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Electronic Refuse Flooding East Africa.

For years now, tens of thousands of tons of electric and electronic material have been poured into the continent resulting in environmental pollution and damage to people’s health. Now, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan
have banned such imports.

On 1 June 2022, countries of the EAC, the Community of East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan), will prohibit the import of used electric and electronic appliances (e-waste). The unanimous decision was taken on 12 November in Arusha, Tanzania, where the regional organisation has its headquarters. The member countries, like many other African countries, are becoming dumping grounds for computers, cellphones, televisions and similar obsolete or broken material that damage the environment and cause serious damage to health.
Africa, too, produces e-waste. It is estimated that, in 2019, it amounted to 2.9 million tons, 2.5 kg for each inhabitant. This is a minimal quantity compared to 44.7 million tons produced worldwide.
It is almost impossible to trace exactly where this mountain of refuse goes as there are no laws regulating its dumping or transport. Studies made by the European Union and the UN, however, show that a large amount is sent to Africa in different forms.

Part of it is ‘donated’ because it is technologically out of date in the countries from where it originates but still usable in less advanced contexts. This transfer is legal and concerns 75% of electronic material.
However, according to a recent study, 60% of the items sent to Kenyan beneficiaries such as schools was completely useless and was immediately dumped.
The same is happening in the other countries of the area and this explains the decision taken recently in Arusha to ban such imports.
Other material is sent in a less transparent way, hidden among other sorts of merchandise. Again, according to the above-mentioned study, in Nigeria, in the period from 2015 to 2016, at least 60,000 tons of non-declared electronic refuse was brought into the country.
The countries of origin are obviously the more developed ones, especially China which accounts for 24% of the total, followed by the United States (20%), Spain (12%) and Great Britain (9%). Most often, the destination is West Africa. The largest and best-known dump is to be found at Agbogbloshie, a suburb of the Ghanaian capital Accra.
Also in Nigeria and Cameroon, there are various sites where electronic refuse ends up being dumped; they are smaller and therefore less visible and less known. The same problem, as we have seen, also affects East Africa: Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in particular.

The alarm has been sounded because of the environmental and health damage potentially caused by many of the raw materials from which the electronic appliances are made – the reason why, in the first place, the Northern countries try to rid themselves of it by all possible means. In fact, the e-waste contains a collection of hundreds of potentially harmful substances. Among these are lead, mercury, nickel, arsenic, cadmium, and chrome, all of which are known to be carcinogenic and harmful both to the nervous system, especially in the foetal stage and during growth as well as for causing the progressive poisoning of human tissues, starting with the blood.
There are also volatile substances that cause environmental pollution and are seriously harmful to the respiratory system and that is not all. Finally, there are the leachates that penetrate the subsoil and cause the pollution of aquifers and water that is used with no preventive treatment by the population even outside the area surrounding the landfill.
Many problems are caused by the informal systems of management of the waste that are normally in daily use in the sector of African informal work. The burning of plastics, from which appliance bodies are made, for example, produces dioxin pollution.
Serious physical harm – burns, wounds, and fractures, often disabling – is also caused by acids and inadequate instruments in an environment that is already dangerous such as that of the landfill where much of the work to recuperate useful components takes place. Children are the most exposed to this danger, especially the thousands of children whose lives are spent recovering raw materials from waste.

Africa has become an important centre for the disposal of electronic waste due to the general lack of adequate legislation, policies, and regulations for the safe handling of waste. In 2019, only 13 of the 54 African countries had such laws. Egypt, for example, did not and it is the largest producer. Besides, experts say that, even where laws and regulations exist, they are rarely enforced.
Similarly, the continental and regional conventions and initiatives regarding the problem have become a dead letter. The Bamako Convention – On the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa – which goes back as far as 1991, was very clear about the issue but it did not help to avoid the harm derived from it.

The same applies to the numerous seminars organised on the theme by EACO, The East Africa Communication Organization. Experts actually believe that electronic waste is one of the major causes of pollution and damage to health in the continent.
Electronic waste is also a source of wealth and is a growing work centre. The recovery of raw materials from waste is not economical in the northern countries of the world due to high labour costs but is very attractive in Africa where it exists largely in the informal sector with no guarantees either of remuneration or security.
Experts calculate that, in 2019, the value of raw materials recovered from electronic waste amounted to around 3.2 billion dollars. The recovery of the raw material and its marketing, apart from the recycling of reusable appliances, provides work for tens of thousands of people in Africa.There are between 4,500 and 6,000 people working directly in the Ghanaian landfill at Agbogbloshie; at least a further 1,500 work recovering materials, and 200,000 work in recycling activities. According to the estimates of experts in the sector, the country earns from 105 to 268 million dollars annually in this way.
Precious raw materials cannot be recuperated, and such significant earnings cannot be made to the detriment of the health of the population and the well-being of the environment.

Bruna Sironi

 

 

Myanmar. One Year later.

On February 1st, 2021, the Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) announced the change of regime in the country.

Within a few hours, the military arrested the leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party that won the elections twice in five years, gaining about 80% of the seats in Parliament in November 2020. The army’s key target was Aung San Suu Kyi, an icon for Myanmar’s people and a symbol of the battle against the military.

From that date, a tough fight began with thousands of men and women taking the streets all over the country to protest against the military regime. Among them, there were many young people.  But after a few weeks of peaceful demonstrations, it became clear that the clash with the military would have been hard and relentless.

The Tatmadaw is now engaged in a de facto civil war with the Government of National Unity (NUG), a shadow government largely composed by NLD’s MEPs, but also by ethnic representatives such as the interim president Duwa Lashi Ladel of Kachin, and civil society members.

The military, who led the country since the 1962 coup d’état, miscalculated the tenacious and lasting determination against their regime. A resistance movement emerged, overcoming historical mistrust between the Bamar majority, dominant in the NLD, and the representatives of ethnic minority groups, that for years had been fighting against the Bamar-dominated central government.

The resolve of the civil society, in agreement with the NUG, made a resistance army possible. The PDF (People’s Defense Force) was born, a real resistance army reinforced thanks to alliances with heavily armed ethnic organizations.

“It is difficult to make a proper estimate of the PDF’s military numbers”, said Aung Kyaw advisor of Alliance For Democratic Myanmar, an NGO supporting the return of democracy in the country. “The resistance army is made up of independent groups that do not recognize a central authority. Roughly, we can estimate 40,000 units. In the Sagaing region, a particularly strategic state in the centre of the country, close to the capital Naypyidaw and therefore to military power, the PDF is rather powerful, counting on at least 20,000 men.”

Aung Kyaw  continued: “A large support network is also active in several urban centres, but it is difficult to precisely quantify it. The armies of ethnic groups need to be taken into account, including the KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party) from Kayah and the CNF (Chin National Front), an armed group of the Chin minority.”

“ KIA (Kachin Independence Army) is the army of Kachin, the northernmost state of former Burma. While not opening declaring it, it is very active in the fight against the military junta. KIA, a historic enemy of the Tatmadaw, is fighting in Sagaing, alongside the PDF.
Some brigades of the KNU (Karen National Union), mainly active in the south-eastern part of the country, joined the battle, too. Summing up, the Burmese resistance can count on between 60,000 and 80,000 units”, he pointed out.

According to Thant Myint U, a historian and one of the leading experts on Myanmar, the Burmese army can count on about 300,000-350,000 soldiers, of which only half of them with real combat capabilities. It seems like an uneven fight, also because the Burmese military is among the best equipped armies in Asia.

In December 2021 Aung San Suu Kyi, was found guilty of inciting dissent and breaking Covid rules in the first of a series of verdicts that could see her jailed for life. Furthermore, five new charges have been recently added, concerning the rental and purchase of a helicopter that allegedly caused a loss of state funds.

