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The Strategic Importance of the Indian Ocean.

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

While the focus remains on the western Pacific and the South China Sea, because of the China-US direct interests, the Indian Ocean is a major geopolitical theatre.

Several key energy-producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Qatar and the UAE are located in the region. More than 60 percent of the world’s oil shipments, largely from the Middle East to China, Japan and other Asian economies pass through the Indian Ocean, as does 70 percent of all container traffic to and from Asia’s industrialized nations and the rest of the world.

In addition to commercial shipping and energy resources, three of the most significant choke points in the world make this Ocean of tremendous strategic significance. Malacca Strait between Malaysia, Singapore and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, connects Southeast Asia and the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean.

The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Gulf to the wider Indian Ocean is arguably the most critical choke point because of the energy flows from the Gulf. Much of the energy resource to China, Japan, Korea and ASEAN passes through these two points.

The third, Bab-el-Mandeb strait, which flows between the Horn of Africa and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Equally important is the Mozambique Channel between Madagascar and Mozambique, which is a key trading route for goods transiting the Cape of Good Hope to Europe, the Americas and Asia.

In recent years China’s accent as a second-biggest economy and its need to protect its trade and energy supplies put it on what could become a collision course with the US and its regional allies (Quad- US, Japan, Australia and India and more recently the AUKUS, which is an acronym for Australia, United Kingdom and the United States).

Building on its anti-piracy missions around the Horn of Africa, China has emerged as a strong partner for the islands and littoral countries of the Indian Ocean. China’s Maritime Silk Road, under Belt and Road Initiative, has provided an added platform to collaborate on economic and
possibly military issues.

In 2017 China set up its first overseas military facility in Djibouti on the Indian Ocean coast. While France, Japan, and the United States already have facilities in Djibouti, the Chinese base cements its position as a new player in the region.

After opening its economy over the last 40 years China has become the world’s biggest mercantile nation. As reported by WTO, China’s imports and exports in 2021 totalled USD 6,052.4 billion. The country is poised to become the world’s biggest economy soon.

China’s military modernisation to protect its economic interests directly challenges the American predominance in the Indian Ocean. The United States is, therefore, loath to let China dominate the region. This struggle is a core geopolitical issue of the 21st century.

China has invested heavily in infrastructure projects such as ports, roads, and railways in countries along the Indian Ocean, as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This aims to improve connectivity and promote economic development in the region, which will further facilitate China’s merchandise passing through the Indian Ocean.

In the last few years, China has increased its naval deployments into the Indian Ocean and developed what some analysts call a “string of pearls”, a network of commercial facilities along the Indian Ocean littorals.

As the military tempo in the Indian Ocean is retched up, the predictions of Alfred Mahan, an American naval officer called the most important American strategist of the nineteenth century, seem to be coming true. He said, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas.” (Photo: USS Porter transits the Strait of Hormuz. Alex R. Forster/U.S. Navy)
(ANI)

Guatemala. A Wounded Country.

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

A past full of violence and abuse. Drug trafficking, corruption, weak or non-existent institutions. Meanwhile, next June, the country will go to the polls for the general elections.

Guatemala constitutes the northern edge of the Central American area nestled between Mexico, Belize, El Salvador, and Honduras with which it shares borders to the north and northwest, respectively, also, east and southeast. The country also enjoys two important outlets to the sea: to the west on the Pacific while to the east on the Caribbean basin, for a total coastal area of 400 kilometres. This factor which, due to its importance, is also symbolized in the national flag with a vertical white band flanked by two other light blue bands.

Over the course of history, the location area has favoured the numerous upheavals that have upset the country because it is considered of crucial strategic importance since the time of its discovery. It constitutes an isthmus, or contact area, between the two large masses, the northern and southern part of the American continent. Above all, the closeness and economic-strategic interests of the major world power – the United States – and those of various oligarchies which have never allowed the definition of grounds for institutional confrontation, are incumbent on the region.
In addition to the coastal strip, from a geographical point of view, Guatemala is also characterized by the mountain ranges of the Sierra Madre, which run along the central part with peaks, among the highest in all of Central America, whose height exceeds 4,000 metres. Among these is that of Tajumulco which is also one of the many active volcanos present in Guatemalan territory and, at 4,220m, is the highest peak in the country. Guatemala, in fact, has one of the most important volcanic complexes in Central America which also includes the Acatenango at 3976m, while in the southern area, there is the largest number of extinct volcanoes. In the northern part, more precisely in the area between Mexico and Belize, there is a vast plain dotted with some limited hills and large wooded extensions which, like the southern part of the coastal strip facing the Pacific, is also flat. To the north, however, there is also an arc of ancient rocks, covered by marine sediments, belonging to the Mesozoic and Cenozoic eras.
The country is also very rich in watercourses, which flow among the wide valleys present in the central part of the country and into the two oceans, including the Río Chixoy, the Motagua and the Usumacinta, and lake basins including Lake Izabal (590 Km²), about thirty kilometres away from the Atlantic, Lake Petén Itzá (99 Km²) and Lake Atitlán (130 Km²) which is of volcanic origin and still active.

Guatemala has one of the most important volcanic complexes in Central America. (Photo Pixbay)

Also belonging to the country are some islets present both in the waters of the bordering oceans and in some lakes, all of a very small size, less than one square kilometre.
From a historical point of view, Guatemala has been for millennia the cradle of the Mayas whose testimony is still alive among the inhabitants of the country, despite the terrible persecutions suffered by this population over the centuries, but also in the archaeological works bequeathed and deriving from their high architectural, astronomical, mathematical, and medical skills. They also distinguished themselves for having given birth to the only writing system developed in the Americas. It was the advent of the Spaniards led by Pedro de Alvaro, together with the internal strife of this native population, which put an end to their dominance without completely erasing their presence and ancestral traditions, also preserved by the hostility of the territory.

Manuel Estrada Cabrera ruled Guatemala between 1898 and 1920. (Photo Archive)

In 1821, following a series of historical events, the territories of that area declared themselves independent from the settlers, giving rise to the Central American Federation. This federation, however, was short-lived and was divided into 5 states: Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica while Belize, which in the meantime had become a British colony, would gain independence in 1981.Independence, however, was certainly not synonymous with freedom since these countries were immediately used as instruments of control and domination by external actors. As proof of this, it is enough to remember that between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, major and decisive battles were fought between the European powers and the United States for the conquest of strategic, economic, and financial spaces. The United States, in particular, intervening heavily and militarily in local political life, worked to oust the European powers by virtue of the presence of notable investments, concentrated in the production and export of tropical agricultural products, especially bananas. The size and importance of these investments were such as to severely limit national sovereignty. Hence the epithet ‘banana republics’.

Guatemala’s democratically elected president Jacobo Árbenz was overthrown in a coup planned by the CIA and The United Fruit Company. (Photo Archive)

Against this, Guatemala, from the time of its independence, was forced to deal with a long period of repressive dictatorships including that of Manuel Estrada Cabrera, in office from 1898 until 1920, who to promote the agricultural development of the country, opened its doors to the United Fruit Company of Boston which immediately extended its control over almost the entire economy of the country.
This allowed the USA, thanks to the ‘dollar diplomacy’, to establish itself as the country’s first economic partner, making it extremely dependent on its own economic structure.
It was Jacobo Arbenez, who tried to cut this independence in 1951, following his election, through the promotion of agrarian reform and the nationalization of the United Fruit Company which at the time held 40% of the arable land, but also the concession of the railways of the country. His action did not last long as, in 1954, he was overthrown by a group of officers supported by the CIA. The new military dictatorship, which acted as guarantor with multinational companies, maintained power for about thirty years, changing the political course of the country which sank into a very long phase of political instability. The result was one of the bloodiest conflicts in Latin America with more than 200,000 victims in a war that lasted 36 years which saw the regular army and paramilitary formations in the field, more or less openly supported by North American advisers. (Open Photo: National flag of Guatemala. 123rf.com)
(F.R.)

