A physicist and oceanographer, a telephone entrepreneur and an economist. Three African women who see the great potential of Africa.

Lala Kounta, a physicist and oceanographer, is obsessed with the ecological impact of climate change, marine heatwaves and extreme natural events. She is the first to hold a PhD in Physical Oceanography and Climate Sciences in Senegal. She also has degrees from the University of Michigan (USA), the Sorbonne in Paris (France) and the Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar (Senegal).
In 2022, she completed a six-month stay at the Canary Islands Ocean Platform, known as PLOCAN, a scientific and technological research infrastructure. Since then, she has focused her attention on measuring the temperature of the Atlantic Ocean in order to prevent and encourage the adoption of decisions that will stop the serious degradation of the marine environment due to climate change. “A two-degree increase in sea temperature means that nutrients decrease and fish die or migrate in search of colder currents and, therefore, fishermen fish in vain,” she explained to the Spanish newspaper El País in March 2022.

To understand the role that the ocean plays in local and regional climate. File swm

Before her doctorate, she graduated in Physical Sciences and did not hesitate to sacrifice time with her family when she accepted a scholarship from the Women for Africa Foundation to participate in its “Investigano” program. During that time, she focused on her main subject of study, related to the effects of climate change and its impact on the coasts of the Canary Islands.
“The temperature of the ocean affects the entire food chain, from plankton to people, creating an imbalance in the marine and terrestrial ecosystem,” she added in the same interview.
The Senegalese oceanographer is an example of the scientific level achieved on the African continent, not only for her capacity for work and tenacity but for the recognition and value that her theories and essays are given in the academic world. The project on the impact of heatwaves off the coast of West Africa on marine ecosystems is based on hypotheses that are starting to become reality in Senegal, such as the fact that the ocean erodes the country’s coasts and fish flee from the fishing grounds, where fishermen usually catch them.
The obsession with data and having the most complete and reliable record possible of the evolution of sea temperatures is what has made Kounta a point of reference and she is also creating a school through the classes she gives as an associate professor at the main university of Senegal’s capital.Observing the dynamics of the circulation of marine currents between Senegal and Mauritania, as well as climate variability, are the activities that Lala Kounta is currently focusing on at the Simeon Fongang Laboratory of Physics and Atmosphere in Dakar. “I want to understand the role that the ocean plays in local and regional climate modulations when hot days occur, to be able to predict and help policymakers adapt to future conditions,” the Senegalese said. (Carla Fibla García-Sala.)

Manka Angwafo. A Social Enterprise
In 2013, the young Manka Angwafo, a research analyst in the Office of the Chief Economist for Africa at the World Bank (WB), decided to spend the summer in her home country, Cameroon. She left her home country for the United States at the age of 18 to continue her studies. She enrolled at Tufts University, where she graduated in Economics and International Relations and, in 2008, obtained a Master’s degree in European Business. In 2009, after internships at Tudor Investment Corporation and Hawpoint Partners, she was hired by the World Bank (WB). There, she had the opportunity to analyse macroeconomic trends in the region and evaluate the policies developed by low- and middle-income countries on the continent that are emerging from conflict.
It is in this context that she spent five months in South Sudan, between June and October 2011, where she led a WB mission to analyse the functioning of health centres in the states of Jonglei and Upper Nile. When she arrived in South Sudan, she was still recovering from her volunteer experience in Haiti, where she had gone a year earlier, after the earthquake that had devastated the capital of the Caribbean country, Port-au-Prince, to rebuild the homes of people left homeless after the quake. But let’s go back to the start date, 2013.