According to Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a Bangkok-based NGO, starting from the February 1st coup d’état, there have been 1495 death sentences and 12.000 people imprisoned for political motivations.

The coup and the pandemic have had a devastating effect on economic growth. According to the World Bank, the economy is around 30 percent smaller than it might have been in the absence of COVID-19 and military coup. Over the past year, millions of people have lost their jobs and livelihoods. The price of essential food products rose, while the national currency, the kyat, plummeted, driving up the cost of imports, including fertilizers and gasoline, with enormous consequences for internal transport costs.

Public services collapsed, too. Doctors and teachers have been at the forefront of the CDM (Civil Disobedience Movement), and many of them continue to refuse to work under the junta. On the other hand, those who keep working face violent retaliation from the local community. The result is the disarray of the health system. Same story for the education system: for the most part, schools are still closed or with few teachers, and even fewer students.

The bulk of the population, including in cities, is sliding into poverty and malnutrition. According to Save the Children, in the last year at least 150,000 children have been forced away from their homes, exposed to hunger, risk and disease.
Recent data from the United Nations show that, since the junta took power, at least 405,700 people have been displaced due to the fighting, a figure that has increased by 27% in the last two months.

In short, while the military escalation continues to intensify, chaos is growing in the country. The State appears to be completely dysfunctional, while the military is no longer able to manage it.

The country is less and less at the centre of the international scene. The Afghan crisis, the situation in Ukraine and the rising tensions between the Western world and some authoritarian regimes moved resources and media attention away from former Burma.

ASEAN, the Southeast Asian association, whose Chairmanship recently passed to Cambodia, a close ally of China, softened its position towards Naypyitaw. After long internal negotiations, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have managed to obtain an agreement to put Myanmar under pressure, excluding the military leader Min Aung Hlaing from ASEAN summits. At the beginning of January, amid much controversy, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen decided to visit Naypyitaw. As expected, no results came out of the visit.

Myanmar is a complicated game for China, too. Even if Beijing cares about the stability of the country, it does not seem to have a clear decisive strategy. In the meanwhile, a whole young generation, the most committed to resistance, continues to fight and die notwithstanding the world’s indifference, being aware that they can only rely on their own strength. (Photo: Protest in Myanmar against Military Coup. CC BY-SA 4.0/ Maung Sun)

Francesca Baronio/ISPI

Sahel. A war increasingly difficult to win.

France and the EU announced the withdrawal of their troops from Mali. The jihadists may reap the benefits. Already, coastal states
are under threat.

On the 17 February 2022, ahead of the EU-Africa summit in Brussels, the French president Emmanuel Macron announced that France, the EU and Canada will withdraw their troops from Mali, nine years after the French army’s intervention to stop a jihadist offensive on Bamako.
Accordingly, the withdrawal will be made in a coordinated manner with the Malian troops and France and the EU will maintain a military presence in neighbouring countries. Europe, said Macron who is also the EU rotating chairman will stand by ECOWAS, the African Union and the G5 group of countries.

The headquarters of the French Barkhane anti-terrorist operation will be moved to Niger where French and the EU will continue to provide training, equipment and operational support to the troops of the G5 Sahel (Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) except Mali. The European Takuba force which includes several hundred special forces from ten EU countries and was training Malian soldiers will also move its headquarters to Niger.
France which has about 4,300 troops in Sahel, will repatriate the 2,400 soldiers it has deployed in Mali and reduce sharply its numbers to 2,500, said a French Armed Forces spokesperson.
Accordingly, France will start by closing military bases in Northern Mali, and the withdrawal will take four to six months.
In a joint communiqué, France, the EU and Canada justified the withdrawal, arguing that political, operational and legal conditions were no more met to maintain their troops in Mali. Such decision did not come as a surprise, since the relations between the EU and Mali have seriously deteriorated after the August 2020 coup which overthrew President Boubacar Ibrahim Keita and the announcement in January 2022 by the Malian military junta that it would not hold its promise to organise the presidential election by late February 2022 and would remain in power until 2026 because of the deepening insecurity.

Mali. Junta leader Colonel Assimi Goïta.

The EU imposed travel bans and asset freezes on the Malian Prime Minister Choguel Maiga and four members of the junta led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, on the last 4 February. But these sanctions only increased the determination of the Malian coup makers who were encouraged by the Russian and Chinese vetoes at the U.N. Security Council on the 25 January against a French resolution backing the ECOWAS sanctions against Mali which include
the suspension of most commerce and financial aid to Mali, closing borders and the activation of a standby force. As a result, the Malian authorities turned to other neighbours to bypass the sanctions. On the 19 January, they sent a ministerial delegation to Guinea-Conakry which is also under ECOWAS sanctions since the September 2021 coup which toppled President Alpha Conde, and to Mauritania which isn’t an ECOWAS member.

French President Emmanuel Macron.

Another bone of contention is that France and the EU “cannot remain militarily involved” alongside Malian transitional authorities with whom “we don’t share the strategy and goals,” Macron said. The French President accused Mali’s junta of neglecting the fight against Islamic extremists. Macron had certainly in mind secret talks between the Malian government and the jihadists. One group is the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) known in English as the “Support Group for Islam and Muslims”, created in 2017 as an amalgamation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front and Al-Mourabitoune. The second is the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.
A third reason is the hostility shown by the Malian authorities against the former colonial power and the EU. On the 13 January 2022, Mali protested against the alleged violation of its airspace by a French military transport aircraft. A week later, a Bundeswehr aircraft was denied access to the Malian airspace. By end January, the Malian government ordered the expulsion of a 90 Danish troops of the Takuba force, which had been deployed without its formal consent. On several occasions, demonstrators have been waving banners wishing « Death to France ». Macron accused some of the social networks which spread anti-French propaganda to be financed by Russia.

The fourth reason for the French departure is the Malian junta’s decision to hire the Wagner Group of Russian mercenaries, which the EU accuses of committing human rights abuses in Africa.  “They have now come to Mali to act in a very predatory manner,” Macron said. Accordingly, there are some 800 Wagner mercenaries in the country who “have mostly come to secure their economic interests. French military source claim that, these mercenaries which were brought to Mali by Russian military planes are not so much involved in the anti-terrorist war but rather serve as praetorian guard for the members of the junta. In an interview with the Paris-based BFM TV channel, the French army chief of staff spokesman, Hervé Grandjean, said, that in exchange for its security services, Wagner will exploit goldmines in Western Mali. France’s announcement in October 2021 that it would pull out from the three bases of Timbuktu, Kidal and Tessalit,in Northern Mali  accelerated the recruitment of Russian military advisers. Wagner’s presence in Mali has also a strong political meaning. Ex-Red Army colonel, Alexander Ivanov, head of the Officers’ Union for International Security, says that Russian military personnel sent to Mali to train the army and provide logistical support would make it an independent force and contribute to destroy the neo-colonial system in Africa.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov : “Wagner has a ‘legitimate’ right to be in Mali”.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that Wagner had a “legitimate” right to be in Mali since it was invited by the transitional government. Clearly, Russian military contractors who substituted earlier the French in the Central African Republic, see the crisis between Sahelian states and the EU as a business opportunity. A week after the 24 January 2022 coup in Ouagadougou, Ivanov’s group offered to train the army in Burkina, reported the BBC. Yet, the presence of the Russian mercenaries was seen as incompatible with their mission by several EU member states. On the 14 January 2022, Sweden which had already decided to withdraw its 150 troops from the Takuba force, said it would review its contribution in MINUSMA of 250 soldiers.
Macron said that the EU and France would remain in Sahel and in the Guinea Gulf to counter actions from Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. But West-African ministers in Brussels told journalists off the record that they were worried. Macron himself admitted that the withdrawal of Barkhane from Mali would mean less anti-terrorist operations though claiming it would not change the situation since such fight is not the junta’s top priority. Yet, a West-African ministers, expressed doubts about Wagner’s capacity to cope with the jihadist threat since the Russian mercenaries lack a strong airforce support to carry out their operations. At any rate, during the next months, French troops will be mainly busy with the logistical problems related to their relocation in Niger, in the so-called three borders area, near the Malian and Burkinabe boundaries. But jihadists could take advantage of this situation to launch attacks against the French troops, warns Ulysse Gosset, editor of the BFM TV channel.

