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Equatorial Guinea – The Mekuyo clown.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

The Ndowe people of Equatorial Guinea live along the banks of the Rio Muni. Of all their traditional feasts, the Mekuyo celebration stands out for its rich popular flavour. Any social event is a reason to celebrate.

The Mekuyo – the clown, as the Ndowe call him – is completely covered with small bamboo canes tied together; his hands and feet are covered by dark stockings. His face is a mask of bright colours: white, red, and black painted to make him look frightening.
Even though the celebration climaxes at dusk, the village awakens in the morning to the sound of typical songs: the Mekuyo and his assistants make the first round of the village to the beat of a drum.
The mid-morning is for the children. The Mekuyo walks through the village scaring and chasing boys and girls. They try to get away from him or to attract him by clapping their hands, shouting, and singing. Sometimes the Mekuyo runs towards the frightened children who scurry to take cover in a corner of the village; at other times, he makes signs to show he likes the children’s songs. While marching and singing they escort the important figure in fancy dress.

The Mekuyo walks through the village scaring and chasing boys and girls.CC BY-SA 3.0/ TheHungryCapitalist

If the Mekuyo falls or uncovers a hidden part of his body, everyone refrains from looking and commenting. Doing so would make them liable to punishment or to be cursed.
In the late afternoon, with the sun still high, the feast intensifies. First, the scene must be prepared. Any open space will do; the courtyard of the house where the feast is being celebrated is usually chosen.
There are many reasons for calling the Mekuyo: a wedding, a special social event, or a celebration of any kind. The family organising the feast provides the Mekuyo and his companions with plenty of drinks and liquor. They place a high seat or armchair in the centre of the courtyard as a throne for the Mekuyo. He sits there and, at the proper time, begins his frenzied moves and dances. In front of the throne, leaving plenty of space for people to dance, a hedge of vines or other plants is erected. The women gather near the fence, with a rhythmic dance they coax the Mekuyo to appear and entertain those present with his exciting movements. A bonfire is kept burning. It is an atypical bonfire in that the flames are hidden and only the smoke is seen. A large branch or small tree stands at the centre of the bonfire.

There are many reasons for calling the Mekuyo: a wedding, a special social event, or a celebration of any kind. CC BY-SA 3.0/ TheHungryCapitalist

The entire celebration takes place surrounded by the smoke of the bonfire, in the heat of the afternoon sun, and with the echoes of female singing.
The Mekuyo arrives at the courtyard with his entourage to the rhythm of the usual drum and goes towards the small house built for him. This hut must be very near where the feast takes place. It is concealed from prying eyes; only the Mekuyo’s comrades can enter. If a woman were to see what goes on in there, she would be severely punished. The same would happen if she should dare criticise the Mekuyo’s behaviour.
At the sound of the drum, the women begin their song waving one arm from above to below. The Mekuyo is about to come. He does not keep people waiting; he appears with his funny, exaggeratedly solemn gait and ridiculous gestures, with a green branch in either hand. He delights the spectators with some ridiculous moves and then takes his seat on the throne. The women intensify their song. Now the men, too, take part: with green branches in their hands, they approach the Mekuyo, inviting him with leaps and gestures to begin his dance.

A woman at the door of her house. Women shouldn’t enter the dance – it is only for adult males. 123rf

At first, the Mekuyo pretends to take no notice. He soon begins to grow restless, and finally launches into a spasmodic dance, shaking frenetically like an electric puppet.
The people are now enthusiastic with this success but suddenly the Mekuyo makes an abrupt gesture and stops. The whole process must begin all over again: the women’s songs, the men’s gestures and, finally, the Mekuyo’s dance. During the afternoon, several different Mekuyos appear, up to four or five. One after the other, they repeat the same scene; at times they may act all together. The feast goes on for three or four hours without a break. It climaxes as night falls. Instead of branches the Mekuyo gather glowing firebrands. The leaps and dances become increasingly impressive – drinks inevitably play their part. Then, slowly, with no further ado, the feast dies away and ends with darkness.
Women shouldn’t enter the dance enclosure – it is only for adult males. Women enliven the feast with songs and dances.
All the same, women enter for the briefest of moments; they dance differently to the men and, before going back to their places, offer a small gift to soothe the men’s indignation, usually a coin. Also, boys cannot approach the Mekuyo. Their role is to flee, pretending to be frightened. When they approach adolescence their fathers or some male family member introduces them to the secret of the Mekuyo. From then on, they can take part in the dances with the other men. No one, not even the women, can ask them to reveal the secret. If they are questioned, they will not answer but will express great anger and, perhaps, if the question comes from someone younger, will slap them.

The Mekuyo originated outside the ethnic groups that now practice it. CC BY-SA 3.0/ TheHungryCapitalist

Where does the Mekuyo originate? What do the theatrics mean? What does it mean to the Ndowe today? Without doubt, it is ritual and symbolic. The Ndowe say very little about the Mekuyo. They only say it describes the participants’ roles. The rest is secret.
The Mekuyo originated outside the ethnic groups that now practise it. It began along the coast of Gabon, expanding towards the north. In the middle of the XIX century, it reached Kogo and Corisco and, in the XX century the Ndowe of Bata and its surroundings. Compared with other Ndowe traditions of the area bordering on Cameroon (Bevala, Mokuku), it is different: celebrated by day and often with the whole village participating. It lasts for just one day and the magical element is minimal. It is not associated with other curative or religious rites. At first sight, it could be related to events highlighting male courage. For this, women and children are excluded.
Some legends speak of a forest animal that accidentally came across a woman and asked her to take it to the village. She was frightened and did not dare to; instead, she ran to the village to tell what had happened. The men coaxed the animal into the village and played with it. Others speak of a bear that terrorised a village until the courageous men captured it, making it fall into a trap. They carried it to the village and showed off their courage while teasing the animal.
(Open Photo: The Mekuyo. CC BY-SA 3.0/ TheHungryCapitalist)
Felipe R. Aron

Music. Morocco. A Rainbow of Sounds.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

In a mix of ancient traditions and echoes of cosmopolis, Moroccan music fascinates with its sonority and elegance.

Morocco is increasingly looking towards Europe, above all thanks to its emigrants who have populated the metropolises of the West for centuries in a diaspora basin of at least five million people. The parents of Loreen, winner of two editions of the Eurovision Song Contest, also belong to this category.
Lorine Zineb Talhaoui was born in Stockholm to parents of Berber origin. But, besides her, the indigenous music scene also offers a large number of fascinating sounds and many artists worthy of interest.

Loreen’s victory in the Eurovision Song Contest 2012 in Baku. CC BY-SA 3.0/ Vugarİbadov

A varied sound which, as often happens in countries in the South of the world, lives in a continuous mix between the recovery of ancient traditions and echoes of contemporary pop cosmopolitanism. Instruments such as the qraqeb (percussive instrument) and the guembri, similar to a three-string bass guitar, are fundamental in gnawa music, an expression of Afro-Muslim spirituality, typical of the entire sub-Saharan area but also very widespread in Morocco where it was imported by early slaves.
Another basic instrument is the oud, the Arab lute widespread throughout the Middle Eastern area, while the qanun (a table harp), the nay (a reed flute) and the ghaita (a kind of bagpipes) are also widely used in music of Andalusian origin as well as that of Berber origin, another essential tributary of traditional Moroccan music.