The vast majority of Cameroonian farmers are women who cannot make a living from their work. File swm

A simple vacation changed the life of the Cameroonian woman. In those weeks, she took the opportunity to harvest corn with her paternal grandmother – her mother is Jamaican. That process, which her paternal grandmother performed as her ancestors had done for centuries, caused many ears of corn to break and the loss of much of the grain. What happened to her grandmother was not a coincidence.
The vast majority of Cameroonian farmers are women who cannot make a living from their work. “I immediately understood that there was another way,” she said every time she was asked about those days. For the fall from the horse to be complete, she had to return to the United States, where she helped a friend’s uncle on the farm. During this time, she assimilated some of the resources of agricultural work and began to mature the idea of ​​returning to Cameroon.
She returned in 2015 and founded Grassland Cameroon (GC), a social enterprise that aims to address the main challenges of farmers in the country: difficulty accessing credit to improve equipment and lack of training. GC provides low-interest loans that farmers can repay with part of their production. In addition, Angwafo’s company buys up to 70% of the remaining harvest and sells it on the market through wholesalers. Her work, which earned her the 2019 Cartier Initiative Award, has already reached more than 1,000 farmers, who have multiplied their production 2.5 times since being connected to GC. In an interview published on the Spore portal, the Cameroonian stressed that “men are more ambitious when it comes to starting a business, while women are more realistic. We aspire to what we know is possible, while they aspire to what they hope is possible.”  (Javier Fariñas Martín)

Fadima Diawara. “Being in touch”
Fadima Diawara is a telephone entrepreneur “Don’t wait for the right moment because it never comes, persevere and try with what you have, give it your all, remember that you are not alone and never give up, don’t give up.” This is the advice that Guinean Fadima Diawara, founder of Kunfabo, the first African telephone brand, gives to those who want to make their dream come true.
Kunfabo, which in Mandinka means “To be in touch” or “To have news”, was founded in 2017 in Barcelona. Diawara had arrived in the city nine years earlier “for love” and had been able to exploit the technological and innovative impulse that characterizes the Catalan capital to create a team as enthusiastic as herself. “Barcelona is part of me, I feel like I’m in Conakry, at home. It is a place of opportunity when you make an effort to learn the language, relate, interact with people and work with a clear objective,” she explained in an interview during the launch of one of the brand’s three models, two smartphones and one without data, all in the low-cost range. “The Chinese dominate the African market with brands that are only sold on the continent, but with Kunfabo we value our Africanness. It is a brand created exclusively for people who live in Africa, with applications that accompany them in their daily lives.”

Kunfabo is a brand created exclusively for people who live in Africa. Courtesy of Kunafabo

In just over seven years, Kunfabo – which presents itself with a slogan as powerful as that of its founder: “Because it is your right” – has reached more than 70,000 customers and aims to have 100% African production, although for the moment it is obliged to have production partners in China. “If you want to achieve your goal, to do what you are truly passionate about, the important thing is to train and organize yourself,” Diawara recommends in her multiple appearances on African social networks and in Spanish media.
She divides her time between her native Conakry, where she attended primary school and university, and Barcelona. “I always knew I would return to my country because Africa lives in me. When I decided to create Kunfabo, I did it so that users who live on the continent could identify with it. That’s why we develop applications adapted to the health situation of African countries, also to our gastronomy (Afrocook collects recipes from all the countries where its terminals are sold), to art, finance or even to a specific WhatsApp. “Everyone responds to the way of communicating and relating in Africa.” Diawara has already shown that new technologies are not just a “white field”, nor should they be attributed exclusively to men. “It’s a very sexist sector where the gap is huge and you have to work twice as hard as a man. Also, if you fail, they will say it’s because you’re a woman”, she said. She emphasizes that the key is the team, “the collective brain”, a group of people who are not responsible for their gender or skin colour but are capable of achieving goals. (Carla Fibla García-Sala) – (Illustrations: Tina Ramos Ekongo)

Change at the top. The new Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) is fifty-nine-year-old Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the foreign minister of Djibouti. He faces an organization marked by internal divisions, regional rivalries, and a strong dependence on foreign funding. The AU stands at a crossroads: to strengthen its presence on the continent or remain a prisoner of its contradictions.

