Widespread corruption, disorganised armed forces, and a system of power based on patronage networks. The portrait of a head of state who, betraying the ideals of his party, is favouring his own community, aggravating ethnic tensions.

Since late 2021, the Democratic Republic of Congo has been the scene of growing instability, fuelled by the advance of the M23 rebel movement, led by ethnic Tutsis. In December 2023, this group was strengthened with the integration of the political wing, Alliance of the Congo River (AFC). The conflict between the M23, supported by the Rwandan army, and the government forces of Kinshasa, disorganised and supported by numerous local armed groups, intensified in early 2025 with the occupation of two important eastern cities, Goma and Bukavu.

M23 fighters moving along the road towards Goma. The initial objectives of the M23 were relatively simple to address. © Monusco/Sylvain Liechti

This military escalation is a gamble. Western countries, which had previously ignored the international violations committed by Rwanda, have now imposed sanctions, contributing to a change in the global perception of Rwandan President Paul Kagame. An authoritarian but development-oriented leader, Kagame is now seen as a ruthless dictator, intent on redrawing the borders between Rwanda and the DRC. However, this international condemnation should not obscure the responsibility of Congolese President, Félix Tshisekedi, in the current crisis.
The initial objectives of the M23 were relatively simple to address. But the agreements signed with its factions were ignored by the Congolese presidency, which refused any negotiation, branding the rebels as “terrorists”. This hard line has allowed Kagame and the M23/AFC coalition to expand their territorial control, raising the bar of ambition to the point of aiming for the removal of Tshisekedi from Kinshasa.

Money vanished into thin air
Compared to the rebels, the government army appears disorganised and poorly paid, despite having been allocated $3.8 billion for defence since the beginning of the conflict. An intelligence document reports embezzlement of $722 million, suggesting that for many senior officers and politicians, the war is above all an opportunity to enrich themselves. Significant bribes reportedly accompanied the purchasing of weapons.
In an attempt to strengthen the armed forces, many local armed groups were formally integrated as reserves, but with poor training and poor management contributing to a climate of persistent insecurity.

The Congolese National Armed Forces (FARDC). The government army appears disorganised and poorly paid, despite having allocated $3.8 billion for defence since the beginning of the conflict. © Monusco/Clara Padovan

This approach reflects the regime’s style of governance. When Tshisekedi was proclaimed president in 2019, despite the victory actually being that of Martin Fayulu, there were expectations of improvement, thanks also to the history of his party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). This party had historically fought against dictatorial regimes such as those of Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent-Désiré Kabila and was committed to the rule of law.
Unfortunately, the current government has proven worse than the previous one, betraying the founding ideals of the UDPS, partly due to Tshisekedi’s inexperience and incompetence.
Progress has been limited. Political opponents and dissidents are routinely arrested on treason charges and detained illegally. Corruption is rampant, not just tolerated but almost legitimised. The president himself has publicly declared bribes a legal practice, defending the finance minister accused of embezzling millions of dollars, calling him “probably the best finance minister in the history of the country.” The general inspectorate of finance, while investigating numerous cases, rarely sees its reports translated into prosecution.
The ruling party is now in deep crisis. In the 1990s, it was the main opposition force and attracted prestigious intellectuals. Today, it is emptied of its most competent figures, led by a controversial secretary general completely subservient to the presidency and composed mainly of unemployed youths recruited as militants. Some of these informal movements have transformed into militias that operate above the law.

Family Affairs
The situation is particularly critical in the four provinces of former Katanga, the homeland of former President Joseph Kabila and a mining region that is key to national finances. Local sources and civil society reports document how members of the presidential family control and exploit artisanal mineral deposits with the support of the presidential guard or the army, violating regulations even on industrial sites. Some reports denounce actual raids on foreign mining companies, forced to work one week a month for the presidency.