Migrants.

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

Among the many problems afflicting Guatemala, there is certainly also the migratory phenomenon.

In fact, Guatemala, in addition to being the country of origin of large numbers of migrants heading to the USA, is also, due to its geographical position, a transit route for those leaving from other states both in Central America and in the southern area.
According to some estimates made in 2021 by the IOM (International Organization for Migration), around 31,000 people try to leave the country every month to cross the border with Mexico. Generally, the majority of migrants, about 60%, leave from Honduras, 17% from Haiti and 12% from El Salvador. It has also been estimated that 46% of people attempting crossings are women. In recent months there has also been an increase in departures from Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela.

Around 31,000 people try to leave the country every month to cross the border with Mexico. (Photo IOM).

The weak structure on which the country rests and the atavistic criticalities with which it lives have not allowed it to deal adequately with the pandemic situation. The impact of this has accentuated the crisis situation, drastically affecting the weakest groups deprived of adequate care by the health system which was already quite fragile.
In addition to the pandemic, there were also the hurricanes Eta and Iota which hit Central America in November 2020, causing significant damage to the agricultural sector and the communities dependent on it, as well as numerous displaced persons who facilitated the circulation of the virus during the pandemic period. In the same year, the approval of a controversial budget law, with huge reductions in education and health care and the possible aiding and abetting of companies linked to the government, sparked large protests in the country, up to the request for the resignation of the entire executive. These dynamics have once again worked in favour of the now atavistic internal divisions, despite the great commitment made by the United Nations and other members of the international community. The burden of the lack of a shared historical memory of what happened in the past and in particular of the crimes committed against indigenous communities, still weighs on the population. In recent years, in particular, there has been a phenomenon of aggregation of original peoples, marginalized and protagonists of misery who, despite having always organized themselves in communities and supported each other, are acquiring an ever-greater space in the national political arena by placing themselves today as protagonists in the promotion of protests against corruption.

Journalist José Rubén Zamora Marroquín was arrested on July 29, 2022 for exposing the corruption cases of the Alejandro Giammattei government. Photo: El Periódico

The fracture present within the country is also evident from the repressive climate that has arisen and which led in July 2022 to the arrest of one of the most important journalists in the country, José Ruben Zamora. One of the greatest critics of the Giammattei government, from the columns of his newspaper El Periódico, he published weekly inquiries into the corruption of the country’s political class. In the opinion of some analysts, this arrest is part of a larger mosaic aimed at putting those in the country who oppose the phenomenon of corruption, out of the game.

The indigenous leader Thelma Cabrera. CC BY-SA 4.0/Carlos Sebastián

From a legal point of view Guatemala, according to the Constitution drawn up in 1985, is a presidential republic whose head of state is elected for a four-year term. Next June 23, the country will once again be grappling with general elections for the election of the President of the Republic and his deputy. On the same day, 160 deputies who will go to Congress, 340 mayors and the 20 deputies who will go to the Central American Parliament will also be elected (the latter is a political institution dedicated to the integration of Central American countries, including the Dominican Republic, to bring about the unity of this region and the prosperity of its peoples).
The indigenous leader Thelma Cabrera will again be in the field as the candidate of the Movement for the Liberation of Peoples (MLP), which is a leftist formation and fights for the creation of a plurinational state based on the different Mayan peoples who inhabit the country. Cabrera will be accompanied by former Guatemalan human rights prosecutor Jordán Rodas, having held that position between 2017 and 2022, who will run for the vice presidency.
In late January 2023, Guatemala’s Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) blocked Cabrera and Rodas from participating in the upcoming election, which will be held on June 25.
Guatemalan social movement activists and international observers have reported that the TSE is deeply politicized and acts in the interests of Giammattei and the country’s powerful oligarchs.
Cabrera and her MLP party filed an appeal, but on February 2, the TSE ruled against them, officially banning them from the race.
The Guatemalan electoral authority claimed they cannot run because their application was “invalid”.
Cabrera shared the completed paperwork on Twitter, insisting that “we fulfilled all the legal requirements”. Rodas also explained that he submitted all the required paperwork, and a review of his record found no legal cases or complaints against him.
“Any additional requirement is not found in the law; it cannot be invoked to avoid my candidacy and violate my right to be elected”, he said. (Open Photo: 123rf.com)

Filippo Romeo

The Gecko and the Elephant.

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

The elephant, the leader of the village, was already sound asleep when suddenly a loud, insistent voice made him gasp: Ge-cko… Ge-cko… Ge-cko. After opening his eyes and taking a deep breath, the elephant said: “Gecko, what are you doing here? Why are you walking around my head? It’s the middle of the night. Go to sleep. “

“But I cannot sleep, – replied the gecko -. Outside, the air is full of fireflies that keep turning their lanterns on and off. You who are the chief of this village, try to do something.” “All right, all right, – replied the elephant – I will talk to them in the morning. Now go to sleep”.

Early in the morning, the elephant summoned all the fireflies of the valley. “Is it true”, he asked them, “that all night long you do nothing but turn your lanterns on and off so that the gecko cannot sleep?”

“Yes, it is. We are constantly turning our lanterns on and off all night because the buffaloes on their way backfill the paths with dung and we have to light the way to prevent anyone from trampling on their dirt, “replied the fireflies. “All right, you can go now, said the elephant.

The elephant was sleeping when suddenly a snapping voice woke him up: Ge-cko… Ge-cko… Ge-cko… The elephant opened his eyes, took a deep breath, and said: “Gecko, what are you doing here? Why are you walking around my head? It’s night, go to sleep.”

“I can’t sleep”, replied the gecko, “the fireflies keep turning their lanterns on and off. You promised me you would talk to them.
What did they tell you?”

“Yes, I talked to them”, replied the Elephant. “The fireflies have to light and extinguish their lanterns because they are afraid that someone, walking along the paths, will step on the dung of the buffaloes. They do their duty. I guess you will have to get used to fireflies.”

“Then, talk to the buffaloes”, insisted the gecko. “You are the chief of this village; try to do something”.

The next day, the elephant summoned the buffaloes of the valley and said to them: “Is it true, that you come back in the evening and fill the paths with dung, and the fireflies are obliged to turn their lanterns on and off all night to prevent anyone from treading on them?”

“Yes, it is true” – the buffaloes confessed. “Every afternoon the rain digs holes along the paths and we fill them as best we can so no one falls in.” “Very good buffaloes”, said the village chief. “Now you can go.”

The next night the elephant was sound asleep when the usual voice woke him up. “Gecko, it’s the middle of the night. Go to sleep.” “But I cannot sleep”, was the usual reply. “The fireflies keep turning their lanterns on and off. You promised to talk to the buffaloes.
What did they tell you?”

“In fact, I did talk to the buffaloes”, replied the elephant, “and they told me that every afternoon the rain digs holes along the paths and that they try to fill them as best they can to prevent anyone from going into them. They do their duty. I guess you’ll have to get used to the buffaloes.” “Then talk to the rain”, said the gecko. “You are the chief of this village try to do something.”

