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Towards an African intelligence model ?

Investments that are lower by more than half the global average, a lack of coordination and cooperation plans between the intelligence agencies of the various countries. The risk of being at the service of the political elite of the moment. Little attention to cybersecurity. We discuss this with Annette Hübschle, research director of the Global Risk Governance Programme at the University of Cape Town Law School (South Africa).

Many African countries allocate less than 1% of their national budgets to strengthening their intelligence agencies, compared to the global average of 2%. Would investing more resources be enough to improve their performance?

Annette Hübschle, research director of the Global Risk Governance Programme at the University of Cape Town Law School.

Low resources are certainly an aspect that needs to be considered. But increasing them alone will not allow African countries to address and solve deeper systemic challenges. There are legitimate concerns about the misuse of intelligence resources, often used, for example, to spy on political opponents or to safeguard the interests of ruling elites rather than addressing urgent threats to national and regional security. To improve in this area, African countries need to equip themselves with more transparent oversight mechanisms, assign clearer mandates to their intelligence agencies, and build internal know-how to address shared threats such as terrorism, organized crime,
and cyberattacks.

Among the challenges to be faced is the need to coordinate and cooperate more. Are there plans in the continent that go
in this direction?
Lack of coordination and cooperation within individual states and between country agencies often reflects broader issues of mistrust, political rivalries and divergent national interests. Addressing these issues requires more than just technical solutions. It requires political will, shared governance visions and defined accountability systems. Strengthening regional platforms, such as the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC), could help incentivise greater collaboration. However, care must be taken to ensure that intelligence sharing is not misused to target political dissidents or suppress opposition movements, as has been seen in several instances on
the African continent.

British Secret Intelligence Service building, known as MI6, London. The concept of aligning with “Western standards” deserves critical scrutiny. 123rf

Which African state has the most advanced intelligence services approaching Western standards?
The concept of aligning with “Western standards” deserves critical scrutiny. Why should African intelligence agencies aspire to adopt models that may not be appropriate to the specifics of their socio-political realities? Instead, African intelligence should develop its own standards of excellence, focusing on principles such as civil society engagement, human rights protection, and the challenges of ensuring national and local security. This approach could offer lessons to Western standards, not the other way around.

How are African intelligence agencies investing in cybersecurity? Are some countries more advanced than others?
Cybersecurity is emerging as a growing priority on the continent, although currently only for a few intelligence agencies.
This leaves significant disparities between countries, with levels of investment and growth in domestic expertise varying significantly. Countries such as Kenya and South Africa have made great strides in this area. However, even in these countries, there can be risks, with tools and resources put to use in cybersecurity that could be misused to spy on political opponents or civil society activists. Investments in this area must always be accompanied by strong ethical and legal safeguards to prevent potential abuse.

There are legitimate concerns about African countries’ sovereignty and the imposition of external directives. 123rf

Is the influence of extra-continental actors, from the United States to Israel, from Russia to China, on African intelligence services,
still too great?
Foreign influence in Africa is a complex issue. Partnerships with countries such as the United States, China or Israel can provide African countries with technical support and resources. At the same time, there are legitimate concerns about African countries’ sovereignty and the imposition of external directives. Sometimes these partnerships can exacerbate rather than resolve domestic challenges, such as strengthening regimes that abuse intelligence services to suppress dissent. African countries need to critically evaluate their relationships with these powers, ensuring that their involvement with these partners is in line with their national interests and that these partnerships help them develop internal capacities to reduce their dependence over time. (Open Photo: 123rf)

(R.B.)

 

Music. Cape Verde. A dance lasting half a century.

Musician, writer and politician Mário Lúcio celebrates the 50 years of the independence of the archipelago with his seventh work ‘Independance’. A non-random Frenchism, which tells of Pan-Africanism, struggles and the joy of freedom.

In January 1960, in Brussels, when the date of independence of the Belgian Congo, June 30, was set at the negotiating table between Belgium and the Congolese delegation, Joseph Kabasele launched his Indépendance Cha Cha. The musician, known as Le Grand Kallé and a crucial figure in modern Congolese music, was present with his band in the capital to support his compatriots engaged in negotiations: in French, the indépendance of the title rhymes with danse, and all of black Africa in the years following 1960 – the year in which seventeen African countries became independent – would dance wildly to Kabasele’s Indépendance Cha Cha.

Not all of them, to be honest: for example, not the Portuguese colonies, who had to wait for their liberation movements to wear down the fascist dictatorship of the Estado Novo, until April 25, 1974, when the uprising of the captains of the Portuguese armed forces brought down the then Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano.Cape Verde became independent on July 5, 1975: it was only in the mid-1970s that the archipelago – which since colonialism had been kept facing Portugal and with its back to Africa – could re-embrace the music of the other countries of the black continent, and it was only then that it could return to practising in the light of day the traditional dance music that had been discouraged or – like the funaná – severely prohibited by the Portuguese.

Vertigo of freedom
In the memories of Mário Lúcio, who was ten years old at the time, the emotion of freedom is one with the contagious atmosphere of dancing in a Cape Verde without any more masters: for this reason Lúcio, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Cape Verde being free from colonialism, titled his seventh, joyful personal album not Independência, in Portuguese, but Independance, as in French, precisely to preserve that rhyme that he had personally experienced as a teenager: but it can also be taken as a title in English, and then it is a play on words between independence and dance.

Mário Lúcio in concert. Facebook

Mário Lúcio began to be attracted to music while still a child, and to play, with other peers, often with rudimentary instruments, in the years before independence. Born in 1964 on the island of Santiago, in Tarrafal, the city of the infamous prison where the Estado Novo deported opponents from Portugal and all the colonies, Mário grew up with seven brothers in a Cape Verde that Portuguese colonialism condemned to poverty and backwardness. A very precocious child, at eight years old, he was writing poems and drafting in Portuguese the letters to migrant husbands that the women dictated to him in Creole. At ten years old, he was entrusted to the soldiers of the newly formed Cape Verdean army, who had transformed the former prison into a barracks: this was to his benefit since, at the age of twelve, he lost his father, and then, at fifteen, also his mother. During his adolescence he would play the guitar and sing in a group that called itself Abel Djassi, the clandestine battle name of Amìlcar Cabral, the charismatic leader of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, assassinated in ’73 by Portuguese hitmen; Lúcio, who was also an established writer, published, in 2022, A Ultima Lua de Homem Grande, a splendid novel about Cabral’s last twenty-four hours.

He is considered to be one of the most important exponents of his country’s music. Facebook

His new album aims to be a celebration of independence through dance, but certainly without leaving history aside: in one song, Rabidante, Lúcio evokes the “camarada Abel”. In 1984, thanks to a grant from the Cuban government, Lúcio was able to continue his studies in Havana, where he attended university but also discovered the Afro-Cuban musical heritage. It was there that he was influenced by the great singer-songwriter Pablo Milanés; he formed a group and became interested in European composers such as Kodali and Bartok. In 1990 Lúcio returned to Cape Verde with a law degree and practised law in the capital Praia. In 1992, he was among the founders of Simentera, one of the most important groups in modern Cape Verdean music, with which he remained until 2004.In the meantime, between 1996 and 2001, he was in parliament, elected for the PAICV, Cape Verdean heir of the party that had led the fight for independence. Having left Simentera and also his job as a lawyer, in the new millennium Lúcio continued with a personal career, establishing himself as one of the most important exponents of his country’s music, also as an appreciated and much sought-after author of songs for other performers.

From 2011 to 2016, he was also the Minister of Culture of Cape Verde. CC BY-SA 4.0/Mario Lucio Sousa

From 2011 to 2016 he was also the Minister of Culture of Cape Verde, in that role creating among other things the Atlantic Music Expo, an important annual showcase for the music of the archipelago. In interviews given on the occasion of the album’s release – which ends with a track for which Lúcio used a recording featuring the late Cameroonian musician Manu Dibango – the Praia artist stated that he sees independence as a process, more difficult than reaching the moment of independence itself; and in terms of balance, he told the Cape Verdean website inforpress: “Independence means going from 75 percent illiterate to 98 percent literate in fifty years, from zero to eleven universities, from two to fifty high schools: it was worthwhile.” (Open Photo: Mário Lúcio. Facebook)

Marcello Lorrai

 

The Hippo. King of the Rivers.