In Lubumbashi, the building of the General Management of Gécamines. The state-owned mining company Gécamines suffers from liquidity problems due to frequent withdrawals by people close to power. (Courtesy of Gécamines)

The state-owned mining company Gécamines suffers from liquidity problems due to frequent withdrawals by people close to power. Influential figures in the presidential family and party have created networks of clientelism that reach down to the lowest levels of the political and military structures. These competing networks neutralise each other, making it almost impossible to remove officials protected by higher levels and paralysing the system. Tshisekedi’s regime enjoys solid support in the Kasai region, his homeland, especially among the Luba ethnic group, who consider themselves legitimized in power after years of fighting against dictatorship and discrimination. The cohesion of this community is remarkable. However, the numerous appointments of people from Kasai in the administration and state companies have created the impression of a government that favours a single community, contrary to the tradition of previous Congolese presidents of maintaining regional balances.

Clashes between communities
This is particularly sensitive in Katanga, where social competition between Katangese and natives of Kasai has always been conflictual. The situation has worsened under Tshisekedi, due to the massive immigration from Kasai to Katanga. The “immigrants” engage in small-scale trade, motorbike transport and menial jobs, becoming very visible in Katangese society. Their different traditions, their backward social status and a triumphalist attitude, based on the predominant role in government, fuel tensions and conflicts.

Former President Joseph Kabila has allied himself with the rebel movement. M23/AFC. (Facebook)

Many feel untouchable, protected by members of their community at government and presidential levels. At the important border of Kasumbalesa, where most minerals and goods pass through, the UDPS militias have established a parallel control system to collect informal “export taxes”. This situation fuels the perception among Katangese of being dominated by a regime that favours a single community. As former President Kabila, originally from Katanga, has allied himself with the rebel movement M23/AFC, many Katangans hope that he will end Tshisekedi’s regime, unaware that the military movement is an instrument of Kagame’s power politics.
In the occupied territories, the M23/AFC rules by repression. In the west of the country, Tshisekedi’s tough stance against Rwanda is appreciated, but not his system of power. Unfortunately, neither Tshisekedi nor Kabila represent a hope for better governance. Kabila seems to want to take over from where he left off in 2018, when he was rejected for his attempts to stay in power. His possible return is not welcomed in many areas, due to his explicit alliance with the M23/AFC and its supporters. In 2024, Tshisekedi attempted to amend the Constitution to stay in power indefinitely. If he were to retain control, he would likely try again to protect his community and his family’s access to financial resources. In either case, they would rule against the will of a significant portion of the population, resorting to repression.

People trust the Churches
In this scenario, the Catholic and Protestant Churches, among the few institutions left with legitimacy and moral authority, are trying to unite civil society and other stakeholders to propose concrete solutions to the country’s real problems through a national consultation.
This may be the only way to build a better future, but it requires significant regional and international support. It is a fundamental step to avoid the mistakes of the past.

Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo Besungu, Archbishop of Kinshasa. The Catholic and Protestant Churches, among the few institutions left with legitimacy and moral authority. Photo: José Luis Silván Sen

Too many times, in fact, tensions in Congo have ended with peace agreements between elites, capable of temporarily calming violence and insecurity, without, however, addressing the root causes that have afflicted the country for decades, especially in the east. There, the absence of effective state authority has given way to the domination of armed groups that protect the illegal exploitation of mineral resources. There are also networks of mineral smuggling to Rwanda and Uganda, complex land ownership issues, difficulties in the return of refugees and the need for reconciliation between Rwandan and other communities. These unresolved issues continue to undermine national stability, making it indispensable a new and concrete approach which goes beyond window-dressing agreements. Now is the time to seek real solutions, a complex but unavoidable challenge. (Open Photo: Democratic Republic of Congo’s President Felix Tshisekedi. Shutterstock/Alexandros Michailidis)

Erik Kennes

The country is emerging as an exception in the Sahel region by stemming the tide of jihadism that has engulfed neighbouring states, through a combination of military, political, religious and social measures. Camel riders and women religious leaders are among the heroes of this success story.