The African Union (AU) has made significant progress in its mission to unite the continent and propel it towards a prosperous future. Over the years, we have seen important advances, especially in areas such as regional integration. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is one such achievement that promises to transform Africa’s economic landscape. However, while the AfCFTA lays the foundation for economic cooperation, deeper issues remain that impede real progress, particularly regional rivalries and disputes that threaten to undermine these efforts. A critical obstacle to regional integration is the flawed application of the principle of subsidiarity in Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This principle, which gives regional bodies a leading role in conflict resolution, is undermined in practice by the overlapping mandates of RECs, which compete rather than collaborate.

Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the new Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC). Photo AU

In the interventions of neighbouring countries, national interests trump regional peace efforts for simple reasons: political gain or historical territorial and ideological disputes. These dynamics hamper the AU’s peacekeeping mechanisms, with states instrumentalising subsidiarity to prevent independent interventions or manipulate regional responses.
This distortion has led to an ineffective approach, as demonstrated by the cases of the Sahel (where Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have left ECOWAS) and the unresolved conflicts in Sudan and the DR Congo. Rather than facilitating peaceful solutions, the Communautés économiques régionales (CERs) see their influence limited by member states that exploit neighbouring conflicts to strengthen their own positions, weakening regional bodies and hampering the AU’s effectiveness.

What sort of integration?
In addition to conflict, overlapping and competing regional economic blocs undermine the AU’s ability to drive integration. The multiplicity of CERs with different mandates – ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, COMESA and IGAD – generates inefficiencies and policy inconsistencies. The DR Congo, for example, belongs to multiple CERs, each with its regulations and structures, creating complexity that undermines efforts for a unified trade policy under the AfCFTA.

Misera (The Gambia) and Senoba (Senegal) border post on the South of Trans-Gambia Corridor. Photo: IOM/Lamin W. Sanneh

Without clear alignment and a defined roadmap, Africa risks seeing its integration agenda bogged down by bureaucracy and power struggles.
Border closures for security reasons or political disputes hinder the movement of goods and people, contradicting the principles of the AfCFTA itself. There are many examples. Two in particular: the Nigeria-Benin tensions have caused periodic blockades that limit trade and cooperation; Kenya-Tanzania disputes over non-tariff barriers have disrupted trade flows within the East African Community (EAC).
The root of these difficulties is often a lack of trust and unresolved historical tensions. Many states still face colonial demarcation issues that influence current policies, fuelling suspicion and rivalry. Resolution requires diplomacy and impartial mechanisms recognized by all parties. The AU could take a more proactive role here, mediating pre-emptively and providing the CERs with robust tools to manage disputes.

A disunited front on the global stage
The second major challenge is Africa’s fragmented and ineffective voice on the global stage. This is particularly worrying at a time when geopolitical dynamics are rapidly changing and Africa’s potential as an economic and political force is greater than ever. Instead of presenting a united front in international negotiations, Africa’s position is often divided, reducing its influence and bargaining power. Whether it’s climate negotiations, trade talks, or efforts to reform the international financial system, Africa’s approach often revolves around asking for more aid, without challenging the structural barriers that continue to hinder its development.
For example, in climate negotiations, the African position has typically focused on demanding more financial support, even if promises made in previous agreements have not been kept. This focus on aid, rather than regulatory reforms that would support long-term industrialization and economic transformation, keeps Africa trapped in a cycle of dependency.

Ordinary Session of AU Assembly. Photo: AU

The current debate over renewable energy and critical minerals highlights this: Africa is again being positioned as a mere supplier of raw materials – lithium, cobalt, rare earths, green hydrogen – needed for global transitions, rather than being empowered to develop its own industries and value chains.
World powers, in particular, continue to treat Africa as a resource base to fuel their green energy ambitions, without recognizing that Africa must not only be a supplier of raw materials, but also a global player in technological innovation. The weakness of Africa’s negotiating position is also evident in global financial negotiations.
While institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) continue to dictate financial terms for many African countries, the continent has yet to achieve significant structural reforms in global financial governance. The AU needs a more proactive strategy to push for debt restructuring that goes beyond short-term relief and instead addresses the underlying inequalities of the global financial system. Further complicating the picture, Africa also lacks a united diplomatic front. Even during critical global events – such as the annual UN General Assembly or G20 summits – African nations may present conflicting proposals or fail to coordinate their negotiating positions, diluting the continent’s collective influence. Greater investment in diplomatic training is needed.