Despite its apparent tranquillity and its soft and jovial appearance, it is an animal with an irascible, unpredictable and aggressive character. The most dangerous and deadly in Africa. But you have to know it to appreciate it. Legendary origins.

The hippopotamus is one of the most dangerous, yet interesting, animals on the entire African continent. A large mammal (an adult male can weigh up to 3,200 kilos and be 1.6 metres tall), the hippopotamus is an essential feature of Africa’s rivers, lakes and bodies of water, and an important element in ecology.

The hippopotamus is a vital part of Africa’s rivers, lakes, and waterways, and plays a significant role in ecology. Pixabay

Legend has it that when it was created, the hippopotamus was placed on land, but its passion for water led it to repeatedly pray to the Creator to place it in rivers and lakes. The Creator was reluctant, however, as he feared that an animal of its size would soon devour all the fish. The hippopotamus then promised to feed only on grass and to demonstrate its good faith, it would regularly open its jaws to show that it had not ingested any fish. It thus convinced the Creator and since then the hippopotamus has lived in the waters of African lakes and rivers.

Water Horse
This animal seems to be “designed” for the aquatic environment: eyes, nostrils and ears lie on the same plane (as in the crocodile), allowing the animal to keep them just above the surface while the rest of the body and much of the head remain submerged. As a result of its shape and enormous size, the hippopotamus floats with difficulty and, not being able to swim, it gallops skilfully on the seabed and it is precisely this characteristic that has earned it its name (from the Greek híppos, horse, and potamós, river).

The hippo appears to be “designed” for the aquatic environment. Pixabay

Its essential symbiosis with water is due to the characteristics of its skin which, despite reaching a thickness of 6 centimetres, has a very thin epidermis, equipped with glands that secrete an oily and reddish protective liquid, but unsuitable for effectively protecting it from the sun’s rays, dehydration and overheating, thus forcing the animal to remain immersed in water for most of the day. Hippos therefore occupy any place with water deep enough to submerge themselves, allowing them to surface every 2-3 minutes to breathe, with plenty of grass nearby. The aquatic environment also provides them with protection; here they have virtually no enemies and even crocodiles keep away
from their powerful jaws.

Ferocious and lethal
Only when darkness falls do hippos leave the water to graze, travelling up to 40 kilometres a night and returning at dawn after eating about 40 kilos of grass. During the day, in the water, hippos show a certain degree of sociability, often gathering in groups that rest side by side. But on land, they become solitary and territorial.

Their main weapon is their powerful jaws. Pixabay

Males mark their territory with abundant jets of faeces, using their tails to disperse them even in the water and defend their dominance with ferocious fights. Their main weapon is their powerful jaws, which can open in an impressive gesture of challenge, showing sharp canines that reach half a meter in length. Opening their jaws is an unmistakable sign of aggression, especially between males who begin to compete from the age of seven to establish precise hierarchies.

Very good for the environment
Females give birth to a calf after 6-8 months of gestation. Giving birth takes place in water. Mothers are very protective of their young and show aggression towards anyone who gets too close. The strong territoriality of the males and the strong sense of protection of the females make this animal very aggressive and dangerous for humans, both in water and on land.

Females give birth to a calf after 6-8 months of gestation. Giving birth takes place in water. Pixabay

The number of victims that these enormous herbivores claim in a year (in Africa, about 500) is higher than the record for any other animal in Africa. But it would be unfair to talk about them as a threat. Hippos provide an important ecological contribution: they are responsible for both the creation of the main access routes to water where the banks of rivers and lakes are steep, and for the opening of paths in the bush, paths that are then taken by many other smaller animals, while their grazing keeps many species of grass at an optimal height, preventing them from deteriorating.

Hippos provide an important ecological contribution: while their grazing keeps many species of grass at an optimal height, preventing them from deteriorating. Pixabay

In the past, they suffered from excessive hunting pressure (the fat is very tasty and the skin is durable), conflict with humans and a reduction in habitat. The hippopotamus has faced difficulties but has returned to repopulate African waterways, thanks to the commitment of conservation authorities. Today its deep roar echoes in the African nights, reminding us that, although irascible, this “king of the river” is a fundamental pillar of the ecosystem, a grumpy but irreplaceable guardian of the
natural balance.

Gianni Bauce/Africa

Türkiye. Tactical Neutrality.

Turkey in the Israel-Iran confrontation, between strategic balancing and internal issues.

In the reshaping of the Middle Eastern balance of power following the events of October 7, 2023, Turkey has adopted a balanced and pragmatic posture, reflecting its complex national interests, internal security priorities, and a geopolitical ambition expressed through a foreign policy that oscillates between assertiveness and containment.

The escalation of the conflict between Israel and Iran, culminating in the kinetic phase of mid-June 2025 and still unresolved at the political and diplomatic level, has forcefully exposed the strategic tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv, once military partners and now regional rivals. In this context, Turkey is pursuing a policy of “conditional neutrality,” aiming to prevent the Islamic Republic’s implosion, contain the risk of an Israeli-Kurdish alliance, and simultaneously strengthen its position as a privileged interlocutor in Syria and the redefinition of the regional order.

Ankara, although historically opposed to Iran’s nuclear program, has avoided supporting any plan that could lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime, fearing multiple repercussions: instability on its eastern borders, new waves of migration, and a resurgence of Kurdish irredentism. Turkey’s stance, particularly evident during the US raids on Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow, has been characterized by a largely measured tone.

The Foreign Ministry avoided any explicit condemnation of the attacks, emphasizing Turkey’s willingness to contribute to de-escalation. This is a somewhat more cautious stance than the vehement statements against Western operations seen in the previous decade, partly attributable to the personal convergence between President Erdoğan and his US counterpart Donald Trump, but also to Ankara’s desire to preserve its own room for manoeuvre in sensitive matters.

The relationship between Iran and Turkey is part of a centuries-long historical course marked by imperial rivalries, indirect conflicts, and strategic similarities. Since the 17th century, after centuries of conflict between the Ottoman and Persian Empires, the two nations have avoided direct confrontation, establishing a silent mutual respect for each other’s spheres of influence. However, the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons signifies, for Ankara, a historic disruption in the delicate regional balance of power, already challenged by Israel’s
de facto (nuclear) status.

With a nuclear Iran, symmetric deterrence would be compromised, leading to an increase in strategic insecurity for Turkey, which, like other regional players such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, would be unable to resist pursuing a similar uranium enrichment process for military ends, dragging the region towards uncontrolled proliferation. Fear of a “definitive asymmetry” remains a key factor driving Turkish diplomatic activity concerning Iran.

Overall, while officially supporting the need to prevent a nuclear Iran, Turkey has in the past adopted approaches that are not aligned with those of its Western allies, such as indirectly violating the sanctions regime through banking transactions with Tehran. In any case, Ankara has strongly opposed, at least rhetorically, the possibility of a large-scale military attack against Iran by Israel, which it interprets as an uncontrollable destabilization of the region, especially if power vacuums were to arise in the Islamic Republic.

At the same time, Turkey’s rivalry with Israel has become increasingly structural, fuelled by competition for influence in Syria and disagreements over the Palestinian and Kurdish issues, as well as the progressive strategic rapprochement between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. The era of strategic cooperation between Ankara and Tel Aviv, culminating in the 1990s with military agreements, intelligence sharing, and industrial collaborations, is now a distant memory. The deterioration began with the AKP’s pro-Hamas shift and intensified after the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010.