According to the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute, the Sahelian branch of Al Qaeda, Jama’at Nusra al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) – also known as the ‘Support Group for Islam and Muslims’ – is making real progress across the entire region. However, Mauritania is emerging as the exception, and a quite successful one at that.
The last jihadist attack in the country took place in December 2011, when a commando fired on a Mauritanian gendarmerie post at Adel Begrou, kidnapping an officer before escaping across the border into Mali. Before this, Mauritania had experienced attacks on foreign embassies and the murder and abduction of Westerners since 2005, which culminated in the cancellation of the Paris-Dakar Rally in January 2008.Since then, under the leadership of President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, the authorities have developed a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy. The government invested heavily in the defence sector.

Mauritanian President, Mohamed Ould Cheikh Mohamed Ahmed Ould Ghazouani. (Photo: EU)

The aim was to make the army a more attractive prospect for soldiers than the jihadists, and wages were increased considerably.
Defence expenditure rose from $106 million in 2009 to $141 million in 2019 and $251 million in 2023, enabling the purchase of modern pick-up trucks and surveillance radars that surpassed the rebels’ equipment.New military bases were established along the 2,200-kilometre-long porous Malian border. These included the Lemreya base, which straddles the border between Algeria and Mali. This area had previously been used as a sanctuary by jihadists and traffickers. The Special Intervention Groups, which are highly mobile military units, established their headquarters here to operate in the desert. They were supported by light aircraft.
Unlike the other members of the Sahelian Alliance (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), who are struggling to cope with jihadist threats, Mauritania has maintained military cooperation with France, consisting primarily of training its special forces. While Niger closed French and American military bases, Mauritania strengthened its ties with the United States through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and joint training missions. At the same time, Mauritania is cultivating good relations with Moscow, as demonstrated by the visit of the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, to President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani in February 2023. Lavrov expressed the Kremlin’s support for Mauritania in its fight against jihadism.
In addition, Mauritania has invested considerably in developing the intelligence gathered by the Mehari units, whose officers patrol the desert on camels in eastern Hodh Ech Chargui. They maintain a presence among the nomadic populations who permanently cross the borders with their herds, and who are potential targets for jihadist recruitment.
These camel riders, who are part of Mauritania’s National Guard, are often dressed as civilians and can reach every part of the vast country discreetly. Meanwhile, checkpoints are scattered across the country.   The northeastern region of Mauritania, which is mostly uninhabited, has been a restricted military zone since 2008 to facilitate surveillance and prevent it from becoming a safe haven for jihadists.

Mauritania has invested considerably in developing the intelligence gathered by the Mehari units, whose officers patrol the desert on camels. File swm

Mauritania has revived the French colonial tradition of army units riding camels. Until a few years ago, the desert riders’ unit numbered just 50 men, but by 2019, the ‘Nomad Group’ had grown to comprise 150 riders and boasts a herd of 400 camels. They have also received a grant of several million euros from the European Union.
Some of these Meharists are recruited from Bedouin tribes, to whom they provide services such as tracking down cattle thieves and offering medical care. The key to the strategy is controlling the water sources and thus the desert. The strategy appears to be quite successful. Indeed, Chad and Niger, two other Sahel countries affected by jihadism, have expressed interest in the Mauritanian approach.
However, the strategy is not limited to military aspects. As the core of the jihadist offensive is spiritual and aims to impose a theocratic order, the Mauritanian authorities have also decided to counter jihadist propaganda on religious grounds.
When the government realised that Al-Qaeda had recruited Mauritanian citizens in the early 2000s, it mobilised imams to produce an ideological response to the jihadist narrative. In an attempt to prevent its citizens from becoming radicalised, Mauritania organised a nationwide theological debate and implemented a system to control the ideology preached in mosques.