The next day, the elephant summoned Rain and said to her: “Is it true that every afternoon you dig holes along the paths and the buffaloes are forced to fill them with dung so that no one ends up in them? And the fireflies have to turn their lanterns on and off all night to light the way and prevent anyone from stepping in the buffalo dung?”

“Of course,”, said the rain. “Every afternoon I try to fall on the earth with all my strength to make the rice fields fertile so that the insects have a place to be born and live. If every afternoon I did not fall with all my strength and make the fields fertile, the insects would die and the geckos would have nothing to eat.” “Oh, now I understand”, said the elephant contentedly. “Thank you; you may go”.

The Elephant was already fast asleep when for the umpteenth time a loud, insistent voice woke him up. “Gecko, what are you doing here? It’s night, go to sleep”. “But I can’t sleep”, the gecko replied, “because the fireflies keep turning their lanterns on and off. You promised you would talk to the rain. What did it tell you?”

“Every afternoon the rain tries to pour down on the earth with all the strength it has to make the rice fields fertile. It is in the rice fields that insects are born and live. If the rain stopped falling, the insects would die and you, gecko, would have nothing left to eat. So”, concluded the elephant, “how shall we put it?”.

The gecko was silent for a moment. After a while, he said in an astonished voice: “Do you mean to say that if the rain did not leave holes in the paths and the buffaloes did not fill them with dung and the fireflies did not light and extinguish their lanterns, I, a gecko, would have nothing to eat?” “Exactly! Gecko, in this world everything is connected”, the elephant replied. “Now go home and go to sleep”.

The gecko walked home thoughtfully and once he arrived; he fell into a deep sleep. Outside, the fireflies continued to light and extinguish their lanterns. In this world, all creatures must know that they depend on each other, and for this reason we should not complain. (Photo: 123rf.com)

Folktale from India

Ghana. Akwasidae, an Ashanti Festival of Rich Cultural Heritage.

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

It is the most important event celebrated by the Chiefs and people of Ashanti in the central part of Ghana. We attend the celebration.

It is a magnificent celebration centred on ancestral reverence, remembrance and acknowledgment of past kings and noble feats. It marks the sheer magnificence of the golden heritage of the Ashanti people. Between 1697 and 1699, the Battle of Feyiase, otherwise known as the Ashanti war of independence, was an occasion to re-affirm indivisibility. Akwasidae serves as a celebration of the Golden Stool and a cultural vibrancy that brings together the Asantehene, sub-kings and subjects at Manhyia in Kumasi. The Akwasidae celebration is indeed an eventful spectacle, where the spiritual meets the physical. Ashanti culture centres on ancestral worship. The festival is also known to honour the Ashanti independence war. It is celebrated on a Sunday, once in every six weeks. The importance of the celebration of Akwasidae festival is next only to the National Day celebrations.

Akwasidae Celebration in Manhyia Palace. CC BY-SA 4.0/Zack Agon

In Akan, ‘adae’ means ‘place of rest’, and as such Akwasidae is when past kings are called upon to invoke their blessings on the people. Prior to Akwasidae, the preceding Saturday evening, known as Memeneda Dapaa, sees elderly women of the Stool conveying emblematic songs to the palace grounds. Drums and horns voice out harmonies and dancing goes on until the early hours of the morning, inviting the spirits of the dead. One place to learn more about the event is the Manhyia Museum.
The traditions of the Akwasidae festival are connected with the Akan annual calendar which is divided into nine parts. Each part lasts approximately six weeks (between 40–42 days in a period). The celebration of this period is called the ‘Adae’ festival. The ‘Adae’ Festival has two celebration days: the Akwasidae festival which is celebrated on the final Sunday of the period and the Awukudae festival that is celebrated on a Wednesday within the period.

The Friday preceding 10 days to the Akwasidae is called Fofie, which means a ritual Friday. During the last Akwasidae of the year, which coincides with the Adae Kese Festival, special attention is given to making food offerings and donations for helping people. The festivals of Adae are not interchangeable as they were fixed from ancient times.
The festival adores the milestones in the history of the Ashanti Kingdom. Its first celebration was during the attainment of statehood by the Ashanti Kingdom after it had defeated the Denkyiras in the battle of Feyiase, also known as the Ashanti independence war.
During the Akwasidae festival, the rich cultural heritage of the Ashanti people is displayed to attract local people and foreign visitors. The Ashanti kingdom is made up of social groups led by clan heads, compelled to connect the life force of the past and the people. Due to the rich nature of the event, the festival takes place in the royal palace and gathers thousands of people, all dressed in traditional costumes.
The ceremony opens in the throne room, where only the initiates are allowed. According to the Ashanti cultural archive records, Akwasidae is an ornate ceremony, commemorating the date that the Ashanti Golden Stool was magically brought down from heaven.

The Golden Stool symbolizes solidarity within the Ashanti kingdom.

The Golden Stool is historic and arguably the most sacred symbol commanded from the sky by Okomfo Anokye, into the lap of Asantehene Osei Tutu during the 17th century. The stool stands 18 inches high, 24 inches long and 12 inches wide and is never allowed to come into contact with earth or be used as a seat. Every new king is lowered and raised over the Golden Stool without ever touching it. At Akwasidae, the Asantehene sits in close proximity to the installed Golden Stool. Since its introduction, the Golden Stool has always symbolised solidarity within the Ashanti kingdom.
Ritual libations of blood and schnapps (gin) are poured onto the thrones of the former kings as offerings to them and to the ancestors. The belief is that the blood revitalizes the stools and the ancestral spirits, and the lungs; a symbol of breath of life serves the purpose of giving new life to the stools. During the last Akwasidae of the year, special attention is given to making food offerings and donations for helping people.
Food offerings include special items such as etor (mashed African yam) mixed with boiled eggs.

Ashanti local chiefs. CC BY-SA 2.0/ Erik Kristensen

On this day, the Asantehene (King of Asantes) is called upon to oversee the pledging of allegiance to the Golden Stool, arguably the most sacred symbol within the Ashanti Kingdom. He meets his subjects and subordinate chiefs in the courtyard of the Manhyia Palace. The Golden Stool (throne) is displayed at the palace grounds in the presence of the King. People sing and dance while the King holds his durbar on the occasion of the festival. During that period, people are at liberty to shake hands with their King.
The King leads a procession in a palanquin decorated with gold jewellery and he sits under a large bright umbrella. He also witnesses a colourful parade from his palace grounds at Kumasi. Participants of the parade include drum beaters, folk dancers, horn-blowers, and singers. The arrival of the Asantehene at the durbar grounds is heralded by a retinue of courtiers led by a man carrying a brass pan containing talisman and herbs believed to drive away evil spirits.

Ashanti woman.