The recent war between Israel and Iran has further fuelled the Turkish narrative portraying Israel as a destabilizing power, prone to extraterritorial military projection and the construction of anti-Turkish tactical alliances, including indirect support for the Syrian Kurds. Today, the rivalry is also fuelled by competition in the Syrian theatre, where a new political course has been established since December 2024, influenced by Ankara. However, Israel plays a key role in countering Turkish pressure and preventing any possible return of Iranian influence, severed by the collapse of the Assad regime.

A core element of Turkey’ s current security doctrine is managing the Kurdish issue both domestically- regarding relations with the internal minority- and across borders, concerning YPG in Syria and PJAK in Iran. Ankara views the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), officially announced in May 2025, as essential for strengthening the “domestic front” and preventing Iranian instability from being exploited by Kurdish factions to reintroduce a separatist agenda.

In this context, the prospect, suggested by the pro- government press, of a future alliance between Israel and Kurdish movements in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, ranks among the most feared scenarios for Turkish security. Statements by Israeli officials advocating closer ties with Kurdish communities have reinforced this perception. The official Turkish narrative, echoed by prominent figures such as Devlet Bahçeli (leader of the nationalist MHP party), depicts Israel as a country attempting to “encircle Anatolia” and destabilise Turkey’ s internal cohesion, thereby fostering ethnic secessionism.

Currently, the Syrian front remains the primary arena of strategic rivalry between Ankara and Tel Aviv. While Turkey advocates for a centralised, functional, and controlled Syrian state to prevent the PKK and its affiliates, mainly the YPG, from gaining influence, Israel favours a weakened and fractured Syria, easier to contain and less likely to become a hub of Iranian influence. The fall of the Assad regime has increased uncertainties but also provided Ankara with an opportunity to enhance its political and military influence, while Israel has intensified its air operations and collaboration with alternative local actors.

This situation also reveals areas of potential convergence: both Turkey and Israel have a shared interest in avoiding uncontrolled escalation and the rise of new hostile actors. The “Turkish vision” of a Syria that does not threaten its neighbours offers a potential point of contact, which could serve as a basis for the United States to establish a channel for bilateral dialogue. The Trump administration’ s recent decision to suspend sanctions on post- Assad Syria was welcomed by Ankara, which saw it as aligned with its own stabilisation objectives. Aware of the growing Israeli- Turkish tensions, Washington could play a facilitating role by fostering pragmatic cooperation between the two allies to prevent the risk of a proxy war on Syrian soil.

In this context, Turkey observes with growing concern the possibility that regional tensions could escalate into a broader proxy war, capable of further destabilizing the region. An unstable Iran or one experiencing a power vacuum could not only generate uncontrollable migration flows toward Turkey, but also facilitate the emergence of new armed non-state entities on its eastern borders. It is no coincidence that Ankara appears inclined to support diplomatic and sanctioning measures coordinated by the United States, provided they do not result in a large-scale military intervention. The stated objective remains to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons without provoking the collapse of its state. This orientation reflects both a pragmatic vision of Middle Eastern stability and a strategy of containing internal risks.

Turkey’s current posture can be summarized as tactical neutrality, articulated along two parallel axes: on the one hand, containing Israeli pressure without provoking a direct conflict; on the other, maintaining dialogue with Tehran, while preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear power status. In this context, the tactical alliance with Washington, based more on Erdoğan-Trump personal harmony than on structural convergence, allows Ankara room for flexibility, but also limits its autonomy in the event of a future escalation.

Ankara pursues a dual objective: positioning itself as a stabilizing actor in the eyes of the United States and the European Union, and at the same time as the leader of a non-aligned regional sovereignty, pursuing its own interests both in the Levant and beyond the region (Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia).

While Erdoğan aims to contain the risks of uncontrolled regional escalation, he is also using the crisis to strengthen domestic consensus, reviving a security-focused nationalism that includes a “tactical peace” with the Kurds. Turkey’s balancing act is therefore based on a balancing act between two regional powers (Israel and Iran), both perceived as potentially threatening but also as inevitable interlocutors. (Open Photo: People passing by portraits of Kemal Ataturk and Erdogan, the current president of Turkey. 123rf)

Alessio Stilo/CeSI

Intelligence. The Digital Challenge.

The market is expected to reach $700 billion by 2050. However, cybersecurity is a growing concern, with increased attacks and significant losses in countries such as South Africa and Nigeria. Often, regimes use technologies to survey dissent.

It was in January 2018 that an investigation by the French newspaper Le Monde revealed espionage activities conducted by China in the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa, in the buildings
built by the Chinese state company China State Construction
Engineering Corporation.

Addis Ababa. African Union Headquarters. From 2012 to 2017, the data contained in the computers used by the organisation’s employees was transferred to Chinese servers in Shanghai. UN Photo/Antonio Fiorente

For five years, from 2012 to 2017, the data contained in the computers used by the organization’s employees were transferred to Chinese servers in Shanghai. While sensitive information escaped at night, during the day an army of bugs captured voices in the rooms and along the corridors. Shortly after, a cell of Mustang Panda, a group of hackers in the pay of Beijing, stole the footage from the security cameras: “If you let them build the entire system, it’s obvious that they’ll listen to you,” a Western diplomat commented on the news while it was still hot. In Africa, most of the telecommunication infrastructure was set up, in fact, by two Chinese giants, Huawei and ZTE.

The US hunting down data centres
A cumbersome presence, to say the least, that the United States is now trying to counter by grabbing the properties of African data centres. Equinix and Digital Realty have won the biggest fish. The only player on the continent capable of holding their own is Africa Data Centre, a subsidiary of Cassava Technologies based in South Africa.

In 2023, there were 23% more cyberattacks in Africa than in 2022. Losses were estimated at 10 billion dollars. 123rf

With the Cloud market constantly growing and the rise of Artificial Intelligence applications, the real security challenge at a global level will increasingly depend on the control of data archives and processors. This also applies to Africa, where the digital market will reach a turnover of over 700 billion dollars in 2050 and where in 2023 there were 23% more cyber-attacks than in 2022, with losses estimated by the Kenyan company, Serianu, at 10 billion dollars.

Regulatory antibodies
For years, the African Union has been equipping itself with regulatory antibodies to deal with these scenarios. In 2014, the Malabo Convention was signed, a community document aimed at increasing cybersecurity and the protection of personal data on the continent, ratified in 2022 with the Lomé Declaration by Togo and the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). In January 2024, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC) unanimously adopted the Common African Position on the Application of International Law on the Use of Information and Communication Technologies in Cyberspace, adhering in many points to the protocols launched by the European Union.

According to the 2024 Global Cybersecurity Index, , the top-performing models are those developed by Mauritius, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania.

However, not all African states are moving at the same speed and in the same direction. According to an analysis by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies in 2022, only three countries have prepared a structured threat assessment plan, with adequate investments: Eswatini, Kenya and Senegal. According to the 2024 Global Cybersecurity Index, drawn up by the International Telecommunication Union, the best-performing models are those developed by Mauritius, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania. Matteo Lucchetti is the director of Cyber 4.0, an organization that provides support to law enforcement, magistrates and prosecutors in the fight against cybercrime. For the Council of Europe, he coordinated a project to support several African states, working closely in particular with the National Cyber Security Authority of Ghana. “In the sector, Accra represents a hub for the English-speaking countries of West Africa, while Senegal is for the French-speaking ones and Cape Verde for those in the area of Russian influence”, he explains. “Ghana has ratified the Budapest Convention of the Council of Europe, adopted by Western countries but opposed by the BRICS bloc. By receiving know-how and devices from Europe and the United States, this country has greatly strengthened in terms of organization, technological protections, reaction capacity and data protection”.

Instruments of repression
While investments in cyber threat intelligence have allowed Ghana and other African countries to improve their performance in gathering and analysing information and predicting threats, a circle of regimes on the continent have instead armed themselves with innovative cyber espionage techniques and tools to repress dissent.

