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Witnesses of the Jubilee: Father Ramin, Martyr of Hope for the Amazon Forest.

“I love you all and I love justice. Let us not approve violence, even if we are treated violently. The Father who is speaking to you has received death threats. Dear brothers, if my life belongs to you, so will my death.” Forty years have passed since the murder of Father Ezechiel Ramin, a young Comboni missionary in the Amazon Forest.

As the old jeep moves swiftly along the narrow, dirt road through the forests of the Amazon, the sunlight streams down through the thick undergrowth and the eyes of the curious follow the movement of the car.  The situation is becoming difficult and Fr. Ezekiel feels the tension, aware as he is that armed conflict could break out which would affect the families of the peasants most of all. They and their many children.
For some weeks now, a group of families had occupied land on the Katuva ranch, whose property had been illegally occupied by some farmers of the area.
The ranchers had set up roadblocks with heavily armed guards on the approach roads, thus isolating the peasants.On the previous day, Fr. Ezekiel, together with the president of the rural union of Cacoal, Adilio de Souza, had visited the nearby community of Road 7. While speaking with those settlers, he had told them they should do something immediately about the case of the peasants on Katuva ranch.

Father Ezechiel and two community leaders. “Justice is achieved by peace, not with weapons. File swm

After the meeting, he had agreed with Adilio to go the following day to Katuva to meet the peasants, reassure them and advise them not to make the situation worse.
And so, early in the morning, he left with Adilio and arrived at 11.00 am  at Katuva Ranch, in the municipality of Aripuanà (Mato Grosso), about 100 Km from Cacoal.
Fr. Ezekiel immediately had a meeting with a dozen or so people. He advised the peasants to steer clear of violence and said, among other things: “You must be patient for a few more days. Justice is achieved by peace, not with weapons. If you take up arms, you will come off worse, because the others are too powerful. And that is what the pistoleros want, so that they can wipe you out, under the pretext of legitimate self-defence”. The meeting was quite short and left Fr. Ezekiel convinced that he had persuaded the farmers to stay calm and not to resort to violence. Afterwards, he and Adilio set out on their fateful return journey only to find the road blocked after a few kilometres by an off-road vehicle.
Before they could realise what was happening, a machine gun and pistols opened fire on the Jeep. The fire was concentrated on Fr. Ezekiel; in fact, he was struck by more than 100 bullets. Adilio was only slightly wounded; years later, it came to light that Adilio had worked in collusion with the assassins. He had led the priest to his death.
Hearing the shots, some peasants approached, but could do nothing to help. Fr. Ezekiel was already dead, lying in a pool of blood. One of them left on foot for Cacoal, reaching the town late that night and informing the Fathers at the mission. Having spoken with the Bishop, they decided to go to the place of the shooting, where they arrived three hours later.

In memory of Father Ezechiel in Rondolândia, Mato Grosso. File swm

Fr. Ezekiel was lying fifty metres from the Jeep, his body riddled with bullets and shotgun pellets. His shirt and trousers were soaked in blood. His neck had been hit by a close range shot from a rifle. His arms were spread out like Christ on the Cross. His watch was still on his wrist and around his neck there was his coconut chain, a gift from his Surui Indians. His usual sandals were on his feet. The Jeep had not been touched: the keys of the house, the hammock he always took with him to rest in, his personal documents and his camera – nothing was missing. The purpose of the attack was simply to kill Fr. Ezekiel.At that moment, someone remembered what Fr. Ezekiel had said a few days earlier: “I love you all and I love justice. Let us not approve violence, even if we are treated violently. The Father who is speaking to you has received death threats. Dear brothers, if my life belongs to you, so will my death.”

Love is stronger than death
Ezekiel Ramin was born in Padua, a city in northern Italy, in 1953. He attended a local college. In 1972, he joined the Comboni Missionaries, was ordained a priest in 1980, and left for Brazil four years later, assigned to Cacoal in Rondonia, a state in the northeast of the country.

“Love is stronger than death”

It did not take long for Fr. Ezekiel to become aware of the struggle for land that afflicted the entire region. He found himself in a situation of considerable injustice, due to the lack of agrarian reform. Essentially, the situation was one of systematic violence, where the powerful were increasing their holdings by stealing land from the indigenous people, often after killing or expelling them. He once wrote in a letter: “Around me the people are dying while the landowners increase, the poor are humiliated, the police kill the peasants and all the reserves of the Indios are being invaded. My eyes find it hard to see the history of God here on earth. The Cross is the solidarity of God which assumes the process and its pain, not to make it last forever but to end it. The way He wants to end it is not by force or dominion but by the way of love. Christ lived and preached this new dimension. The fear of death did not make him desist from his project of love. Love is stronger than death.”
His commitment brought him into conflict with the powerful and with the authorities. He received several death threats. On 25th July 1985, he died at the tender age of 32, only five years after his ordination.

Private economic interests
More than forty years have passed since Fr. Ezekiel’s death, but the situation remains unchanged. Agrarian reform is progressing very slowly.  Last year, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva launched the ‘Land of the People’ programme, which aims to reform agrarian policy in the country by defining the land that can be allocated to family farmers.  The executive expects the programme to help resolve agrarian conflicts and increase food production. By the end of Lula’s term, the goal is to reach 295,000 families, of which 74,000 are settled and 221,000 are recognised or regularised in existing settlement plots.

Amazon Forest. Instead of protecting land designated for land reform from mining pressures, private economic interests are given priority. 123rf

Lula’s government has not yet repealed the previous government’s law authorising mining and other industrial projects on protected lands in the Amazon. According to data from the National Mining Agency, as of January 2022, there were 20,000 active mining claims involving land reform settlements. Among the 8,372 settlements nationwide, 3,309 (39%) are subject to mining claims, nearly half of which are in the Brazilian Amazon (1,480 projects, or 44.7% of settlements with mining interests).  For Amazon Watch, Brazilian civil society organisations and social movements united in defence of land rights, instead of protecting land designated for land reform from mining pressures, private economic interests are given priority. This trend underscores the increasing normalisation and acceptance of the preference given to economic interests over land redistribution and food production policies, which are essential to address social, environmental, and food inequalities.

Pedro Santacruz

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Far more than just a plot of land.

On November 10, 1995, the Nigerian government executed nine activists from the Ogoni people, the majority of the population of the Niger Delta, for opposing the oil extraction of the Royal Dutch Shell on their land. Among them was Ken Saro-Wiwa, a well-known author and winner of the Goldman Environmental Prize.

According to Amnesty International, the executions were part of a plan by the Nigerian Armed Forces, with the complicity of the Anglo-Dutch company, to silence the protests of the Ogoni People’s Survival Movement, which is a movement for the survival of the Ogoni people who not only depend on natural resources for their livelihoods but also use ecosystems for cultural and spiritual purposes.

These killings sparked international protests against Shell and led several countries to temporarily suspend diplomatic relations with Nigeria. The United Nations Environment Programme documented the devastating effects of the oil spills in Ogoniland and made urgent recommendations for the cleanup of the land.

Despite this, almost 30 years after the killing of the environmentalists, thousands of people in the region continue to suffer from serious health problems due to contaminated food and water. Likewise, many Afro-descendant peoples in Latin America and the Caribbean have been denouncing for decades the invasion of their ancestral territories for the extraction of natural resources and acts of violence against community leaders who defend their right to a healthy environment.

Colombia is the country with the highest number of environmental defenders murdered, according to a list published by Global Witness. Between 2016 and 2024, the United Nations confirmed the killing of 248 activists who fought against mining and oil exploitation in the country, most of them indigenous and of African origin.

