitable, though not imminent.

However, the realisation of such retaliation presents a dilemma, not so much regarding the methods, but the nature of the selected targets, as New Delhi did not strike military infrastructures, thus negating the grounds for a symmetrical response.

The current scenario, therefore, reproduces at least in part some elements that have already emerged during the rather limited clashes, in terms of scope and duration, that took place between India and Pakistan in 2016 and especially in 2019.

In the latter case, the two countries focused on achieving outcomes that could be leveraged on their respective domestic fronts, a dynamic that may recur in this instance. At that time, the Indian response took the form of a limited-strike operation in Balakot, which did not lead to large-scale conflict between the two nations.

In the current context, Operation Sindoor, although relatively more extensive in scope than in 2019, nonetheless served to confirm India’s intention to respond militarily to terrorist attacks, thereby attempting to re-establish deterrence and underscoring the absence of a distinction between actions carried out by Kashmiri groups and conventional operations attributed to Pakistani forces.

Contextually, a counter-response occurred on 10 May when Pakistan launched an operation codenamed Operation Bunyan al-Marsus, targeting several Indian military bases. In retaliation, India continued Operation Sindoor, expanding its scope to target Pakistani military installations. This conflict marked the first drone battle between the two nuclear-armed nations.

Barring the risk of an extended incident, it will also depend largely on the pressure exerted by external actors, notably the United States, China, Iran, and the Gulf States. In 2019, it was precisely Washington’s intervention that proved crucial in keeping the confrontation contained. Not coincidentally, after signalling discreet support for its Indian partner, the U.S. administration, through Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio, has initiated intensive talks with both sides, urging restraint.

On Saturday evening, 10 May, the Trump administration announced a ‘full and immediate’ ceasefire between India and Pakistan.  However, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that India had only ‘paused’ its military action against Pakistan and would ‘retaliate on its own terms’ in the event of any further attacks.

Military developments aside, relations between India and Pakistan after what happened are likely to enter a new phase in which hypotheses of dialogue and rapprochement seem unthinkable. Prolonged tension, moreover, risks turning South Asia, more than it already is, into one of the privileged theatres of the broader confrontation between the United States and China.

While the former, in fact, could face increasing difficulty in building a relatively balanced relationship between the two sides, the latter could exploit the circumstances to impose ever-increasing pressure
on its Indian rival.

At the regional level, the confrontation calls into question the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, whose leadership may try to take advantage of the Pakistani “distraction” to strengthen direct and indirect support for active militancy against Islamabad along the shared border. The security situation in Pakistani province of Balochistan, already very precarious at present, could also be further aggravated if the parties fail to de-escalate tensions in the short to medium term, a scenario that looks highly likely. (Photo: 123rf)

Tiziano Marino and Emmanuele Panero/CeSI

 

The Mediterranean Sea. A Liquid Border.

In addition to the economic ferment connected to the opportunities of maritime and land trade, the Mediterranean is currently witnessing one of the most decisive games related to security, a factor that connects the economic and social interests of the entire planet.

In some countries – such as Israel and Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Greece, Egypt, Turkey and Algeria – due to the geopolitical vacuum caused by the weakness of Europe and most of the countries in the area – the tensions of the major powers of the planet are discharged. From a geopolitical point of view, this makes the Basin a liquid border in which the instabilities that have exploded even thousands of kilometres from its coasts are interconnected.
An area in which the major world powers converge for obvious reasons of economic speculation and in which, particularly on the shores of North Africa and the Near East, the stability of some state actors is weakening in favour of non-state actors whose power is fuelled by the erosion of the sovereignty of weak and failed states.

The Red Sea Region, with Bab al Mandab Strait, is shown on the map. Shutterstock/Below the Sky

The careful observer cannot fail to notice that this instability constitutes a long arc of crisis that tends to keep separate the three large continental blocks, European-Asian and African, thus causing the Mediterranean to lose what could constitute the main function of this sea, that of unification. This situation strongly calls into question the basic unity built and shaped over the centuries that made this space a maritime region from which the contemporary Euro-Mediterranean also originates. What was brought about by the Cold War – which, on the contrary, had generated particular conditions of conservation for this microcosm – is happening with the reorganisation of global balances that, although external to the region, are acting in a de-structuring way on the balances of the area. This de-structuring is also dictated by the presence of external actors whose approach does not take into account the collateral or destabilizing effects of the medium-long term. This process has undergone a significant acceleration with the dramatic attack of 7 October 2023, carried out by Palestinian terrorist groups against the state of Israel. This has triggered the slow but inexorable extension of the conflict to other crisis areas, in a complex and fragmented mosaic in which different actors and interests are intertwined. A chaotic and incendiary context within which non-state actors emerge, such as the Yemeni Houthis, authors of targeted attacks with missiles and drones against Israeli and US military targets, but, above all, against ships and cargo in transit in the Red Sea.
An action that has produced a real logistical earthquake forcing the major shipping companies to give up intra-Mediterranean transit, passing through Bab-el Mandeb and Suez, for the circumnavigation of Africa through the Cape of Good Hope.