Oum, singer and composer from Casablanca. CC BY-SA 4.0/ Frank C. Müller

Chaabi music derived from Arab and Berber influences enjoyed great popularity during the 20th century: engaging rhythms and catchy melodies played with instruments such as the darbuka (goblet-shaped drum), the violin, and the guitar. Chaabi songs deal with themes of everyday life, love and joy, and are often accompanied by traditional dances. As for the artists, at least three are essential: Oum El Ghaït Benessahraoui better known as Oum, singer and composer from Casablanca with a style that blends jazz and blues influences with North African tradition; Hamid El Kasri, from Rabat, a master and virtuoso of guembri and an ambassador of gnawa music in the world; and the refined French-Moroccan singer-songwriter Hindi Zahra, perhaps the best-known Moroccan artist abroad.
Last but not least, there is also the historic group Nass El Ghiwane, disbanded in 2007, which mixed the gnawa tradition with rock and international folk, and among the new artists we have the young pop-singers Ibtissam Tiskat and Salma Rashid. (Open Photo: traditional musical instruments.123rf)

Franz Coriasco

Bolivia. Elegance in traditional Chacobo dress.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

The Chacobos are an indigenous people living on the banks of the Benicito River in Northeastern Bolivia. Let’s get to know them
through their clothing.

The clothing of the Chacobos is made with material that Mother Nature gives them, mainly strips of bark from leafy trees. They like to adorn themselves with seed bracelets.
Chacobo women, when they go to visit another Chacobo village or during festivities, wear a strip of tufts of feathers at the top of their arms. Another important item to them is the bead necklace. A well-dressed woman is one wearing necklaces with several rows of brightly coloured beads, coins, and small pendants. They say that in the past, Chacobo women used to wear seed bead necklaces only, but now due to the influence of modern culture, they like wearing also other ornaments, which they buy in urban areas. According to them, beads are a symbol of elegance and prestige. That’s why every woman wants to wear more bead rows than the others, showing this way, greater prestige.

The Chacobo women paint geometric patterns onto their skin using urucú (the bright red crushed seeds of achiote) and a dye made from genipa, the berry of a species of genip tree. File swm

On special occasions such as parties or when they visit other Chacobo villages, they can also wear a circular headband made of red toucan feathers. If a woman does not have a headband, then she sticks some feathers to her hair with glue, near the crown of her head. The Chacobo women paint geometric patterns onto their skin using urucú (the bright red crushed seeds of achiote) and a dye made from genipa, the berry of a species of genip tree. They sometimes just dye their skin without drawing any pattern, some of them do so just to adorn their skin, others think that the black dye repels insects, blocks sun’s rays, and prevents diseases.
According to their oral narrations, once, women used to pierce their nasal septum at puberty and insert a tuft of red toucan feathers. They even used to pierce their nostrils to insert a wooden ball into those two small holes. Currently, these customs no longer exist, since many women died from infection. In times of mourning, the women of this ethnic group have the custom of removing their necklaces and other ornaments for up to a year. Another Chacobo tradition is giving a newborn baby a bead necklace or small trinkets as a gift. The bead row is put around the neck or wrists of the baby. The typical clothing for the Chacobo men is a loose ankle-length robe made of strips of bark in the shape of a poncho with a slit in the middle for the head and armholes. This robe is similar to the kushama of the Asheninkas of Peru. They use a cotton pita belt to cover their private parts. Their ankles, calves, wrists, and arms are wrapped with strips of bark. The strips on the wrists serve as protection while shooting arrows. The Chacobo men wear a headdress consisting of fibrous strips of bark covered with the silky plumage of ducks from which tassels of toucan bright scarlet- and yellow-coloured feathers hang. There can be between 100 and 200 tassels of feathers on a single headdress, which is also adorned with small pieces of broken mirrors, beads, and other decorations.

The Chacobos use their traditional colourful clothing only on very special occasions. File swm

In addition, some headdresses include a tassel of feathers tied at the back. This type of headdress consists of ten red and light blue tail feathers of macaw with a cluster of 12 oriole feathers. The tips of the two outer feathers droop under the weight of the tassel made from the silky plumage of ducks from which a few oriole feathers hang, which are all yellow except the two in the centre that are black. Behind the macaw feathers there are 30 or so chicken tail feathers, set near the bottom of the headdress. The woven sashes tied to the arms are decorated with bright yellow feathers. Chacobo men also wear long threads covered with the plumage of ducks. The arm girdles are decorated with various ornaments such as seeds and bones.
Just like the women, men use these bands at parties or when visiting other Chacobo groups. But some of them admit that they enjoy wearing these decorations also when they are at home. When not working, they like to sit in the meeting hall, chatting while adorned with bright feathered headbands and armbands.
However, modern fashion has also reached this community by now. The Chacobos use their traditional colourful clothing only on very special occasions such as parties and other special events.

Jhonny Mancilla Pérez

A Turkish fleet of power stations comes to Africa’s rescue.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

Africa has the lowest access to electricity in the world. For a few years, a Turkish company that owns a large fleet of powerships that dock at the harbors and connect to the national grid. Critics claim that the solution is not sustainable and expansive. But the company delivers as long as countries pay their bills. Otherwise, they can be switched off.

Approximately one century after the sunset of the Ottoman empire in 1922, Turkey is back on the African continent, in a powerful way. On a continent where half a billion people lack access to electricity, a Turkish fleet of power ships is providing a unique solution for coastal countries that lack infrastructure.
A company called Karpowership, owned by the Karadeniz Holding whose CEO is Orhan Remzi Karadeniz launched indeed in 2007 a project called “Power of Friendship”, which supplies electricity to shortage-stricken countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

Karpowership supplies electricity to shortage-stricken countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Photo: Karadeniz Holding.

So far, Karpowership which has operated in Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Indonesia, Cuba, has built a 6,000 MW installed capacity on its 36 Powerships. Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRU), LNG Carriers and Support Ships. Such capacity is simply enormous. It amounts to the equivalent of the future total capacity of Africa’s largest hydropower plant: the Renaissance dam on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia.
These vessels are barge- or ship-mounted floating power plants which can operate on heavy fuel oil (HFO), diesel fuel or increasingly natural gas. The power is available under electricity-generation services contracts, power-rental contracts, energy-conversion works contracts, or power-purchase agreements.

Around Africa
Orhan Remzi Karadeniz’s company is namely active in the countries that are the most in need and where it has managed to become the main provider. The list includes Gambia, where Karpowership signed a contract in 2018 with the National Water and Electricity Supply Company to deploy a 36 MW powership which is still operational and has been supplying 60% of the country’s total electricity needs.
In Guinea-Bissau, Karpowership deployed in 2019 a powership of 35 MW which is supplying 100% of the national electricity needs, while in neighbouring Sierra Leone, a 65 MW capacity has installed and generates 80% of the power distributed by the Electricity Distribution
and Supply Authority (EDSA)

The vessels are barge – or ship- mounted floating power plants that can operate on heavy fuel oil (HFO), diesel fuel, or increasingly natural gas. Photo: Karadeniz Holding.