Others carry the traditional sandals of silver and gold keys (the Nsafoahene). The key, in folklore, signifies that when the Asantehene is out of the palace all doors are shut. The Asantehene emerges holding a traditional sword in one hand and a whisk in another and dances to traditional music and steps out of the palanquin. As the procession passes, he bows gently to the chiefs and other subjects to acknowledge their presence.
As it is a festival of paying respect to ancestors, the Asantehene (king) visits the Bantama Mausoleum and offers worship not only to his ancestors’ chairs (stools), but also to the skeletal remains of his ancestors. He pays respect to the honour of Abosom (lesser gods in the Akan tradition) and Nsamanfo (spiritually cultivated ancestors). Concluding the ceremony in the mausoleum, the paramount chief orders drinks to be served to all present who later depart, leaving the stools and the ancestors to eat and drink what has been served them.
In front of the King stand other chiefs in the shade of their umbrellas, sword carriers, bearers of ritual knives, armed guards with loaded rifles and nobles with ostrich feather fans. Sitting next to the King are the dignitaries of the court. The royal speaker stands by the King’s side and holds in his hands a golden scepter as a symbol of the Asantehene’s (King) power.The Queen mother, the most important woman in the realm, is also present and surrounded by her court made up exclusively of women. To accompany the ceremony, glorious stories are told of the past Ashanti Kings, musicians play drums and ivory horns giving the rhythm to the ceremony and women wrapped in bright red clothes dance, performing traditional steps.

Akwasidae itself comes in two parts: aside from the main celebrations open to the general public there are solemn, private ceremonies, including rituals for eulogising the incumbent king and the presentation of ceremonial sacrifices to the ancestral spirits. The celebration on these days involves the purification of black, ancestral, hand-carved stools.
Public celebrations include a fine durbar of kings, queen mothers, elders and the people presided over by the Asantehene. Golden regalia, umbrellas, palanquins, and paraphernalia add to the glow interspersed with drumming and dancing from different cultural bands at the palace grounds. The enormous wealth of the Ashantis is a factor that helped to develop the society into one of the greatest in Africa to the extent that it currently stands out as the leading custodian of Ghana’s rich cultural heritage. (Open Photo: The 16th Asantehene, King of Ashanti, Otumfour Osei Tutu II. CCBY-SA 4.0/ Zackagonii)

Damian Dieu Donne Avevor

Yemen. Houthis and Iran: A Marriage of Wartime Convenience.

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

After eight years of conflict, the Houthis are now militarily closer to Iran. They are also more integrated than before in the pro-Iranian armed network. However, the Houthis differ from Iran’s proxies in the region, and not only for being part of the Zaydi Shia doctrine.
The Yemeni armed movement is economically autonomous from Tehran, with its own political agenda and a distinct, elite-driven structure of power.

According to the United Nations, the Houthis received weapons for the first time from Iran since at least 2009, while the Yemeni Zaydi Shia movement was fighting against the government (“Saada wars”), prompting Saudi Arabia to intervene to secure its border
from Houthi guerrillas.

This means that the increasing alliance between the Houthis and Iran, strengthened by the 2015 conflict, has never really been tested during peacetimes, but only in times of uprising and war. The question is to what extent the Houthis are able to exercise their ‘agenda’ in Yemeni politics – so hypothetically diverging from Iran’s expectations – as talks with Saudi Arabia are still ongoing and the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic agreement was inked.

The growing Houthi-Iran integration is increasingly noticeable in warfare, media and propaganda, foreign relations. In terms of warfare, the Houthis have turned from a local guerrilla group to a more sophisticated armed force able to strike ground and maritime targets throughout the region. First, this was achieved through the hybridization with segments of pro-Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regular security forces and, secondly, through the enhanced relationship with Iran.

Security assistance from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF weapons and ammunition smuggling, military training) allowed the Houthis to upgrade their defence capabilities and further develop their asymmetric skills. Together, they also forged new military institutions in Yemen. For instance, the Jihad Council is a tool of Houthis’ strategic integration in the Iranian armed constellation.

The Council is headed by Abdel Malek Al Houthi, with a jihad assistant from the Qods and a deputy jihad assistance from Hezbollah. The Council allows the Houthis to further centralize strategic decision-making while ‘institutionalizing` Qods and Hezbollah’s advice on military strategy and technical weapons-related aspects.
The assistance of the Iranian network also helped the Houthis to build their own weapons factories (drones), as part of a military-industrial complex in controlled areas.

The Iranian armed network played a role in structuring the Houthis’ media. Their official media outlet, Al-Masirah, broadcasts since 2012 from Southern Beirut, with the technical assistance of Hezbollah’s Al-Manar. The Houthis often coordinated with Iran and pro-Iranian Iraqi armed groups on information and propaganda, providing them plausible deniability after attacks: for instance, the Yemeni group claimed responsibility for the attacks against Saudi Aramco in 2019, although these came from the north, not from the south of the kingdom.

Iran doesn’t control the Houthis’ decision-making process, although their worldview is similar. This favours foreign policy convergence. Both the Houthis and the post-1979 Iranian leadership cultivate an anti-imperialist discourse, claiming to protect ′the oppressed` against ′the arrogance`. For example, the Houthis’ narrative harshly opposes the United States and Israel. The slogan of the Yemeni movement is a clear iteration of the Islamic Republic’s propaganda: both the founder Husayn Al Houthi and his father Badreddin, the ideologue of the movement, studied in Iran between the 1980s and the 1990s.

Despite rising integration, the Houthi-Iran relationship is not that of a classic patron-client. While the Houthis often behave like a proxy to gain regional legitimacy and strengthen their position vis-à-vis Yemeni actors, they have their own agenda and notable agency. The Houthis are pragmatic and adaptable political players. For instance, they often shifted domestic alliances when this was politically convenient, also talking directly with ′the enemy` Saudi Arabia.

Four variables highlight why the Houthis are distinct from Iranian proxies. First, the Houthis are financially autonomous from Iran: they directly extract economic resources from the de facto state in the north (taxes, levies, zakat, khums), and control the smuggling networks stretching in the area.

The Houthis were able to penetrate and then replace former Saleh-centred patronage networks with their own webs. However, they are probably the weakest actor for welfare provision in the Iranian constellation, as seen also during the Covid-19 pandemic.
This is likely due to widespread poverty in Yemen, especially in their Northern fiefdom.

Second, the Houthis mainly pursue local goals, such as the Northern regions’ greater autonomy and participation to state revenues. Third, the Houthis don’t belong to the Twelver Shia branch like the Iranians.
They are a rupture stream within Zaydism: differently from the Zaydi doctrine, they haven’t appointed an imam so far, while they also distinguish from khomeinism.

As noted by Charles Schmitz, a professor at Towson University in Baltimore, Maryland, the Houthis haven’t provided their leader a formal role within the state architecture, yet they have shaped an Islamic Republic-like government guided by a revolutionary movement.

Fourth, the Houthis claim to represent the oppressed – as other pro-Iranian groups in the region do – and Northern marginalized areas. However, their leadership presents not only a unique family-based connotation (the Al Houthi family), but also a class dimension (sayyid; sâda, the non-tribal Zaydi religious elite): a sort of ′monarchism` which can’t be traced elsewhere in the Iranian network.

Lebanon’s Hezbollah are the Houthis’ closest ally in the Iranian constellation. Hezbollah has played the role of mentor with regard to military training, allowing the Houthis to strengthen both regular (ex. infantry tactics) and irregular (ex. mine warfare) capabilities, improving guided missile operations against tanks and anti-shipping attacks.

To an extent, the Houthis display some similarities to Hezbollah. First, they both emerged as resistance movements against perceived oppression by their neighbours. Second, their charismatic leaders, Abdel Malek Al Houthi and Hassan Nasrallah, are ultimate decision-makers but don’t have formal roles in governments and state institutions.

Third, war was a foundational moment for both the armed movements (the 1975-1989 Lebanese civil war; Yemen’s Saada wars 2004-10), and then was decisive in upgrading their political and military weight in the region (the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war; the 2015 Saudi-led
military intervention).