Istanbul. A group of women working in a textile factory. The damage caused by global shocks has increased the production specialisation of Albania, Turkey and Morocco in the textile, mechanical and agricultural sectors. 123rf

Among the effects of the Red Sea crisis is that of having given a further acceleration to the process of redefining globalization that had taken hold under the first Trump presidency, whose priority had been given to the restructuring of production chains. This reconfiguration, encouraged by the new US posture, could have repercussions on global structures, whereby large multinational companies – as is already partly happening – will tend to diversify supply chains, transferring them from China to new centres located on this side of the risk areas (Vietnam, Indonesia, Mexico and, with reference to the Mediterranean area, Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia), chosen to reduce the damage of future global shocks. Also included in this reorganization strategy, better known as de-risking, are the assembly lines reconfigured to avoid concentration in a single area, especially if affected by geopolitical risks. In fact, a strategic priority for many governments is to encourage and support companies in rethinking the location of their plants in order to safeguard value chains and national interests, by implementing a reshoring process.
This trend also affects the “Mare Nostrum” since the development of alternative and proximity maritime supply chains, to reduce the damage caused by global shocks, has increased the production specialisation
of Albania, Turkey and Morocco in the textile, mechanical
and agricultural sectors.

Sunrise over the Mediterranean Sea. Deep-sea shipping that benefits the Mediterranean economy could be diverted to the ports of the North Sea. 123rf

These are dynamics that, by strengthening cooperation in the “Mare Nostrum” for security and stability needs, translate into a nearshoring opportunity for companies that, by reducing production in Asia and increasing it in the Mediterranean, can take advantage of accessible production costs favoured by the SEZs (special economic zones) equipped with tax breaks and port infrastructures that are significantly strengthening. The strengthening of the “Mediterranean supply chain” is one of the reasons why, despite the Houthi attacks, the repercussions on the economy of the Basin have been rather limited. However, it is likely that, if the crisis were to drag on for a long time, the share of Deep-Sea Shipping that benefits the Mediterranean economy could be diverted to the ports of the North Sea, following the consolidation of the route passing through the Cape of Good Hope. (Open Photo:  View of the Strait of Gibraltar opening into the Mediterranean Sea. Photo: Andreas Meck)

F.R.

Witnesses of Jubilee. Sr. Dorothy Stang. A message of hope for the Amazon.

Twenty years ago, on February 12, 2005, Brazil was shocked by the news of Sister Dorothy Stang’s murder. That morning,
the gunmen hired to kill her found her alone on a trail deep
in the Amazon rainforest.

When the armed youths blocked her way, and having already received death threats, she saw the immediate danger and tried to engage them in conversation. She almost dissuaded them from killing her and even managed to read some verses from the Gospels to them, telling them that her weapon was that holy book.
But the hit money offered counted for more, and six shots fired at point-blank range left her lying on the ground in the emptiness of the forest. Then a tropical rainstorm came on, and her blood bathed the ground she had loved and defended.
And so it was that, distraught and weeping, the families she had come to see found her later. Her lifeless body remained on the ground till evening, waiting for representatives of the law, while around her the people of the region and her Sisters in the Congregation held hands, wept, and prayed. This was the day that Amazonia lost a friend and gained an angel, in the words of Felicio Pontes, Jr, a young Procurator of the Republic and colleague of Sr Dorothy in struggles on behalf of the peoples of the forest.

Sr. Dorothy with young leaders during a meeting. She was able to obtain the public lands of the region for her sustainable project development. Courtesy: Sisters of the Congregation of Notre Dame de Namur

Why did they kill Sr Dorothy? Could she have been seen as a threat? A clear explanation was given by Procurator Felicio Pontes.  Sr Dorothy was killed in the clash between the ordinary life of Amazonian people and the economics of agribusiness. There is a violent struggle in the State of Para, which together with that of Amazonas, contains the greatest area of Amazonian forest (which extends over half of Brazil, embracing eight states as well as five other Latin American countries). On one side is the traditional way of life of the forest peoples, who live integrated into it, on the banks of its innumerable rivers, on their creeks and pools: they derive their extractive economy from the forest and plant their crops and build their villages in its clearings. These are not just the indigenous peoples who keep their languages and cultures but, in far greater numbers, people of mixed race, simply Amazonian people. They have no titles to the lands of their ancestors; they are children of the land.
On the other side is the agribusiness project, concerned with exporting timber, minerals, meat, and soya. Its people are landowners with the power to clear the forest and install their huge tracts of monoculture and stock-raising. Exporting, in the current globalized economy, is the means of earning the most money, of amassing the greatest wealth. And agribusiness provides Brazil’s greatest source of exports. But this is taking place at the expense of the environment and of the people who live in the vastness of the country’s interior.