Karpowership is also important in other countries of the region. It has signed a Power Purchase Agreement with the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) for the supply of 450 MW of electric power and it has been operational there since 2015, supplying 23% of the total national needs. Since 2022, Karpowership is also operational in Côte d’Ivoire where it is generating 100 MW of electricity, representing 7,5% of the country’s total needs.In August 2019, Karpowership signed an LNG-to-Power contract with Senegal’s Electricity Authority (SENELEC) to deploy a Powership of 350 MW which corresponds to 15% of Senegal’s total electricity needs. In 2021, a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) constructed in a 50/50 joint venture between Karpowership and Japanese firm Mitsui OSK Lines,called KARMOL, arrived in Dakar.
Karpowership is operational since 2018 in Mozambique where it signed also a contract with Electricidade de Moçambique (EdM), to deploy a Powership of 125 MW. In the past, between 2019 and 2023, Karpowership was also operational in Guinea-Conarky where it supplied 105 MW, amounting to 10% of the country’s needs besides other contracts in Sudan and Zambia.

New Supply Contracts
New markets are being explored. In October 2022, the Regulation Authority of Electricity (ARE) of the Democratic Republic of Congo approved a concession to Karpowership for the installation of a 200 MW floating power plant in the port of Matadi. On the November 17, 2023, the company’s chief commercial officer, Zeynep Harezi, told the Semafor Africa news platform that Karpowership expected to begin operating in South Africa in the second half of 2024 after winning a tender to generate 1,220 MW of LNG-to-Power were named as winning bids for 3 projects – about 2% of the country’s energy supply. According to Harezi, the company is now engaging with the authorities of Tanzania, Kenya, Gabon, Cameroon and Liberia to sign new supply contracts.

Turkey has sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ethiopia, which has used them in its war against Tigray. CC BY-SA 4.0/Bayhaluk

This spectacular expansion fits in Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s wider strategy in Africa. Indeed, alongside Turkish Airlines which is planning to fly to 62 African destinations (instead of 44 in 2021) and reinforce its leading position on the continent, Karpowership is one of the most important ambassadors of Turkish diplomacy in that part of the world, alongside with the arms exporters. Indeed, Turkey has been aggressive on that front, selling Bayraktar TB2s drones to Ethiopia which used it in its war against Tigray and Nurol Makina armoured personal carriers sold to the Senegalese gendarmerie. Obviously, such diplomatic, commercial and military breakthroughs irritated former colonial powers. Before she left her job in May 2022, the former French Defence Minister Florence Parly accused Turkish troll farms and the Anadolu News Agency of carrying out disinformation campaigns and French bashing.
Meanwhile, the Turkish offensive in the energy sector does not always look like a rosy picture. Indeed, in recent months, Karpowership cut off electricity in Freetown and Bissau after the authorities failed to pay bills reportedly totalling $40 million and $17 million respectively. Last September, In Freetown, the switch-off by Karpowership reduced electricity supply to the capital by 13%. Electricity was rationed with homes and businesses going without power for hours daily. Likewise, on the 17 October, Bissau was plunged into darkness.
Eventually, the power was restored after a few weeks in both countries and the supply contracts were renegotiated as part of a deal under which Karpowership supplies them with less electricity. These incidents highlighted however the vulnerability of the customers in the event of a dispute with the power provider.

Sierra Leone. Freetown Harbour. Last September, in Freetown, the switch-off by Karpowership reduced the electricity supply to the capital by 13%. 123rf

Karpowership has also faced a hostile campaign waged by South African environment activists which launched a petition in 2021 urging the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), ABSA and Investec banks not to invest in Karpower’s gas-to-power ships because such deals tie “South Africa into a future dependent on climate-damaging fossil fuels” accordingly. These critics also claim that the pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from these ships exacerbate climate change and limit South Africa’s ability to tackle the climate crisis. Besides, they say, the 20-year contract will make electricity more expensive as the Karpowership tariffs depend predominantly on imported fossil fuels. The authors of the petition claim that cheaper and cleaner electricity are available at 75c/kWh (wind) or 91c/kWh (solar), as against R1.36/kWH for Karpowership SA Coega: R1,36/kWh.

South Africa. View of Cape Town at night from Signal Hill. Environment activists accused the Turkish company of entering new markets by paying large facilitation fees to politically exposed persons which could be construed as bribery.123rf

Other critics are questioning Karpowership’s ethical attitude. They stress that the Turkish company has a practice of entering new markets by paying large facilitation fees to politically exposed persons which could be construed as bribery. They remind that in Pakistan, a Karadeniz subsidiary allegedly paid middlemen to secure a $565 million government contract.
The Supreme Court voided the contract in 2012 and launched a corruption investigation. But eventually, the matter was resolved in 2019 through political negotiations between Pakistan and Turkey.
In South Africa, a losing bidder made corruption allegations against Karpowership and a government official. But Karpowership and its local partners denied the allegations while the Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme said the losing bidder had been disqualified because its bids fell short of requirements. Karpowership also retorted to critics that their allegations were “completely incorrect and unsubstantiated”. (Open Photo: Karpowership. Karadeniz Holding).

François Misser

Taiwan. Post-Election Scenarios.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

On January 13, approximately twenty million Taiwanese went to the polls to elect the new President and the country’s unicameral Parliament (Legislative Yuan).

The selected candidate, elected with 40.1% of the votes, was Lai Ching-te, known as William Lai, a leading exponent of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and former vice president alongside Tsai Ing-wen. The nationalist candidate Hou Yu-ih, a member of the Kuomintang (KMT), a party considered close to Beijing, came in second place with 33.5% of the votes. In third place, as predicted by the polls, was the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je, with 26.5% of the votes. Overall, turnout was slightly down compared to 2020, with a turnout of around 70%.

In the context of the election of the 113 members of the Legislative Yuan, the most significant element concerns the loss of the majority by the DPP, which fell to 51 seats compared to 61 in 2020.
For its part, the KMT obtained 52 seats and now represents the majority relative to the Yuan.

This result, favoured by the mixed Taiwanese electoral system, demonstrates that the Nationalist Party can still count on the support of a significant portion of the population attentive to maintaining the status quo (de facto independence, but not de iure) and to relaunching political and economic relations with China across the strait.

The TPP, which increased slightly compared to the previous elections, instead received eight seats (five in 2020), useful for making the party decisive in the legislative process. In particular, it will be essential for the new Government to find a balance for the defence budget, with the TPP acting as the balance.

Looking at the distribution of the vote, we can see how along the western coast of the island, opposite the Chinese province of Fujian, the preference clearly went towards the DPP, while the KMT imposed itself in the internal and eastern areas, historic nationalist bastions. The KMT also managed to obtain moderate results in the capital and the peripheral offshoots of New Taipei.

During the election campaign, the focus of the national and international media was on relations between the island and Beijing. However, there was no lack of debate on internal issues which especially involved the younger sectors of the population, who appeared less interested in geopolitical dynamics.

The increase in unemployment (particularly among young people), in addition to the increase in housing prices, which are growing despite the overall stagnation of wages, have therefore influenced the choices of the younger sectors of the population, who have preferred the TPP proposal compared to the two traditional parties.