Mauritania organised a nationwide theological debate and implemented a system to control the ideology preached in mosques. File swm

It also decided to take action in the deprived, sensitive suburbs of the capital, Nouakchott, by initiating a dialogue with local communities. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Education and the Association of Women Heads of Families launched the ‘Mourchidates’ project, in which women religious guides visit radicalised Muslims in these neighbourhoods to prevent violent extremism.
Fifty Mourchidate women from the capital and the rest of the country were appointed. These women, who are teachers in Quranic schools, graduates in Islamic sciences, or community leaders, will deconstruct concepts that have been manipulated by jihadists, such as takfir, caliphate, imamat and jihad. This initiative is supported by the UNESCO project, ‘Strengthening Women’s Leadership in the Prevention of Violent Extremism through Criminal Justice, Social Cohesion and Cultural Identity’. As jihadist ideology has flourished amid poverty and repression in other Sahelian countries, the Nouakchott authorities are trying to demonstrate to their citizens that the jihadist proposition is less appealing than a functioning state that provides services such as drilling wells, caring for livestock and building medical centres to meet the needs of nomadic communities.
A key element of the strategy has been the implementation of a policy that combines firmness and forgiveness for those who repent. During a government-led dialogue in 2010, dozens of detained radical Islamists signed a renunciation of violence, and several former jihadists were reintegrated into society instead of being killed.
The absence of terrorist attacks for over a decade is testament to the success of the strategy. However, some experts suspect that the Mauritanian government has paid a kind of non-aggression price to Al-Qaeda. ‘Everyone agrees there is a pact. That’s a widely accepted fact,” former CIA agent Michael Scheuer told the Arab Weekly, which published a story on the matter in May.

The jihadists are investing in livestock, logging and smuggling activities. File swm

Accordingly, JNIM fighters cross the border into Mauritania to find a safe haven, provided they don’t carry weapons. However, the Mauritanian authorities firmly deny the existence of such an agreement. Some critics also point out that, in return for supporting the fight against hate speech and violent extremism, the government has appointed some Salafist preachers to influential positions.
At the same time, in such a troubled region, the fight against the jihadist scourge is never-ending and success is fragile. There are still many challenges. One of the greatest is the presence of between 250,000 and 300,000 Malian refugees in the M’bera refugee camp and the villages of the Hodh Chargui border region. In a report published on 27 April, the Timbuktu Institute warned that JNIM was extending its influence in the tri-border area between Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.
Accordingly, the jihadists are investing in livestock, logging and smuggling activities in the area, generating revenue that enables them to expand their networks. These activities also provide them with a means of transporting weapons and explosives. The threat should not be underestimated: JNIM is indeed attempting to infiltrate its members from Kayes, in western Mali, into Mauritania and Senegal. (Open Photo: Soldiers of the Mauritanian Army in training section. DVIDS)

François Misser

Economic, political and military power merge in Crystal Ventures, the holding company of President Paul Kagame’s party. The company operates opaquely but monopolises the country’s production system and is increasingly present in Africa.

Since coming to power in 2000, Rwandan President Paul Kagame has constructed a precise narrative, which can be summarised in the formula “from the destruction of the genocide to a successful economy”. Behind this image, however, lies a complex reality where economic, political and military power merge into a single, large entity: Crystal Ventures Ltd (CVL), the holding company owned by the head of state’s party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
Founded in 1995 under the name Tri-Star Investments, Crystal Ventures has gone from being a fund for post-genocide reconstruction in 1994 to a business empire with an estimated value of around one billion dollars. The company dominates several key sectors of the Rwandan economy: from construction to telecommunications to real estate, through consumer products, construction and manufacturing.