There is a permanent struggle permeating the population. On one hand, in areas where the State has not yet managed to establish a presence, with no police security and a high level of institutional corruption, people are threatened and forced out of their homes. Violent farmers grab land with no justification and extend their properties by force, with the result that the same piece of land can have three or more titles of ownership. On the other hand, these same landowners entice workers from various regions of Brazil, mainly from the interior of the poor, dry northeast. So, there is also an increase in (hidden) slave labour. It is in this complicated, violent scenario that Sr Dorothy’s death, and before that her missionary life and brilliant initiative, are to be understood.
She came from the north-east of Brazil, where she had worked with her Sisters of the Congregation of Notre Dame de Namur among the poor country people. She became a naturalized Brazilian to be more radically dedicated to the people. Seeing, however, that the people of her north-eastern area of Maranhāo were migrating to the Amazonian region of Para she agreed with the Sisters of the Congregation that they had to uproot themselves and go with the migrants.

So, after travelling through different parts of Para experiencing persecutions along with the people, they settled in Anapu, in the ‘middle ground’, on public land – so belonging to the State – some four hundred miles from Belem. They came to a land of forest and conflicts, at the invitation of the then bishop of the diocese of Altamira, Erwin Krautler. He, together with three other bishops, was among the more than two hundred people explicitly under threat of death.
With the support of the bishop and in collaboration with the National Institute for Settlement and Agrarian Reform, Sister Dorothy was able to obtain the public lands of the region, her project for sustainable development. The project aims basically to cultivate 20 per cent of the land and to preserve 50 per cent as forest, increasing the native species of trees that produce fruits and other harvests. Implementation of such projects gained the support of civic bodies, organs of state and national government, universities, social movements and pastoral plans. And they began to produce fruit and hope.
But then the confrontations began: farmers who take possession of land using violence, falsifying documents and forcing the inhabitants off, advanced into the same areas. They met with organised and articulate resistance from the people, with juridical battles in the state capital.
And they decided to eliminate Sr Dorothy: they got together to pay a considerable sum to a middleman who, in his turn, contracted the young gunmen and sold Sr Dorothy’s life for fifty reals (some twenty US dollars). At her funeral celebration, in Anapu, one of the Sisters from her Congregation said: “We are not going to bury; we are going to plant Sr Dorothy”. Her name means ‘gift of God’, and she is a gift to the Amazonian forest and peoples. Her seed has not ceased producing fruit: her struggle for integration between forest and people has spread through the whole of Brazil.

Members of the Christian communities in prayer at Sr. Dorothy’s grave. Photo: Thomas Bauer

She was buried in a grove in Anapu, her grave was marked with a simple wooden cross bearing her name and dates of birth and death.
Last January during a vigil, in memory of Sister Dorothy in the sanctuary of the New Martyrs of St Bartholomew on the Island in Rome, Italy, Laurie Jonhston, professor of theology at Emmanuel College in Boston pointed out: “Remembering her today, twenty years later, is more important because, in the year of the Jubilee, we need to reaffirm the centrality of the Christian mission in contemporary society”.
Sister Dorothy’s message, therefore, “is perfectly in line with the pontificate of Pope Francis who, in July 2023, established the Commission of New Martyrs, Witnesses of the Faith and in 2015 had dedicated the second encyclical of his pontificate to creation”.
The figure of Sister Dorothy recalls how “Christian mission extends beyond personal commitment. It includes commitment to the forgotten, to the victims of environmental degradation and social inequalities”.  Professor Johnston concluded: “the testimonies of terrible violence and human weaknesses are interwoven with stories of hope, showing that it is possible to create communities capable of living in harmony with the environment and with God’s teachings”.  (Open Photo: Courtesy:  Sisters of the Congregation of Notre Dame de Namur)

Luiz Carlos Susie

 

Kenya. Pökot, the Parpara Ceremony.

The Pökot are a Nilotic people. They live in Western Kenya, in the West Pokot and Baringo districts, and Uganda, in the Karamoja region. We look at the Parpara ceremony, a rite that every Pokot woman must perform before giving birth to her first child.