Indeed, the TPP itself presented an electoral program less focused on the issue of bilateral relations with Beijing and more attentive to internal economic policy issues. Ko Wen-je, in particular, said that his Party will try to take advantage of the next four years to grow further and compete for the presidency.

The Taiwanese vote was also followed with particular attention by mainland China. In the days preceding the elections, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated that the issue of re-unification remains essentially inevitable. The President intends to take the island, considered a detached Province, by the centenary of the People’s Republic, in 2049, and, possibly, before the end of his mandate.

Similarly, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on the occasion of a recent meeting with his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry, was keen to point out that the outcome of the elections does not change Beijing’s position, i.e. the so-called “One-China Principle”. The same Minister once again called on international actors to avoid interference in the internal affairs of the Nation regarding Taiwan.

Following the vote, the island state of Nauru, one of only 13 state entities to cultivate bilateral relations with Taipei, announced the interruption of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) to instead guarantee its recognition of the People’s Republic of China.

In Taipei, the news was welcomed as a move inspired by Beijing, presumably annoyed by the verdict of the polls and worried by the alleged independence tendency of the newly elected William Lai. The elections in Taiwan, however, remain a topic of very high resonance in other regions of the globe.

In light of all this, there are essentially two possible scenarios expected in the coming days. The first would re-propose the usual show of force that Beijing usually implements following the perception of external provocations, similar to what happened in August 2022 following the visit of the then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi.

It is possible, in such a scenario, to expect the mobilization of Navy shipping in the waters of the strait, resulting in repeated violations of Taiwanese airspace by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aviation.

The second scenario would see Beijing demonstrate apparent disinterest in the electoral result in an attempt to delegitimize its value. Meanwhile, during his victory speech, the new Taiwanese president made a point of toning down his tone by reassuring himself about the future of relations with China, precisely to avoid excessive reactions. Lai’s words suggest that the priority for the island at the moment is to find a balance between deterrence and promoting constructive dialogue while safeguarding its sovereignty. (Open Photo: Taiwan Flag.123rf)

Vanni Filoramo/CeSI

Ghana. The Village of the Children.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

‘In My Father’s House’, a centre for vulnerable children. A school for over 800 pupils. But above all, a place where children can dream
of a better future.

The first thing that strikes you is the beauty of the place, with palm and mango trees covering much of the site. The second thing is the number of children and young people wandering around, playing, chatting, or sitting at the edge of the garden.It is like a small village with elongated one-story buildings, painted cream and blue. Inside: classrooms, a kitchen, a clinic, a laboratory… There is also a small tower, a park, an esplanade with two porticoes, and a chapel dedicated to Saint Daniel Comboni. Farther on, the vegetable garden. And around the corner, more classrooms. At this time in the afternoon, with the light filtered through the branches, the atmosphere is quiet, but there is activity. Some girls hang out freshly washed t-shirts.
A group of young people sit and chat in front of old tyres. Two women fry slices of banana and cassava. We are at the Abor Children’s Village, for some of them an oasis of second chances.

Children at the Centre. Photo: J.S.Salcedo

It all started when the Italian Comboni missionary Joe Rabbiosi founded the humanitarian organization ‘In My Father’s House’ in 2000 to carry out a series of initiatives in the Volta region, in the south-east of Ghana, to respond to some social needs, with particular attention to the most disadvantaged children. “African children are currently among the most vulnerable and exploited people in the world. The time has come for the entire human community, including Africa itself, to wake up to this unjust reality and work towards creating an environment of mutual collaboration and fair solidarity”, says Father Rabbiosi.
The 75-year-old priest has delegated responsibility for the work to two Ghanaians from villages near Abor: Frank Amenyo and Wisdom Seade. Amenyo, father of four, has had a close relationship with Father Rabbiosi since they met during a professional course when the Ghanaian was twenty years old. He was unable to finish his studies due to a heart problem that forced him to use up all his money, but the religious priest helped him complete his baccalaureate and sent him to Italy for treatment. Upon his return Amenyo, together with Father Rabbiosi, decided to found ‘In My Father’s House’.

The chapel is dedicated to Saint Daniel Comboni. Photo: J.S.Salcedo

“When we started, we only had one and a half hectares of land and one building of our own. Gradually, we thought of more ambitious plans and, over time, we purchased more land. We currently have 24 hectares”, explains Amenyo.The first thing they built was a school and home for underprivileged children. Then they started a transport service in the area to allow the children to attend school. “We started the school with 17 students. Today there are 800”, Amenyo says smiling.
Amenyo manages the Centre together with Wisdom Seade, a father of two children. Ten years into the project, Wisdom is responsible for the administration, coordinates the school and teaches economics and business in secondary school. “When I heard about the work that Father Joe and Frank were doing, I joined them to help those who live without hope. Father Joe always insists that we must be a living testimony of the Gospel. When people need God, they pray.
So, to assure them that God hears them and is close to them, we must do it with projects like this”, says Wisdom.

Sharing their stories
Perhaps the most special part of ‘In My Father’s House’ is the home for those who have the most difficulties: children with disabilities, from disadvantaged families, who have lost their parents, or who have been abandoned. Amenyo says: “Every day we find ourselves dealing with emergency cases that require a response from us. This was the case of four children who had been abandoned and found almost lifeless. We took them to hospital and managed to save them and then we brought them here to the Centre. Another case was that of three children born to the same mother but to different fathers. The mother could not take care of them. They were sick and malnourished. We welcomed them and, after they had been taken to hospital and received the food they needed, they have improved significantly”.

Frank Amenyo, director of the Centre. Photo: J.S.Salcedo

These children and young people with special needs live in the village with other school pupils on a residential basis, because their families live far from the city.
In total there are 120 of these children. Together with assistants and their families, they form a community of 200 people.
“Children who do not have a family to take care of them live in a close relationship with the leaders and with the children who live in the centre”, confirms Seade. “The former are very vulnerable. They go through very painful processes and some of them have psychological problems. It’s very healthy for them to mix and live together with others, telling each other their different life stories”.
The Centre encourages these children to spend their school holidays with a family chosen by the Centre so that, as far as possible,
they do not feel excluded”.

The school
Every day, around seven in the morning, the Children’s Village welcomes hundreds of pupils who arrive from home on foot or by bus. The school runs from the first years of primary school to the last years of secondary school. Families are charged as little as possible.
“We are satisfied if they help us cover a small part of the teachers’ salaries. We take care of the rest”, says Seade.
Thanks to a system of sponsorships and scholarships, students who finish school are offered the opportunity to continue with vocational training or higher education. The school also has a specific program for teacher training. Some of these students are sent to remote areas where they put what they have learned into practice. They go to impoverished and educationally neglected areas, too far from urban centres where teachers are unwilling to go”, explains Seade. “The trainees stay there for a year. First, we build a small hut to start the lessons and, if everything is OK, we build a proper school. Once it’s up and running, we hand
it over to the government”.