Financed by external donors
The third issue concerns the effectiveness and sustainability of the AU, which is still dependent on external donors, which limits its autonomy and its ability to implement its strategies. Without financial independence and more efficient governance, the AU will remain vulnerable to external pressures and unable to meet citizens’ expectations. Another critical issue is the limited inclusion of civil society, the private sector and young people in decision-making processes. While dedicated forums exist, concrete tools to transform recommendations into policies are often lacking. The greater involvement of young people, who are drivers of innovation and entrepreneurship, could give new impetus to the AU agenda. Building a more robust African Union also requires stronger accountability and oversight mechanisms.
Currently, allegations of mismanagement or corruption within certain departments can be difficult to fully investigate. The creation of an independent ethics commission or ombudsman office could enhance transparency and help restore public trust in the institution.

An active role and valuing young people
If the AU is to realise its true potential, it must stop being a passive observer at the global table and start actively shaping the future of the continent and, indeed, the world. This requires bold leadership, a renewed commitment to regional integration, and a fundamental rethinking of Africa’s role in global governance.

University students in Mozambique. With an average age of 19, the continent has the youngest population in the world. File swm.

Critical to this transformation is harnessing the dynamism of Africa’s youth. With an average age of around 19, the continent boasts the youngest population in the world, offering immense potential for innovation, technological entrepreneurship, and social transformation. By prioritizing education, skills training, and digital infrastructure, the African Union can unlock this demographic dividend.

Intercontinental partnerships
Another area ripe for expansion is that of intercontinental partnerships that respect African sovereignty. The AU could, for example, spearhead agreements with China, the European Union, or other global powers that emphasize technology transfer, local manufacturing, and skills development rather than simple raw material extraction. These partnerships must be rooted in transparency, mutual benefit, and long-term capacity building.
Ensuring that such agreements include clauses on environmental protection, labour standards, and equitable revenue sharing would further protect African interests and promote sustainable development.

Troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia. Photo: AMISON

Africa’s recent inclusion in the G20 provides a platform for the continent to raise its voice, but it also brings heightened responsibility. The AU will need to coordinate and promote a range of policy priorities—from infrastructure development to debt restructuring—ensuring that these discussions translate into tangible results on the ground. If used effectively, G20 membership can help shift the narrative from viewing Africa as a place of permanent crisis to recognizing it as a continent of global opportunity.
The AU is, therefore, at a crossroads. It can seize this moment to address its institutional shortcomings, unite its members under a shared vision and assert itself on the world stage, or it can continue to be weakened by internal fragmentation and external exploitation. The stakes are high.With the right leadership, adequate resources and strong political will, the AU can become the linchpin for Africa’s renaissance in a rapidly changing global order. (Open Photo: African Union flag and African flags. Shutterstock/patrice6000)

Carlos Lopes

After fifty-six years, Somalia returns to the polls. In June for local elections and in September for legislative elections. Many challenges. The Somaliland issue.

Somalia is still one of the poorest countries in the world and the impact of drought, plagues, conflicts and volatile world prices directly affects its economic development. According to the World Bank, the salary of two-thirds of the population is 2.15 dollars a day. It is estimated that 54% of the population lives below the poverty line, a much higher percentage among nomadic communities.
In addition, the workforce is minimal: 33% of men and only 12% of women. Despite this, there has been a consolidation of the economic turnaround in recent years, particularly evident in the capital Mogadishu. In 2024, the country managed to emerge from a situation of over-indebtedness, favouring the arrival of new investments and the promotion of social structures such as Baxnaano, the first national social protection program. Moreover, the latest news about oil exploration off the coast of Somalia has attracted the attention of large international companies. It remains to be seen what the effects of this future exploitation will be on the environment and, in particular, on the coasts. All this economic development would not have been possible without the political stabilization of the country.