Seven African governments had purchased Pegasus spyware. 123rf

In 2021, four executives of the French companies Amesys and Nexa ended up under investigation for allegedly providing the regimes of Egypt and Libya with cyber-surveillance tools to monitor opponents. In 2020, a Citizen Lab dossier from the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs combed through the customers of Circles, a company linked to the Tel Aviv-based tech firm NSO Group, and found that seven African governments had purchased its Pegasus spyware, software capable of identifying a person’s location with just their phone number, hacking the SS7 (Signalling System #7) system, capturing everything contained in the cameras and microphones built into cell phones, tracking app usage, and following web and social media browsing patterns. The list included Nigeria, Botswana, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Propaganda on the Web
Even on the web, many African states find themselves in the limbo of external spheres of influence. Some are hit by propaganda campaigns, or become their megaphone. The case study of recent years is the activity to discredit the West carried out through TV, radio, newspapers and especially local sites and social networks by former Wagners, in the countries where the military company that went under the name of Africa Corps operates. “When protests against a government erupt, typically those in power turn off the Internet so that opponents cannot communicate with each other,” concludes Lucchetti. “But countering propaganda with more propaganda, in addition to going against the principles of respect for freedom of expression and access to information, is not a lasting solution and also leads to a loss of productivity. Protecting governance from phenomena like these is difficult especially in countries that are fragile on a democratic level. It happened recently with Niger. And now there are fears for Chad.”

About 90% of private African companies operate without cybersecurity protocols. 123rf

Between the cyber militarization manoeuvres imposed by the Kremlin, Chinese investments in infrastructure and cyber governance programs proposed by Western partners, the challenge for African countries is to carve out and defend spaces of autonomy also in the digital dimension. This applies to governments and also to businesses. According to an estimate reported by African Business, about 90% of private African companies operate without cybersecurity protocols, which makes them vulnerable to hacking, phishing and malware attacks. Holes that end up costing South Africa 570 million dollars and Nigeria 500 million dollars every year. (Open Photo: 123rf)

Rocco Bellantone

Moscow increases its influence in Africa.

Despite the loss of its Syrian logistical hub, Russia is increasing its influence in Africa but it has suffered some serious setbacks in clashes with the jihadists in the Sahel.

Some observers anticipated that Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine would divert critical military resources away from its African clients and mercenary operations on the continent, and that the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December, followed by the loss of its bases in Syria, would disrupt Moscow’s supply lines in Africa. However, eight months after the collapse of al-Assad’s regime, the Kremlin has not only maintained its influence but increased it.
The departure of Wagner from Mali, announced on 6 June after more than three and a half years of fighting jihadist groups, has resulted in an increased Russian military presence there. The Africa Corps, Russia’s state-controlled paramilitary force which replaced Wagner, announced on its Telegram channel that the Russian contingent would remain in Mali, despite Wagner claiming that its mission had been accomplished by bringing all regional capitals under the control of the Malian army and pushing out armed militants and killing their commanders.

The Kremlin has tightened its grip on Russian military operations in Africa since Prigozhin’s death. 123rf

The Kremlin has exercised tighter control over Russian military operations in Africa since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner Group, in 2023. The Africa Corps is under the Russian Ministry of Defence’s direct command and is overseen by Gen. Andrey Averyanov, commander of Unit 29155 (one of the GRU’s branches). He has been targeted by EU sanctions since December 2024. About 70-80% of Africa Corps personnel are former Wagner fighters, according to Crisis Group expert Franklin Nossiter.
According to US military sources, there are currently around 2,000 mercenaries in Mali, a number set to rise. A Russian defence ministry-Mali agreement will deploy more Africa Corps fighters, according to the Control Risks consultancy.
However, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation reports a shift in style, with the Africa Corps likely to shift the focus from fighting alongside the Malian army to training, like in Niger and Burkina Faso.
The Africa Corps is acquiring more resources. Vessels targeted by European sanctions have been supplying weapons to the Sahel and the African Corps. A Russian-made SU-24 fighter-bomber was seen at an airbase near Bamako on 14 April 2025, as shown in a satellite image from Maxar Technologies. Western military experts say the aircraft was supplied to the Africa Corps. Since last January, 152 mm artillery guns, BTR-80 armoured troop carriers with radio-jamming equipment, Spartak armoured vehicles, tanker and transport trucks have also been delivered to the Malian army and the Africa Corps.

Jihadist group in the Sahel. CC BY-SA 4.0/aharan_kotogo

Since the beginning of the year, three convoys have been transported by sea from Russia to the port of Conakry, before reaching Mali by road. Satellite images identified the Russian vessel Baltic Leader which belongs to Russia’s 900 units shadow fleet which transports weapons, hydrocarbons and wheat to Russian partners across the globe. According to Radio France International, this ship was part of the so-called “Syrian Express” naval fleet between Russia and Syria targeted by NATO sanctions. These sanctions don’t work: Russian cargo ships have continued to dock in Conakry since the start of the year. Russia has found another ally in West Africa following the visit of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Conakry in June 2024. The Siyanie Severa also unloaded trucks in the port of Bata (Equatorial Guinea) on 29 May 2025. In April, a Russian Navy warship escorted these ships after they set off from Kaliningrad.But Russia’s increasing presence on the field has also negative consequences. One of them is the complaint last June by four Tuareg associations in Mali and Burkina Faso (Imouhagh International, Kel Akal, Diaspora of the United States, and the Azawad Solidarity Association) with the International Criminal Court against their nations’ armies and the Africa Corps which are accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Accordingly, since 2022, murders, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, looting and torture, have been perpetrated against their community.
Malian military and Russian mercenaries killed over 500 civilians in Moura in March 2022, also claims the UN.

Nigerien soldiers from the capital of Niamey are moving to Agadez. Photo Richard Bumgardner/US Army

The efficiency of the Russian operations remains to be proven. One of the alleged justifications of the juntas’ leaders for expelling French troops was their incapacity to defeat the jihadists. But neither Wagner or the Africa Corps have obtained much better results. The Russian mercenaries suffered significant setbacks. During the summer 2024, a joint attack of Tuareg separatists and jihadists at Tin Zaouaten near the Algerian border caused an important defeat to the Malian Army and its Russian allies. The reclamation of the Kidal rebel stronghold, in Northern Mali in November 2023 did not put and end to insecurity. Less than a year later, jihadist attacks targeted Bamako, for the first time in nearly a decade. The situation is even more dangerous in Burkina Faso and Niger, where the Africa Corps’ presence remains insufficient to combat the worsening jihadist threat. After a meeting with the three foreign ministers of the Confederation of Sahel States in Moscow, last April, Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov announced Russia’s commitment to help the three  governments to acquire more arms and train a 5,000-strong force. Reinforcements already begun by end March. According Western intelligence sources, during that month, a Russian Air Force Tupolev Tu-154M brought 37 Africa Corps soldiers and 200 Syrian ex-fighters of Bashar al-Assad’s army to the Agadez airbase in northern Niger.

Young Chadian army soldiers. Shutterstock/yoh4nn

Despite these setbacks, Russia could still increase its influence in West Africa. The number of countries interested in military cooperation with Moscow is indeed growing. Togo, Sudan and Chad are considering establishing closer links with the Russia-backed Alliance of Sahel States (AES).  Chadian and Togolese soldiers participated to joint military exercises in 2024 with the AES states, while Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leaders visited Mali and Niger last year.  General al Burhan’s regime is another Russian ally. In February 2025, the Khartoum authorities and the Kremlin agreed to materialize a deal signed in 2017 for a Russian naval on the Red Sea in return for  a Russian “unrestricted military aid” to the SAF. The Togolese foreign minister declared in 2025 that his country was “considering joining the AES” to strengthen regional cooperation and offer sea access to the landlocked countries. In January, 30 Russian military advisers were already in Lomé.