It is a long rite that lasts all night. It is usually performed around the seventh month of pregnancy. The presence of the father of the child is very important in this ceremony, as the child to be born will belong to his family. Parpara is performed only once for each woman. The only exception is if the woman does not succeed in giving birth to a live child. In this case, it would mean that the first parpara was not done properly and would have to be repeated.
This ceremony attempts to remove all the sins committed by the ancestors of the father of the child. They have to be cleansed so that the woman can have a successful birth.The people involved in this rite are: the wife, the husband, the husband’s father and mother, the close relatives on both sides, and two young children, a boy and a girl, who act as sort of godparents to the child still in the womb.

The master of the rite is the grandfather of the man. File swm

A few days before the date set for the parpara, the husband brews more than six gourds of beer. When the beer is ready, the wife’s relatives and the husband’s parents are invited to the homestead. The husband’s family must welcome the wife’s relatives with a few gourds of beer. After a few drinks, the husband’s father, the future grandfather, starts a song to welcome the guests. As darkness falls, the guests are led to the herd of goats inside the house where the parpara will take place.
The master of the rite is the grandfather of the man, or the father of the man if the former has already died; he is called the porporin. Once the wife’s relatives are out of the house, the porporin gives a large jar of honey and a small one to the young boy who helps with the ceremony.
The presence of the boy and girl is very important; they predict the successful birth of the young mother-to-be, who is happy about her pregnancy but nervous. The first birth of a Pokot woman is always difficult and painful because the girl’s circumcision has left a scar that needs to be reopened.

Dancing and drinking the whole night
When the time comes, the porporin begins the rite by taking a wooden bowl and putting in some earth from an ant hill, roots from a fig tree and pieces of bark from another tree. Then the old man begins to mix all these ingredients, making a muddy substance.
As the old man’s hands move slowly and pompously, the others respond to his song. Every now and then he would stop and take a sip of beer, and then he would continue for a long time.
The singing goes on for a long time as the old man mentions many of the known sins and mistakes of their ancestors that need to be purified so that their sins do not affect the birth.

The presence of the boy and girl is very important; they predict the successful birth of the young mother-to-be. File swm

Then the old man takes a brand from the fire and puts it in the wooden bowl. He takes a drink, pauses to breathe, during which time people can talk about anything else, and after a while, starts the same ritual again.
The young couple do not need to be there yet, although the man could be there.  People dance and drink all night. At dawn, all the people who are on the homestead, relatives and guests, come to the hut where the parpara has been celebrated. Now the couple are told to sit down at the narrow entrance of the hut.
The two small children, a boy and a girl, were brought and sat by their sides: the boy on the right, the girl on the left. The husband is completely naked, and his wife sits on his left hand, covered with a wrap of animal skin. The porporin begins to mix the mud again and sings.

People dance and drink all night. File swm

When this is done, the mothers of the couple leave the hut and stand in front of the entrance. The porporin takes a small jar of honey and two small gourds of milk, one from a cow that has just given birth and the other from a goat. He took a piece of a palm branch and smeared milk and honey on the couple’s mouths. But they cannot lick it. Both milk and honey are symbols of wealth and a sweet future. Some of the milk and honey is also poured on their heads. The rest of the milk and honey is given to the two small children sitting on their sides to drink and lick.
When the ceremony is over, everyone sings together. While everyone is singing, they go around the couple and the two children sitting in front of the door of the hut. When the song is over, everyone leaves the hut and the couple and the two children sit outside the door. They sit on a white goatskin, their legs close together, next to each other. It is about the time when the sun comes out, and as most Pökot houses face east, the sun should shine on them.
Then the porporin takes the basin full of mud and spits into it. Soon after, all the people present, both men and women, spit into it as well. The spitting, which is done specially, is a sign of blessing.

When the ceremony is over, everyone sings together. Shutterstock/Cheboite Titus

Everyone blesses those who will be parents, everyone is with them. The old man continues the ceremony, quietly smearing the mud on the husband and then on the wife. He also smears a little on the two children. Then the porporin washes the couple’s bodies with milk and pours some honey on them, as a sign of purification and sweet future blessings. When the ceremony at the entrance to the hut is over, all those present walk in procession to the kraal, at the entrance of which there are two branches. The leader of the procession removes them and everyone enters the kraal. They walk around the kraal three times, following their right hand, singing as they go.
At the end, the porporin calls the young couple to the centre of the kraal and blesses them. The whole parpara ceremony now ends. The birth will be without any problems. But if there are, the parpara may have to be repeated. (Open Photo: File swm)

Daniel Partany

Reflection. Leo XIV: Mission & Grace.

In the conclave, the Cardinals were choosing a person, not a nationality, ethnicity or ideology.  The appointment of the new Pope revealed two general features: Cardinals don’t leak – well, maybe the odd one did – and the experts don’t get it right, a single one
did mid-conclave. 