The search for wealth and political power led European nations to promote extractivism as a development model during colonial expansion. This legitimised the occupation of territories, the plundering of raw materials and the enslavement of populations in the Global South.

In today’s terms, this amounts to the extraction of materials used for digital transformation and energy transition and the production of models already used during centuries of colonial exploitation, land dispossession and subjugation of historically racialised communities.

This would not be possible without the support of governments that respond with the use of police and military force to the resistance of people who seek to protect their territories. There is a direct relationship between land and the survival of some populations that not only depend on natural resources for their sustenance, but also use ecosystems for cultural and spiritual purposes.

These populations must be consulted and taken into account before any operation is carried out in their environment. However, the persistent violation of human rights suffered by local populations reveals that the doctrines of racial superiority, according to which the lives of black and indigenous people must sustain the privileges of Western societies, remain deeply rooted.

Eradicating the global dynamics of racism and dehumanisation that advantage some groups at the expense of others is a collective task that requires profound changes in our social, economic and political structures. A sustainable world for all will be possible when our societies understand that peace is not only the absence of war, but intrinsically implies respect for the rights of people living in harmony with nature.

Isabelle Mamadou

Africa. The Turkish friend.

President Erdoğan’s country has built a relationship of trust with many African partners, also taking advantage of their growing detachment from the West. Cooperation, investments and defence have done the rest: the Anatolian presence on the continent is increasingly relevant. Libya, Egypt and Somalia, three countries under scrutiny

If there is a continent where Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to have no detractors at the moment, it is Africa. The reason is not in the Opening Africa plans launched in 2005 and 2008, or in the Africa Action Plan of 2013, or even in the forum on the Turkey-Africa partnership held every year in Istanbul. African countries are used to proclamations and projects launched by different countries for decades. Initiatives that prove ineffective, if not unsuccessful, or even counterproductive, when put to the test. A film seen several times, which, however, has nothing to do with the pragmatism shown by Turkey in Africa in the last 20 years.

President of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan. CC BY 4.0/Pres.Office

Since 2003, Erdoğan has made 41 visits to African countries, the number of Turkish embassies has risen from 12 to 44 and the Turkish national airline has reached 61 destinations across the continent. Trade has also reached 25 billion dollars and Erdoğan has no intention of stopping: the declared objective is 75 billion.
Turkey’s ascent has been continuous and rapid, based on a precise strategy. The bridgehead of Turkish interests in Africa has been for years the agency for cooperation and development, Tika, which can count on more than 22 offices on the continent. Over the years, this body has allowed Turkish penetration through humanitarian interventions: mobile clinics, hospitals, schools, water and electricity distribution systems, which benefit the local populations.”We can operate in Africa because, unlike those who preceded us, we have no imperialist agenda”, the line dictated by Hakan Fidan, who before becoming a foreign minister and head of intelligence had led Tika. A line of intervention that avoids forms of cultural assimilation and that seems instead to pursue a modus operandi that harks back to the tradition of the Ottoman Empire, aiming for a relationship of trust that paves the way for economic agreements.

Investments and defence
Agreements constitute the second step of the Turkish strategy: they translate into investments and consequently into the growth of Turkish interests, which must be protected.
The lack of security is a factor that has caused cooperation plans to fail in the past. Erdoğan and Fidan know this, and for this reason, the protection of missions and investments has always been a priority. Here comes the action against local governments, who are offered supplies of weapons, training programs and agreements in the defence sector.

The Turkish defence consulting company SADAT. The company is led by people close to the Turkish government. Photo: Sadat

The aim is to improve the equipment of local forces, increase their number and put them in a position to protect both the country and Turkish interests. Where this is not possible or there are immediate needs, Sadat comes into play, a controversial company of contractors to which operations carried out in the shadows have been attributed. This company is led by people close to the Turkish government who have denied being involved in secret operations and reiterated that Sadat’s mission is to provide training and advice.
In addition to Sadat, Ankara has not hesitated in the past to send Syrian mercenaries to defend its interests. It happened in Libya, but also in Nigeria, Niger and Burkina Faso.

Broadening relations
In short, Ankara trains both doctors and the military, but it also looks to the future. An example of this is the Maarif Foundation, which currently runs 175 schools in 26 countries. The institute trains students who, once at university, can also apply for a scholarship in Turkey.
A pragmatic strategy that has allowed Ankara to become a key player in the Horn of Africa, take on a leading role in North Africa and see its importance grow in the Sahel and Central-West Africa. Somalia and Ethiopia have been firmly in Turkey’s orbit for years now.
After having concluded an important defence agreement with Kenya in 2023, memoranda of understanding to be signed with Djibouti have already been announced.

Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone. CC BY-SA 4.0/ Bayhaluk

In North Africa, Erdogan has established himself as the main actor in the Libyan crisis, has recently mended relations and formed an alliance with Egypt that extends from Gaza to the future of its Libyan neighbour, in addition to having sold its drones to Morocco and Tunisia.
However, Turkey’s constant rise in Africa has also been favoured by the perception of the failure of post-colonial policies implemented by Western countries.
Once upon a time, it was all Paris. France’s gradual detachment and loss of influence has allowed Ankara to advance in the Sahel and push for the opening of embassies in Mali (2010), Burkina Faso, and Niger (2012).
In the Sahel, Turkey has acted on two axes: mending institutional relations and helping the local population. In Mali, for example, a large mosque was built for the Malian Islamic High Council and a second was restored in the hometown of former president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

Niger. In Agadez, the Turkish government took charge of the restoration of the Great Mosque. 123rf

In Agadez, the Turkish government took charge of the restoration of the Great Mosque and the palace of Sultan Air, heir to a family whose founder was born in Istanbul in 1400, according to a legend that is always useful for rhetorical purposes.
Ankara’s winning move, however, once again consisted in assisting local populations. Hospitals were opened and schools renovated in Bamako and Niamey between 2017 and 2019, in addition to numerous mobile clinics donated and then sent to the poorest corners of the two countries, where systems for the distribution of water and electricity were set up. The numbers of Turkish trade in the Sahel are still far from those of France and China, but have been growing steadily for ten years.

Heavy artillery
It was inevitable that the intervention should extend to defence: since 2016, Ankara has intensified its collaboration in the Sahel, providing training for officers of the Malian army, who were guaranteed supplies of light weapons and ammunition; Niger and Burkina Faso have purchased Turkish TB2 Bayraktar drones.In West Africa, too, Turkey is ready to challenge France. In Senegal, a new embassy was inaugurated in 2022, but above all a new Olympic stadium built by the Turkish company Summa, opened by Erdoğan two weeks after Senegal won the Africa Cup of Nations for the first time in its history. Erdoğan was also the first Turkish president to visit Togo and Guinea-Bissau (2021), where the inevitable cooperation agreements were concluded.

During a recent visit by Rwandan President Paul Kagame to Ankara, Erdoğan declared that he was ready to mediate in the ongoing conflict in the northeastern provinces of the DR. Congo. (Photo. Pres. Office)

In Central and Southern Africa, Turkey has recently taken important steps with Angola, which has asked Ankara for the drones, but could soon take on a much greater weight. During a recent visit by Rwandan President Paul Kagame to Ankara, Erdoğan declared that he was ready to mediate in the ongoing conflict in the northeastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
A difficult mediation, but for which the Turkish leader is ready to use the agreements already in place with the two countries to convince the parties with the promise of future advantages.
In addition to mediation, Turkey is ready to deploy another weapon for its rise. “Everywhere they ask me for information on our drones,” declared the President returning from a trip to Africa. The TB2 Bayraktar could not have counted on a better advertisement than the Libyan crisis. After having defended Tripoli, they were ordered by Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Niger and Chad.
The Turkish drones seem perfect for ensuring control of vast territories and countering rebels and Islamists, but they could also become the next card to play for Erdoğan, to increase his weight in Africa. (GdD)  –  (African Union and Turkey, national flag. 123rf)

 

Tshisekedi’s businesses.