Russian mercenaries in the Central African Republic. CC BY-SA 4.0/CorbeauNews

Despite their setbacks, the relative success of Wagner and of the Africa Corps in stabilizing the Central African Republic regime during a rebel offensive in 2021 has increased Moscow’s appeal elsewhere on the continent as a viable security partner for fragile juntas. Meanwhile, Russia is maintaining a strong presence in Libya through its partnership with the Benghazi warlord, Marshall Khalifa Haftar. It is also strengthening military links with Algeria at the very moment, this country is embroiled in its worse post-independence crisis with France, following Emmanuel Macron’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Last February, Algeria confirmed the purchase of several last generation US $ 50 million worth SU-57 stealth air-fighters, which are the rivals of the American F-35 and of the Chinese J-20 aircraft. (Open Photo:  Emblem of the Russian Africa Corps. SpaceRefugee)

François Misser

 

Mari Luz Canaquiri Murayari. A Steward of the Marañón River.

The river is sacred to the Kukama people, who believe that their ancestors reside on the river floor.  They are ready to protect the Marañón River.  They won the case in court. For the first time in the country’s history, a river was granted legal personhood, with the right to be free-flowing and free of contamination

Traveling more than 1,000 miles, from the Nevado de Yapura glacier in the Andes mountains in Peru through valleys and forests and eventually into the Ucayali River to form the Amazon River, the Marañón River is an outsize presence that shapes an 89-million-acres basin.

The Marañón River and its tributaries are the lifeblood of Peru’s tropical rainforests and support 75% of the country’s tropical wetlands. It is home to pink dolphins, giant river otters, manatees, black caimans, and 156 fish species. The forests in the river basin support thousands of plant species and are a habitat for the critically endangered Peruvian yellow-tailed woolly monkey, jaguars, and spectacled bears.

Along with supporting globally important biodiversity, the Marañón River flows through lands containing some of Peru’s largest oil and gas reserves. In the 1970s, the Peruvian government began granting drilling concessions in the region, leading to the construction of the massive Northern Peruvian Pipeline along the river to coastal cities and ports. The new industry profoundly altered the landscape along the river, and with it, the ecosystems, livelihoods, and health of river communities.

By 2014, the region represented 40% of Peru’s oil production, and the effects have been devastating. Since 1997, there have been more than 60 oil spills along the Marañón River, some of them catastrophic. In addition to the effects on wildlife and local livelihoods, health problems proliferated; a 2021 study revealed elevated levels of lead, mercury, arsenic, and cadmium in the blood of river community members.

In 2010, the Peruvian government announced a plan to build 20 hydroelectric projects along the Marañón River. As of 2024, one has been constructed and two additional projects have been approved.

Mari Luz Canaquiri Murayari, 56, is a Kukama woman who grew up in Shapajilla, a community on the banks of the Marañón River. The river is sacred to the Kukama people, who believe that their ancestors
reside on the river floor.

The Kukama people are among dozens of Indigenous groups living along the Marañón River, serving as traditional stewards of the sacred river and its rainforests. They depend on the river for transport, agriculture, water, and fishing. Their primary diet is fish extracted from the river. As such, river communities are especially vulnerable to water contamination, and, for years, locals have suffered from fevers, diarrhoea, skin rashes, and miscarriages following oil spills.

After a major oil spill on the river in 2000, Mari Luz represented the community with other leaders and observed that there were very few visible women. In 2001, motivated to address the ongoing oil spills threatening the river and the lack of leadership opportunities for women, Mari Luz founded Asociación de Mujeres Huaynakana Kamatahuara Kana (“Hard-working Women’s Association” or “HKK”), a Kukama women’s association addressing social, economic, and environmental challenges.

In 2010, nearly 400 barrels of oil fell off a barge near the port of Saramuro, spilling thousands of gallons of crude oil into the Marañón River. The damage from the incident was catastrophic, causing a massive fish die-off and severe health problems for the Kukama, who had no other option than to consume contaminated river water. Despite suffering from fevers and skin rashes after the incident, Mari Luz stepped in to lodge a formal complaint with regional authorities
– and demand a response.

As the volunteer president of HKK, Mari Luz had been working on environmental issues as well as promoting female leadership. Following the Saramuro spill, she positioned HKK as a key actor on environmental issues and assumed the role of spokesperson for the community.

When the Peruvian government announced a river dredging project in 2014, Mari Luz connected with the Legal Defense Institute – a Peruvian NGO – and began to explore legal strategies for protecting the Marañón River. HKK sued the government to stop the project due to the absence of consultation with local communities.

Ultimately successful in stopping the dredging project, the experience educated Mari Luz about the environmental consultation process—and the Peruvian legal system’s lack of recognition of Indigenous stewardship of natural resources like forests and rivers.

By 2020, HKK had grown to include 29 Kukama communities, helping to position the association to formally act in defense of the river.

Around the same period, successful rights of nature cases granting legal personhood to rivers in New Zealand and Colombia opened the door for Mari Luz’ vision to become reality.

In September 2021, HKK, with the support of the Legal Defense Institute, International Rivers, and Earth Law Center, filed a lawsuit seeking recognition of the legal personhood of the Marañón River to protect it from oil spills and other forms of destruction.

During the legal proceedings, Mari Luz became the public face of the case. With HKK, she organized community meetings, spoke at press conferences, and was among a handful of Kukama women who testified in court. While the case progressed, multiple new oil spills on the Marañón and Amazon rivers drew greater attention to the issue. In response to the spills, HKK led protest marches in Iquitos—the provincial capital—and drew significant media coverage, increasing pressure on the government to act against the ongoing contamination.

In March 2024, after more than two years of litigation, the federal court ruled in favour of the Kukama and the Marañón River. The historic decision recognized the river’s intrinsic value and inherent right to be free of environmental contamination and remain free-flowing.

This was the first river to be granted legal rights in Peru. The court found the Peruvian government—and its state-run oil company, Petroperú – to violate those rights, ordering authorities to immediately address the oil spills and create a protection plan for the river and its tributaries. The decision provides an unprecedented level of legal protection for the river and enables the Kukama and other Indigenous groups to be active stakeholders in the conservation of the river.

HKK’s victory represents a potential sea change in the protection of not only the Marañón but all rivers and ecosystems in Peru. Other Indigenous communities have since filed similar cases to protect other rivers throughout Peru. Outside of Peru, the case gained substantial media attention and builds momentum for the rights of nature movement across Latin America. Today, Mari Luz and HKK are supporting the creation of a river protection plan.

Last April, Mari Luz Canaquiri Murayari received the Goldman Environmental Prize, known as the “Green Nobel Prize.” (The Goldman Environmental Report – Photo Goldman Environmental Prize)

Cameroon. Improving the quality of life.

In just two decades, the small Dominican health centre in the Mvog-Betsi neighbourhood has become one of the best hospitals in the Cameroonian capital. Founded by a coalition of Dominican women’s congregations to provide health care to the most vulnerable, it now boasts 180 beds and specialized services, including a palliative care unit and a centre for people living with HIV/AIDS.

At first glance, the hospital appears to be a labyrinth, where spaces and corners are utilised to provide all the necessary services. The dental clinic occupies two small rooms, serving an average of 210 patients per month. In contrast, the ophthalmology service, which has more space, receives over 400 patients per month and is associated with an optical shop where lenses for eyeglasses are manufactured.
The hospital’s blood bank has a stock of 250 bags of all blood types. It also has a pharmacy that only dispenses drugs prescribed by hospital doctors. Another centre of energy in the hospital is the laboratory, which performs more than 12,000 tests and analyses per month, from the simplest, such as the diagnosis of malaria, to the most complicated, such as lipid profiles or bacterial cultures.

The dental clinic occupies two small rooms with an average of 210 patients per month.