Somalia Political Map. 123rf

Despite numerous adversities, the situation has been improving since 2012. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) controls much of the south and centre of the country, where it has established an administration and has managed to reduce the influence of the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, which in 2011 dominated significant areas in the south of the country.Besides, since 2013, the different federal regions of Somalia have been formed, which have been the cornerstone of the expansion of the State. Today, Somalia is composed of seven regions and the capital, although Somaliland remains a de facto independent state. Relations between the state and some regions have been tense, especially with Jubaland and Puntland, which in 2021, after extending his presidential mandate, came into conflict with former Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi, known as Farmajo. These regions have their main supporters in two neighbouring states: Ethiopia and Kenya. Meanwhile, the Southwest, Hirshabelle and Galmudug regions are the main pillars of the central government.

Election time
This year, Somalia will hold elections for municipal councils this month of June, while representatives of the Federal Parliament, members of state legislatures and presidents will be elected in September. This is one of the country’s major challenges, as it has not held universal suffrage elections since 1969.
The debate has been ongoing for years: in each legislature, presidents commit to promising that the next elections will be held with the “one person, one vote” system, but this has never been respected. Currently, the parliamentary election system involves the selection of delegates, elected by each of the clans that make up Somalia.

Year of elections in Somalia. In June, for municipal councils this month and in September, for the representatives of the Federal Parliament. Phil Moore/IRIN

These delegates in turn elect the deputies who will vote for the President. Although there has been an official register of political parties since 2017, they are not very widespread, mainly because they have not been active in the country’s political life. In addition, it is often reported as another problem that there are regions where it will not be possible to vote due to the threat of Al-Shabaab. In the meantime, some progress has been made. On November 27, 2024, the Somali Parliament approved the creation of the new Federal Election Commission. The vote took place one day after the executive had approved the creation of the body.

The great challenge
Despite a certain stability within the country and the creation of a government with greater capacity for action, the Federal Republic of Somalia still faces a territorial challenge: one of its regions acts as an independent state. In 1991, Somaliland, in the far north, unilaterally declared its independence and built its own state, becoming one of the most stable regions in the Horn of Africa. Although not recognized internationally, Somaliland has a constitution, a government, its own currency and an army that defends its sovereignty.
Despite negotiations, it was impossible to reach an agreement, as the starting points are radically different: for Somalia, it is just another territory of the Republic; Somaliland, on the other hand, considers itself a legitimate independent state.

Somaliland Independence Monument in Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland. 123rf

Somaliland considers its official borders to be those of its colonial past: its borders are those of the former British protectorate of the same name. However, the eastern provinces of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn are inhabited by a majority of Dulbahaante and Warsangali Somalis who, for years, have felt marginalized by the central government of Somaliland and its majority population, the Isaaq. The first two groups are more closely linked to the Puntland populations, with whom they share the same branch of the Darood clan. In these circumstances, Puntland and Somaliland have clashed on several occasions for control of these territories.
In January 2023, the situation reversed with the start of the so-called ‘Blue Revolution’, a reference to the blue of the Somali national flag. Public demonstrations on the main streets of cities, especially in Las Anod, the administrative capital of the Sool region, prompted the government of Mogadishu to intervene to increase its presence in the area. The unrest has led to a new confrontation, with the military penetration of Somaliland into the region to reassert control over the territory. However, its troops were expelled in the summer of 2023 and effective control of these provinces is very limited.

The prime minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed and Muse Bihi Abdi, the president of SomalilandOffice of the Prime Minister – Ethiopia – Madaxtooyada JSL

In this situation, Mogadishu proclaimed the creation of the federal state SSC-Khatumo. The acronym is composed of the initials of the three provinces in question, while khatumo can be translated as “positive result”. This move by the federal government has generated unrest in both Puntland and Somaliland. The former believed that this was a territory that should be part of their federal state, while the latter argued that it was an inalienable part of their territory. The result so far has undoubtedly been very positive for Mogadishu, which has not only expanded its sphere of influence, controlling territories that were under the administration of Somaliland but has also managed to curb the aspirations of Puntland, which is one of the largest and most powerful states in Somalia.