The commentariat ruled out an American Pope.  Leo XIV, a Peruvian citizen, presented himself in Spanish and Italian with hardly a word of English.  A contrast to Pope John Paul II who had been well and truly a Polish Pope as well as a striking universal pontiff.
Leo XIV’s American nationality will, though, probably pose him problems.  President Trump initially has been unusually gracious.  How long that lasts remains to be seen.  The MAGA masses are already on the attack.  Pope Francis outspokenly condemned Trump’s contempt for ‘losers’, his treatment of immigrants and the vulnerable.  His successor shares his views, though likely to steer a more diplomatic course.

Pope Leo XIV. (Vatican Media)

The crunch in relations with the Vatican will come over meeting Trump a possible invitation to the USA creating huge media interest, a request to visit the Pope a little less problematic.  It is not hard to imagine how the White House would manipulate a papal visit.  One way of saying ‘no’ to Washington would be to present declining as following Pope Francis who resisted return to his homeland Argentina.  A visit to Peru would still be possible?
The new Pope’s Chicago origins elicited massive and investigative interest.  His two brothers must be a mixed blessing, immediately humanizing brother Bob but, you can be sure, a bit too gabby for the Vatican into the bargain.   And, on cue, ambitious scribblers, religious or otherwise, joined in the ‘what’s he going to be like as Pope’ comment.
The media is stuck on conservative and progressive as two binary categories applicable to Catholic prelates.  The reality is there is nothing unusual about sharing an ‘option for the poor’ with an option for social conservatism, or what is commonly called ‘anti-woke’.  You might call it normative for Francis and Leo.  In that sense Pope Leo was indeed the continuity candidate for the papacy.
Papa Leone is clearly a very interesting man, as at ease talking about the impact of AI on future work as the horrors of war, the plight of migrants and climate change.  No-one has really been able to pin down his personality in a paragraph or two from details of his biography.  Most have missed the full significance of his having worked as a North American missionary in Latin America.

In 2015, he was appointed bishop of Chiclayo. (Facebook)

He worked in a rural area of Peru in his formative years as a young priest.  Then in Peru’s historic third city, Trujillo from 1988-1998 as a parish priest and Augustinian seminary teacher.  In 2015 he was appointed bishop of Chiclayo, a seaside town also in the North-West where he served for eight years.  All this has been publicized.  What is missing is the significance of this appointment.
Three-quarters of Peru’s population of 34 million is, at least nominally, Catholic.  As an Episcopal Conference, the country has 75 cardinals, archbishops and bishops, plus 12 titular bishops who do not serve a particular diocese.  As Bishop of Chiclayo he took out Peruvian citizenship.   Looking at the 75 names in the Conference, Roberto Prevost appears like the only American one.  The only other American name was the papal Nuncio, the Vatican’s State’s ambassador in Peru.
To be recommended in 2014, an American, for a Peruvian diocese is some measure of his record as a priest.  Missionary bishops are in the main a thing of the past.  An American Nuncio perhaps had some anxieties as he passed on his name to Rome, though Pope Francis appointed him quickly.  In many parts of Latin America, the USA’s role in propping up vicious dictatorships in the past has not been forgotten.   Peru had less unpleasant memories, was far from America’s backyard, but also suffered from insurgency and military reaction to it.
It was, typically, politically and culturally independent.  And Gustavo Gutierrez’s seminal Theology of Liberation: Perspectives was published in Lima, Peru’s capital, in 1971.  Its radical spirituality and Marxist economic analysis – of relations with the USA – caused consternation in the Vatican.  The Peruvian love and acceptance of their Bishop Roberto is shown in the joy of his appointment as Pope.

Pope Leo XIV is visiting his confreres at the Augustinian Shrine in Genazzano. (Facebook)

As the leadership of all Religious Orders demanded, his two terms as Prior-General of the Augustinians, meant extensive travel.  The distinctive demands of a missionary vocation in different contexts and cultures would have become obvious.  No-one had to tell Roberto Prevost that he was serving a global Church.
He brought lay teams into the pastoral action of the diocese of Chiclayo following the Second Vatican Council’s vision of a united “People of God”.    He was known for his easy manner and friendship, his concern for migrants, the poor and vulnerable, for the refugees arriving from Venezuela, and as a spiritual director.  Leo’s first words ”peace be with you all” and his fatherly ‘Non avete paura’,  (“do not be afraid”), reflect the gravity of the global conflicts and problems he now faces.
How on earth do you lead 1.4 billion people today in their various cultures, societies and governance?  Respected for his calm and as a listener, no wonder his emotion and tension showed before his address on the balcony.  A missionary Pope, many prayers will carry him, his friendship with many, not least the cardinals who chose him, his Augustinian spirituality, and a faith honed by the people of Peru. (Bishop Prevost greets the faithful outside the Cathedral of Saint Mary in Chiclayo. (Photo: Facebook)

Ian Linden
Visiting Professor at St Mary’s University,
Strawberry Hill, London

The Mediterranean Sea. Friendshoring.