The origin of the hospital dates back to 2005. The then Master General of the Order of Preachers, Father Carlos Alfonso Azpiroz, encouraged the different orders of the Dominican charism to work together. Responding to this call, seven Dominican women’s congregations decided to join forces to create a health centre where the poorest and most vulnerable could have access to medical care. On November 3 of that year, the Dominican Health Centre was inaugurated in the Mvog-Betsi neighbourhood of Yaoundé, but it was soon found to be too small.
In April 2006, the first stone of the future hospital was laid, which was inaugurated on February 7, 2008. However, the health needs of the population made it necessary to construct a new building, and a third is currently under construction to house the new maternity ward. The current one is too small to adequately accommodate the 200 women who choose to give birth at the centre every month.

“We never send anyone away”
Five of the original seven congregations remain. All the nuns are African and belong to the Dominican Sisters of Blessed Imelda, the Dominican Sisters of the Presentation, the Dominican Sisters of the Annunciation, the Dominican Missionaries of the Holy Family, and the Congregation of Saint Dominic, which has assumed the general direction from the beginning. Sister Judith Moche, from Cameroon, is the director of the Saint Martin de Porres hospital.
Sister Moche says: “The centre was born as a social work to help the poorest and we remain faithful to this principle. We never send anyone away without first receiving at least the emergency health care they need. First, they are treated and then we see if they can pay or not”. The director confesses the inability of the centre to self-finance and for this reason, accepts aid that comes from both abroad and within the country.

Morning meeting of all hospital staff.

The hospital recently received a modern tunnel incubator for phototherapy. Nurse Nathalie, head of the service, says, “It has already started saving lives because it offers rapid results in children with severe jaundice and other pathologies”.
Nursing and medical students from both Europe and Cameroonian nursing schools attend the hospital. Not only that, but also religious men and women, young people and women in training from different congregations, come to carry out their apostolate in the hospital. Sr. Moche says: “We recently welcomed a large group of Dominican novices and asked them to come on Wednesdays so as not to have them coincide with other groups. We distributed them in different services, even in the maternity ward, because everywhere there are people who need to be listened to, both patients and their companions. Even if the religious do not intervene at a medical level, they do a great service in that essential part of listening and accompanying the sick”.

Social Services and the CIF
Marlène Claudine Melingui is a social worker and coordinates Social Services, which is responsible for identifying all the poor people who cannot afford medical care. “When we determine the degree of poverty of a person, we help them with a total or partial reduction in the cost of care. Every month, about 100 people receive help from the hospital,” explains Melingui.
In addition, the Social Services visit the neediest people to ensure they are continuing their treatment. Within the hospital, there is the Itinerant Training Community (CIF), which in coordination with the Social Services, is committed to disease prevention and the pastoral care of the sick. Every day, it organizes conferences in the hospital waiting room on topics such as cancer prevention, AIDS and tuberculosis. The members of the CIF visit the sick in their rooms, pray with them, listen to them and, if they need to receive the sacraments, call the priests to assist them. They also help prepare the two monthly Masses celebrated at the hospital, which are attended by many patients and their companions. The centre has a Dominican ethos, which is training, education and preaching, and could not limit itself to simply being a hospital.

Dr. Jocelyne Cheukak Ngangom,  in charge of the clinical and psychological monitoring of patients with HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.

In 2014, the Dominican Hospital Centre, San Martin de Porres, was the first in Cameroon to open a palliative care unit. The palliative care unit is currently located on one floor of the hospital. In addition to the wards, it has a living room where patients can meet with their relatives. Some of the patients are hospitalised, while others are cared for at home, where they are cared for by the medical team, made up of doctors, nurses, psychologists and a priest in charge of the chaplaincy. According to one of the nurses, Geoffroy Essama, “The goal of everyone is to improve the quality of the patient’s life so that they leave this world with the least possible pain.” Essama confesses that the main challenge is finding morphine or other substitute drugs, because “They are difficult to obtain and the demand is so great that we are always running out of drugs”. What is not lacking, neither in the palliative care unit nor in the rest of the services of San Martín de Porres, is the human warmth, dedication and the desire to serve to be found in this social hospital whose inspiration lies in the Christian faith, which is the source
of life and hope.

Marlène Claudine Melingui is a social worker and coordinator of Social Services.

Although the majority of HIV-positive people now have access to effective retroviral drugs, new infections and relaxation in the fight against the virus can increase infections. All this has justified the existence in San Martin de Porres of a service like UPEC, directed by Dr. Jocelyne Cheukak Ngangom, who is in charge of the clinical and psychological monitoring of patients with HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.
UPEC currently accompanies around 2,300 patients. Cheukak states, “Every year we identify and integrate more than 180 new cases into our program.” The hospital is responsible for setting up the treatment and administering the doses to patients, the cost of which is covered by the Cameroonian government. In addition to the six people who report directly to the hospital, UPEC employs about 20 people from partner associations, mostly administrative staff and social workers who ensure that patients take their medications. (Open Photo: St Martin de Porres hospital in the Mvog Betsi neighbourhood of Yaoundé)

Text & Photos. Enrique Bayo

A Wise Grandmother.

Like the other farmers, Taro also grew rice, wheat, and vegetables, living in peace and contentment. However, things
never remain the same.

One time, there was no rainfall, and the drought-like conditions parched the fields and dried the wells. Gradually, food became very scarce, and they feared the day when there would be no food at all.

The headman of the village had to take notice of the impending crisis. “We must think of some ways to resolve this problem,” announced the headman at the assembly of the villagers he had called. “Each person must have some food,” voiced one farmer, “but nothing can
grow without water.”

“I know. Now the only solution is to migrate to the adjoining mountainside. Let the young people remain here as they are strong and can work hard to improve the situation,” said the headman. After a moment’s silence, he continued, “All those over sixty should leave and go to the mountain village, where it will be easier to procure food.”

All the families bade a sad farewell to their loved ones with whom they parted and journeyed on. But not Taro, who could not bear the agony of parting due to his intense emotional attachment. He quietly
guided his grandmother to a dark recess at the back of the courtyard where she lived.

Silently, he supplied her with food and attended to all her needs. However, troubles seemed to follow each other. A few weeks later, the village headman had to post a notice that was important for
everyone to read.

It was from the warlord of the neighbouring town, who threatened to take half the land if the villagers failed to answer the three riddles sent by him. But if they answered the riddles correctly, he promised to provide the villagers with all the food they needed.

Taro quickly ran home to tell his grandmother about the riddles. In case she could solve them, as he hoped, the village headman might allow his grandmother to remain in the village. “Grandmother, listen, please listen carefully. Can you tell which part of the log is close to the top and which part is closer to the root?”

The old lady closed her eyes to think for a while and then said to Taro, “Float the log on water. The part closer to the root will sink, but the part closer to the top will remain afloat.” Taro beamed with happiness. Feeling certain that the answer was correct, he asked the second riddle. “How can you make a rope of ashes, Grandma?”

Her forehead creased as she closed her eyes to think hard. She opened her eyes. “Take a strong rope. Pour salt all over the rope. Light one end of the rope; it will burn slowly inch by inch, and what is left at the end is the coil of ashes.”

“Wow, that is great. You are a superb grandmother! So, now can I ask the third riddle?” “Go ahead. Let me see if I can answer.” “Well, well, this is the last one, Grandma. How can you pass the silk thread through a hollow pipe that is crooked and curved?”

The grandmother gave a hearty laugh. “That is easy. Take the thread, tie the leg of an ant to it, put some honey at one end of the pipe, and push the ant from the other end. The ant is sure to crawl through for
the sake of the honey at the other end, however crooked or curved
the pipe may be.

“How wonderful is my grandmother!” Taro was thrilled. He jumped and clapped with joy. “I am lucky to have such a wise grandmother,” and with these words, he rushed to the village headman. He told the headman all the answers, which he acknowledged were correct.

The headman was amazed to see the wisdom of such a young boy in his village. “Oh, no Sir, it was not me who answered,” said Taro humbly, bowing his head, “It was my grandmother who answered all of them.” The headman felt remorse and shame for having deemed all the old people useless. He thanked Taro and showered him and his grandmother with gifts, whose wisdom had saved the village.