Opération Barkhane. CC BY-SA 4.0/ TM1972

Within six months, there will be twice less French troops on the field, in a context where violence is increasing and Sahelian states are losing control of their territory despite the killing of the ISGS leader Adnan Abu Wahid al-Sahrawi in August 2021 by a French airstrike. In February 2022, the Washington-based Africa Centre for Strategic Studies estimated that the number of incidents linked to Islamist groups in the Sahel in 2021 had nearly doubled from 1,180 to 2,005, since 2020.
Last year, the estimated 4,839 fatalities linked to these events were 17 percent higher than in 2020. More than 2.4 million people are displaced in the Sahel, including 200,000 refugees. Moreover, acknowledge French military intelligence sources, jihadist groups linked to Al Qaeda have become more professional as showed an attack with 120 mm howitzers against the Gao base in Mali
The relocation of the Barkhane and Takuba headquarters in Niger is another challenge.  In November 2021, a French army convoy was blocked by demonstrators in Niger and in Burkina Faso who accused the French military to supply weapons to the jihadists.
Besides, the relations between the EU and another Sahelian state have also deteriorated after the 24 January military coup in Burkina Faso that ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré.

Sahel refugees. UNHCR/Romain Desclous

With less troops, Macron intends nevertheless to continue its support to the G5 Sahel countries but also to extend it to the Guinea Gulf countries which belong to the Accra Initiative against terrorism, created in 2017 to fight terrorism and includes Ghana, Togo, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, respectively.
Coastal states are indeed increasingly under threat. In Benin, which had been relatively unscathed, there are growing fears of a spill over of violence. In December, three soldiers were killed during an attack of a military post in the Northern Atacora region.
In 2021, seven members of the local security forces died in separate attacks in the north of Ivory Coast. Togolese security forces repulsed last November an attack by unidentified armed men who had crossed the border with Burkina Faso. And in December, President Macky Sall expressed worries that Senegal could become the next target.
Macron also wants to increase aid to West Africa to avert the expansion of terrorist groups by spending US $ 22 billion for social programmes within the framework of the Sahel Alliance, created in 2017 by France, the EU and Germany to improve the living conditions of the local populations. But without security, such preventive action may be difficult to implement. (Open photo : A French military helicopter over the Nigerien town Madama. CC BY-SA 3.0/ Thomas Goisque)

François Misser

Europe. Drug-trafficking Ports.

The ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp have become the main entry hubs for cocaine in Europe

These are two large structures, not just for the enormous number of containers handled every year, but also because they have become the two main hubs on European soil that are used by drug traffickers.
In itself, a port represents a particular organisational entity, a hybrid and complex space a crucial reality that is an ‘obstacle’ to the processes of identifying illegal trafficking. This applies all the more to the large ports: too much freight to check, a large number of operating actors in the port, many opportunities to corrupt specialised personnel, and openings for hackers to attack the information systems.
The ports receive not only loads of cocaine, methamphetamines, marijuana, and heroin, but also witness the trafficking of people and counterfeit goods.

A lot of automated cranes at busy port terminal in Antwerp. 123rf.com/creativenature

The reports of UNDOC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), the UN agency that deals with illegal trafficking, the drug seizures carried out by the European agency Europol together with national police forces, the Europol reports and those of the Belgian and Dutch customs show clearly that Antwerp and Rotterdam handle the largest flow of drugs from South America.
The amounts seized in recent years show that Antwerp and Rotterdam head the list, followed by Hamburg, Valencia, Pontevedra, Barcelona, Marseilles, Genoa, Livorno, and other minor ports.
European data have shown especially the boom in cocaine seizures in 2020 as compared to 2019. In Rotterdam, drug seizures amounted to 33 tons while in Antwerp the amount was 66 tons of cocaine. Why these two ports in particular? The geographical proximity of the two ports favoured their development and the mafias exploited this factor to their advantage; police investigations and specific studies have shown that the Albanian and Moroccan mafias, the most active in Holland, manage the strategic hub of Rotterdam, and have brought the nearby port of Antwerp into their criminal network. Where does the cocaine come from? Produced in Colombia and Bolivia, the cocaine was, until 2018, despatched from Brazil. However, when the local authorities significantly reinforced checks, coordinating with European police forces, despatched drugs were sent to Paraguay. With no exit to the sea, the country uses the great waterway of the Rio Paranà. Drugs enter from Bolivia across the Chaco desert. It is then routed along the Parana River from the port of Villeta located near the capital Asunciòn and from there it is sent to Holland and Belgium. Various episodes of corruption and collusion between the drug cartels and Paraguayan politicians are revealing the many branches of this new, lethal logistical route.

In Ports, Crime and Security. Governing and Policing Seaports in a Changing World by Anna Sergi, Alexandria Reid, Luca Storti and Marleen Easton, published by the University of Bristol (July 2021), two crucial points are clearly revealed; one is the coordination and cooperation between all the agents involved and the contribution of high-tech equipment in the management process. What is being done to combat trafficking? One of the weak points in port facilities is the human component, as in many other cases, which is therefore subject to corruption, blackmail, and threats of all kinds. Coordination between the various institutions that have to do with the port area has proved effective since it is not an easy task to get the police forces, judicial bodies, and customs officials, representatives of the body that manages the port and shipping companies, to cooperate. In this sense, the success of the Flow Plan (Stroomplan) put in place in Antwerp is proof that involving the local and federal police, magistrates, customs officials, private companies and the managing body of the port works well and gets results, as the relevant seizures of cocaine attest.

Bundle of euro and cocaine banknotes. 123rf.com/saianoo

Another point that is highlighted is the advent of the smart port that will automate as much as possible the processing phases and controls in the logistics chain. The smart port is seen as a very valid tool against illegal trafficking since it is able to take advantage of new technologies such as IoT (Internet of the Things), big data and artificial intelligence. Authorities and scholars believe that the extensive implementation of these technologies will reduce the number of employees generating the so-called de-peopling of port facilities, a decrease in the workforce that can help weaken the siren of corruption and blackmail.With the phase of the so-called war on terror, the ports had already been equipped, since 2002, with new means of controlling freight traffic, in particular with the adoption of the ISPS code, an acronym that stands for International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code, considered: ‘a complete set of measures aimed at improving the security of ships and port facilities.

Its objectives are to establish what are the appropriate security measures and provide a coherent and standardised framework to evaluate the risks by determining the correct security levels and the corresponding security measures’. However, nobody denies the danger that too much technology may be open to cyber-attacks. The local mafias and the trans-nationals engage their informatics experts to work in this no-longer-new dimension of the cyber-sphere.
Trying to break the tentacles of the criminal octopus is a daily challenge and it is worth remembering that the mafias try to use even the minor ports where the controls are less robust and, above all, they use the Free Trade Zones, those Freeport zones that are a real boon for criminals. A sector, whose implications are well known, but which, despite everything, is growing as reported by the World Customs Organization (WCO): the Free Trade Zones to date are over 3,500, located in 130 countries, while in 1975 there were just 79 in 25 countries. (Open Photo: Docked nautical containers at Rotterdam Port. 123rf/jvdwolf)

Marco Leofrigio

 

 

Egypt. The Copts. Second-class Citizens.

Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, Christians in Egypt have lived on a knife edge as they cannot rely on the country’s authorities whose policies fail to protect them.

Today in Egypt the Coptic Christian population is divided into Catholics and the Orthodox Christians, the latter being a vast majority, some 9.5 million inhabitants, around 10% of the country’s population. Being a Christian in Egypt since the arrival of Islam in the 7th century has not been an easy task. But we must also understand that Egypt is a country in permanent transformation, and consequently the Christians had to face several change processes over the centuries, in the 10th century as in the 15th, and more recently in 2009, 2013 and 2021.

Saint Mark’s Coptic Orthodox Cathedral. Roland Unger/ CC BY-SA 3.0

The several governments that have alternated over the centuries in Egypt had different attitudes towards Christians and so had the Muslim population. In order to understand the real situation of the Copts in the 21st century, it is essential to analyse all the events that occurred from the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in 2011 until today.

A new beginning
The long-lasting governments of Gamal-Abdel Nasser and Hosni Mubarak were characterized by the strong support they had from the Muslim communities. The use of a nationalist Islam, with political and ideological bases firmly established in the Muslim religion, was very useful for the authoritarian regimes that ruled the country during the second half of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. By granting several privileges to Muslims, which no other religious group enjoyed, the two leaders were able to stay in power for decades. These policies also favoured the growth of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, which would later play a key role in Egyptian politics, and which would affect greatly the situation of Coptic Christians.
After the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, the Egyptian political map began to take a new shape, whose foundations still remain today: those who participated in the demonstrations against the Mubarak government, later took a piece of the electoral cake; those who preferred to remain on the sidelines simply lost their seat.
The first protests and demonstrations were joined by several sectors of Egyptian society, thus facilitating cooperation between different social and religious groups and opening the door to a plural and tolerant Egypt, but later different organizations of nationalist and Islamic organizations took centre stage.
So, what started as a social movement became a political issue where there was no room for religious minorities like the Copts.

2011 Egypt protests. Mujaddara/ CC BY-SA 3.0

Five groups took the lead in the uprisings: the Youth (mostly Muslims), the Kifaya group (Nasserists, Muslims and Marxists), the April 6 Youth Movement (a small group of young activists), the National Association for Change (a loose grouping of all political affiliations and religions, a hodgepodge of undefined ideologies), and the Muslim Brotherhood (Islamist organization today classified as a terrorist group by the Egyptian government).
The coalition of these five groups forced President Mubarak to resign after decades of repression. The primary objectives of these revolutionaries were worthy of applause by the international community, but not a single organization included among their demands the improvement of the situation of the Coptic Christians, though the Copts initially participated in the demonstrations against the Mubarak government and some of them were members of the Kifaya group and the April 6 Youth Movement. The Copts’ participation did not translate into electoral success and their marginalisation within the Egyptian society was reaffirmed once again.

The Muslim Brotherhood
After the revolution against Mubarak and a period of rule by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the Muslim Brotherhood took power in Egypt through a series of popular elections. The exclusion of the Coptic Christians in Egyptian political life is evident though they make up 10% of the population. Islamist parties won nearly three-quarters of the seats in parliament in Egypt’s first elections since the ouster of authoritarian president Hosni Mubarak, the ultraconservative Al-Nour Party was second with 25 percent.
Under Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, a new constitution was approved. It declared Egypt to be a ‘democratic state’, deriving its sovereignty from the people, and a part of the Arab world.

Abdul Fattah al-Sisi has been Egypt’s president since 2014.

The new constitution also specifies that ‘Islam is the official religion of the State’ governed by ‘Islamic Sharia principles’, although Morsi later specified during a speech that respect for the rights and freedoms of all citizens would be maintained. He also promised that a woman and a Coptic would be part of his government, a promise that he never kept.
At the end of June 2013, many Egyptians took to the streets calling for the end of the Muslim Brotherhood government. This became a reality a few days later, when a coup d’état, led by Egyptian army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, took place on 3 July 2013. Al-Sisi told the nation that the head of Egypt’s constitutional court would lead a non-partisan, ‘technocratic’ government until new presidential elections would be held. Since then, the attitude of the subsequent governments has been much kinder towards the Copts compared to that of the government where the Muslim Brotherhood was the majority, although in reality it has been just a cosmetic operation, as attacks against this community go on.
The Egyptian state, later, established new rules for citizenship, which stipulate that all citizens have the same rights and must receive the same treatment, that religion belongs to God and that homeland welcomes everyone.
Some of the demands of Christians, likewise, which had remained pending for years have been met, such as the contribution of the State in the reconstruction of churches that were burned and looted by groups related to the Muslim Brotherhood, in retaliation to Al-Sisi’s coup.

St. Mark the Apostle, the Founder of the Coptic Church.

The promulgation of the regulations for the construction and restoration of churches in 2016, as well as the kind attitude that President Abdelfatah Al-Sisi shows sending his greetings and congratulations to Christians on occasion of their religious celebrations, confirm thus his words “The religious identity of any citizen of this country should not have a role in determining or distinguishing his rights and duties”. The government has so far authorized the legalization of the status of 1,800 churches and affiliated buildings. The constitution approved in 2014, although it continues to consider Islam as the state religion, guarantees freedom of belief, which should provide some protection for religious minorities in the country.
However, there is still a long way to go until Coptic Christians may live in an effectively egalitarian society. Muslim and Coptic communities are still far from being integrated with each other in Egypt. Coptic Christians are still victims of attacks. Suffice it to visit the Coptic neighbourhood in Cairo, which must be strongly protected by military and police forces, to understand that it is not easy to be Coptic in Egypt.

Alfonso Masoliver

The Enemy Inside.

The fight is not only between Peuls and other groups. In many areas there is also an inner fight within the community.

Younger generations coming especially from the lower castes of the community refuse the role of a Peul aristocracy that they judge as corrupt and deceitful. To challenge the status quo, they take up arms and join militias or jihadist groups. Within the local branch of Al Qaeda in North Africa (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) there is a group called Katiba Macina. This name is a reference to the Macina Empire created by Peuls in the centre of Mali. Its leader, Amadou Koufa, is a Peul and in his speeches he urges Peuls from all West Africa to join jihad. His calls have undoubtedly raised fears among the politicians who rule states where there are large Peul communities. But Koufa’s Islamist propaganda seems, at least in part, a facade to hide a desire to overturn the existing Peul leadership in the countries of the regions, starting with Mali.

In Central African Republic there are at least three militias that are led by Peuls and fight against the government: the Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) led by Ali Darassa, the 3R (Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation), and the Siriri. These groups fight to defend Mbororo communities from the attacks by other ethnic groups in the civil war that started in 2013, and from bandits. But now these militia act also as criminal gangs and extort money and livestock to herders and some of their leaders become owners of large herds of cattle.
In the beginning, Mbororo traditional leadership saw those militias as a defence against violence and crime for its community, but now sees militia leaders as a new power that can challenge the social order among Mbororos. Ali Darassa became a public enemy for Central African Republic, but he still manages to attract the respect of many people
in his community. It is wrong to describe all Peuls as terrorists. But, as seen before, there are Peuls that are terrorists. Some of them (such as Amadou Koufa) are exploiting the grievances of their community to spread jihadist propaganda and are using Peul communities to hide from the security forces and to collect the means for their attacks.