Widespread corruption, disorganised armed forces, and a system of power based on patronage networks. The portrait of a head of state who, betraying the ideals of his party, is favouring his own community, aggravating ethnic tensions.

Since late 2021, the Democratic Republic of Congo has been the scene of growing instability, fuelled by the advance of the M23 rebel movement, led by ethnic Tutsis. In December 2023, this group was strengthened with the integration of the political wing, Alliance of the Congo River (AFC). The conflict between the M23, supported by the Rwandan army, and the government forces of Kinshasa, disorganised and supported by numerous local armed groups, intensified in early 2025 with the occupation of two important eastern cities, Goma and Bukavu.

M23 fighters moving along the road towards Goma. The initial objectives of the M23 were relatively simple to address. © Monusco/Sylvain Liechti

This military escalation is a gamble. Western countries, which had previously ignored the international violations committed by Rwanda, have now imposed sanctions, contributing to a change in the global perception of Rwandan President Paul Kagame. An authoritarian but development-oriented leader, Kagame is now seen as a ruthless dictator, intent on redrawing the borders between Rwanda and the DRC. However, this international condemnation should not obscure the responsibility of Congolese President, Félix Tshisekedi, in the current crisis.
The initial objectives of the M23 were relatively simple to address. But the agreements signed with its factions were ignored by the Congolese presidency, which refused any negotiation, branding the rebels as “terrorists”. This hard line has allowed Kagame and the M23/AFC coalition to expand their territorial control, raising the bar of ambition to the point of aiming for the removal of Tshisekedi from Kinshasa.

Money vanished into thin air
Compared to the rebels, the government army appears disorganised and poorly paid, despite having been allocated $3.8 billion for defence since the beginning of the conflict. An intelligence document reports embezzlement of $722 million, suggesting that for many senior officers and politicians, the war is above all an opportunity to enrich themselves. Significant bribes reportedly accompanied the purchasing of weapons.
In an attempt to strengthen the armed forces, many local armed groups were formally integrated as reserves, but with poor training and poor management contributing to a climate of persistent insecurity.

The Congolese National Armed Forces (FARDC). The government army appears disorganised and poorly paid, despite having allocated $3.8 billion for defence since the beginning of the conflict. © Monusco/Clara Padovan

This approach reflects the regime’s style of governance. When Tshisekedi was proclaimed president in 2019, despite the victory actually being that of Martin Fayulu, there were expectations of improvement, thanks also to the history of his party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). This party had historically fought against dictatorial regimes such as those of Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent-Désiré Kabila and was committed to the rule of law.
Unfortunately, the current government has proven worse than the previous one, betraying the founding ideals of the UDPS, partly due to Tshisekedi’s inexperience and incompetence.
Progress has been limited. Political opponents and dissidents are routinely arrested on treason charges and detained illegally. Corruption is rampant, not just tolerated but almost legitimised. The president himself has publicly declared bribes a legal practice, defending the finance minister accused of embezzling millions of dollars, calling him “probably the best finance minister in the history of the country.” The general inspectorate of finance, while investigating numerous cases, rarely sees its reports translated into prosecution.
The ruling party is now in deep crisis. In the 1990s, it was the main opposition force and attracted prestigious intellectuals. Today, it is emptied of its most competent figures, led by a controversial secretary general completely subservient to the presidency and composed mainly of unemployed youths recruited as militants. Some of these informal movements have transformed into militias that operate above the law.

Family Affairs
The situation is particularly critical in the four provinces of former Katanga, the homeland of former President Joseph Kabila and a mining region that is key to national finances. Local sources and civil society reports document how members of the presidential family control and exploit artisanal mineral deposits with the support of the presidential guard or the army, violating regulations even on industrial sites. Some reports denounce actual raids on foreign mining companies, forced to work one week a month for the presidency.

In Lubumbashi, the building of the General Management of Gécamines. The state-owned mining company Gécamines suffers from liquidity problems due to frequent withdrawals by people close to power. (Courtesy of Gécamines)

The state-owned mining company Gécamines suffers from liquidity problems due to frequent withdrawals by people close to power. Influential figures in the presidential family and party have created networks of clientelism that reach down to the lowest levels of the political and military structures. These competing networks neutralise each other, making it almost impossible to remove officials protected by higher levels and paralysing the system. Tshisekedi’s regime enjoys solid support in the Kasai region, his homeland, especially among the Luba ethnic group, who consider themselves legitimized in power after years of fighting against dictatorship and discrimination. The cohesion of this community is remarkable. However, the numerous appointments of people from Kasai in the administration and state companies have created the impression of a government that favours a single community, contrary to the tradition of previous Congolese presidents of maintaining regional balances.

Clashes between communities
This is particularly sensitive in Katanga, where social competition between Katangese and natives of Kasai has always been conflictual. The situation has worsened under Tshisekedi, due to the massive immigration from Kasai to Katanga. The “immigrants” engage in small-scale trade, motorbike transport and menial jobs, becoming very visible in Katangese society. Their different traditions, their backward social status and a triumphalist attitude, based on the predominant role in government, fuel tensions and conflicts.

Former President Joseph Kabila has allied himself with the rebel movement. M23/AFC. (Facebook)

Many feel untouchable, protected by members of their community at government and presidential levels. At the important border of Kasumbalesa, where most minerals and goods pass through, the UDPS militias have established a parallel control system to collect informal “export taxes”. This situation fuels the perception among Katangese of being dominated by a regime that favours a single community. As former President Kabila, originally from Katanga, has allied himself with the rebel movement M23/AFC, many Katangans hope that he will end Tshisekedi’s regime, unaware that the military movement is an instrument of Kagame’s power politics.
In the occupied territories, the M23/AFC rules by repression. In the west of the country, Tshisekedi’s tough stance against Rwanda is appreciated, but not his system of power. Unfortunately, neither Tshisekedi nor Kabila represent a hope for better governance. Kabila seems to want to take over from where he left off in 2018, when he was rejected for his attempts to stay in power. His possible return is not welcomed in many areas, due to his explicit alliance with the M23/AFC and its supporters. In 2024, Tshisekedi attempted to amend the Constitution to stay in power indefinitely. If he were to retain control, he would likely try again to protect his community and his family’s access to financial resources. In either case, they would rule against the will of a significant portion of the population, resorting to repression.

People trust the Churches
In this scenario, the Catholic and Protestant Churches, among the few institutions left with legitimacy and moral authority, are trying to unite civil society and other stakeholders to propose concrete solutions to the country’s real problems through a national consultation.
This may be the only way to build a better future, but it requires significant regional and international support. It is a fundamental step to avoid the mistakes of the past.

Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo Besungu, Archbishop of Kinshasa. The Catholic and Protestant Churches, among the few institutions left with legitimacy and moral authority. Photo: José Luis Silván Sen

Too many times, in fact, tensions in Congo have ended with peace agreements between elites, capable of temporarily calming violence and insecurity, without, however, addressing the root causes that have afflicted the country for decades, especially in the east. There, the absence of effective state authority has given way to the domination of armed groups that protect the illegal exploitation of mineral resources. There are also networks of mineral smuggling to Rwanda and Uganda, complex land ownership issues, difficulties in the return of refugees and the need for reconciliation between Rwandan and other communities. These unresolved issues continue to undermine national stability, making it indispensable a new and concrete approach which goes beyond window-dressing agreements. Now is the time to seek real solutions, a complex but unavoidable challenge. (Open Photo: Democratic Republic of Congo’s President Felix Tshisekedi. Shutterstock/Alexandros Michailidis)

Erik Kennes

Libya. The Great Ascent.