Kigali Convention Centre at night, lit up in the colours of the Rwandan flag. The facility is designed to host a variety of events and is a top attraction in the city. Shutterstock/Jennifer Sophie

Despite its size and influence, Crystal Ventures operates opaquely. Its website provides no annual reports, details of its governance structure beyond its ownership of RPF, or any of the information that a company of its size would be required to disclose.
The lack of transparency makes it nearly impossible to independently verify the true value of Kagame’s venture. CVL has grown so much that it has more staff and more economic power than many state institutions. The company has four divisions—infrastructure, consumer products, building materials, and services—and dozens of subsidiaries operating in Rwanda and increasingly across Africa. In the consumer products sector, Inyange Industries is emblematic of CVL’s monopolistic ambitions.
In 2023, this subsidiary of Crystal Ventures opened Rwanda’s first milk powder plant, a $45 million facility with the capacity to produce about 250,000 litres of milk per day. Research by this writer reveals that part of this venture was financed with resources from the state pension fund: it involves using public pension savings to support the building of assets for the ruling party. David Himbara, a former economic adviser to Kagame who has since become a critic of the president, has devoted two books to the topic, one of the most problematic aspects of CVL’s expansion: Kagame Ate Rwanda’s Pension and Rwanda’s Stillborn Middle-Income Economy.

Kigali, Rwanda. A broad view overlooking the city centre, with Pension Plaza dominating the foreground and Kigali City Tower visible in the background. 123rf

Several of its revelations are confirmed by the author’s investigations: in addition to the aforementioned powdered milk plant, Rwandan workers’ savings have been channelled into multiple CVL projects, from the Kigali Convention Centre to real estate development plans to the growth of manufacturing industries.  What emerges is a scenario in which pension funds become venture capital for pro-government party businesses, with little or no government oversight. Crystal Ventures’ expansion beyond Rwanda’s borders follows a different model, one that blends military deployment with economic penetration. In Mozambique, Rwandan troops have been present in the resource-rich province of Cabo Delgado since 2021, to combat an Islamist insurgency. A few months after the military’s arrival, CVL subsidiaries and affiliates secured a series of infrastructure, energy and security projects. Intersec Security Company (Isco), a company under the CVL umbrella according to its own website, has won a majority stake in a joint venture that provides security for the facilities of the French giant Total, the leader of a mega natural gas project in Cabo Delgado. This pattern – first military intervention and then preferential entry of certain businesses – is also being repeated in the Central African Republic. Kigali’s military arrived in Bangui in 2020 to support the fight of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government against rebel groups. Shortly thereafter, mining companies linked to former CVL executives obtained gold and diamond mining rights through unclear procedures. Local civil society organisations have been unable to trace the revenue flows from these operations, raising serious concerns about the possibility of illicit activities.

Flag of Rwanda on a soldier’s arm. Kigali’s military arrived in Bangui in 2020. Shortly thereafter, mining companies linked to former CVL executives secured mining rights for gold and diamonds. Shutterstock/Bumble Dee

Back in Rwanda, CVL’s dominance extends to virtually every sector. Its subsidiary NPD Limited, controls major construction projects; Inyange Industries operates food and beverage retail; East African Granite Industries monopolises granite mining and processing; Kinigi Cassiterite and Wolfram Mining Company (KCWMC) has secured mining rights for other major minerals. Again, the CVL website proudly lists these companies – except for KCWMC – but offers no additional information. Crystal Ventures’s ambiguous structure also makes anyone who criticises its business practices automatically a government critic – a dangerous position to take in Rwanda, given the repressive political climate there. International financial institutions and Rwanda’s development partners have long overlooked CVL’s governance problems. Its grey structure defies scrutiny in both the private and public sectors. Without a separation between party, state and commercial interests, the Rwandan model risks normalising a system in which political loyalty is more important than anything else: economic efficiency, transparency and fair competition. If it were to become the rule in Africa, it would be a new blow to decades of laborious reforms of governance systems on the continent. (Open Photo: Rwandan President Paul Kagame. CC BY 3.0/Hildenbrand /MSC)

Samuel Baker Byansi