A Complex Network
While Somalia is achieving significant successes domestically, the situation on the international scene is rather agitated. Relations with its neighbours have been characterized by continuous disagreements and military invasions, especially by Ethiopia, but also by Kenya. The governments of Addis Ababa and Nairobi have acted in Somali territory to protect their own interests and security and have maintained close relations with Somaliland.
Tensions have been increased by Ethiopia’s decision to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland in early 2024, which implied the Ethiopian government’s commitment to recognize Somaliland as a state in exchange for the transfer of a coastal territory for the construction of a port that would give Ethiopia its long-awaited access to the sea.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Office of the president

Mogadishu sees the agreement as a direct aggression. At the same time, the MoU itself has generated great confusion. Addis Ababa intends that the territory be ceded for an indefinite period, while Hargeisa speaks only of an agreement to build a military port in the area. In addition, the signing of the agreement has strengthened regional alliances between Eritrea and Somalia, territories that are under pressure from the Ethiopian threat to obtain a commercial port. They have been joined by Egypt, a traditional ally that defends its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Thus, in 2024, the three countries reaffirmed their mutual cooperation and Al Sisi’s government has committed to sending troops to Somalia to help stabilize it and fight against Al-Shabaab. This development, together with the statements of Somali President Hassan Sheik Mohamud, in which he assured that the government will decide which troops remain in Somali territory, has generated some uncertainty in the Ethiopian army. Addis Ababa was the main contributor to ATMIS (African Transition Mission in Somalia), but due to enmity between Ethiopia and Somalia, its departure seems likely with the launch of the new AUSSOM mission. Relations with its other neighbour, Kenya, have also not been cordial. Its Kenyan government has seen the Somali border as a security issue, stemming from Somali refugee and migration pressure and the threat posed to the country by Al-Shabaab. The terrorist attacks at Nairobi’s Westgate in 2013, with 72 deaths, and at Garissa University in 2015, with 147 deaths, have strengthened Kenya’s position. In addition to tense relations with the Somali government, it has unilaterally intervened militarily and extended its influence over Jubaland, of which it has become the main ally, strengthening its role as an opponent to Mogadishu. This relationship has had a domestic fallout.

President of Jubaland, Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe. Photo: Gov.Somalia

On November 25, Ahmed Madobe, who has led the federal state since 2012, was re-elected president of Jubaland. His election was declared illegal by Somalia, which led to some regional revolts. Relations between the two administrations have always been complex, partly due to the influence of neighbouring Kenya. Finally, Kenya’s rapprochement with Somaliland led to the breakdown of relations with Somalia in 2020, further aggravating the situation. Al-Shabaab has been the main actor opposing the Somali government since 2007. Heir to the Islamic Courts Union, it has radicalised and controlled large areas of southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, until 2011, when it was expelled. Although its territorial presence has decreased year after year, it has not meant the end of acts of violence, which have increased. In October 2017, it committed the worst terrorist attack in the history of Somalia and the second worst in the world in terms of number of victims, only after 9/11. The explosion of a tanker in the capital caused more than 600 deaths. The most immediate effect was the reaction of the population, a part of which had legitimized and supported their actions. Today, the terrorist group continues to lose ground, but the challenge for the government is to contain the terrorist attacks and eliminate the main destabilizing element within the country. In recent years, Somalia has made progress towards economic and political stabilization, reaching a very fragile balance that is at risk without international action. The stability of Somalia depends on regional relations based on cooperation with neighbouring states and on a lasting peace. (Open Photo: Shutterstock/Free Wind)

Pablo Arconada Ledesma

In recent years, Qatar has emerged as a significant peace broker in Africa, reflecting a growing Gulf involvement in the continent’s economy and politics. Sycophants praise the emirate as a soft power with no hidden agenda. However, the reality is not always so rosy.