First with Sadat’s mercenaries, then with drones and economic agreements in the waters of the Mediterranean. Finally, the military support marked a turning point in the defence of Tripoli against General Haftar’s men. And now the future of the country passes through Erdoğan.

A ten-year tit-for-tat with the world. This could be the summary of the strategy pursued by the Turkish government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in post-Gaddafi Libya. Marginal in Turkish strategies in Africa for almost 20 years, the doors of Libya opened wide to Erdoğan with the end of the Libyan dictator.
The first move came in 2012 and was a response to Russia. Moscow sent Wagner contractors to Libya to support General Khalifa Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army based in Tobruk. For Erdogan, he was a copy of the Egyptian Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, an enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood, dear to the Turkish leader.
In support of the President of the Government of National Accord, Fayez al-Sarraj, came the Sadat mercenaries, shadow men of Turkish strategies in several Muslim countries; former Turkish soldiers who also carry out training and intelligence tasks.

Baykar Bayraktar Kızılelma 2. CC BY 3.0/tolgaozbekcom

Erdogan’s second response came in 2019 and this time it was aimed at the United Arab Emirates, which sent Chinese-made Wing Loong drones to Haftar. In May, the first four Turkish drones docked in Tripoli, aboard a ship flying the Moldovan flag, along with technicians and over 40 armoured vehicles. A drone war began in the Libyan skies that Ankara’s TB2 Bayraktars won, sending the Russians into crisis.
The third response does not arrive on the battlefield and is addressed to French President Emmanuel Macron, who accuses Erdogan of violating the embargo on the shipment of weapons decided by the UN. “Drones serve to rebalance the forces on the field because countries like France arm Haftar. I do not take lessons from those who have always exploited Africans”. Such words uttered by the Turkish head of state sound like a challenge to France not only in Libya, but across the continent.

Troubled waters
A few months went by and in December 2019, the Turkish government concluded an agreement with Tripoli on the delimitation of territorial waters. This time, the response is to the European Union, which supports Greece’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, but also to al-Sisi’s Egypt, with which relations are at an all-time low.

A container ship leaves the port of Tripoli. In December 2019, the Turkish government concluded an agreement with Tripoli on the delimitation of territorial waters. Shutterstock/Hussein Eddeb

The agreement with the Libyan government provides for a division of the maritime borders of the two countries in a stretch between North Africa and Turkey, with the border established south of Cyprus. Erdoğan is thus reacting to Europe’s sanctions for drilling carried out off the island, but also to the exclusion from the forum on gas reserves desired by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Italy.
The agreement with Tripoli averts the risk of a gas pipeline connecting the Israeli and Cypriot fields with Europe, excluding Turkey. A crucial objective for Erdoğan, now called upon to defend the agreement and the Tripoli government from Haftar’s attacks.
Hence, the need for the second agreement; the delimitation of maritime borders is accompanied by military cooperation.

Soldiers with an assault rifle and flag of Turkey. At the beginning of 2020, the Turkish parliament approved the sending of troops to Libya. Shutterstock/ Bumble Dee

At the beginning of 2020, the Turkish parliament approved the sending of troops to Libya. The mission was aimed, as stated in the text, at “supporting the legitimate government of Tripoli”, defending “Turkey’s rights established by the protocols signed by the two governments”, preventing “the resurgence of terrorist groups”, “mass migrations” and guaranteeing “peace and stability” through the relaunch of “a political process”. The Turks will make an important contribution in terms of training and strategy for the defence of Tripoli. However, drones will be a decisive factor. The ones getting their hands dirty on the battlefield are the mercenaries of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), whom Ankara trained and used in operations in Syria. According to data from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, around 2,000 Syrians arrive in Tripoli and defend it against Haftar.There is no shortage of accusations against Erdoğan from the European Commission and, once again, the response is not long in coming: “They are not part of our mission. We go in with coordination tasks; the Syrians will be able to defend our people who are not fighting”, was Erdoğan’s response.

The strategy of Ankara today
The Turkish president’s strategy in Libya is based on three different fronts: the consolidation of Turkey as a diplomatic interlocutor, military support and control in the eastern Mediterranean. A clear message to Greece, Egypt and Israel: a possible gas pipeline to Europe will not be done without me. A triple objective that Erdogan achieved with the defeat of Haftar in June 2020: “Our secret services have turned the situation around”, says the president, who then defines Haftar as a “coup plotter”, “the main obstacle to a political solution”, author of “a bloodbath” supported by Egypt, Russia, France and the Emirates, who will be “judged by history”.The end of the civil war allows Turkey to consolidate its role in Libya. Numerous reconstruction contracts end up in the hands of Turkish companies, but not solely. Ankara trains the army, navy, police and even the coast guard. A move that touches the migrant nerve and weakens Europe.

Libya’s Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh during a press conference. Shutterstock/Hussein Eddeb

Serraj’s exit in 2021 did not find Erdogan unprepared, on the contrary. Mohammed al-Menfi was elected president of the National Unity Council and Abdul Hamid Dbeibah was elected head of government. The first phone call of good wishes came from Ankara. Breaking with the 13 months of Turkish protagonism did not seem to suit anyone. The new Libyan leadership was aware of this, and showed no intention of asking for the return of Turkish troops, as the international community would like. The Turkish parliament extended the military mission and Dbeibah’s first trip is to Ankara. The agreements stipulated with Serraj were extended and five new agreements stipulated: Turkey will build three power plants, the international hub of the new Tripoli airport and a large shopping centre. Meanwhile, Turkish exports to Libya have increased by 65% in 2021, reaching 2.4 billion dollars. A growth that is also recognized by the choice of the African Union to hold the ‘African-Turkish Summit 2026’ in Libya, recently announced.

A crisis avoided
Not everything, however, went as planned. The elections in Libya were omitted and at the beginning of 2022, Dbeibah ended up mistrusted by parliament, defeated by his rival Fathi Bashagha. For Ankara, a phase of doubts, wait-and-see attitude and dialogue on two tables began.
On September 1, 2022, both Dbeibah and Bashagha arrived in Ankara.
A double visit organised urgently, just as the clashes resumed
on the streets of Tripoli.

Street in Tripoli. Electricity consumption in the country has exceeded the production capacity of gas and oil-fired plants. Shutterstock/TOSKA_LY

Meetings in which Ankara maintained a very low profile and of which Erdogan will not say a word. What happened in the rooms of the Turkish capital is not known, but more than two years later Dbeibah remained in his place, the weapons in Libya were silent and the Turkish ally central.
Once again, conditions were ideal for a further step: “A memorandum of understanding has been signed with Turkey for the supply of technologies and expertise to develop renewable energy. There will be investments in solar and wind energy,” announced Osama El Durrat, Dbeibah’s energy advisor. Electricity consumption in the country has exceeded the production capacity of gas and oil-fired plants. A problem for Libya that, once again, Erdogan’s Turkey was ready to solve. A move to reiterate that any discussion on the country’s future cannot ignore Turkey’s position and interests.
(GdD) – (The national flag of Turkey and Libya. 123rf)

Nuclear: USA and Iran negotiate, but tensions remain.

The Trump administration has reopened dialogue with Iran, despite Israel’s opposition. The conditions set by the parties, however, make an immediate agreement difficult.

After many years of geopolitical tension between the US and Iran over the nuclear issue, the US administration has returned to the negotiating table with Tehran. In 2015, Washington and its allies signed an agreement with the Iranian government that regulated the issue. The agreement consisted of Iran’s commitment not to build the atomic bomb in exchange for the easing of economic sanctions against it.