In the last years, especially in Gulf of Guinea countries like Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, an increase in the attacks from jihadists was reported in the northern areas. Due to the pressure from security forces, both African and foreign, in countries like Mali, but also to expand their range of action, jihadists are moving southward to the coast of these states. To do so, they use the transhumance routes used by Peul herders that interconnect those countries and use the Peul communities scattered in the northern regions to hide. To convince the local population to join their ranks or simply to help them, they use different tactics. They pretend they defend the interests of Peuls that are marginalized and protect them from the abuses of security forces and from criminals. But also, in exchange for some economic compensation, they give herders the possibility to move their livestock into areas that are free from the intervention of farmers and authorities. They provide sectors of society dissatisfied with their economic and social condition (unemployed youths, former soldiers that were demobilized but also criminals) an alternative. Jihad becomes a way to gain a wage and status by challenging the existing social order.

Peuls are mostly Muslims. But as shown by the works of Malian ethnologist and historian Amadou Hampate Ba, their culture has been profoundly influenced by their contacts with their neighbours and therefore developed into a unique culture. They also created a social order based on distinct groups (that can be described as castes) that is not strictly based on Islam, even if they created kingdoms that were overtly Islamic. Those kingdoms, even if they were inspired by Islam, were not theocracies as we define them today. Jihadist groups active in Africa are inspired by a fundamentalist view that sees as non-Islamic, many customs created during the centuries by local Muslims. And since religion is a common ground and an inspiration for these populations, a radical preacher or leader who speaks against customs that are felt as oppressive by sectors of the community declaring them not truly Islamic, can find many supporters.
In a certain way, jihadists are revolutionaries from a social point of view. By eliminating structures that are, according to them, against Islam they (in theory) create the conditions for the empowerment of poor people or, at least, give them hope. It is yet to be seen if jihadist leaders are sincere on this matter. But their propaganda is having an impact in Peul communities by fuelling resentment towards the traditional rulers, portrayed as corrupt and ineffective.
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism will have a deep impact on the Peul community, and its consequences are difficult to predict. It will also have a deep impact on how other groups see them.

In many contexts Peuls are confronting Christian or Animist farmers, but in some areas (like northern Nigeria) are clashing also with other Muslims (that is to say, Hausas). It is therefore wrong to present what is happening as a religious war. Certainly, jihadists are trying to exploit this situation to reach their goals and destabilize West African Countries. But at this moment the clashes are caused by economic or social reason. The fact that recently in the north of Nigeria episodes of violence between Hausas and Peuls are reported, is particularly relevant.
Traditionally, the country was considered as split between Hausa and Peuls (called Fulanis there) on one side (because they both are Muslims) and Igbo and Ijaw on the other side, since both are in majority Christians or Animists. The quarrels between Hausas and Fulani could be a sign that in Nigeria the security situation is spiralling out of control with new ethnic fractures that incite violence. It is possible that these dynamics occur also in other countries of the region. I.P.

The crisis of chieftaincy.

The crisis of traditional authorities is a common phenomenon in many northern areas in West African countries and is not limited to Peuls. In addition to the factors listed above, traditional leaders lost their authoritativeness due to their links with the politicians.

In many areas, politicians are directly involved in the nomination of traditional monarchs or give them their authorization. In this way, local monarchs are not seen as independent and, therefore, are not considered as trustworthy because their judgment in a dispute can be influenced. The loss of authoritativeness has an impact also on public order. In the past, when a dispute between herders and farmers risked degenerating, local leaders intervened from the two communities and from other groups and tried a conciliation. But the possibility of a successful outcome was based on the perceived reliability of the tribal leaders and their ability to enforce what was agreed upon.

Now that this system which helped the de-escalation of conflicts is in crisis, it is easier for a small fight linked to a local dispute, to spiral out of control. It must be added that chieftains are often targeted by extremist groups that delegitimize, and even kill, those who opposed them with the goal of destroying the existing order, to impose their vision of Islam. It could take some time to find new ways for mediation and conciliation between different communities in a dispute, and new leaders considered as fair and reliable.
The Nigerian government is trying to solve the problem of violence related to the quarrels between herders and farmers by putting strong limits to their activities and even imposing a ban on open-air grazing. The long-term project is to transform nomadic herders into semi-nomadic or sedentary. This might seem a logical idea and over the years, in different countries Peuls, indeed, decided autonomously to settle down. But there are different caveats.

First, the government is trying to influence the customs and change the habits of a population that is proud of them, and that is risky. In other words, it could backlash, bringing to a violent reaction, but it could also create unforeseen problems to local communities such as causing a sense of uprooting and alienation.
Second, open-air grazing from an economic point of view is a low-cost activity while intensive livestock farming in stables is expensive, and Fulani herders may not be willing to pay the price, especially since the economic incentives offered from the authorities are not sufficient to cover the new costs.
The fact that in neighbouring countries like Benin quarrels between Peul and other groups involve also those Peuls that are sedentary or seminomadic, implies that the sedentarisation policy could not bear fruit. At this time, its implementation in Nigeria is different from state to state, and its results could be judged only in the medium term.

A new level of violence
The security situation in West and Central Africa is worsening for varied reasons, and many of them are linked to the peculiar conditions of the single states. Each one of the states has its own problems and is responsible for its destiny. But there are emergencies that cross the borders, first of all the jihadist groups. Among the transnational issues there are the growing ethnic tensions centred around the Peuls, tensions that bring to a new level of violence. And this violence is destabilizing the institutions of the countries and could put at risk the life of already problematic states, like Nigeria.

But, even if not with this intensity, clashes between herders and farmers are an ancient phenomenon and in the past phases of violence alternated with more or less extended periods of peace. The mechanisms that were used to defuse the tensions (mediation from traditional leaders, compensations for the losses, etc.) are in crisis in many areas, but experience teaches that they can be replaced with others that adapt better to current times. And a new balance can still be reached.
Politicians have the bigger burden to bear during this path. They have a leading role in finding the solutions but are also among the main causes of the problems. First, some of them exploited the tensions to gain power, and based their consensus on ethnicity. By getting involved in the nomination of traditional rulers they damage the functioning of traditional institutions and undermine the mediation mechanisms. Second, they are responsible for the poor performances of the state apparatuses, especially the security forces.

Due to their shortcomings, security forces cannot be the only solution to solve the issues described before. Also, the civil society of these states must be involved in the solution of these issues from the lower level. As an example, farmers must consider the exigences of herders when planning to cultivate a new plot that could block the routes of transhumance. Experience shows that, in the long term, there is no credible alternative to the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of different ethnicities.

Innocent Pond

Saudi Arabia in Africa.

With its petrodollars and religious penetration, Saudi Arabia is broadening its influence on the continent. It is spreading the Salafi doctrine of radical and conservative Islam.

The Saudi heir Prince Mohammed bin Salman has announced that next April a summit will be held in Riyadh on collaboration between Saudi Arabia and Africa. What are the interests in Africa of this rich Gulf country believed to be the cradle of Islamic fundamentalism and the ideologue/sponsor of Jihadi terrorism which, for years, has been spreading death and instability in the Middle East and in Africa?

Certainly, it is not the socio-economic development and political stability of the African countries. Today, for all intents and purposes, Saudi Arabia presents itself as a neo-colonial country.
Its African ‘crusade’ has as its main objective that of extending its geo-political and geo-religious influence. The economy of Saudi Arabia is essentially based upon oil: it is one of the three top countries in the world both for production and export of the ‘black gold’ (the other two are the United States and Russia).

The special interest of the Saudis in the Horn of Africa is to guarantee the transit of the oil tankers to other countries through the Straits of Bab el Mandeb that connect the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.
Using its petrodollars, Saudi Arabia greatly influences Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan.
In Sudan, Riyadh maintains the military coup regime led by General al-Burhan who, in the time of the dictator El-Bashir, was responsible for the Sudanese troops sent to fight in the war against the Yemen.

Saudi Arabia imports most of its agricultural needs. For many years it has been appropriating the fertile lands of the state at the expense of the populations of Sudan, Ethiopia and many others.
A World Bank report ten years ago revealed that 60 million hectares of land have been ceded in Africa to foreign investors, including the Saudis and their cousins in the United Arab Emirates, under decades-long sales or lease agreements.