Fourth, they are locally rooted movements that have been able to develop a national and ultimately a regional narrative. Fifth, they adopt a populist political discourse against corruption, with an ideology and political platform mostly elaborated in reaction against someone, rather than fully expressed from a theoretical perspective.

To some extent, Tehran “bandwagoned on Houthi successes”. In fact, the Houthis’ resilience and unexpected capabilities allowed the Iranians to indirectly put Saudi Arabia under pressure, and along its border, with a limited material investment. Moreover, Iran has also gained an indirect access to the Red Sea due to the Houthis’ presence in Hodeida.

The IRGC-QF is primarily interested in maintaining transit points for weapons and smuggling through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, also to support armed allies. However, Hodeida and the neighbouring Red Sea coast represent, despite the Saudi-led blockade, both an entry-point as well as a linchpin for the Iranian maritime depth. Yemen would be increasingly used by Iran as a platform for weapons smuggling benefitting, for instance, Hamas. Arms sent to Yemen would then be shipped to Sudan, through Egypt, all the way to the Gaza Strip.

The Houthis have largely benefitted from Iran’s support so far as this is a marriage of mutual convenience. The Yemeni Zaydi movement has been able to fight a protracted conflict without losing controlled territories, which include the capital Sanaa, thanks to Iranian-related military training and weapons.

While Iran’s support has been extremely effective in wartime, would Tehran be able, and willing, to support Houthis’ political goals also in peacetime, or at least, during a hypothetical a ceasefire season? The point is how much the relationship with Iran binds, and limits, the Houthis’ decision-making, especially vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. This hasn’t been the case during the war, while it could become the issue towards a post-conflict season. (Photo: Sana’n. CC BY-SA 2.0/Rod Waddington)

Eleonora Ardemagni/ISPI

Mali. Taking over African Lithium.

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

Australians and Chinese are investing in a project that could soon make the Sahelian country the third-largest producer
of the metal in the world.

An area of 100 km² located in the district of Bougouni, in the Sikasso region, on the southern tip of Mali: this is where the Goulamina mineral deposit is located, managed by the Leo Lithium company, a joint venture created in mid-2021 by the Australian Firefinch and the Chinese Ganfeng companies. It is estimated that this mine contains 108 million tons of lithium, a chemical element of the alkali metal group, a component necessary to light up the batteries of our smartphones, but also the engines of hybrid and electric vehicles.
Australians and Chinese will invest $250 million in the development of the Goulamina Lithium Project.

Leo Lithium is developing the world-class Goulamina Lithium Project in Mali. (Photo: Leo Lithium Project)

The goal is to get to extract from the mine over the course of its life – just over twenty years – an annual average of 436,000 tons of spodumene concentrate, which could even amount to 726,000. Once fully operational, this field would make Mali the world’s third-largest producer of lithium, allowing it to cover 15% of global production.
The chronic insecurity of this Sahelian country, the continuous military coups and government oustings, and the repeated halts to the issuance of permits for mining exploration have thus far not been an obstacle to the project. To the point that the minister of energy, mines,
and water, Lamine Seydou Traoré, personally took the trouble to lay
the foundation stone last June.

The axis with the port of Abidjan
The Chinese partner of the joint venture, Jiangxi Ganfeng Lithium, the world leader in the sector, will offer a loan of about 194 million dollars for the development of the mine. This has allowed the construction of an on-site lithium processing plant to begin with, which could soon make Leo Lithium the main exporter throughout West Africa, pending the entry into production of another large mine, also located in the district of Bougouni but farther north than Goulamina, managed by British Kodal Minerals. By the end of this year, the first shipments are expected to the autonomous port of Abidjan, from where cargoes of clinker, manganese, bauxite, and nickel are already transiting to Western and Asian processing plants.

The port of Abidjan.

Belgian Sea Invest, the manager of the Ivorian port’s mining terminal, in November 2022, reached an agreement with Leo Lithium to take care of the handling and storage of its cargo for the next ten years.
To comply with the agreements, work is under way in the terminal to increase the storage capacity from 200 thousand to 300 thousand tons within 9 months, in order to guarantee the export of over 3 million tons of metal per year.
A system of lagoon barges has also been created in the port which allows for the transfer of up to 100,000 tons of goods to anchored ships with a draft of up to 14 metres, double the normal load on the quay. Another element that made the choice of Leo Lithium fall on the port of Abidjan was the road infrastructure that connect it to Bamako in less than 24 hours. An added value compared to the ports of Dakar (Senegal) or Tema (Ghana), which are more difficult to reach.

Breathless race for Africa
The growth in the value of lithium at a global level mainly depends on the increasing use made of it for the production of batteries that power the latest generation of devices. In 2008, lithium covered only 20% of this market, but by 2030, according to estimates by the United States Institute of Geological Studies, this percentage will increase to 85%. If in January 2021 a ton of lithium was worth 6,400 euros, today that value has already passed to 65 thousand euros. Currently, the world production of lithium is shared by Australia, Chile, and China which in 2019 extracted 45, 19 and 11 million tons, respectively. Thanks to the increase in demand, for some years the radars of large mining companies have also turned to Africa.
China alone has, since 2021, invested in three projects on the continent, including the Goulamina Lithium Project.

Bikita Minerals’ lithium mine in Masvingo province, Zimbabwe. Photo: Handout

In addition to Mali, the other countries attracting the most attention are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Zimbabwe. In Angola, the Australian group Tyranna Resources announced its intention, at the beginning of 2022, to acquire 80% of the shares of the Namibe Lithium Project. While in Zimbabwe, the Chinese company Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt has invested 378 million dollars to purchase the rights to exploit the Arcadia mine from the Australian Prospect Resources.
At the moment, however, with the exception of the Manono Project, located 500 kilometres north of Lubumbashi in the south of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in view of the Goulamina Lithium Project, only the raw metal is extracted in the other African mines. The high costs and complexity of the raw material transformation processes cut Africa out of the supply chains, despite the immense reserves it has. The continental demand for batteries for electronic devices thus remains anchored to imports from abroad. Yet another case of a supply chain broken at the source.

Rocco Bellantone

India. At School with a Look of Love.

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

Sister Nancy Thomas recounts her experience at Nirmala Bhavan, an institution for blind girls in the Indian state of Karnataka.

The school where Sister Nancy Thomas, missionary of the Immaculate in India, has been working for twenty years is special: it is called Nirmala Bhavan and welcomes blind girls and young ladies aged 10 to 28 who, “aside from driving and painting – explains Sr Nancy – manage to do everything independently: they read and write in Braille, they pray, they wash the dishes, they learn to go around with a stick for the blind, they play various instruments and they dance”.
The school is located in the village of Athani in the southwestern Indian state of Karnataka. For reasons of caste and inheritance, families often marry off their daughters to first cousins. “Parents want land ownership to remain within the family and, as in all of India, prevent their children from marrying someone of a different caste”, explains Sister Nancy.
And she continues: “Children with disabilities, mental retardation or other problems are born from these marriages. Many are indeed blind and girls find themselves in a situation of greater insecurity than boys”.