The Houthi attacks, in addition to accelerating the contemporary processes of nearshoring and friendshoring of production chains, resulting in the creation of new value chains based on proximity to ensure greater security, are accelerating the processes of
identifying alternative land corridors, with the Mediterranean
as their final destination.

This need is also driven by geopolitical reasons aimed at reducing political-economic dependence on China and increasing the supply of those “critical” raw materials essential to Europe. Among these is the IMEC (India-Middle-East-Corridor) project which, undoubtedly represents a response to the needs for differentiation and de-risking. In fact, it is outlined as an alternative corridor to the route, exposed to Houthi attacks, passing through the Strait of Baab al Mandeb.
In addition to this, the IMEC constitutes, for the Mediterranean area, the only relevant strategic infrastructure that excludes Beijing, thus assuming a value opposed to the Belt and Road Initiative.
Therefore, the project has the merit of achieving an essential geopolitical objective, namely the creation of a supply chain external to the involvement of China and distant from the perimeter of intervention
of the terrorist group.

Ship with cargo near Haifa shore. The Port of Haifa is the largest of Israel’s three major international seaports. 123rf

The IMEC, based on a multi-level system, integrates the physical dimension with the digital and energy version, providing a rail connection, a system of submarine electric cables and gas pipelines for the passage of green hydrogen. The infrastructure involves relatively stable political realities such as India (Mumbai), the United Arab Emirates (Dubai), Saudi Arabia (Riyadh), Jordan (Al-Haditah), Israel (Haifa) and Greece (Piraeus), presenting a hybrid system of maritime and land flow capable of reducing costs by 30% and accelerating the speed of transit times by 40%, compared to those used to pass through Suez.
The project has a strong friendshoring component, strengthened both by the Abraham Accords, which sanctioned the normalisation of relations between Israel and the UAE by promoting cooperation for the stability of the Middle East and by the I2U2 alliance, created in 2021 between Israel, the UAE, India and the United States as an anti-Chinese function. Furthermore, it connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean, creating a significant convergence between the two macro-areas.
The National Green Hydrogen Mission (NGHM), announced by India in 2023, is compatible with the European objectives of REPowerEU, including the import of 10 million tons of renewable hydrogen by 2030. NGHM represents a response to this need, envisaging the production of 5 MMT (million metric tons) of green hydrogen per year through renewable sources by 2030 and export through new infrastructures, such as, precisely, the IMEC.

Jordan. Two merchant ships coming into port in Aqaba. The Port of Aqaba is the only port in Jordan and is owned by Aqaba Development Corporation (ADC). 123rf

These are aspects destined to strengthen Euro-Indian cooperation also in the area of maritime security, where Delhi’s participation in the Eunavfor Atalanta mission has already created a shared operational framework. The Houthi attacks could lead to a greater need for the security of production chains by creating infrastructure works, such as the IMEC, with a high transformative potential for geopolitical structures, to accelerate both the partnership for maritime security between the actors involved, and the construction of supply chains external to Beijing, and the energy conversion processes envisaged by the European agenda by strengthening cooperation with India.
In a complementary manner to the IMEC project, and in conjunction with the strategy of reshoring the production chain, the Israeli Ben Gurion project represents a valid response to the threat posed by the Houthis to trade routes. Given the impact on transit through the Suez Canal, the plan envisages the development of an alternative corridor with a predominantly land-based character, defined as a “land bridge” capable of connecting Eilat, located on the Gulf of Aqaba, with Ashdod, in the Mediterranean Sea. The project would constitute an alternative to the crossing of Baab al Mandab, although it would be in direct competition with Egypt, as it would present, also for ships transiting the Strait, a complementary and additional option to Suez in the outlet to the Mediterranean. The idea of building a railway system between Eilat and Aqaba would save two days of navigation through Suez for those transport carriers coming from the Red Sea.
However, at present, several questions afflict the feasibility of the project understood as competing with Egypt. First of all, the limited size of the port of Eilat and its shallow depth (less than 12 meters). In addition, the excessive cost of the operation of land drainage and expansion of the port. Therefore, if the option of an alternative canal to Suez passing through Eilat seems unrealistic, the idea of an Eilat-Ashdod land corridor has not lost value, especially in the perspective of neutralizing the Palestinian threat from Gaza.