“To respond to certain social needs. Particular attention is paid to the most disadvantaged children”. File Swm

In My Father’s House has already built 75 schools in rural areas and around 400 pupils have gone through this training and are now teaching in other schools.In addition to education, In My Father’s House also has a health program through which it raises funds for operations for people with serious illnesses, such as cancer or heart problems.
From the beginning, In My Father’s House has aimed at economic self-sufficiency. Rice, cassava, corn, and beans are grown on the land surrounding the Centre. A chicken farm and a pig farm have been started. With what is produced, we feed the children of the centre and help other families in the area by giving them bags of food every month. “The ultimate goal of everything we do is for the people who pass through here to develop and become self-sufficient in life. If we can achieve this, it will have been worth it”, says Amenyo.
In the future, we want to continue to make the project increasingly autonomous. “Some of our initiatives: increase the production of our fields and farms; build accommodation facilities for rent; and use the facilities to offer new courses on weekends for those who want to broaden their academic and professional knowledge and cannot do it from Monday to Friday for work reasons. We must plan well everything we can do, also learning from other experiences”, Amenyo concludes. (Open Photo: In My Father’s House. J.S.Salcedo)

Javier Sánchez Salcedo

Patricia Gualinga. Defending the Amazon Rivers.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

She is a Kichwa Indigenous leader of the Sarayaku people in Ecuador. “When you begin a fight against global economic interests, your life is always at risk. I knew staying quiet was not the better option; I had to keep going. If they wanted to drive me away through fear, they didn’t succeed.” She tells.

The Amazonian ecosystem is one of the most important freshwater sources in the world. I come from a land of waterfalls, lakes and rivers that flow from the Amazon, and it is water that gives us food sovereignty. There are no markets in my town; we feed ourselves with fish from the river. If [water] dries up we lose our food source, the land dries up, and it generates an imbalance because the water is a living thing, with energy, with its light and purpose.

According to our ancestors, we are the people of the Zenith, meaning midday; a fighting people. … It’s a people of 1250 inhabitants who fought fiercely against extractive companies. Our challenge is a “success story” because we are the only people who removed an oil company [the Argentinian General Fuel Company] in the early 2000s, confronted the nation of Ecuador, and denounced human rights violations.

In 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights agreed with us, ruling in Sarayaku’s favour and penalizing the state. The blessing of Sarayaku is turning into a symbol of resistance, struggle and dignity for Indigenous people. This is not only for the welfare of Indigenous peoples. Think about humankind, your children, and all the people who benefit from the Amazonian biome. No one can say we are isolated; we are close and connected.

We [Indigenous] are people who have cared for those forests and ecosystems for millennia. We went to the United Nations … to speak up and to make a stand. The human right to water belongs to everyone and, accordingly, defending the Amazon is everyone’s responsibility because thanks to it we have water.

If the forest is healthy, water will flow. Complete deforestation, as commercial interests attempt to do, affects water directly; it begins to dry up, to lose its balance. Now it’s time to listen to us, to act and to see things in a different light. Not as man dominating nature, but man
as part of nature.

When the oil company entered Sarayaku territory and people decided to fight … it was impossible to stand by and watch. We didn’t know where this fight would take us, but we knew we couldn’t stay quiet. I knew the plan of action, how the government functions, how to direct, how to document the technical aspects of the process and how to communicate. I had contacts in the media. … [Initially] I thought the fight would be over if we managed to say no to the company, that it would end there. In 2018, I decided to retire from leadership and keep a low profile,
but it was impossible.

Six months after, I received death threats. It was terrible because they came to my house around one o’clock in the morning. I was with my elderly parents. They threatened me, “If you continue with this, we’ll kill you.” When you begin a fight against global economic interests, your life is always at risk. I knew staying quiet was not the better option; I had to keep going. If they wanted to drive me away through fear,
they didn’t succeed.

I asked the Church to be our ally. I told them they couldn’t watch while Indigenous rights were violated. That they had speak up and accompany us. We have fought side-by-side with many priests, but help from the head of the institution was needed.
Currently, I’m part of the vice presidency of the Ecclesial Conference of the Amazon (CEAMA). [It] can only be the work of the Spirit.

We are happy that Pope Francis has put the Amazon in his heart. It’s a great strength for marginalized people who inhabit and care for such a biodiverse biome and at the same time suffer the ravages of extractivism. I’m 54 years old and 30 of those years I have spent fighting. My parents were Catholic — the first catechists. I always dreamt and prayed that the Church would be a part of this journey, of this accompaniment. God lives in the Amazon rainforest, with these extraordinary people. (Maryknoll magazine) – (CC BY 2.0/ Climate Alliance Org)

Mission. The Challenges Ahead.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

Three young Comboni missionaries talk about their vocation and their pastoral journeys.

My name is David Costa Domingues, a Comboni missionary from Portugal. I have just celebrated my priestly silver jubilee. I grew up in the simple but profound religiosity of my family and with a certain curiosity for the mission world, which at that time was still very vague. I was going to catechism and, one day, the catechist asked: “Who wants to be a missionary?”, “Me!”, I answered. Everything started from there.
Saying goodbye to family, friends, and my youth football team in Calvão was not easy. But I wanted something more serious and lasting. So, in 1984, I entered the Comboni Seminary in Viseu. I was not alone! A nice group of schoolmates and the football team joined this new adventure.

During the many years of training, I saw my companions take other paths. I moved on. After 14 years of studies, on 9 August 1998, I was ordained a priest in the parish of Calvão, surrounded by my family and the Christian community that had seen me born and grow.
Since then, 25 years of grace have passed, which took me first to the north of Portugal, to Famalicão, for five years (1998-2003), and then to the unknown world of Asia, where I stayed for almost twenty years (2003-2022). If it was all down to my own will, I would certainly still be there! But we are not missionaries to do what we want. Therefore, in June 2022, I agreed to leave Asia to come to Rome where I now find myself performing a different service: this time, to the whole Comboni Institute.

Of the many beautiful experiences, I have had over the past 25 years, here I recount one that has particularly marked me. Shortly after arriving in Manila, Philippines, I could not close my eyes to the reality of the many poor who live and sleep in the streets and struggle to survive, many times with what they find in the garbage from the rich.
So, I started bringing them rice, tins of food, and clothes.

Little by little, this became for me a pleasant habit of communion with these people, accustomed as they were to be ignored and rejected. Out of shame, they preferred to go out at night to look through the rubbish for their daily food. One day, in one of these dumps, I came across a boy who was rummaging through the dirt. I offered him the bag of food I had brought with me and stopped to have a few words with him. At that moment, a young pregnant woman approached and said: “I am so hungry.” The boy looked at her, lowered his eyes to the bag

I had just given him, and, without hesitation, offered it to her. “Take it,” he said. The young woman opened the bag, took a handful of uncooked rice, and began to eat it greedily. Such was the hunger she felt! It was experiences like this that gave me the strength to continue living my missionary life.

In recalling the past 25 years of my priesthood, I can say that I have lived them with all my heart, with joy and sadness, and also with some difficulties and frailties, but wholeheartedly. Precisely for this reason, I celebrated this jubilee with much gratitude. I have had many mission experiences over the years, many of them unforgettable. I have met so many people who, in different ways, have been – and still are – part of my journey. To all of them, I feel I must say: “Thank you from the bottom of my heart!”