Next, he ordered all the old people to be brought back to the village with all due respect, where they lived comfortably and happily. It rained, and all the wells filled. The land prospered again, thanks to Taro’s grandmother.

Folktale from Japan

Witnesses of the Jubilee: Father Ramin, Martyr of Hope for the Amazon Forest.

“I love you all and I love justice. Let us not approve violence, even if we are treated violently. The Father who is speaking to you has received death threats. Dear brothers, if my life belongs to you, so will my death.” Forty years have passed since the murder of Father Ezechiel Ramin, a young Comboni missionary in the Amazon Forest.

As the old jeep moves swiftly along the narrow, dirt road through the forests of the Amazon, the sunlight streams down through the thick undergrowth and the eyes of the curious follow the movement of the car.  The situation is becoming difficult and Fr. Ezekiel feels the tension, aware as he is that armed conflict could break out which would affect the families of the peasants most of all. They and their many children.
For some weeks now, a group of families had occupied land on the Katuva ranch, whose property had been illegally occupied by some farmers of the area.
The ranchers had set up roadblocks with heavily armed guards on the approach roads, thus isolating the peasants.On the previous day, Fr. Ezekiel, together with the president of the rural union of Cacoal, Adilio de Souza, had visited the nearby community of Road 7. While speaking with those settlers, he had told them they should do something immediately about the case of the peasants on Katuva ranch.

Father Ezechiel and two community leaders. “Justice is achieved by peace, not with weapons. File swm

After the meeting, he had agreed with Adilio to go the following day to Katuva to meet the peasants, reassure them and advise them not to make the situation worse.
And so, early in the morning, he left with Adilio and arrived at 11.00 am  at Katuva Ranch, in the municipality of Aripuanà (Mato Grosso), about 100 Km from Cacoal.
Fr. Ezekiel immediately had a meeting with a dozen or so people. He advised the peasants to steer clear of violence and said, among other things: “You must be patient for a few more days. Justice is achieved by peace, not with weapons. If you take up arms, you will come off worse, because the others are too powerful. And that is what the pistoleros want, so that they can wipe you out, under the pretext of legitimate self-defence”. The meeting was quite short and left Fr. Ezekiel convinced that he had persuaded the farmers to stay calm and not to resort to violence. Afterwards, he and Adilio set out on their fateful return journey only to find the road blocked after a few kilometres by an off-road vehicle.
Before they could realise what was happening, a machine gun and pistols opened fire on the Jeep. The fire was concentrated on Fr. Ezekiel; in fact, he was struck by more than 100 bullets. Adilio was only slightly wounded; years later, it came to light that Adilio had worked in collusion with the assassins. He had led the priest to his death.
Hearing the shots, some peasants approached, but could do nothing to help. Fr. Ezekiel was already dead, lying in a pool of blood. One of them left on foot for Cacoal, reaching the town late that night and informing the Fathers at the mission. Having spoken with the Bishop, they decided to go to the place of the shooting, where they arrived three hours later.

In memory of Father Ezechiel in Rondolândia, Mato Grosso. File swm

Fr. Ezekiel was lying fifty metres from the Jeep, his body riddled with bullets and shotgun pellets. His shirt and trousers were soaked in blood. His neck had been hit by a close range shot from a rifle. His arms were spread out like Christ on the Cross. His watch was still on his wrist and around his neck there was his coconut chain, a gift from his Surui Indians. His usual sandals were on his feet. The Jeep had not been touched: the keys of the house, the hammock he always took with him to rest in, his personal documents and his camera – nothing was missing. The purpose of the attack was simply to kill Fr. Ezekiel.At that moment, someone remembered what Fr. Ezekiel had said a few days earlier: “I love you all and I love justice. Let us not approve violence, even if we are treated violently. The Father who is speaking to you has received death threats. Dear brothers, if my life belongs to you, so will my death.”

Love is stronger than death
Ezekiel Ramin was born in Padua, a city in northern Italy, in 1953. He attended a local college. In 1972, he joined the Comboni Missionaries, was ordained a priest in 1980, and left for Brazil four years later, assigned to Cacoal in Rondonia, a state in the northeast of the country.

“Love is stronger than death”

It did not take long for Fr. Ezekiel to become aware of the struggle for land that afflicted the entire region. He found himself in a situation of considerable injustice, due to the lack of agrarian reform. Essentially, the situation was one of systematic violence, where the powerful were increasing their holdings by stealing land from the indigenous people, often after killing or expelling them. He once wrote in a letter: “Around me the people are dying while the landowners increase, the poor are humiliated, the police kill the peasants and all the reserves of the Indios are being invaded. My eyes find it hard to see the history of God here on earth. The Cross is the solidarity of God which assumes the process and its pain, not to make it last forever but to end it. The way He wants to end it is not by force or dominion but by the way of love. Christ lived and preached this new dimension. The fear of death did not make him desist from his project of love. Love is stronger than death.”
His commitment brought him into conflict with the powerful and with the authorities. He received several death threats. On 25th July 1985, he died at the tender age of 32, only five years after his ordination.

Private economic interests
More than forty years have passed since Fr. Ezekiel’s death, but the situation remains unchanged. Agrarian reform is progressing very slowly.  Last year, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva launched the ‘Land of the People’ programme, which aims to reform agrarian policy in the country by defining the land that can be allocated to family farmers.  The executive expects the programme to help resolve agrarian conflicts and increase food production. By the end of Lula’s term, the goal is to reach 295,000 families, of which 74,000 are settled and 221,000 are recognised or regularised in existing settlement plots.

Amazon Forest. Instead of protecting land designated for land reform from mining pressures, private economic interests are given priority. 123rf

Lula’s government has not yet repealed the previous government’s law authorising mining and other industrial projects on protected lands in the Amazon. According to data from the National Mining Agency, as of January 2022, there were 20,000 active mining claims involving land reform settlements. Among the 8,372 settlements nationwide, 3,309 (39%) are subject to mining claims, nearly half of which are in the Brazilian Amazon (1,480 projects, or 44.7% of settlements with mining interests).  For Amazon Watch, Brazilian civil society organisations and social movements united in defence of land rights, instead of protecting land designated for land reform from mining pressures, private economic interests are given priority. This trend underscores the increasing normalisation and acceptance of the preference given to economic interests over land redistribution and food production policies, which are essential to address social, environmental, and food inequalities.

Pedro Santacruz

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Far more than just a plot of land.

On November 10, 1995, the Nigerian government executed nine activists from the Ogoni people, the majority of the population of the Niger Delta, for opposing the oil extraction of the Royal Dutch Shell on their land. Among them was Ken Saro-Wiwa, a well-known author and winner of the Goldman Environmental Prize.

According to Amnesty International, the executions were part of a plan by the Nigerian Armed Forces, with the complicity of the Anglo-Dutch company, to silence the protests of the Ogoni People’s Survival Movement, which is a movement for the survival of the Ogoni people who not only depend on natural resources for their livelihoods but also use ecosystems for cultural and spiritual purposes.

These killings sparked international protests against Shell and led several countries to temporarily suspend diplomatic relations with Nigeria. The United Nations Environment Programme documented the devastating effects of the oil spills in Ogoniland and made urgent recommendations for the cleanup of the land.

Despite this, almost 30 years after the killing of the environmentalists, thousands of people in the region continue to suffer from serious health problems due to contaminated food and water. Likewise, many Afro-descendant peoples in Latin America and the Caribbean have been denouncing for decades the invasion of their ancestral territories for the extraction of natural resources and acts of violence against community leaders who defend their right to a healthy environment.

Colombia is the country with the highest number of environmental defenders murdered, according to a list published by Global Witness. Between 2016 and 2024, the United Nations confirmed the killing of 248 activists who fought against mining and oil exploitation in the country, most of them indigenous and of African origin.