China, the USA, Canada, Great Britain, France, and Italy are also resorting to this new and subtle form of neo-colonialism but what distinguishes Saudi Arabia from other predators is its inclination to penetrate Africa through religious neo-colonialism.

In a continent with nearly 650 million Muslims, most of them Sunnis, Saudi Arabia has used religious identity as a lever to extend its influence: today we are witnessing rampant Islamisation in Africa. In Ivory Coast, a country with a Christian majority, more mosques and Koranic schools have been built in recent years, financed indirectly by Saudi Arabia, than churches or secular schools

Even more worrying is the spread of Salafism, a doctrine cultivated by the al-Saud family, which proposes a radical and conservative form of Islam, based on violence. And it is the same doctrine that characterizes the actions of al-Qaeda and its subsidiaries that have destabilized the Middle East and are disrupting the Sahel.
This diffusion is financed with petrodollars which today represent a curse for the peoples of Africa as they are bearers of hatred, violence, and religious sectarianism. (Photo: 123rf.com/kunilanskap)

Mostafa El Ayoubi

Evangelizing in a Changing World.

In the face of epochal transformations, the missionary service is called to renew itself. A Comboni Missionary looks at innovative ways of evangelizing in line with the teaching of the Church.  

The dynamics of globalization and of the digital revolution, on top of the dominant neo-liberal financial capitalism, are shaping the world in a radically new fashion. Change characterizes all areas of life and society.
Although new possibilities and potential for the promotion of life are emerging, the prevailing economic system is leading the world in the direction of social exclusion and environmental devastation, with climate change having a distressing impact on the planet.
The gap between the rich and the impoverished ones continues to widen exponentially; the wealth of the world’s 26 richest people reached $1.4 trillion in 2018, which is the same amount of wealth possessed by the world’s 3.8 billion poor people.
In many countries, acceptable education and basic health care are a luxury that only the rich can afford.

During Covid, the inequality gap has widened even further; worldwide, billionaires’ wealth increased by a staggering $3.9 trillion between 18 March and 31 December 2020. while the total number of people living in poverty could have increased by between 200-500 million in 2020. (“The inequality virus”. Oxfam 2021).
Every day, 10 000 people die because they cannot afford the care necessary to survive. Unemployment and underemployment are widespread and people, in many cases, are beyond the threshold of exploitation and oppression; they are excluded and become ‘waste’ among the indifference of those who are privileged.
The other emergency, correlated to this socio-economic situation, is climate change, with serious environmental, social, economic and political consequences. The dominant economic system is unsustainable. We need to realise that such a grim picture of reality is not a contingency, but a structural outcome of the global system.

An evolving religious reality
From a religious point of view, we are experiencing profound changes; religious pluralism is becoming common everywhere, raising tensions, fundamentalism and identity struggles. Secularism is spreading at a high rate, leading to two opposite perspectives: a worldview that rejects the idea of a spiritual reality within the material one; and rejects the spiritualization of reality and the disengagement from social responsibility. In either case, the ‘sacramental’ value of the world is denied, with a dichotomy of sacred and profane, spiritual and material, which is the essence of secularism. Missionary service is also facing new scenarios. The traditional model of mission, a creation of the 19th century, was based on geographical and expansion assumptions. Missionaries were sent – from Christian countries in the northern hemisphere  to baptise and implant the Church in non-Christian countries in the southern hemisphere. Countries in the South were seen as a territory for evangelization, while those in the North for mission promotion, to raise the funds to finance missionary service and structures with donations from affluent Christian countries.

All such assumptions nowadays are failing the test of reality. In various African countries, such as Kenya and South Africa, over 80% of the population define themselves as Christians (of various denominations), and in countries such as DR Congo, Angola and Rwanda it goes beyond 90%. Instead, in traditionally `Christian’ countries such as France, Belgium, Germany and the UK, that percentage falls below 70%, and in the Netherlands even below 60%.
More significantly, practising Christians are generally a tiny minority, amid a highly secularized society. The geography of vocations is also radically different, with most of the missionaries coming from the young Churches of the South. Financing missionary ministry is becoming an ever-bigger challenge, with a reduction of donations from benefactors in the North. This is pushing countries in the South to develop mission promotion activities and start income-generating projects.
On the other hand, a greater consciousness of the urgent need for mission in Europe is emerging. The boundaries between evangelization and mission promotion are ever more blurred. We now speak of missionary action, which reflects the fact that evangelization and mission promotion overlap.

A new paradigm emerges
Pope Francis in his Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium (EG), presents a theological reading of the new epoch and suggests a new paradigm of mission, no longer simply geographically but existentially based. The Church is called to overcome her own self-centredness and to go forth to all human peripheries where people suffer exclusion and experience the hardships of economic inequality and impoverishment, social injustice and environmental degradation.
Mission is the paradigm of all pastoral action with the local Church as its subject. The missionary institutes have the role of animating local Churches to live fully their mandate of being missionary Churches that go forth to the existential peripheries.

Pope Francis is re-launching the vision of the Church of the Second Vatican Council, as “the sacrament, or the sign and instrument of intimate union with God and of the unity of the whole human race”. The Church is called to gather a people who are able to go beyond her confines of belonging and walk towards the Kingdom of God.
In the Evangelii Gaudium, Pope Francis   offers four major criteria guiding the discernment of missionary ministry. First, reaching out to the peripheries, to the impoverished the marginalised, the excluded. Second, witnessing the kerygma, the communication of the Gospel, the “encounter with an event, a person, which gives life a new horizon and a decisive direction” (EG 7).
Third, prophecy as denunciation of evil in society – an economy of exclusion and the idolatry of money, inequality which spawns violence, deterioration of one’s cultural roots, secularization. Prophecy as a proposal of alternatives of more just and peaceful societies, listening to the cry and struggles of the poor, working towards the elimination of the structural causes of poverty and promoting human integral development, as well as acts of solidarity. Finally, evangelizing cultures and inculturation of the Gospel: in the words of the International Commission’s document, Faith and inculturation, inculturation of the Gospel implies that the “Gospel may penetrate the soul of living cultures, responding to their highest expectations”.

Specific ministries
Ministries are a place of encounter between humanity, the Word and the Spirit in history. Mission ad gentes tends now in focus more on human groups, especially those at the margins or at the peripheries. A ministerial approach will find a good insertion point with a contextualized pastoral approach, articulated in a plurality of services, under a shared vision and methodology.
It is an organic pastoral approach, in which all dimensions (leitourgia, martyrin, diakonia, koinonia) are present and in synergy, being the subject the whole Christian community, in communion with others. It is oriented to people’s life situations.

The ministerial model entails being focused on a specific setting or field, a human need, a human group, or a life situation; to proclaim the truth of the kerygma and the Kingdom of God; to be based on both, human abilities and talents, and gifts of grace; to discern and collaborate with the work of the Spirit, already operating in the history of the people; being the expression of the life arid service of a Christian community, sacrament of Christ’s presence and action in the world; a plurality of services and competences, thus the need for collaboration.
In such a perspective, Justice and Peace and Integrity of creation (JPIC), inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue emerge as cross-cutting dimensions of mission, constituent parts of any missionary commitment.

Brother Alberto Parise

The Leopard, the Tortoise, and the Bush Rat.

Once there was a great famine on earth, and all the animals were very thin and weak from want of food; but there was one exception, and that was the tortoise and all his family. They were very fat, and did not seem to suffer at all. Even the leopard was very thin, in spite of the promise of animals to bring him other animals for food.