Fr Eduardo: “People teach Me how to Be a Missionary”
I am Fr Eduardo Revolledo Villanueva from Lima, Peru. To talk about my vocation, I have to remember my experience in the Comboni parish “Cristo Missionario del Padre”, located on the outskirts of Lima, Peru. Since I was a child and adolescent I participated with great enthusiasm in the groups of altar servers, liturgy, catechesis, and youth. I feel that my vocation to missionary religious life was born from the contact I had with the Comboni Missionaries I met there.

Encouraged by the witness of the Comboni Missionaries, I started a journey of deeper discernment to discover what God wanted for me. With many fears and doubts, but with the conviction that God would accompany me, in 2008 I entered the postulancy of the Comboni Missionaries, the first stage of formation to religious life, and I started studying philosophy.

It was a very positive experience and I was able to share my vocational concerns with young Peruvians and Chileans who had the same ideals and wanted to be missionaries. Then I went to Mexico for almost two years to continue my formation process. It was the first time I left my country and had an international experience.

In 2014 I made my first religious vows. To carry out my theological studies, my superiors assigned me to Kenya. I was in that East African country for almost four years.
Going to another continent and learning new languages was, without a doubt, a great challenge for me. As a missionary, it was necessary to open my mind and heart, strengthen my will and determination to learn from the people and get to know their culture and customs.

After finishing my studies in Kenya, I was assigned to Asia. I spent the first year in Vietnam studying the language and then came to Taiwan to learn Chinese. It was there that I gave my life for the mission with perpetual consecration to God and ordination to the diaconate in the Comboni parish we serve on the outskirts of the capital Taipei. Later, I returned to Peru where I was ordained a priest for the service of the people of God.

At present, I serve as a parish priest in a parish on the outskirts of the city where the Comboni Missionaries live in Taipei (Taiwan).
The parish is small because the percentage of Catholics in the region is low, yet the Christian community is lively and very enthusiastic in the expression of their faith. The parish is very peculiar, as it welcomes Vietnamese immigrants and people coming from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

It is a truly multicultural place, where faith is the meeting point and the union. In the parish we carry out various pastoral tasks, such as accompanying groups of children and teenagers, caring for migrants, indigenous pastoral work, visiting families, and Bible courses.
Normally, we tend to think that missionaries are the ones who teach people about God. However, considering my short experience in Vietnam and Taiwan, I think it is the opposite.

It is the people I meet who, in their simplicity, reveal to me the merciful face of God. They are the ones who taught me how to be a missionary priest, encouraging me to be a close person, willing to learn day by day from them, who share with me their culture, their faith, and their experience with our God who is love and present in their hearts.

Father Moses, “the challenges that face me as a young missionary”
My name is Father Moses Samuel Huruwella, from Malawi. After 13 years of mission in Togo and Ghana, last July, I have just celebrated my first year in the parish of Chikowa, in the Zambian diocese of Chipata, but located very close to the border with Malawi, my native country. The parish was founded in 1941 by the Missionaries of Africa and in 1983 the Comboni Missionaries took it over. I am currently the parish priest and if I have to be honest, I will say that the mission here is not easy at all because there are many challenges that we have to face.

Nestled among the valleys, our parish territory is quite isolated and we are not helped by the poor state of the communication routes, which become impassable during the rainy season. The government has abandoned this area for many years, which is reflected in both the communication routes and other aspects of life.

The number of schools is insufficient and the numbers of enrolments are scandalous: less than 30% in the primary schools, even if the figure is even worse in the very few middle schools in the area. Even though, as missionaries, we have sought to intensify schooling, we face the reluctance of many parents who do not see the use of school and do not want to send their sons, let alone their daughters to school.

Many girls fall behind in their studies, which has consequences for them, such as the proliferation of teenage pregnancies. Another challenge is the shortage of teachers and the low level of education.
Health is another of our concerns. The list of diseases that people suffer from is long. There are frequent cases of malaria, anemia, tuberculosis, malnutrition, and tropical sores.

As for the life of faith, despite the presence of the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations, people remain very attached to their traditional beliefs. Even those who have accepted Christianity profess their faith in God while practicing their traditional beliefs. It is evident that, despite our widespread presence in the area, we still have much to do to inculturate the faith.
As a missionary, I accept all the challenges that the social reality presents, and with love and patience I try to adapt to people’s level of understanding and point of view, always respecting their culture.

Seeking to control the Northeast.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

The thirty-year instability of the mining provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri is an indicator of the voracity of neighbouring countries, the obtuseness of the Kinshasa government and the lack of interest on the part of the international community. A state of war that also has ethnic implications.

Compared to 2018, the elections last December 2023 had an additional and rather cumbersome obstacle: the armed group March 23 (M23), a survivor of the enormous combined civil and foreign war that took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 1996 and 2007. M23 was a remnant formed in March 2012 as an armed extension of the Congolese Rally for Democracy which had lost heavily in the first post-war elections. Having disappeared from the Congolese political scene after an attempted insurrection, the M23 brutally reappeared in the northeast in November 2021 as an unofficial but heavily armed embodiment of Rwandan interests.

The city of Goma, North Kivu. Clashes with the M23 rebels have moved closer to Goma in recent weeks, causing the U.N. peacekeeping mission MONUSCO and the Congolese army to launch a new operation to reinforce its security perimeter.
Photo: CC BY-SA 2.0/Abel Kavanagh

This added an explosive international touch to a state of war inherited from the conflict at the beginning of the century which had left behind a disjointed society, whose positive symbol was and is Dr. Denis Mukwege, 2018 Nobel Peace Prize winner and a candidate for the presidency in past elections.

An ethnic headache
Specific studies have estimated that there are 120 armed groups in the northeast: if the M23 is but one of these, its political cohesion, discipline and modern weapons make it a leading player. Its political positioning derives from the horror of the Rwandan genocide (1994), even if it had nothing to do with this tragedy (the ethnic basis of the movement is Tutsi, but it is an extension of the Rwandan population not a Congolese factor), but proved useful to the iconic figure of Rwandan President Kagame. Many of the armed groups are ethnically based formations and some such as Codeco (Cooperative for the Development of Congo, Lendu ethnic group) and M23 itself (Banyarwanda Tutsi) are ethnically limited. Others approach forms of banditry. There are also actors with complex links to foreign countries through entirely different connections.

Tanzanian soldiers of the UN brigade deployed in the city of Kiwanja, 75 km north of Goma, Rutshuru territory. CC BY-SA 2.0/ ONUSCO/Sy Koumbo Singa Gali

For example, the members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (Fdlr) – heirs of the Rwandan genocidal Hutu groups who sought refuge in Ituri where they took root – have become a Congolese ethnic group which serves as an “anti-genocidal” pretext for President Kagame to justify the existence of M23 (which he denies supporting) which opposes the Fdlr.
There is also a regional military force which is the expression of the East African Community. As well as an Islamist terrorist group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), coming from Uganda and linked to the Islamic State group. The ADF operates in DR Congo because the weakness and military incapacity of the Congolese army facilitate the holding of a base. To continue their cross-border war, Ugandan troops have followed the ADF and are now fighting alongside the Congolese army.