But in 2018, under pressure from Israel, President Trump, during his previous term, decided to nullify the agreement and further tighten sanctions against Iran. The Middle East is currently going through a serious phase of instability: the war against Gaza, the collapse of the Syrian state, the political crisis in Lebanon and the armed conflict between Yemen and Israel.

In this dire context, Trump, surprisingly, decided to reopen the dialogue with the Iranians on nuclear issues. Indirect talks between Washington and Tehran began on April 15 in the capital of Oman. During the various meetings that followed, there was a climate of optimism on both sides. But the gap between the conditions set by one side and the other is difficult to bridge.

The Americans are asking for the dismantling of all nuclear sites, the renunciation of the production of ballistic missiles and the breaking of relations of support for the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, in addition to abstention from support for the Yemeni government in Sana’a. All this in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions against Iran. The Iranians, on the other hand, want to talk exclusively
about the nuclear issue.

No renunciation of its program. Iran insists that nuclear power be used exclusively for civilian purposes. And this is permitted by international law. A fatwa by the Guardian of the Revolution, Khamenei, in 2003 asserts that Iran does not intend to equip itself with the atomic bomb because this contradicts the dictates of the Islamic religion.

Furthermore, Iran is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Relations with the Agency’s inspectors have not always been idyllic due to the strong politicisation of the IAEA, over which the US exercises strict control.

Trump’s initiative did not please Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu at all. Israel has long been trying to drag the US into a direct war against Iran under the pretext that Iranian nuclear power would be a threat to Tel Aviv’s security. It should be remembered that Israel is the only country in the Middle East/Persian Gulf that has the atomic bomb, built by France and tested in Algeria and the Pacific.

Furthermore, Israel is not a member of the IAEA. Today, Iran is a major power in the region, which is why Tel Aviv would like to weaken it (with US military help), because it is considered the main obstacle to the realisation of the “Greater Israel” project. In fact, all the Arab countries of the Gulf (in addition to Egypt and Jordan) have been “tamed” by Israel through Washington.

Aside from the circumstantial statements, none of these countries has done anything to stop the war against Gaza. Now it remains to be seen whether the Zionist lobby will succeed in sabotaging Trump’s initiative to negotiate with Iran. But pushing the Israelis too far could backfire on them. The American president is growing impatient with his friend Netanyahu. (Waving Israeli and Iranian flags. 123rf).
Mostafa El Ayoubi

Comboni Youth Jubilee. To live is to hope.

From 24 to 27 July, hundreds of young people from the Comboni youth movements across Europe will gather in Milan, Verona, and Florence, Italy, in preparation for the Youth Jubilee in Rome. Together, they will contemplate the significance of hope in a world that is increasingly adrift.

Today, our world is marked by such global challenges as the climate crisis, economic inequalities, the exploitation of populations, forced migrations and the tendency towards a spirituality that forgets God the Creator and Father of all. All situations that wreck the hopes of many people and show us how life is put to the test.

However, it must be said that perhaps we don’t talk much about hope, perhaps it is little known, but everyone hopes, because to live is to hope and to hope is to live. If there is one thing that distinguishes man from other creatures, it is hope. It keeps us alive, and it can be said that where hope is extinguished, life is extinguished too.

The Jubilee offers us the opportunity to reflect on crucial issues such as social justice, integral ecology and the dignity of every person, which are the fundamental values of our faith, and to deepen a healthy spirituality that can nourish a passion for the care of our interiority and of all the reality that surrounds us.

All these concerns are at the heart of the Comboni mission, which, with its attention to the existential peripheries and the promotion of the dignity of each individual, pushes us to build a more just
and sustainable future.

The Comboni Family in Europe, therefore, believes that this ecclesial event, the Jubilee of Youth, could be an opportunity to revive hope, especially among young people who increasingly declare that they do not have faith in the future. Desirous of offering our contribution to the journey of the Church that celebrates this event, we have therefore decided to organise a pilgrimage for the young people we meet in our missions in Europe.

The Jubilee will be for the young people who participate with us an opportunity to experience the mercy of God and the experience of the Church as a people on a journey that will be able to bring light into their lives and their everyday choices, thanks to the different stages they will go through. Therefore, they will be invited to live it as a moment of grace not only for themselves, but also for their communities of origin.

By participating in the “Comboni moment” (24-27 July 2025), which according to our approach would like to be a preparation for the Jubilee of Youth in Rome, young people will have the opportunity to delve deeper into one of the global challenges that we have just listed, which concerns them and which they chose when they registered.

They will therefore be welcomed into different groups in different Comboni communities (Milan, Verona and Florence) with different pastoral challenges in Italy.

The Milan group will reflect on the challenge of the commitment of young people. It is about addressing the protagonism of young people in the uncertainty of the current situation, in which their dreams often “collapse”, the future seems uncertain and impermeable to their dreams, studies do not offer opportunities and the lack of a job or sufficiently stable occupation risks nullifying their ambitions. The meeting and listening that they will have with their peers engaged at a civil and ecclesial level can be, in our opinion, a stimulus and a reason
for hope for them.

The Verona group will deepen the theme of critical information. It is about reflecting on the call to “Communicate (in) hope” in a context of crisis like the one our world is going through. Young people must commit to a communication that uses responsibility and discernment, a communication free from prejudice, rancour, fanaticism, ideology or violence. We believe that it is above all the task of young people today to commit to communication that can listen to the cry of people who have no voice and to welcome the weak.

The young people who will be welcomed into our community in Florence will be accompanied on a path of reflection on the issues of care for creation, one of the most urgent challenges of our time, which tends more and more to valorise social models in which the agenda is dictated by the pursuit of profit rather than care for relationships with others, creation and God.

Everything will take place in a climate of brotherhood and friendship, in an international and multicultural context. We will draw inspiration from the Word of God, human experience and the figure of our Founder, Saint Daniel Comboni, and his charism. In the first stage, participants will have the opportunity to listen to the testimonies of young people of their age, to participate in thematic workshops, to dedicate themselves to moments of prayer and to devote themselves to service activities that can inspire in them a lifestyle capable of transforming their daily lives.

On July 28, the young people of these communities will move to Rome, where they will participate in the meetings scheduled for that week together with other young people from all over the world.

The journey can be an opportunity to remind ourselves that there are “pilgrimages” that no one would ever want to undertake: those that force young people, children and entire families to leave their land and their home. The same journey together to Rome can help us better understand the first Christian community, which, starting from the establishment of the group of apostles, found itself thinking of itself as “we”, in which the call of each was experienced within a common and reciprocal belonging. The Comboni Family in Europe hopes that this experience can become a point of (re)departure for all the young people of the world, in particular for those who have chosen to live these moments with us.

Fr. Raoul Sohouénou
Coordinator of Comboni Youth Jubilee

Somalia. The Somalian Paradigm.

Among all the African countries, Somalia represents the most evident example of Turkish strategy and pragmatism on the continent.

The origin of the relationship between the two countries dates back to 2011, the year in which Erdoğan visited a Mogadishu devastated by famine and war with the Islamist militia al-Shabaab, the only non-African leader to visit the country in almost twenty years.
The visit of the Turkish president accelerated the operations of Tika, the Turkish cooperation agency, Ankara’s Trojan horse on the African continent. Tika’s humanitarian missions paved the way for the opening of the largest Turkish embassy in Africa in 2016.
A move with which Ankara began to influence the country’s political agenda and which allowed it to achieve concrete results. In just a few years, Turkey managed to bring annual trade from zero to 280 million dollars, restructured, reopened and managed ports and airports, but also schools and universities and opened a huge health centre that bears Erdoğan’s name.The reopening of the University of Mogadishu has also allowed scholarships to be awarded to local university students. The latter, including the son of President Sheikh Mohamud, go to study in Turkey, learn the language, develop a direct connection with the country and then become the Somali ruling class of the future.