On 18 March, Qatar made headlines by hosting a meeting in Doha between the presidents of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Felix Tshisekedi, and Rwanda, Paul Kagame. After the meeting, which was also attended by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the two African leaders reaffirmed their commitment to negotiating an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.
Subsequently, delegations from both countries met several times in Doha until the negotiations began to bear fruit. Indeed, on 25 April, the Congolese and Rwandan foreign ministers, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Olivier Nduhungireye, met in Washington with the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, to discuss the terms of an agreement that would guarantee peace and security in the Great Lakes Region while creating a favourable climate for American investment in the area.
The two ministers signed a “Declaration of Principles” to promote peace and economic development in the region and end the conflict in eastern DRC. The Washington agreement also follows a joint declaration on 23 April by the Congolese government on the one hand and the Congo River Alliance and the M23 on the other, who had been negotiating a ceasefire in Qatar at the same time. Time will tell whether the ceasefire will eventually take place and hold, but everyone recognised that bringing the warring parties together was an achievement in itself, as previous attempts by the African Union had failed.
One sign of this recognition came on 19 March, when UN Secretary-General António Guterres thanked the Emir of Qatar for his mediation to end the conflict in eastern DRC.

Democratic Republic of the Congo President Felix Tshisekedi and his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame, meet with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in Doha, Qatar. (Photo: MOFA.gov.qa)

But this mediation is only the latest chapter in a longer saga of similar processes that have established Qatar as a major diplomatic hub. Indeed, the emirate has previously positioned itself as a mediator in a number of other conflicts in Africa.
Its record dates back to 2004, when Qatar secured the release of 100 Moroccan prisoners of war held by the Polisario Sahrawi movement in Tinduf. Qatar was also instrumental in securing a ceasefire between Djibouti and Eritrea in 2010. The emirate also facilitated a ceasefire in Darfur in 2013. Qatari diplomats also worked to restore diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia in 2021. Qatar also mediated peace talks in Chad between the government, rebel groups and political opponents in 2022. Elsewhere, Qatar has been involved in peace efforts for Lebanon and between the Taliban and the US government.

Militiamen Houthis. Doha has mediated between the Yemeni government and the Houthis. 123rf

It has also mediated between Palestinian movements, between Israel and Hamas, and between the Yemeni government and the Houthis. Such an impressive track record, Qatari officials explain, reflects a constitutional commitment to the peaceful resolution of international disputes and conflicts, as expressed in the Emirate’s constitution, which makes mediation a key foreign policy priority.
In the recent case of mediating the conflict in eastern Congo, Qatar’s influence is largely due to its track record, neutrality and economic involvement in both the DRC and Rwanda.
The Paris daily Le Monde recalls the close ties between the Emir of Qatar and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, which are taking concrete form with the construction of a new $1.6 billion airport east of the capital Kigali and the partnership between RwandAir and Qatar Airways. At the same time, in late 2022, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi asked Qatar to mediate in the conflict with Rwanda. The previous year, during Tshisekedi’s visit to Doha, several cooperation agreements were signed between the DRC and Qatar.

Airport terminal building at Kigali International Airport. the Emir of Qatar and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, which are taking concrete form with the construction of a new $1.6 billion airport east of the capital Kigali. Shutterstock/Africadventures