Kagame forges ahead
Faced with general confusion, Congolese civil society, which serves as a battleground for all the different forces, is reacting with increasing frustration unfortunately, justified by the brutal behaviour of all the actors. Local defence groups, exasperated, protest to the Kinshasa government against the presence on the ground of their enemies’ enemies. This state of affairs had led President Tshisekedi to proclaim on 25 September a “new war” against the M23 which focuses much of the popular resentment on itself.
The provinces that have been under a state of siege for two and a half years – civil institutions are suspended in Ituri and North Kivu – have become open ground for resolving all regional disputes.

The Burundian army troops themselves, who entered South Kivu with an explicit mandate from the African Union, found themselves the target of attacks without knowing by whom they were being attacked. CC BY 2.0/sedaf

To the point that the Burundian army troops themselves, who entered South Kivu with an explicit mandate from the African Union, found themselves the target of attacks without knowing by whom they were being attacked. Paul Kagame seems to continue to think that his aura of “Liberator from Genocide” – which dates back to 1994 but, due to his questionable subsequent actions, doubts are being raised as to its validity – gives him a sort of global blank check that allows him to deny the evidence. The United Nations has published two reports, in June 2022 and June 2023, reiterating allegations of Rwandan support for the M23. Not only does Kagame continue to deny it, but last August he also promoted and decorated General André Nyamvumba, whom the Americans themselves – who have long been Kigali’s biggest supporters – had condemned for his actions in the DR Congo.

International duplicity
The international community has proven to be incapable of forming a common front in the face of the catastrophic situation in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of Congo where there are no fewer than five million displaced people. The most hypocritical were the French who, to “redeem” the shame of having for so long supported the Rwandan regime responsible for the genocide, tried to effectively deny the accusations of interference made against the Kigali regime to which they paid (last March) 34 million euros in special aid. Given the collapse of the French presence in Africa, marked by a succession of coups d’état from Mali (2020) to Gabon (2023), having a renewed superficial friendship with Kagame has become a kind of partial insurance policy for Paris to try to prevent the Russian presence from replacing that of the French.

Rwanda flag on soldiers’ arm. 123rf

Last December, Great Britain signed a new agreement with the Rwandan regime to send to Rwanda all those who, African or not, do not have the right to political asylum recognized in England. The Americans, on the other hand, are hesitant. The kidnapping in the Middle East and the summary trial of Paul Rusesabagina (the film Hotel Rwanda tells how he saved many lives during the 1994 genocide), later sentenced to 25 years in prison for supporting the Rwandan opposition, marked a distancing from the Kagame regime. The release of Rusesabagina last March softened the US position but did not lead to any condemnation of the presence of the M23 group in DR Congo. Exasperated by the passivity of the UN Mission (MONUSCO, present in the north-east for 23 years), the Kinshasa government has asked for the withdrawal of the international mission which, although not very operational, represents a symbolic eye open to the north-east.

The city of Bukavu, South Kivu. CC BY-SA 40/Abel Kavanagh

This is better than nothing, given “incidents” like the one on August 30th which led to a massacre (48 dead and 56 injured) during a ceremony of the Wazalendo sect in Goma. The M23 accuses the Wazalendo of accepting to be used as an anti-M23 militia, replacing the Congolese army whose efforts in fighting the Tutsi movement leave a lot to be desired. We need to go back to using the painful, though precise term, which emerges in a context in which the Rwandan mini-invasion updates the worst ethnicization of the denomination of the regional political vocabulary. The traces left by the war of the years 1996-2007 remain visible and are still experienced. We have come to a point where, from violated agreements to unenforceable sanctions, from sporadic massacres to ignored territorial violations, the international community shows, more than anything, its hypocrisy and its profound indifference. (Open Photo: M23 rebels. CC BY-SA 2.0/ Al Jazeera)

Gérard Prunier

Madagascar. Water from Baobabs .

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

In Madagascar, large centuries-old trees become cisterns to cope with the growing shortage of water. Baobabs are known for their size, hardiness, and impressive longevity.
Less known is their ability to conserve enormous quantities of water for a long time: a precious feature for those who live in the Mahafaly plateau, the driest region of the Great Island.

The Mahafaly plateau is one of the driest territories in Madagascar. Located in the southeastern part of the Big Island, it is populated by around 20,000 people belonging to the Mahafaly and Tandroy ethnic groups, who have learned to live in such a hostile environment.

Malagasy family travelling on a zebu cart on the sandy road going through the “Avenida the Baobab”. 123rf

Here it rains only a few times a year and the scant rainfall is immediately absorbed by the porous limestone soil. There are no rivers, lakes, or other natural water points.
A century ago, the region suffered a long period of drought that led to famine and the death of thousands of people.
Those who survived realized that they had to take action to avoid other water and humanitarian emergencies. It was then that the population of the plateau noticed a peculiarity of the baobabs: the ability of their trunks to store large quantities of water. When a baobab is struck by lightning, its trunk splits and the rain seeps into the cracks, small and large cracks, collecting in the cavities. Water does not penetrate the hard, compact wood of the tree, which does not rot. The water remains fresh and surprisingly pure.

Natural cisterns
The ‘barrel’ trunk of the baobab, characterized by a trunk that can reach a diameter of 8 metres, is a sort of natural ‘air-conditioned’ cistern capable of holding and conserving rainwater. The largest baobabs can store up to 14,000 litres of water, which the tree bark protects from external contamination.

Beautiful Baobab trees at sunset. The ‘barrel’ trunk of the baobab, is characterized by a trunk that can reach a diameter of 8 metres. 123rf

The Mahafaly communities have learned to transform these giants of nature into water reservoirs that allow them to cope with the harshest and hottest periods of the year.Each family is responsible for their own tree, which they look after with care. Ampotaka, with a population of 300 families, each with its own baobab, is a typical village of the region. Every June, two or three new trees are hollowed out to create new reservoirs, as older reservoirs lead to the slow deterioration of the tree which eventually collapses in on itself. To create a good cistern, the baobab must be relatively mature: speaking of plants that can live over a thousand years, ‘mature’ usually means being at least three hundred years old. Three people and at least ten days of work are needed to obtain the cavity of the desired volume. The larger the reservoir, the greater the chance of surviving droughts.

Difficult months
On the Madagascar plateau, water resources are carefully managed throughout the dry season, which generally runs from May to October… but can last much longer. For the first three months, the daily water requirement is met by reserves collected naturally in the hollow trees. In the following three months, the inhabitants go in search of tubers (such as mangeboka) and roots (baboke) which they squeeze to obtain drinking water and quench their thirst. Wild watermelons, used for cooking and drinking, are also rich in water.In July, the artificial baobab cisterns that fill up during the rainy season are reopened.

Each family is responsible for their tree, which they look after with care. File swm

The water inside them usually lasts until October and is used for drinking, cooking, and washing. If rainfall is delayed – and climate change makes the alternation of seasons increasingly uncertain – villagers are forced to make long cart journeys, 15-20 hours on bad roads, to reach the nearest place where it is possible to buy water. At that point, water consumption is extremely limited. Children are bathed only once a month. Not a drop should go to waste. People suffer from thirst and the weakest die of dehydration.
The vagaries of the sky are increasingly frequent and, while the eastern coasts of Madagascar are often plagued by violent hurricanes, the internal regions of the plateau are exposed to recurring periods of drought. This is why baobab cisterns are increasingly necessary. Their construction and maintenance are passed down from generation to generation. Each tree is baptized with the name of a newborn so that, once an adult, he can take care of his own baobab. (Open Photo:123rf)

Pascal Maitre/Africa

Sudan. The forgotten catastrophe.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

While the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine are attracting most media and Western attention, a potentially greater tragedy is threatening
Sudan where a civil war has been raging since April 2023 with
no peace in sight.