The nun explains the main difficulty they find. She says: “Parents struggle to let someone else take care of their daughters because, in accordance with the Hindu tradition which believes in reincarnation, a disabled daughter is seen as a divine punishment. We go to the families and talk to them. We try to explain that it is not a divine punishment and that girls can have a future in school. Families usually calm down after visiting the school and are happy to see how we take care of their daughters”.Even though consanguineous marriages are a widespread practice among all social classes, the girls of the Nirmala Bhavan almost all come from backgrounds of poverty. Karnataka, in fact, unlike the neighbouring southern Indian states, is one of the poorest states in India.”All our girls ask for is that they be given an opportunity – continues Sister Nancy. Sometimes they are rejected by their families, but they don’t want compassion, they want to be able to study and work”. In fact, in state schools, disabled people are usually left in a corner and all they are given is food.
In the community, however, they learn to read, write, cook, clean, play, use computers and do handicrafts. “We are concerned with their physical and spiritual development”. Many girls who have graduated from school have now found employment and are working in IT companies, in the food sector and even in fashion. Sister Nancy proudly says, “One of our girls is on the national blind girls cricket team”.
“These girls have hope, they pray, and they thank us for being accepted and treated as human beings. Some tell us: ‘Without you, we could have died’ ”. Instead at Nirmala Bhavan, they got a second chance at life.

“They recognize us by our voice or by our smell – continues the nun. And they are extremely intelligent: as soon as they meet a new person, they remember them forever. They also have a high sensitivity: when we are ill, they worry about us, they tell us to go to the hospital because they are afraid that if we were to die, no one would take care of them anymore”.Even though they can’t see, the girls wear make-up for special occasions or when visitors arrive: “They want to look pretty because they know that others can see them”.
The presence of the Missionary Sisters of the Immaculate in Athani began in 2000 and a few years later the Nirmala Bhavan community was born. “Occasionally, people are suspicious and ask us what we are doing, but in general our presence is welcome”, says Sister Nancy.
The Bharatiya Janata Party, the ultra-nationalist Hindu party from which Prime Minister Narendra Modi comes, and which governs Karnataka, has so far never caused problems for the Sisters because the girls they take care of are all Hindus. “Only one or two girls are Christian”, explains Sister Nancy. The decision of the sister Nancy to devote herself to the consecrated life came at a young age. “One of my older sisters was already a nun – she explains – and when I saw her all dressed in white, she looked like an angel to me: I immediately wanted to be one too”. The missionary vocation arrived shortly after when during the last year of high school Sister Nancy attended a lesson on Father Damien, a Belgian missionary of the Congregation of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary who in the 19th century gave his life for lepers in Molokai.

But the missionary, who worked in other communities before arriving in Athani, had some difficulty in approaching the blind girls: “At first I would call them, expecting them to be able to reach me right away. But it’s not that simple for the blind. And they were very suspicious. It took me a while to get used to it and understand their feelings. To do that, you have to put yourself in their shoes”.
Concretely, and not just metaphorically, “You have to really understand what it was like to not see all the time. When I understood what it was like to live in the dark, I began to feel even more love and concern for them. Sometimes we are grumpy, unhappy, but when I look at these girls who are happy despite their condition, I can’t entertain negative feelings”, concludes Sr. Nancy.

Alessandra De Poli/MM

Agnès Kabwiz. “We continue to advocate for human rights”

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

She is the leader of a cooperative of artisanal miners in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). “Our story is also about resilience, empowerment and our fight for survival for ourselves
and our families.”

My story is not easy to tell. It is full of pain, one shared by countless women who work in mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). I live in the province of Lualaba, the capital of the world’s largest deposit of cobalt, an urgently needed mineral for computer batteries, smartphones, and electric cars. Our story, however, is not just about pain; it is also about resilience, empowerment and our fight for survival for ourselves and our families.

I was a young girl in the 1990s when multinational companies came to Lualaba. Their arrival and the liberalization of the Congolese mining sector in 2002 facilitated the quasi-privatization of Gécamines, our national mining company.

Previously, the profit from Gécamines financed the basic government social services given to local communities.
With quasi-privatization however, these services ended.People in our communities also lost their jobs. Foreign mining companies did not hire local people other than for manual labour because they said we did not have the necessary qualifications.

Families, including my own, fell on hard times. Our poverty was in great contrast to the multinationals who got richer by taking our country’s wealth. Left to fend for ourselves, many of us went into artisanal or subsistence mining. This meant digging by hand for copper and cobalt ores contaminated with uranium. We faced many challenges: financial insecurity, forced displacement, health issues due to radiation exposure and contact with contaminated water.

The women were the biggest losers. We experienced sexual harassment and violence. We were excluded from working directly in the industrial and artisanal mines. Traditional patriarchal beliefs forbid us from entering mine shafts.

This left young girls and women no choice but to work in the cleaning and transport of minerals, exposing us to toxic water. Worse again, we sold our mining products to these multinationals and traders at really low prices. However, it was this hazardous and unsafe work that put food on my table and enabled me to finish my studies.

As a mother, I have committed myself to protecting the rights of women so they do not have to experience what I went through. I started a mining cooperative.

I bring women together so we can mine with dignity. By forming a cooperative, we created an environment that provides us with the training, guidance, and skills we need to work safely and sustainably.

Today, we continue our fight against human rights abuses, especially against women and children. We seek alternatives to mining. However, all this is not enough. Multinational mining companies still operate with impunity and exploit us. We still face huge challenges as the demand for copper and cobalt increases.

It is important that we continue to advocate for human rights and to make companies accountable for the harm they do. We understand that development is necessary but not at such a cost to our people. We need to promote sustainable development based on equality, justice, transparency and accountability.

Economic and Social Crisis.

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

Today, Guatemala continues to deal with a highly precarious social situation that places the country in the last rank in Latin America as regards human development, where the rates of violence and that relating to child malnutrition remain high.

These conditions affect almost the majority of the population which has about 17 million inhabitants. Of these, 41% are indigenous and their percentage is progressively increasing in rural areas; 30% are mestizos; 4% are white; and 11% are Creole. The indigenous people, more than the others, continue to live in a condition of poverty and marginalization, even if the conditions of the rest of the population are not so different. As noted by the United Nations, in fact, around 75% of family groups live in conditions of poverty; 60% of the population has no access to drinking water; about 44% of the population over the age of 15 are illiterate, a percentage that rises to 70% in women; while infant mortality
is around 27.8%.

Guatemala City is the capital and largest city of Guatemala. CC BY-SA 4.0/Andy9696down

Guatemala City is the capital and has 2.5 million inhabitants. Spanish is the official language of the country although, due to its diverse ethnic composition, 24 others are recognized: 22 Maya, Xinca, and Garifuna. However, even though most of these languages are spoken by a few thousand people, this linguistic diversity creates administrative problems as well as mobility opportunities. From the point of view of religion, Catholicism is professed by 75.9% of the population.
The great situation of economic and social crisis that Guatemala is forced to deal with is undoubtedly generated by the high level of internal conflict that has upset the balance of the country for many decades. In this climate, criminal gangs also find fertile ground, keeping the rate of violence high by constantly carrying out murders, armed robberies, and kidnappings for the purpose of extortion. The homicide rate, in particular, remains one of the highest in Latin America, making the country extremely insecure due to the crimes committed by the mareros.