Cargo ships stand in the port of Eilat on the Red Sea (Israel). A “land bridge” connects Eilat, located on the Gulf of Aqaba, with Ashdod, in the Mediterranean Sea. 123rf

In fact, like Haifa, Ashdod has deep waters and can handle container ships with loads of 18 to 24 thousand TEUs, effectively projecting itself into the Mediterranean economy. Consequently, the railway line (land bridge) presents itself as a feasible engineering solution and above all, as being capable of intercepting traffic between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, in continuity with the development of the IMEC corridor along the Middle East.
The extent of the threat posed by the Houthis could determine the level of acceleration of alternative infrastructure projects to the route to Baab al-Mandab, such as the IMEC or the Ben Gurion Canal, in addition to several land corridors deployed in the Middle Eastern quadrant. For example, the Israeli Trucknet Enterprise has received authorization to build additional land bridges aiming to transport goods by land from the United Arab Emirates or Bahrain through Saudi Arabia and Jordan, until reaching Israel. Having signed an agreement with the Egyptian logistics company WWCS, the loads can be located in Egypt and continue through Suez. The result will be an increase in connectivity, strategic relevance and integration of the Middle East with the Mediterranean economy. But also, the formulation of production chains and corridors external to Chinese penetration with a view to contrasting the Belt and Road Initiative, which hinges on the absolute centrality of the Suez Canal. (Open Photo: The shipping system transports containers by cargo ships. 123rf)

F.R.

Pope Leo XIV and the Missionary and Synodal Global Village.

The search for peace, justice and truth. These will be the guiding principles of his pontificate. A church that is open to the challenges of the world, missionary and synodal.

In his first speech as Pontiff, which was just over 530 words to ‘the city and the world’, Leo XIV pronounced the word “peace” nine times. The content of his words was not just a greeting but a programmatic speech. A few days later, receiving those participating in the Jubilee of the Eastern Churches, he relaunched the appeal to bring back to the world the “dignity of peace”. He says: “For peace to spread, I will make every effort” and the Holy See is available “For enemies to meet and look each other in the eye, so that people are given back hope and the dignity they deserve, the dignity of peace.”
The Pope addresses the leaders of the peoples directly and “with his heart in his hand”: “Let us meet, let us dialogue, let us negotiate!” Then he reiterates the appeal for “the weapons to be silent” in all those regions wounded by conflicts and brutal actions: “From the Holy Land to Ukraine, from Lebanon to Syria, from the Middle East to Tigray and the Caucasus, so much violence!”.

“The dignity of peace.” 123rf

The Pope continues: “Peoples want peace. War is never inevitable, weapons can and must be silent, because they do not solve problems but increase them; because those who sow peace will go down in history, not those who reap victims; because others are not first and foremost enemies, but human beings: not bad people to be hated, but people to talk to.”He followed the same lines when meeting the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See. The three words that Pope Leo XIV emphasised in his speech were: Peace, Justice, and Truth. Peace, understood not only as the absence of war but as an “active gift” that is built starting from the heart and language and that aims to leave behind old and new “disputes”.
The Pope spoke of Justice because “the Holy See cannot refrain from making its voice heard in the face of the numerous imbalances and injustices that lead, among other things, to unworthy working conditions and increasingly fragmented and conflictual societies. It is also necessary to work to remedy global disparities, which see opulence and poverty trace deep furrows between continents, countries and even within individual societies.”

Pope Leo XIV presiding over his inaugural papal Mass. “The truth is never separated from charity” Photo: COL. EMB/Juan Cano

Finally, he spoke of Truth “Because truly peaceful relations cannot be built, even within the international community, without truth. Where words take on ambiguous and ambivalent connotations and the virtual world, with its changed perception of reality, takes over without control, it is difficult to build authentic relations, since the objective and real premises of communication are lacking”. “A frank language is needed, which can give rise to some initial misunderstanding”. Drawing on the Augustinian charism, he then recalls that “truth is never separated from charity, which at its root always has concern for the life and good of every man and woman. Moreover, in the Christian perspective, truth is not the affirmation of abstract and disembodied principles, but the encounter with the person of Christ himself, who lives in the community of believers. Thus, truth does not distance us, but rather allows us to face with greater vigour the challenges of our time, such as migration, the ethical use of artificial intelligence and the protection of our beloved Earth. These are challenges that require the commitment and collaboration of all, since no one can think of facing them alone.”