In the early days of the famine the leopard had killed the mother of the tortoise. The tortoise, then, was very angry with the leopard, and intended, if possible, to be even with him. The tortoise was very clever and had discovered a shallow lake full of fish in the middle of the forest.

Every morning he used to go to the lake and bring back enough fish for himself and his family. One day the leopard met the tortoise and noticed how fat he was. As he was very thin himself, he decided to watch
the tortoise.

The next morning, then, the leopard hid himself in the long grass near the home of the tortoise and waited, until the tortoise came along with a heavy basket. Then the leopard jumped out, and said to the tortoise: “What have you in that basket?”

The tortoise did not want to lose his breakfast, and would not tell what he was carrying; but the leopard could easily tell things by smell. He knew at once that there was fish in the basket. He then said: “I know there is fish in there, and I am going to eat it.”

The tortoise was afraid to refuse. As he was such a poor creature, he said: “ Let us sit down under this shady tree, and if you will make a fire, I will go to my home and get pepper, oil, about for dry wood and salt, and then we will eat together. Isn’t that fair enough for both of us?”

The leopard agreed to do this and began to search about for dry wood to start the fire. While the leopard was doing this the tortoise moved slowly off to his house, and very soon came back with the pepper, salt, and oil. He also brought a long piece of cane tie-tie, which is very strong. He put this on the ground, and began boiling the fish.
Then he said to the leopard: “While we are waiting for the fish to cook, let us play at tying one another up to a tree. You may tie me up first, and when I say, ‘Tighten,’ you must loose the rope, and when I say ‘Loosen,’ you must tighten the rope.”

The leopard was very hungry, but he thought that this game would make the time pass more quickly while the fish was being cooked. He, therefore, agreed to play. The tortoise then stood with his back to the tree and said: “Loosen the rope.” The leopard, as he had agreed, began to tie up the tortoise. Very soon the tortoise cried out: “Tighten!” The leopard at once unfastened the tie-tie, and the tortoise was free. The tortoise then said, “Now, leopard, it is your turn.”

The leopard, then, stood up against the tree and called out to the tortoise to loosen the rope, and the tortoise at once very quickly passed the rope several times around the leopard and got him fast to the tree. Then the leopard said, “Tighten the rope.”

But instead of playing the game as he said he would, the tortoise ran faster and faster with the rope round the leopard. He took care to keep out of reach of the leopard’s claws, and very soon had the leopard fastened so tight that he could not get away.

All this time the leopard was crying out to the tortoise to let him go, as he was tired of the game; but the tortoise only laughed, and sat down at the fireside and commenced his meal.
When he had finished eating all he wanted, he picked up the remainder of the fish for his family, and made ready to go. Before he started, however, he said to the leopard: “You killed my mother and now you want to take my fish. It is not likely that I am going to the lake to get fish for you, so I shall leave you here to starve.”

All that day and throughout the night the leopard was yelling for someone to let him loose; but no one came, because the people and animals of the forest do not like to hear the leopard’s voice.

In the morning, when the animals began to go out to find food, the leopard begged every one he saw to come and untie him; but they all refused, as they knew that if they did so the leopard would most likely kill them at once and eat them.

At last, a bush rat came by and saw the leopard tied up to the tree and asked him what his trouble was. The leopard told him that he had been playing a game of ‘tight’ and ‘loose’ with the tortoise, and that he had tied him up and left him there to starve. The leopard then begged the bush rat to cut the ropes with his sharp teeth.

The bush rat was very sorry for the leopard; but at the same time, he knew that, if he let the leopard go, the leopard would most likely kill and eat the one that had thus done him a kind act. He therefore hesitated, and said that he did not quite see his way clear to cut the ropes.

But this bush rat was very kind-hearted. He had had some experience with traps himself, and could sympathize with the leopard in his pain. The bush rat therefore thought for a time, and then made a plan. He first started to dig a hole under the tree.

When he had finished the hole, he came out and cut one of the ropes, and immediately ran into his hole, and waited there to see what would happen; but although the leopard struggled very much, he could not get loose, as the tortoise had tied him up so fast.

After a time, when he saw that there was no danger, the bush rat crept out again and very carefully bit through another rope, and then came back to his hole as before. Again, nothing happened, and he began to feel safe. He then bit several strands through one after the other until the last rope was cut and the leopard was free.

The leopard was wild with hunger. Instead of being grateful to the bush rat, as soon as the leopard was free, he made a dash at the bush rat with his big paw, but just missed him, as the bush rat had dived for his hole.  The bush rat, however, was not quick enough to escape the leopard’s paw, and the sharp claws scratched his back and left marks which all bush rats carry even to this day.

Folktale from Zambia

The Third Way of African Philosophy.

The Mozambican, Severino Elias Ngoenha, the main exponent of African philosophical thinking in Portuguese-speaking Africa, tells of his journey of research and the challenges of modern African thinking which ‘must be capable of finding adequate answers, without looking back too much and without too many ideologisms’.

What is meant by ‘African philosophy’?
There is no difference between African philosophy and tout court philosophy. Both derive from classical Greece when Socrates began to search for the basis of justice; Plato introduced the dialogue method, the idea of the logos as the road to the truth, and Aristotle, with new metaphysical foundations, politics and ethics, or the rules on how to live together with others.
The other key element to understanding African philosophy lies in historicity which is also common to all philosophical thought: it is in historicity that the birth of independent African thought is to be found, just as we have in English, French, German and Italian philosophy.

Severino Elias Ngoenha, the main exponent of African Lusophone philosophy. (photo Luca Bussotti)

In your opinion, philosophy is not, therefore, ethnocentric?
It is. Furthermore, it has been historically bound up with European culture which it finally came to possess, making it its own. Most importantly, since the XIX century, there has been an ethnicisation of philosophy, while the ‘minor’ fields of knowledge were relegated to anthropological studies. It was only in the second half of the XX century that the perspective changed.
Stereotypes were partly defeated, and people began to understand that there exists a philosophical reflection that is not according to the western matrix, even though the first to express it were westerners, usually missionaries like Placide Tempels. From the nineteen-twenties onwards, there appeared the first signs of African or African-American philosophical movements such as Black Renaissance.

And what were the fundamental evolutionary stages after the birth of African philosophical thinking?
During the 1970s a new current was formed that separated anthropological thinking from philosophy, the particular from the universal, with clear critical distancing and writings as the central aspect. This school, known in fact as a critical school, sees African philosophy no longer as the thinking of a group or collective but personal and individual, leaving anthropology to study cultures. The other current is hermeneutic which believes that both African culture and western thinking about Africa must be reviewed and re-interpreted. These new perspectives introduced a break with the past of African philosophy: it is no longer homogenous but pluralistic, open, and dialectic.

You are seen as one of the founders of a Portuguese type of African philosophy with ties to the historicity of Portuguese-speaking countries. Can you explain what this peculiarity consists of?
I would say that African philosophy has fallen into the colonial trap of dividing itself into Anglophone and Francophone philosophy, omitting, for historical reasons, Lusophone philosophy. In Portugal, there has not been, at least in the last hundred years, a philosophical tradition that can be compared to English or French philosophy to the extent that we, who received our independence in the mid-sixties, had largely to invent everything, unlike our Anglophone and Francophone colleagues who had a point of reference in the former motherlands.
In our countries, especially Angola and Mozambique, philosophy began through the seminaries; then, during the sixties, at the end of the colonial era, it was taught in high schools, especially to the Portuguese, usually the children of military people stationed in the African colonies. Nevertheless, in both cases (both in the seminaries and in the schools) philosophy was seen as preparatory, first of all to religion and secondly, to university studies in law, history and geography.