Illustration: Molly Crabapple

Two of America’s most notorious gangs – Mara Salvatrucha, or MS13, and 18th Street Gang, or Barrio 18, both of which originated in migrant communities in Los Angeles in the 1980s – have a particularly strong influence in Guatemala. They are transnational groups, which recruit their soldiers from a very young age, often in elementary or middle school. For this reason, 18th Street has been renamed the army of children for whom belonging to these groups is equivalent to being part of a cohesive and protective community and which often replaces families whose parents are migrants fleeing the precarious conditions in which the country finds itself.
Furthermore, Guatemala, due to its location, is used by drug cartels as a logistics platform and transit area for drug trafficking from the south to the north of the American continent.
Despite this, Guatemala remains one of the most important economies in Central America but in the absence of a consistent inflow of public and private capital and a sound justice system capable of guaranteeing social peace, it appears very difficult to achieve ambitious results in terms of development, as well as exacerbate the inequalities of which the country stands among the highest levels in the world.

The highlands of Quetzaltenango. CC BY-SA 4.0/chensiyuan

Agriculture is the dominant sector of the country’s economy, even if only 3% of the population own 2/3 of the agricultural land. The economy is heavily dependent on exports and, consequently, suffers from price volatility with all the resulting problems. The main trading partners are the United States, which absorbs 40% of national exports, the other Central American states, and also (recently) Japan and South Korea.
The agricultural sector today accounts for 12% of GDP, employs 40% of the population and concentrates mainly on the production of corn, coffee, sugar and bananas. With reference to this sector, it is important to underline that a diversification process has been under way since the early 2000s aimed at encouraging the cultivation, for example, of fruit and flowers destined for the US and European markets.
Over the years, the agri-food and textile sectors have also recorded moderate development linked exclusively to the internal market. Tourism also plays an important role but is, however, held back by the lack of infrastructure and transport. The really significant revenue item on the national budget consists of remittances from the United States, where more than one million Guatemalans work.
Guatemala also plays an active part in the integration organizations of the Central American region, in particular in the Central American Integration System (SICA) and in the Latin American Economic System (SELA). (Open Photo: 123rf.com)
(F.R.)

Niger. Challenging Climate Change.

Saturday, 1 April 2023 8:00

Climatic conditions make agricultural work in the Sahel more and more difficult. One of the countries most affected by this reality is Niger, where a large majority of farmers work in precarious conditions. Many initiatives are emerging to respond to local and regional challenges. The role of young entrepreneurs.

Mahamadou Abdou is delighted with the visit. For months, no technician has visited his plot of land to listen to his advice, which was once a regular business of the state’s technical services. This gardener from Gamkallé, a suburban area of the city of Niamey, the capital of Niger, cultivates half a hectare of land with little knowledge, and without technology or external support.
Like many other Sahelian farmers, Abdou watches the soil that feeds him become more arid and less arable every year.
In this geo-climatic belt that crosses the African continent from east to west – from Djibouti to Senegal and which acts as a transition between the Sahara Desert and the Sudanese savannah – the phenomena of desertification as the degradation of fertile soil due to productive activities and desertification (the natural transformation of a zone into a desert) threaten to merge the Sahara and the Sahel into one region, making life even more difficult for the people who inhabit this
particular part of the world.

Two women walk through a desertified area outside Niamey. Photo: Carlos Nombela.

As demonstrated at COP15 – the United Nations conference against desertification held in May in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) – the African continent is the most vulnerable to climate change, which is the main cause of agricultural land loss due to degradation. Studies have shown that reforestation in some areas of the Sahara-Sahel area could help reduce higher temperatures, favouring the development of indigenous vegetation, and warn of the need for immediate action.
There are many political commitments and efforts which, based on scientific evidence, seek to address this phenomenon. The Great Green Wall (GMV) for the Sahara and the Sahel is perhaps the most publicized. Led and approved in 2007 by the African Union, this mega-project aims to green 150 million hectares, which would block 250 million tons of carbon, and create one million jobs. All this must be achieved by 2030. Eleven countries participate in the project. In Niger, one of the countries most exposed to this crisis, the goal is to green 3.6 million hectares on 4% of the territory through remediation techniques such as assisted natural regeneration and the planting of two tree species particularly resistant to drought: Bauhinia rufescens and Senegalia Senegal.

A Nigerien woman watering her garden. Photo: Usaid

One problem that afflicts the Nigerien agricultural sector is the lack of control, information, and sensitivity. The state does not have the resources to control the markets for plant protection products. As the Niger Chamber of Agriculture Network (RECA-Niger) declares, across the country, there are many products not approved by the Sahelian Pesticides Committee (CSP) and many fake products whose labels closely mimic those of approved products. “Many of them are highly toxic”, says Adamou Haougui, a researcher at the National Agricultural Research Institute of Niger (INRAN) and a member of the CSP. “An example of this are products based on organophosphates. We find them in all eight regions of the country, and they are a real risk to people’s health”. Unapproved products are priced lower than approved ones, which attracts customers. All of these products require a minimum of knowledge and awareness for their use and, again, the Nigerien state does not have the ability to impose this requirement.
Once again, the Nigerien state does not have the capacity to take charge of the situation. A study published in 2018 showed that Nigerien farmers far exceed the recommended doses of pesticides and fertilizers. They treat crops too frequently and rarely respect carry-over time, which is the recommended period of time from the last treatment to harvest. All this has serious consequences for the health of people – exposed to all types of poisonous and carcinogenic products – and for the environment, which is irreparably degraded and polluted.

Hopes for change
One thing to keep in mind is the rural exodus. Life in much of the country can be extremely hard and young people often decide to move to cities, where there are more career opportunities. Niamey is the main urban centre and, as such, attracts thousands of citizens every year. In 2020, the city’s growth rate was 3.22% and is expected to reach 5.25% annually by 2030. As a result, the city is home, among others, to the country’s most educated young people, many of whom have obtained masters and doctorates from the best universities in West Africa.
Given the importance of agriculture in Niger – and in countries throughout the region – and the challenge represented by such a technically and technologically underdeveloped sector, agronomy is, after health subjects, the most studied degree, followed by those related to the environment.
As a result, more and more young Nigeriens see agriculture and the environment as a good way to earn a living and to offer sustainable solutions to their continent’s serious food and climate crisis.

Fruit tree nursery in the commune of Bande, Zinder, Niger. Photo: B Traore, ICRISAT

Abdoul-Kader Issoufou is one of them. This young entrepreneur founded the Agri’Innov’Inspire company in 2016 after two years of specialization at the Shongaï Center in Porto Novo (Benin), a point of reference in the training of young people in organic production techniques on the continent. “Agri’Innov’Inspire is a research, incubation and training centre in the agri-food sector, but our ultimate goal is to create a great agroecological training school in Niger, to give the new generations the opportunity to become trained farmers, which this country urgently needs”, explains Abdoul-Kader Issoufou. His company attracts more and more interested organizations for the quality of his work.
Kadidiatou Souley Yéro holds a PhD in geography and works at the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD); she worked on the use of geographic information systems (GIS) to study the causes, predict desertification, and take corrective measures. At the end of 2021, Souley Yéro created a small organization called Terroir d’Ici (our land) and started a reforestation project of very specific areas with endemic wood species to provide food and income. “We have an infinite number of local plant resources that, in addition to improving our soils, can be used to obtain food and economic benefits. We work with the local population to choose the most interesting plants”.

Many initiatives are emerging in Niger to respond to local and regional challenges, but good ideas and training are not everything, and local entrepreneurs face a big problem: getting funding. There are several ways of financing: on the one hand, there is the government, whose support is almost non-existent; on the other hand, there are the banks. They offer loans, yes, but at such high interest rates that few venture to apply for them. Finally, another source of funding is represented by international development organizations, such as NGOs, whose attention is increasingly directed to this type of entrepreneurial initiative, but whose strategies are very rigid and are based on a predefined terrain, leaving little room for manoeuvre. This is a common cause of the failure of their interventions. (Open Photo: Carlos Nombela)
Carlos Nombela

Turkey and the earthquake: what are its implications for the future?