The list includes a framework agreement for economic, technical and trade cooperation to secure future investments, including the modernisation and development of the ports of Matadi, Kinshasa and Boma. Qatar Airways has also offered to enter into a partnership with the DRC’s aviation authority, RVA, for the modernisation, construction and financing of Ndjili and Ndolo airports in Kinshasa and Luano
airport in Lubumbashi.
Qatar is also funding several projects in the Sahel region, such as the Qatar Cancer Treatment Centre in Burkina Faso, inaugurated in 2021. Four years later, the Qatar Fund for Development signed a $50 million loan and grant agreement with Mali’s Ministry of Economy and Finance.
According to Dr Bakary Sambe, director of the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute, Qatar’s mediation expertise could be useful in the coming years in the Sahel region to help these countries find a way out of terrorism. Nina Wilen, director of the Africa programme at the Brussels-based Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, claims in a recent paper that “rumours also suggest that Qatar may be given a mediation role between the Malian military regime and both Islamist and separatist groups in the north.
Several factors may explain Qatar’s involvement in peace processes around the world, particularly in Africa. In the case of the Great Lakes conflict, Qatar is not only a major investor in both countries. It has also filled the gap left by the former coloniser, Belgium. In the past, before the Sun City peace agreement in 2002, Belgium made considerable efforts to bring together all the regional actors and to ensure that the United Nations and the European Union supported the process. This time, however, Belgium has clearly taken sides, urging the EU to impose sanctions on the Rwandan “aggressor”, which finally broke off diplomatic relations with Brussels last March. Moreover, Belgium’s economic influence in its three former African colonies has shrunk considerably, while Chinese and Indian investment continues to soar.

A view inside Khalifa International Stadium in Al Rayyan, Qatar, during a 2022 FIFA World Cup. Helping to find diplomatic solutions to conflicts is also another way of repairing the reputational damage caused by the abuses of World Cup workers. CC BY-SA 4.0/Standardwhale

More generally, soft power diplomacy has been a way for Qatar to break its diplomatic isolation on the international stage after the emirate refused to align itself with the anti-Iran and anti-Muslim Brotherhood positions of other Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates, which severed diplomatic ties with Doha in June 2017, until their resumption in January 2021.
Helping to find diplomatic solutions to conflicts is also another way of repairing the reputational damage caused by the abuses of World Cup workers exposed by Amnesty International and other human rights organisations, and by the Qatargate scandal, which consisted of more than 300 attempts to corrupt members of the European Parliament. According to a report published in December 2023 by the Brussels-based digital newspaper Politico, the actions included secret plans to kill parliamentary resolutions condemning Qatar’s human rights record and working towards a visa-free travel agreement between Doha and the EU.
A parliamentary assistant arrested by Belgian police has confessed that corrupt lawmakers changed the narrative in parliament during a committee hearing in April 2021 on Qatar’s preparations for the World Cup, which have come under intense criticism for the alleged exploitation of migrant workers.

Qatar’s involvement in African conflicts often coincides with an agenda of economic expansion.123rf

Some analysts stress that Qatar’s diplomatic success is due to the perception that the emirate has no hidden agenda. However, Qatar’s involvement in African conflicts often coincides with an agenda of economic expansion. Amid speculation about a future Qatari mediation role in the Sahel, the state-owned Qatar Mining Company expressed interest in gold exploration projects in Burkina Faso in 2022, where the Emir Sheikh promised to finance a US$240 million highway project between the capital Ouagadougou and the Ivorian border. A subsidiary of Qatar Mining Company is exploring for gold and copper in the Red Sea state of Sudan, where Qatar has been involved in several mediation efforts. Qatar Mining has also been awarded four gold exploration permits in western and southern Mali.
Qatar’s soft power policy and significant economic involvement in Africa are part of a wider context of growing Gulf involvement on the continent, argues Nina Wilen. This approach contrasts sharply with that of the United Arab Emirates, which has adopted a more militarised and transactional approach. Indeed, in 2019 the UAE and Mali signed a military cooperation agreement. The UAE also relies on mercenaries, proxies and logistics networks to support Libya’s National Army and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces.
Whatever the nature of their engagement, says Wilen, the Gulf states’ presence is driven by a desire to shape outcomes in a region that offers new opportunities as Western states withdraw. As oil and gas producers are aware of the need for energy transition, the Gulf states also see their involvement in Africa as a way to diversify their economies. (Open Photo: Pixabay)

François Misser