In 2017, Turkey opened a large military base in the capital Mogadishu. 123rf

Turkish projection in Somalia also involves military support, which has become essential even in the face of the failures recorded in this respect by the African Union (AU) and its various missions in the country. In 2017, Turkey opened a large military base in the capital Mogadishu, where it is estimated that more than 16,000 men have been trained, a third of the Somali army.
The training programs have served to protect Turkish interests in the area, allowing Ankara to have a military base on the continent, but have been blessed by the Somali government, now capable of removing al-Shabaab from the capital without waiting for the AU’s decisions. For this reason, former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre thanked Erdoğan for “having rebuilt the army from the ground up”.
In 2022, another turning point: the TB2 Bayraktar drones began to strike al-Shabaab. After being used for control purposes, it was Mohamud himself who asked for their offensive use. While waiting to understand if, or rather when, Erdoğan will keep his promise to supply war jets to Somalia, it should be emphasised that the alliance between the two countries has allowed Ankara to get its hands on the energy resources off the coast of Somali waters.

Yavuz Turkish Drillship. The ship is owned by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). Turkish ships can now carry out hydrocarbon exploration activities in a 5,000 square kilometre sea area. 123rf

A year ago, the Turkish State Energy Company (TPAO) signed cooperation protocols with the Somali Petroleum Authority. Turkish ships can now carry out hydrocarbon exploration activities in a 5,000 square kilometre sea area. Drilling began in recent months, but is set to continue for years. US government reports estimate the hydrocarbon reserves in the area at 30 million barrels. Interests that, once again, must be defended. Hence the second memorandum of understanding with which Turkey now commits to training the coast guard and navy, patrolling and countering ‘piracy, terrorism and any type of threat’ for the next 10 years. The icing on the cake came last year, when Mohamud announced that Turkey has begun building a space platform for launching satellites in eastern Somalia. The Turkish space plan was Erdogan’s idea, who knows he can count on Somalia to achieve his goals. (Two butterflies with flags of Somalia and Turkey. 123rf)

Giuseppe di Donna

Five Millennials on the way to beatification.

In this Jubilee year, it is not only the adolescent Carlos Acutis or the young Piergiorgio Frassati who will be canonised in the coming weeks or Floribert Bwana Chui Bin Kositi, who was beatified last June, but there are many young people who, in their youth, strongly felt the fascination of Jesus and the Gospel.

Last January 25th in Madrid, the cause for beatification of Sister Giulia Clare Crockett, a missionary of Irish origin, who died in 2016, at the age of 33, during an earthquake in Ecuador, officially began. Sr. Clare belonged to the Congregation of the Servants of the Home of the Mother. Clare’s story is one of those who confirm the creativity of Divine Providence. Born in 1982, at the age of 18, Clare abandoned a promising career as an actress to embrace religious life. A choice that later took her from Spain, where she had been educated, to Latin America, where
she met her death.

Sr Giulia Clare in Ecuador. “All or nothing”. Courtesy of Home of the Mother

The contagious smile that Clare shows in many of the photos portrays her sense of an interior joy that characterised the entire existence of the young nun. Perhaps also for this reason, as well as for the radical nature of her faith (her motto was “all or nothing”), devotion to Sister Clare Crockett quickly spread to various countries around the world.
In Italy, on the same day as Sister Crockett, the Archbishop of Taranto in southern Italy officially concluded the diocesan phase of the beatification process of the Servant of God, Pierangelo Capuzzimati, who died of leukaemia on April 30, 2008, at the age of 17. The disease, far from throwing him into despair, led him to intensify his spiritual life, dedicating his time to prayer, study and contemplation of the beauty of creation.On March 15 of last year, the diocesan phase of the beatification process of Akash Bashir, a young Pakistani and a former Salesian student, who sacrificed his life to protect hundreds of faithful, also concluded. On March 15, 2015, a twenty-year-old Akash chose to prevent a suicide bomber from entering the church during Sunday Mass. The attacker blew himself up; both died, but the young man’s sacrifice prevented a massacre. If the Pope approves the decree regarding his martyrdom, Akash will be beatified without the need for a miracle, thus becoming the first blessed of Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim countries in the world.

Helena in Africa. Her life was devoted to God. (Photo: H.Kmieć Foundation)

Also in the spring of 2024, the Archbishop of Krakow announced the opening of the cause of beatification for Helena Kmieć: a young Polish missionary born in 1991 and killed in 2017, during a robbery attempt in Cochabamba, Bolivia. In 2012, Helena Kmieć joined the “Salvator” Missionary Volunteer Service of the Salvatorian religious congregation. On behalf of the Volunteer Service, she was sent twice on short missions, during which she conducted after-school activities for children in Salvatorian parishes, once in Galgahévíz, Hungary, and the second time in Timisoara, Romania.
In 2013, she participated in a three-month mission in Zambia, which left a deep mark on her heart. She was especially involved with street children; she cared for them and made her intelligence available, giving lessons in English and mathematics, but above all, she became an apostle for them, evangelising them first of all with her example of genuine and strong faith.
When she returned to Poland, she faced a difficult period due to a lung disease, which also required surgery, but she was not discouraged and continued to animate the Missionary Movement with her presence and her prayer. In 2014, having regained her strength, she went to replace a sick missionary in Timisoara in Romania.
In the meantime, after graduating, she began working as a hostess for the WizzAir company, and began planning to build a family together with her boyfriend, whom she wanted to marry soon.
However, she decided to leave again. On January 8, 2017, she began her missionary service with the Sisters Servants of the Immaculate Virgin in Cochabamba, in central Bolivia. On the morning of January 24, the local child care centre was attacked by robbers. Helena was there with another volunteer, Anita. During the incident, the attacker stabbed Helena. Despite attempts to save her life, Helena died. The death of Helena Agnieszka Kmieć resonated in Poland, and among the faithful, the opinion of the sanctity of her life devoted to God, to others and to the Church, emerged spontaneously.

Darwin. Faith became his great strength. (Photo: Darwin Ramos Association)

If successful, the cause of beatification for Darwin Ramos, opened in 2019, will bring a Filipino street boy to the devotion of the Church. Unable to go to school because his family lived in poverty, Darwin collected garbage on the outskirts of Manila for years and, forced by his father, then began begging from passers-by. Born in 1994, Darwin died in 2012, not yet eighteen, due to a form of myopathy. His encounter with Christ took place thanks to the foundation “A Bridge for Children”, started by a French missionary who takes care of street children. At 12, Darwin asked to be baptised; the following year, he received Confirmation and First Communion. Faith became his great strength to face the disease, which would lead to his death, at the end of a series of intense sufferings.

Floribert Bwana. He was tortured and beaten before being killed. (Community of ‘Sant’Egidio’)

Meanwhile, a young Congolese layperson, Floribert Bwana Chui Bin Kositi was beatified on Sunday, 15 June 2025, in Rome, at the Basilica of Saint Paul Outside the Walls, during the Solemnity of the Holy Trinity. Following the beatification Mass in Rome, a thanksgiving Mass will be held in Goma on Tuesday, 8 July, the anniversary of his martyrdom.
Floribert was a member of the Community of ‘Sant’Egidio’ in Goma, in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2007, he graduated and found a job as the director of the customs office for the quality control of goods. An important position in a border town like Goma. His job was to check the quality of food products in transit at the border and certify their good condition. Floribert’s arrival marked a sudden change of direction for the office, because he, unlike his predecessors, refused to be bribed to pass loads of spoiled food.
During the month before his death, his technical service had drawn up a very detailed report on a large batch of spoiled rice, and this time too, he had received phone calls and pressure, even from public authorities, to turn a blind eye and take his bribe just as everyone had always done. But he remained adamant and had the entire batch (4 or 5 tons of rice) destroyed. On July 9, his lifeless body was found in a field. The autopsy revealed that he had been tortured and beaten before being killed.
Floribert Bwana Chui is the fourth Congolese blessed, following the beatification of Blessed Anuarite Nengapeta, Isidore Bakanja, and Father Albert Joubert, who was beatified along with three Xaverian missionaries on 18 August 2024 in Uvira, eastern DRC.