Wednesday, 1 March 2023 8:00

Between the night and early afternoon of Monday 6 February, two violent earthquakes struck south-eastern Turkey and north-western Syria, causing what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called the greatest disaster recorded in the Country since 1939, the year in which the earthquake in Erzincan killed about 33,000 people and injured more than 100,000.

The two tremors, respectively of magnitude 7.8 and 7.5 and with their epicentres in the cities of Gaziantep and Kahramanmaraş, in southern Turkey, were followed by over 100 aftershocks, also felt in Lebanon, Israel and Cyprus. After 24 hours, the overall toll between Turkey and Syria had already exceeded 8,000 dead, with figures destined to grow (to date, they have exceeded 41,000 victims).

In the tragic nature of the event and despite the constantly changing weather, it is already possible to wonder about the consequences of the earthquake in the political landscape of the two countries. This is especially true for the Turkish context, which is preparing for parliamentary and presidential elections in the coming months.

The first doubts arise about maintaining the election date, currently set for May 14th. In addition to the future verification of “stable” physical and territorial conditions in order to be able to follow up on the vote, it is not excluded that Erdoğan may prolong the state of emergency, declared on February 11, to respond to the seismic crisis, with a possible postponement of the electoral round at a new date yet to be determined.

This choice could be consequential to the management of the crisis by the Turkish government. Since the first shock on the night of February 6, the Ankara government immediately took charge of the emergency at a national level, mobilizing rescue teams with a contingent
of 3,500 soldiers attached.

At the same time, President Erdoğan welcomed the immediate international aid promised by over 50 countries, to which were added the mobilisations of the “Tarikat”, charities and Islamic brotherhoods that support the Islamic party, and the President’s decision to declare seven days of national mourning.

This proactive and “inclusive” emergency response certainly highlights the current government administration, also possibly triggers a sense of national solidarity under the guidance of Erdoğan and strengthens his leadership. Furthermore, this interventionism stands in total contrast to what happened following the huge earthquake in north-western Turkey in 1999, where the army, an important component of the power structure of the time, first mobilized to rescue its own ranks, without intervening conscientiously in a situation that caused the death
of more than 20,000 people.

The government response this time, while mindful of the tragic event of 1999, has however been much criticized internally both for the slowness of the relief interventions and for the lack of a political response in the prevention of disasters and the development of adequate emergency services to be adopted in such situations.

In light of these elements, as underlined from the very first hours by many observers, the seismic event could also have a decisive impact in the next electoral round. In particular, it is presumable to hypothesize that several factors will complicate, rather than facilitate, the stability of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the coming months.

In continuity with the 1999 earthquake, there will be many inquiries into “responsibility” for what happened, looking at building codes and safety standards. Although Turkey approved anti-seismic legislation in 2018, many public contracts in the country have been awarded to companies managed by figures close to the President often accused of involvement in corruption and systematic nepotism.

A first element that would endanger Erdoğan’s credibility and which could, on the contrary, work in favour of the opposition, especially that of Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and long-time critic of corruption in the Turkish national procurement system.

Not surprisingly, the earthquake has weakened the country in a period of already complicated government management. Turkey is facing its worst economic crisis since Erdoğan and his AKP came to power in 2002, with annual inflation above 84%, a depreciation of the lira by 30% against the dollar last year and a deficit which reaches almost 5% of GDP.

Elements which, in conjunction with the rise in energy prices and basic necessities caused by the war between Russia and Ukraine, have dented the President’s popularity and consensus regarding the work of his party, which has dropped to 31% against 42.56% in 2018 according
to the MetroPOLL agency.

While remaining firm in his controversial position on interest rates – according to which low rates help to fight inflation – in recent months the President has focused on spending to try to revitalize the economy, promising an increase in the salaries of civil servants, raising pensions by 30%, offering early retirement to 2.3 million workers and
increasing energy subsidies.

Added to this is a January increase in the minimum wage of up to 55% compared to July 2022 to bring it to 8,500 Turkish lire (about 425 euros), together with the promise to build half a million houses
for low-income families.

In continuity with this internal “welfare” policy, some international political decisions must also be seen, such as the strategic will to seek new détente with the Gulf countries, above all the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, so as to allow new economic-commercial agreements and the possibility of income. These choices, together with the mediation role assumed by Turkey in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, have had the first positive implications for Erdoğan’s figure internally, but they may not be sufficient in post-earthquake times.

Ankara’s rapprochement with the Gulf countries may have encouraged the latter to intervene to help the Turkish earthquake victims with various emergency interventions, but such aid can do very little to mitigate the colossal effects of the earthquake.

Like a large part of the international community, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have in fact promised a substantial package of funds to both Turkey and Syria (which reaches 50 million dollars for each of the two countries from the UAE alone), together with various humanitarian emergency interventions such as the establishment of air bridges and field hospitals, urgent relief supplies and the deployment of search and rescue task forces.

However, this does not limit the difficulties and structural criticalities in providing assistance both in the short term – given the complexity of reaching the sites hit by the earthquake, isolated even more by the collapse of roads and damage to connections – and in the long term, where inevitably such measures would not be sufficient.

The legacy of the earthquake could increase popular resentment caused by the country’s economic woes, with a possible exacerbation of other thorny social issues, first and foremost that of Syrian refugees. The growing hostility of public opinion towards the presence of almost 4 million Syrian refugees residing in Turkey prompted the President to announce, on March 2022, a comprehensive plan for the “voluntary return” of 1.5 million Syrian refugees to northern areas of Syria under Turkish control, over a period of 15-20 months and
on the basis of 8 sequential steps.

However, the earthquake also destroyed a good portion of the Syrian territory contemplated in Erdoğan’s repatriation plan, thus making it much more difficult, if not impossible, to implement Ankara’s plan in the short term. Neither must we forget the fact that it could now be difficult for the Turkish government to justify any diversion of funds to northern Syria occupied by Turkey, as well as to continue with the intention of launching a new military operation, threatened after the attack in Istanbul last November, in the areas north-eastern parts of Syria controlled by the Kurds, a further element that seemed to be able to help Erdoğan in recovering internal consensus.

Consequently, the repercussions of the earthquake of recent days will make the Turkish pre-election political climate even more tortuous, further complicating the position of Erdoğan and his AKP on the internal chessboard. Post-earthquake management will therefore be crucial for the President for the future of his political stability, already shaky due to the difficult economic conditions of the country.

The coming days will reveal how much Erdoğan will still be able to turn adversity to his advantage and how much leadership and authority he enjoys in being able to demonstrate his political strength to the Turks. Some have seen, in fact, in the President’s choice to inform Meral Aksener, leader of the nationalist opposition Good Party, rather than Kilicdaroglu, of the management of the relief, a first attempt to use the crisis to sow further division in the oppositions currently in dialogue in the so-called ” Table of Six”, a forum that brings together the main opposition parties.

Aksener has never denied his lack of acquiescence in Kilicdaroglu’s candidacy and collaboration with the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), whose support is essential for the victory of the opposition. All elements that Erdoğan could now create leverage in his favour, but which may not be enough to deal with the scale of the earthquake tragedy. (Photo: EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid)

Angela Ziccardi/CeSI

Photo Gallery – Comboni Youth Movement at World Youth Day

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