The search for wealth and political power led European nations to promote extractivism as a development model during colonial expansion. This legitimised the occupation of territories, the plundering of raw materials and the enslavement of populations in the Global South.

In today’s terms, this amounts to the extraction of materials used for digital transformation and energy transition and the production of models already used during centuries of colonial exploitation, land dispossession and subjugation of historically racialised communities.

This would not be possible without the support of governments that respond with the use of police and military force to the resistance of people who seek to protect their territories. There is a direct relationship between land and the survival of some populations that not only depend on natural resources for their sustenance, but also use ecosystems for cultural and spiritual purposes.

These populations must be consulted and taken into account before any operation is carried out in their environment. However, the persistent violation of human rights suffered by local populations reveals that the doctrines of racial superiority, according to which the lives of black and indigenous people must sustain the privileges of Western societies, remain deeply rooted.

Eradicating the global dynamics of racism and dehumanisation that advantage some groups at the expense of others is a collective task that requires profound changes in our social, economic and political structures. A sustainable world for all will be possible when our societies understand that peace is not only the absence of war, but intrinsically implies respect for the rights of people living in harmony with nature.

Isabelle Mamadou

Africa. The Turkish friend.

President Erdoğan’s country has built a relationship of trust with many African partners, also taking advantage of their growing detachment from the West. Cooperation, investments and defence have done the rest: the Anatolian presence on the continent is increasingly relevant. Libya, Egypt and Somalia, three countries under scrutiny

If there is a continent where Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to have no detractors at the moment, it is Africa. The reason is not in the Opening Africa plans launched in 2005 and 2008, or in the Africa Action Plan of 2013, or even in the forum on the Turkey-Africa partnership held every year in Istanbul. African countries are used to proclamations and projects launched by different countries for decades. Initiatives that prove ineffective, if not unsuccessful, or even counterproductive, when put to the test. A film seen several times, which, however, has nothing to do with the pragmatism shown by Turkey in Africa in the last 20 years.

President of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan. CC BY 4.0/Pres.Office

Since 2003, Erdoğan has made 41 visits to African countries, the number of Turkish embassies has risen from 12 to 44 and the Turkish national airline has reached 61 destinations across the continent. Trade has also reached 25 billion dollars and Erdoğan has no intention of stopping: the declared objective is 75 billion.
Turkey’s ascent has been continuous and rapid, based on a precise strategy. The bridgehead of Turkish interests in Africa has been for years the agency for cooperation and development, Tika, which can count on more than 22 offices on the continent. Over the years, this body has allowed Turkish penetration through humanitarian interventions: mobile clinics, hospitals, schools, water and electricity distribution systems, which benefit the local populations.”We can operate in Africa because, unlike those who preceded us, we have no imperialist agenda”, the line dictated by Hakan Fidan, who before becoming a foreign minister and head of intelligence had led Tika. A line of intervention that avoids forms of cultural assimilation and that seems instead to pursue a modus operandi that harks back to the tradition of the Ottoman Empire, aiming for a relationship of trust that paves the way for economic agreements.

Investments and defence
Agreements constitute the second step of the Turkish strategy: they translate into investments and consequently into the growth of Turkish interests, which must be protected.
The lack of security is a factor that has caused cooperation plans to fail in the past. Erdoğan and Fidan know this, and for this reason, the protection of missions and investments has always been a priority. Here comes the action against local governments, who are offered supplies of weapons, training programs and agreements in the defence sector.

The Turkish defence consulting company SADAT. The company is led by people close to the Turkish government. Photo: Sadat

The aim is to improve the equipment of local forces, increase their number and put them in a position to protect both the country and Turkish interests. Where this is not possible or there are immediate needs, Sadat comes into play, a controversial company of contractors to which operations carried out in the shadows have been attributed. This company is led by people close to the Turkish government who have denied being involved in secret operations and reiterated that Sadat’s mission is to provide training and advice.
In addition to Sadat, Ankara has not hesitated in the past to send Syrian mercenaries to defend its interests. It happened in Libya, but also in Nigeria, Niger and Burkina Faso.

Broadening relations
In short, Ankara trains both doctors and the military, but it also looks to the future. An example of this is the Maarif Foundation, which currently runs 175 schools in 26 countries. The institute trains students who, once at university, can also apply for a scholarship in Turkey.
A pragmatic strategy that has allowed Ankara to become a key player in the Horn of Africa, take on a leading role in North Africa and see its importance grow in the Sahel and Central-West Africa. Somalia and Ethiopia have been firmly in Turkey’s orbit for years now.
After having concluded an important defence agreement with Kenya in 2023, memoranda of understanding to be signed with Djibouti have already been announced.

Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone. CC BY-SA 4.0/ Bayhaluk

In North Africa, Erdogan has established himself as the main actor in the Libyan crisis, has recently mended relations and formed an alliance with Egypt that extends from Gaza to the future of its Libyan neighbour, in addition to having sold its drones to Morocco and Tunisia.
However, Turkey’s constant rise in Africa has also been favoured by the perception of the failure of post-colonial policies implemented by Western countries.
Once upon a time, it was all Paris. France’s gradual detachment and loss of influence has allowed Ankara to advance in the Sahel and push for the opening of embassies in Mali (2010), Burkina Faso, and Niger (2012).
In the Sahel, Turkey has acted on two axes: mending institutional relations and helping the local population. In Mali, for example, a large mosque was built for the Malian Islamic High Council and a second was restored in the hometown of former president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

Niger. In Agadez, the Turkish government took charge of the restoration of the Great Mosque. 123rf

In Agadez, the Turkish government took charge of the restoration of the Great Mosque and the palace of Sultan Air, heir to a family whose founder was born in Istanbul in 1400, according to a legend that is always useful for rhetorical purposes.
Ankara’s winning move, however, once again consisted in assisting local populations. Hospitals were opened and schools renovated in Bamako and Niamey between 2017 and 2019, in addition to numerous mobile clinics donated and then sent to the poorest corners of the two countries, where systems for the distribution of water and electricity were set up. The numbers of Turkish trade in the Sahel are still far from those of France and China, but have been growing steadily for ten years.

Heavy artillery
It was inevitable that the intervention should extend to defence: since 2016, Ankara has intensified its collaboration in the Sahel, providing training for officers of the Malian army, who were guaranteed supplies of light weapons and ammunition; Niger and Burkina Faso have purchased Turkish TB2 Bayraktar drones.In West Africa, too, Turkey is ready to challenge France. In Senegal, a new embassy was inaugurated in 2022, but above all a new Olympic stadium built by the Turkish company Summa, opened by Erdoğan two weeks after Senegal won the Africa Cup of Nations for the first time in its history. Erdoğan was also the first Turkish president to visit Togo and Guinea-Bissau (2021), where the inevitable cooperation agreements were concluded.

During a recent visit by Rwandan President Paul Kagame to Ankara, Erdoğan declared that he was ready to mediate in the ongoing conflict in the northeastern provinces of the DR. Congo. (Photo. Pres. Office)

In Central and Southern Africa, Turkey has recently taken important steps with Angola, which has asked Ankara for the drones, but could soon take on a much greater weight. During a recent visit by Rwandan President Paul Kagame to Ankara, Erdoğan declared that he was ready to mediate in the ongoing conflict in the northeastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
A difficult mediation, but for which the Turkish leader is ready to use the agreements already in place with the two countries to convince the parties with the promise of future advantages.
In addition to mediation, Turkey is ready to deploy another weapon for its rise. “Everywhere they ask me for information on our drones,” declared the President returning from a trip to Africa. The TB2 Bayraktar could not have counted on a better advertisement than the Libyan crisis. After having defended Tripoli, they were ordered by Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Niger and Chad.
The Turkish drones seem perfect for ensuring control of vast territories and countering rebels and Islamists, but they could also become the next card to play for Erdoğan, to increase his weight in Africa. (GdD)  –  (African Union and Turkey, national flag. 123rf)

 

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