Philip Chiba

 

Mauritania. Nouakchott has succeeded in containing jihadism.

The country is emerging as an exception in the Sahel region by stemming the tide of jihadism that has engulfed neighbouring states, through a combination of military, political, religious and social measures. Camel riders and women religious leaders are among the heroes of this success story.

According to the Dakar-based Timbuktu Institute, the Sahelian branch of Al Qaeda, Jama’at Nusra al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) – also known as the ‘Support Group for Islam and Muslims’ – is making real progress across the entire region. However, Mauritania is emerging as the exception, and a quite successful one at that.
The last jihadist attack in the country took place in December 2011, when a commando fired on a Mauritanian gendarmerie post at Adel Begrou, kidnapping an officer before escaping across the border into Mali. Before this, Mauritania had experienced attacks on foreign embassies and the murder and abduction of Westerners since 2005, which culminated in the cancellation of the Paris-Dakar Rally in January 2008.Since then, under the leadership of President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, the authorities have developed a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy. The government invested heavily in the defence sector.

Mauritanian President, Mohamed Ould Cheikh Mohamed Ahmed Ould Ghazouani. (Photo: EU)

The aim was to make the army a more attractive prospect for soldiers than the jihadists, and wages were increased considerably.
Defence expenditure rose from $106 million in 2009 to $141 million in 2019 and $251 million in 2023, enabling the purchase of modern pick-up trucks and surveillance radars that surpassed the rebels’ equipment.New military bases were established along the 2,200-kilometre-long porous Malian border. These included the Lemreya base, which straddles the border between Algeria and Mali. This area had previously been used as a sanctuary by jihadists and traffickers. The Special Intervention Groups, which are highly mobile military units, established their headquarters here to operate in the desert. They were supported by light aircraft.
Unlike the other members of the Sahelian Alliance (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), who are struggling to cope with jihadist threats, Mauritania has maintained military cooperation with France, consisting primarily of training its special forces. While Niger closed French and American military bases, Mauritania strengthened its ties with the United States through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and joint training missions. At the same time, Mauritania is cultivating good relations with Moscow, as demonstrated by the visit of the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, to President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani in February 2023. Lavrov expressed the Kremlin’s support for Mauritania in its fight against jihadism.
In addition, Mauritania has invested considerably in developing the intelligence gathered by the Mehari units, whose officers patrol the desert on camels in eastern Hodh Ech Chargui. They maintain a presence among the nomadic populations who permanently cross the borders with their herds, and who are potential targets for jihadist recruitment.
These camel riders, who are part of Mauritania’s National Guard, are often dressed as civilians and can reach every part of the vast country discreetly. Meanwhile, checkpoints are scattered across the country.   The northeastern region of Mauritania, which is mostly uninhabited, has been a restricted military zone since 2008 to facilitate surveillance and prevent it from becoming a safe haven for jihadists.

Mauritania has invested considerably in developing the intelligence gathered by the Mehari units, whose officers patrol the desert on camels. File swm

Mauritania has revived the French colonial tradition of army units riding camels. Until a few years ago, the desert riders’ unit numbered just 50 men, but by 2019, the ‘Nomad Group’ had grown to comprise 150 riders and boasts a herd of 400 camels. They have also received a grant of several million euros from the European Union.
Some of these Meharists are recruited from Bedouin tribes, to whom they provide services such as tracking down cattle thieves and offering medical care. The key to the strategy is controlling the water sources and thus the desert. The strategy appears to be quite successful. Indeed, Chad and Niger, two other Sahel countries affected by jihadism, have expressed interest in the Mauritanian approach.
However, the strategy is not limited to military aspects. As the core of the jihadist offensive is spiritual and aims to impose a theocratic order, the Mauritanian authorities have also decided to counter jihadist propaganda on religious grounds.
When the government realised that Al-Qaeda had recruited Mauritanian citizens in the early 2000s, it mobilised imams to produce an ideological response to the jihadist narrative. In an attempt to prevent its citizens from becoming radicalised, Mauritania organised a nationwide theological debate and implemented a system to control the ideology preached in mosques.

Mauritania organised a nationwide theological debate and implemented a system to control the ideology preached in mosques. File swm

It also decided to take action in the deprived, sensitive suburbs of the capital, Nouakchott, by initiating a dialogue with local communities. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Education and the Association of Women Heads of Families launched the ‘Mourchidates’ project, in which women religious guides visit radicalised Muslims in these neighbourhoods to prevent violent extremism.
Fifty Mourchidate women from the capital and the rest of the country were appointed. These women, who are teachers in Quranic schools, graduates in Islamic sciences, or community leaders, will deconstruct concepts that have been manipulated by jihadists, such as takfir, caliphate, imamat and jihad. This initiative is supported by the UNESCO project, ‘Strengthening Women’s Leadership in the Prevention of Violent Extremism through Criminal Justice, Social Cohesion and Cultural Identity’. As jihadist ideology has flourished amid poverty and repression in other Sahelian countries, the Nouakchott authorities are trying to demonstrate to their citizens that the jihadist proposition is less appealing than a functioning state that provides services such as drilling wells, caring for livestock and building medical centres to meet the needs of nomadic communities.
A key element of the strategy has been the implementation of a policy that combines firmness and forgiveness for those who repent. During a government-led dialogue in 2010, dozens of detained radical Islamists signed a renunciation of violence, and several former jihadists were reintegrated into society instead of being killed.
The absence of terrorist attacks for over a decade is testament to the success of the strategy. However, some experts suspect that the Mauritanian government has paid a kind of non-aggression price to Al-Qaeda. ‘Everyone agrees there is a pact. That’s a widely accepted fact,” former CIA agent Michael Scheuer told the Arab Weekly, which published a story on the matter in May.

The jihadists are investing in livestock, logging and smuggling activities. File swm

Accordingly, JNIM fighters cross the border into Mauritania to find a safe haven, provided they don’t carry weapons. However, the Mauritanian authorities firmly deny the existence of such an agreement. Some critics also point out that, in return for supporting the fight against hate speech and violent extremism, the government has appointed some Salafist preachers to influential positions.
At the same time, in such a troubled region, the fight against the jihadist scourge is never-ending and success is fragile. There are still many challenges. One of the greatest is the presence of between 250,000 and 300,000 Malian refugees in the M’bera refugee camp and the villages of the Hodh Chargui border region. In a report published on 27 April, the Timbuktu Institute warned that JNIM was extending its influence in the tri-border area between Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.
Accordingly, the jihadists are investing in livestock, logging and smuggling activities in the area, generating revenue that enables them to expand their networks. These activities also provide them with a means of transporting weapons and explosives. The threat should not be underestimated: JNIM is indeed attempting to infiltrate its members from Kayes, in western Mali, into Mauritania and Senegal. (Open Photo: Soldiers of the Mauritanian Army in training section. DVIDS)

François Misser

 

Kenya. The superpower of satire.

With his illustrations, he strikes harder than any editorial. After living for years in Nairobi, the Tanzanian artist shares a passion that was born early and a reality that never ceases to “inspire.”