Later on, with the coming of independence, all the Lusophone African countries chose the path of Marxism, with some differences. But it was Marxism imposed from above, rather weak in the philosophical sense. Marxism without Karl Marx: people were not familiar with the German ideology, the Utopian socialism that Marx criticised, or the classical economists that Marx started from to then develop his criticism of capitalism. Luso-African Marxism was a peripheral theory made up of a mixture of Leninism and prohibitionism, the result of the cold war.
Our two main ideologues were Amilcar Cabral, an agrarian Marxist, and Eduardo Mondlane who was never a Marxist, having always been close to American pragmatism.

This is the post-independence situation. After the changes in the nineties and the introduction of democracy, however, the situation changes …
Certainly, it changes considerably, at least from the philosophical point of view. Personally, this is the context in which I happened to find myself, with some personal and family characteristics.
Mine was a Christian family and I was beginning to absorb the theology of liberation, together, of course, with what was ‘official’ in Mozambique, including Marxism.

When I left Mozambique to complete my studies, I was convinced that philosophy was subordinate to theology and this idea of mine did not change when I entered the Urbanian College in Rome, a college of Propaganda Fide and therefore full of Africans and Latin-Americans, Indians, and Vietnamese. It was in this context that I discovered African philosophy, starting with the critical school of thought of Mudimbe. This is how I came to meet Filomeno Lopes, today an important journalist of Vatican radio, originally from Guinea-Bissau. It was there, together with Filomeno, that the idea of a Luso-African philosophy which many called the ‘School of Rome’, was born.

A fundamental school for Luso-African thinking … But later, Mozambique emerged from the war and … what then?
It happened that, when I was in Lausanne, as professor of intercultural philosophy, President Joaquim Chissano (second president of Mozambique 1986 – 2005) came to see me and asked me to take part in and even direct the process of introducing philosophy into the Mozambican schools and universities, as the main instrument to defeat Marxism and to assist the pacification of the country.
I had just published my book (in 1992) ‘Por uma dimensão moçambicana da consciência histórica’, in which I looked forward to a sort of federalism for a new Mozambique: a project that has not come to pass but which represented an important element of discussion for President Chissano. That is how I found myself at a meeting in Maputo with three rectors of the public universities of the time and the minister for education, speaking of how philosophy could contribute to the pacification and growth of the country. These were the questions I asked and, seeing that none of those present answered, I did so myself.

And then what did you do?
I began to write the programmes of philosophy for the schools of my country, using an approach that was to be neither religious nor western but ours, Mozambican. In doing so, we also influenced the other Portuguese-speaking African countries, especially Angola. We had a theoretical and historical basis but it was very weak, considering that our history, in practice, begins with Ngungunhane, the last emperor of Gaza, the one who tried to resist the Portuguese, but we are speaking of the end of the XIX century.
The same happened with literature: the socialist regime had removed almost all reference to the Portuguese classics and so there was no literature that was ours, Mozambican. Then, the change from socialism to capitalism was traumatic and extremely rapid, and it still presents open ethical challenges today. Result: we had no reference points; everything was fluid and had to be built from scratch.

All of this within a political transition that ought to have led to democracy but which, at least up to now, seems to be more of a plan than a reality …
Exactly. How to bring about democracy in a country devoid of any democratic tradition? This was the great challenge. And it was for this reason that I wrote a book proposing a triple contract between the Mozambicans and those who govern them, something that was cultural, political, and social. Only by means of awareness of a contract, I then believed, would we have been able to establish the sort of democracy that could be more than simply elections.

And how did this experiment go? Did it succeed?
I would not say it succeeded in practice, given that, even today, democracy, or the state, are mistaken for the party that has always been in power, the Frelimo. The diagnosis was right, but the therapy left room for improvement. It was because of this that, with my colleague José Castiano we wrote ‘The Manifesto’ in 2019, in the hope of a ‘third way’.

‘A Third Way’ Blair style, or once again, Mozambican?
Mozambican, of course. The idea of the ‘third way’ includes the need to continually innovate. Continuity of analysis regarding the contract but, at that time, we did not have this capillary system of corruption which I have called dollarocracy, since the fusion between politics and economy had not yet been achieved. The Manifesto seeks to bring to light the positive elements of both experiences of government in independent Mozambique:  socialism, with its ideals of justice and liberalism, the champion of individual liberty. The co-existence of both elements would constitute the inspirational model of the ‘third way’.
(Photos: Angèle Etoundi Essamba)

Luca Bussotti

Herbs & Plants. Aerva lanata. A Diverse Medicinal Herb.

The continent of Africa is endowed with plenty of important medicinal plants. One of such plants is Aerva lanata (L.) A. L. Juss. ex Schultes (Family Amaranthaceae) which has been used since time immemorial for a number of medical conditions.

It is a strangling herb or undershrub that can grow to 90 cm in height. It possesses a villous stem, long tap-root and many wolly-tomentose branches. Leaves ovate to elliptic, acute at apex, hair-like stems. Inflorescence white, short and small, mostly axillary, perianth covered with white woolly hairs. The plant grows on loose soils and in abandoned farmland and is widespread in tropical Africa. Aerva lanata has been ethnomedicinally used as a therapeutic agent for a variety of diseases. The leaves, stems or roots of Aerva lanata have been used in the treatment of several diseases including inflammation, malaria, kidney stone, pneumonia, typhoid, rheumatism, bronchitis, haemorrhage, diuresis, jaundice, diabetes, and as a vermifuge for children.

The leaves decoction is administered for treatment of intestinal worms. The leaves infusion or decoction is used as a gargle for treating sore-throat and, as well, used in various complex treatments against guinea-worm. The leaf decoction is also used to bathe babies who have become unconscious due to an attack of malaria or of some other diseases. In some communities, the smoke from the burning plant leaf is inhaled to heal a number of diseases. The sap obtained from a fresh leaf of Aerva lanata is used to treat eye complaints.
An infusion made from a fresh leaf is orally administered to treat diarrhoea and is also topically applied to treat sores on skin.
The leaves and flowers are used to treat primary and secondary infertility. The decoction made from the leaves of Aerva lanata is used in indigenous medicine to manage diabetes mellitus and its associated complications in Africa. In fact, the leaf decoction is believed to be effective in regulating the body blood sugar level.

The leaf decoction is used to treat gonorrhoea (a sexually transmitted disease), hemorrhages and fever. The decoction made from fresh leaves is often taken as tea for boosting memory. A decoction obtained from a whole plant (flowers, root and stem) is used in treatment of diarrhoea and may also be taken as tea for cleansing the kidneys (treating kidney stones).
In addition, since the root of Aerva lanata is a diuretic, it is also used for treating painful discharge of urine.  Similar to the use of the leaves decoction, the root decoction can also be gargled to treat sore throats.The root is believed to possess anti-venom activity and as such used by herbalists in the treatment of snake-bite. The ash from a mixture of leaves and flowers is applied into incision made on the back to treat lower back pain.

The plant’s juvenile tips are used to chase away evil spirits and for good luck charms, while the whole plant is used to treat pruritus. The plant is also used in traditional medicine to treat cough, headache, and urolithiasis. The root is demulcent, diuretic, and also useful in strangury (blockage at base of bladder) treatment. As a demulcent, Aerva lanata is beneficial in preventing inflammation through protection of the mucous lining during cough and throat infections. The juice obtained from the crushed roots is used in treatment of jaundice conditions. In some communities, the plant is used for the treatment and management of asthma. Aerva lanata plant contains a number of compounds including kaempferol, tiliroside, β-sitosterol, aervoside, syringic acid, and canthin-6-one. As such, the medicinal activities of this plant may be due to the rich phytochemicals in it.
In other uses, Aerva lanata is used as food for both people and animals. The whole plant, especially the leaves, is edible. The leaves are put in soup or eaten as a spinach or as a vegetable. The plant provides feed for domestic animals.

Richard Komakech

 

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