Pastoral experiences
The man who became Pope Leo XIV was one of the last leadership appointments of Pope Francis. Whether in the leadership of the Roman dicasteries or congregations or in the cardinalate, his appointment did not last more than three years. One could say that he belongs to the group selected by Francis for the generational passage. Like many of those who have been chosen in this way, he was brought from a place where he was not making a career.
Born in the United States, he is a member of an order, the Augustinians, which is inspired by one of the greatest thinkers of both the Church and humanistic reflection; he worked in Latin America as a priest and as a bishop for a good number of years.

Monsignor Prevost visits the district of Illimo during the floods in the area. (Photo diocese of Chiclayo)

From this context, so closely linked to pastoral experiences, Francis brought him to a key position in the Church, the Dicastery for Bishops, responsible for analysing and proposing the best candidates for the episcopate. His knowledge of the Latin world helped Leo XIV to understand migrants and to show solidarity with them. His ability to speak clearly, his love for the poor and his closeness to dialogue prepare him to be a good leader for a Church that needs to maintain a clear evangelical word in today’s tormented and bellicose world. The Augustinian values, undoubtedly strongly lived both in study and in prayer, prepare him to face the challenges of the Church. “To dwell in the house with one heart and one soul turned to God”, a fundamental Augustinian norm, pushes us to love, to fraternity and to care for our common home. The famous phrase of St. Augustine in his reflections on the Trinity: “We seek as those who have not yet found seek, and we find as those who have yet to seek find”, marks an indispensable attitude for the government of the Church today.
The response to the challenges that history poses to the Church cannot consist in closing oneself in the past, but in seeking answers that open up to new realities and new research.

Fr. Robert Prevost, OSA, the future Pope Leo XIV, with Fr. Sunday Ikpe, OSA, in Nigeria. (Photo archive OSA)

The choice of the name Leo, which fits into a history of transformation of the Church, is also significant. After a long ecclesiastical period in the 19th century, in which the hierarchy, accustomed to speaking from power, could not find a way to relate to the world, Leo XIII abandoned the dangerous tendency to systematic condemnation and began to speak of the new realities of the world starting from the inspiration of the Gospel and the wisdom of experience. With him, the social doctrine of the Church was born, and continued to develop with his successors, and, translated into Latin America by the episcopate of the subcontinent, has borne fruit in terms of development and many testimonies of martyrs. Choosing the name of a pope who opened the Church to dialogue with the world means committing to continue the path of the Second Vatican Council. A path of permanent internal reform, in which the Gospel is lived and proclaimed; a path of dialogue aimed at building a more fraternal, more just and more attentive world for the good of all.

A Missionary Church
From the Loggia of St. Peter’s Basilica, Pope Leo XIV said: “We must seek together how to be a missionary Church, a Church that builds bridges, that builds dialogue, always open to welcoming everyone, like this Square, with open arms, to all those who need our charity, our presence, dialogue and love.” Pope Leo XIV was elected by the most universal conclave in the history of the Church, with representatives of 71 countries in the Sistine Chapel. There were pastors of very small Catholic communities who live in cities and regions that are never in the spotlight of the world. With a rapid and broad ballot, a pope with many years of missionary experience was chosen.

It was the most universal conclave in the history of the Church, with representatives of 71 countries around the world. Shutterstock/Fabrizio Maffei

The Cardinals wanted to indicate a path already traced by Pope Francis to be an “outgoing” Church. All Missionaries were happy to hear the Pope speak in Spanish, greeting and thanking his diocese of Chiclayo, in Peru. “And if you allow me a word, a greeting to everyone and especially to my dear diocese of Chiclayo, in Peru, where the faithful accompanied their bishop, shared their faith and gave so much, that they continue to be a faithful Church of Jesus Christ”., has a strong symbolic value not only emotional but of belonging to the lands where missionaries work and accompany the journey of the communities. And finally: “I am a son of Saint Augustine, an Augustinian, who said: “With you I am a Christian and for you a bishop”. In this sense, we can all walk together towards that homeland that God has prepared for us. (Open Photo: Pope Leo XIV) – (Photo: Vatican Media)

Francis Mutesa

Photo Gallery – Comboni Youth Movement at World Youth Day

Advocacy

Adenike Oladosu. Climate Change: Time to Act.

Nigerian ecofeminist Adenike Titilope Oladosu is the founder of   I Lead Climate Action, an initiative aimed at empowering women and youth to combat climate change.…

Read more

Baobab

The Crocodile and the Cockerel.

Once upon a time, the crocodile was king of the animals. He was holding court one day. He sat majestically on his throne as he received…

Read more

Youth & Mission

Jubilee of the Youth: An Unforgettable Journey of Hope.

Coming from five continents, 270 young people belonging to the Comboni Youth Movement gathered in Rome (24th July – 4th August 2025) to celebrate the Jubilee.…

Read more