Gado, the pseudonym of Godfrey Mwampembwa, was born in 1969 in Tanzania, but has lived in Nairobi for many years. He is one of the most appreciated African political cartoonists. His immediately recognisable sign and his pointed jokes summarise a complex situation in a flash, better than any long editorial.

How did you come to be called Gado?

I have been drawing since I was very young. My mother, who was a teacher, immediately noticed my abilities and supported me by choosing the schools where I could best develop my talent. I published in the newspapers of the then capital, Dar es Salaam, when I was still a high school student. After finishing my military service, I enrolled in the faculty of architecture, but after a few months, I won a competition run by the Daily Nation newspaper, so I came to Nairobi to collect the prize. They immediately asked me to collaborate permanently, but I did not yet have a regular work permit, and so they asked me to sign with a pseudonym. I chose Gado, my “teenage name”, used by my friends to cheer me on during football matches. It was 1992. I was 23 years old.

When did you realise that you were interested in political satire?

I have always had two passions: art and what happens in the world. History and geography were my favourite subjects. I have always tried to read as much as possible. Even as a boy, I listened to the BBC and read magazines, like Time and Newsweek, that my father brought home. The two interests merged into political satire.

What do you like most about your job?

I would say the ability to communicate by synthesising many words in a drawing, laughing and making people laugh intelligently. Doing satire is not an easy job. You need to have a deep knowledge of the topics discussed, and I’m not just talking about information and reports, but also their historical roots and connections. Only in this way can you connect all the dots and express your thoughts concisely and effectively. This is why I have read and still read a lot, especially historical essays and works by artists. All this is the basis of my inspiration.

What margin does political satire have in this period in which authoritarian regimes are asserting themselves?

Now, satire is more necessary and important than ever because it reveals the problems of power. Cartoons, in particular, can be especially incisive. This is why authoritarian leaders, from Donald Trump to the president of Kenya, William Ruto, and everyone else, detest satire that has the license to tell the king that he has no clothes. Other registers of communication cannot afford that. Many of these leaders have responded with retaliation these days. Here in Kenya, the young cartoonist, Kibet Bull, was arrested. We recently helped a colleague of ours leave Burundi with his family because he was wanted. In the United States, some have quit their jobs because they were censored, like Ann Talneas, who worked at the Washington Post. Steve Bell’s contract was not renewed by The Guardian. Satire is under attack everywhere these days.

Which African leader stimulates your creativity the most?

I cannot single out anyone. There are so many, and they are all very stimulating. In Kenya, for example, all the work of the Ruto government is a stimulus to satire. You wake up in the morning and discover things that make you say: “No, this is not possible”. In Uganda, Museveni and his son do crazy things. You turn around and find South Sudan, with the eternal Salva Kiir and Riek Machar. And do we want to talk about the DR Congo, South Africa, and Tanzania? Now I collaborate with the weekly, The Continent, and there is so much to say that sometimes you don’t know where to start.

In a corner of your drawings, there is always a very small character that looks like a flower or a small insect. What is it?

It is my alter ego who makes me graphically involved in the drawing. I found it could also be useful to escape the director’s censorship! Sometimes, in fact, he adds a comment, in such small writing that it is difficult to read. But that little man has now taken on a life of his own, and the cartoon does not seem complete to me if he does not appear, too. (Open photo: CC BY-SA 2.0/ Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung – Andi Weiland Laugh out Loud @ re publica)

Bruna Sironi

Bolivia. The Andean potato.

Andean communities have a special process for freezing and drying potatoes. We take a look.

The terms ch’uño or tunta come from the Quechua and Aymara languages, spoken in the Andes, Peru and Bolivia. Both terms mean “frozen and dried potatoes”, used for their conservation in the Andes. Of course, both products have different production processes.
According to oral testimonies, the origin of the Andean chuño or tunta is lost in the ancient culture of the ancestors of the Andes. According to anthropologists, the chuño is the oldest invention of Andean man. It is thanks to its practice that indigenous communities keep this tradition alive and its elaboration and teaching is passed down from generation to generation.The preparation of the chuño and the tunta requires time and space because it cannot be done at any time or in any place, but in its own time and place. The time is known as qhasay pacha (winter) and the place as ch’uñuna (place of production of chuño). According to the Andean calendar, it corresponds to the month of Inti Raimi (sun festival), the month of Chaqra Qunakuy Quilla (agricultural cycle), the month of Papa and Sara Apaykuy Amuray (preservation of potato and corn crops).

The origin of the Andean chuño or tunta is lost in the ancient culture of the ancestors of the Andes. File swm

According to the Gregorian calendar, this period is from June to July. During these two months, the indigenous communities of the Andes dedicate themselves to storing in warehouses everything they need for the period of scarcity, which is from August to February. That is why during this period the communities try to save everything they have, even for the animals.
The process of preparing chuño begins with the selection of potatoes at the beginning of June, because they must be ready at that time. Generally, potatoes are selected in three classes or levels: the largest ones, intended for food, are kept in a hole covered with straw underground until the beginning of September.
The second level is represented by the seed, which must be the size of a chicken egg and be healthy, and which is kept underground until September so that it remains strong.
The third and fourth varieties are suitable for the preparation of chuño, because they are vermella potatoes, burned by the sun and not directly edible because they are acidic. They must therefore be processed in the chuño. However, there are also some varieties suitable for the preparation of chuño, such as papa luk’i, qamisaya and others.
The next step is to observe atmospheric phenomena, such as the wind, the Sun, the Moon and the stars. To check the formation of frost, you can for example place a small portion of potato in the space where it forms. In other cases, thayacha is prepared (a mixture of wheat flour and cooked corn, also considered Andean ice cream) and placed on a straw bed on the roof of the house.

According to anthropologists, the chuño is the oldest invention of Andean man. File swm

The next day, if it has frozen well, it means that it is time to prepare the chuño, so you must transfer the potatoes intended for this procedure. If nothing has frozen, you must wait a few more days, because it is still early. Once the frost has been confirmed, the potatoes are transported by pack animals (donkeys, llamas and mules) from the collection sites to the place where the chuño is prepared. To prepare the bed, chopped straw is also used.
Starting at four in the afternoon, the straw bed is prepared and the potatoes are evenly distributed on top. At the end of the day, they return home, but the father and the eldest son stay to water the potatoes during the night. Between eight and nine in the evening they spray the potatoes with water because at that time the first frost of the night begins. Then they retire to rest in a place they have prepared to protect themselves from the cold, which at that latitude reaches between -5 and -6 °C. At eleven in the evening, they have to add water again because that is when the frosts occur and the third time between 4 and 5 in the morning. They then return home. At ten in the morning, everyone goes to see how the chuño is doing: if it is good, they start to trample it in heaps to squeeze the water out of it.

Thanks to their practice, indigenous communities can keep this tradition alive, passing down its elaboration and teaching from generation to generation. File swm

Around midday, they prepare the muraya thuti (fresh potatoes thawed and cooked) with their ch’arkikanka (dried grilled meat), specially prepared for the occasion. In the afternoon, it is spread out again so that the frost can finish the last remaining potatoes. The next day, the sun shines and the chuño dries.
The process of preparing the tunta is different, only the beginning is similar: the potatoes are spread out on the bed of straw and must be frozen for about three nights; then they are trampled and taken to another bed. In this way, the sun’s rays do not reach the potatoes as the straw protects them. The potatoes rest for about two weeks after which they are left to dry in the sun.
Once the production process is finished, the product is gathered and stored. This is how the process of producing chuño and tunta ends in the Andean communities of South America. (Open Photo: Andean Community in celebration. File swm)

Jhonny Mancilla Pérez

 

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