For more than ten months Sudan has been torn apart by a civil war that has already made 12,000 victims according to the UN, a figure probably widely underestimated since large portions of the country have been cut off from the rest of the world and nobody knows exactly what happened there. So far, the war has displaced 7.1 million people, including 1.5 million in neighbouring countries, according to the UN Secretary-General spokesman Stéphane Dujarric, who refers to the tragedy as “the world’s largest displacement crisis”.
This civil war opposes the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) led by Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) which grew from the Janjaweed militia that terrorized the Western Darfur region two decades ago and are now led by Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti”. Both groups were allies when they overthrew in 2019, President Omar al-Bashir whose dictatorship was seriously challenged by the mobilization of pro-democracy activists.
Two years later, both generals cracked down on pro-democracy protesters, putting an end to the transition towards democracy and took power together before they eventually fell out over the timetable for the RSF to be integrated into the army.

Sudanese leader General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan (R) and Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo – known as Hemedti – head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) [X]

Fighting between both sides has thrown the country into chaos, involving large numbers of troops: an estimated 200,000 soldiers on the SAF side against 70,000 to 100,000 fighters on Hemedti’s side. The fighting is fierce. As a result, the UN World Food Programme suspended temporarily aid to 800,000 people on 21 December in the Al-Jazirah state, which was until then spared by violence. The WFP’s decision followed a major battle lost by the SAF, despite the bombardments of its jet fighters, which ended up with the loss of the second city of the country, Wad Madani, 180 km South of Khartoum, to the RSF militia.
The Wad Madani battle generated a humanitarian disaster. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the city turned “into another death trap” for civilians, including 300,000 people who had fled Khartoum where hospitals had been shelled, where airstrikes hit residential neighbourhoods while both sides were perpetrating rapes, kidnappings and murders of civilians. Meanwhile, in Western Sudan, fighting took the form of ethnic cleansing as militias have razed villages and executed families.

The view of Khartoum.

By mid-December, the RSF controlled most of the capital and advanced along the motorway towards Wad Madani, taking village after village after having seized four regional capitals in Western Darfur and several cities in central Sudan. Reporters describe scenes of “total panic” as the RSF paramilitary move South, looting cars, lorries and tractors. Since mid-December, the paramilitary moved near Senna, 140 kilometres south of Wad Madani. According to The Washington Post, both warring sides forcibly recruit civilians, including refugees who return from camps in the Amhara region of Ethiopia where conditions are extremely difficult. There are countless reports that both sides are committing war crimes. Residents of RSF-controlled areas report mass rapes killings and detentions including the looting of banks in Khartoum while SAF has also accused of widespread looting from homes in Omdurman on the other bank of the Nile on 13 December in the only part of the city they still control. Ethnic cleansing has also been perpetrated by the SAF against members of the Rizeigat community, which makes up the core of the RSF. One explanation for the looting by SAF soldiers is that their regular army salaries are low. Fighters can earn 10 times more in the RSF, which controls gold mines in Western Darfur.
The humanitarian toll is enormous. The UN said more than 20 million children have not been at school since the beginning of the war. About 18 million people face acute hunger (including half of the population of Khartoum), and nearly 5 million in emergency levels. According to the UN, families in conflict zones could experience famine-like hunger by next summer. Altogether, some 30 million people, almost two-thirds of the population, need assistance in Sudan.

Sudanese refugees wait to be registered after crossing the border into the Central African Republic. UNHCR/Xavier Bourgois

The crisis is exacerbated because, in some areas such as al-Shajara, a southern Khartoum neighbourhood, the RSF had taken most supplies. Moreover, the area planted during this year’s season is 15% smaller than average and the production of sorghum and millet fell by 24% and 50% compared to 2022, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation.
The conflict has devastated the livelihoods of millions of people. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that Sudan’s real Gross Domestic Product fell by 18 per cent at the end of 2023. Besides, according to the UN, with international attention focused on Ukraine and now Israel and Gaza, necessary funding for Sudan has been falling short. The U.N.’s 2023 humanitarian response appeal for Sudan of US 2.6 billion was only one-third funded, in contrast with Ukraine, where a similar appeal has been 56% funded.
There isn’t much hope that violence will recede soon. Both armies are more or less evenly matched while foreign involvement is exacerbating the conflict and turning it into a proxy war. Saudi Arabia and Egypt back the Sudan Armed Forces, while the United Arab Emirates supports the RSF. Last November, General Yasser Atta, the SAF number two, accused Abu Dhabi of being “a mafia state” that had “taken the path of evil” by supporting General Dagalo’s Rapid Support Forces paramilitaries.
According to researcher Alex de Waal, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyane, the President of the UAE, supported indeed Dagalo because – the latter had “supplied him with paramilitaries for its war against the Houthis in Yemen”.

General Yasser Al-Atta, a member of the Sudanese Sovereign Council and Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Army, has criticized the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for providing military supplies to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Photo Suna

In a speech to his troops on 28 November, Atta accused the Emirates of having sent arms to the RSF via Uganda, Chad and the Central African Republic since the start of the war with the help of the Russian mercenary Wagner group. According to American sources, the gold from Darfur is being used by the RSF to finance the Wagner arms supplies operations. In retaliation, demonstrations against the Emirates took place in Khartoum and were followed by the expulsion of Sudanese diplomats by Abu Dhabi and Emirati diplomats from Sudan.
On the other side, the Emirati support to the RSF combined with Iran’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, which has been itself a long-time supporter of Sudanese governments, has also contributed to a resumption of the ties between Tehran and the Sudanese Armed Forces. All this could stoke the fires since Western powers fear that Iran could supply the SAF with weapons and expertise, namely with drones like those provided to the Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis or the Ethiopian army. This Tehran-Khartoum rapprochement is disappointing Washington which has been pushing for a normalization of diplomatic relations between Sudan and Israel before the Gaza war.
But there are other indications of an internationalization of the conflict. In October 2023, the military Africa website reported that Israeli-made LAR-160 light artillery rockets were being used by the RSF. The list of other foreign actors also includes Egypt which is the traditional ally of the Khartoum authorities and is highly likely to enhance its support for the SAF to better manage cross-border refugee flows even at the price of a deterioration of its relations with the Emirates. (Open Photo: Sudanese refugees. WFP/Eloge Mbaihondoum)

François Misser

Tensions in the Red Sea: the changing scenario in the Middle East.

Thursday, 1 February 2024 8:00

The US and UK have stepped up airstrikes against Yemeni Houthi militias.

The Anglo-American air strikes were a direct response to the long series of Houthi attacks against civilian ships and boats (merchant and container) crossing the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb, in the Red Sea, in retaliation for the Israeli invasion of Gaza.

The drone and missile attacks conducted by the Shiite Zaydi militias have hit a systemic artery of global traffic, equal to 12% of international trade (including energy) and 33% of global container traffic. These actions caused a significant drop in merchant passages in the area (around 40%) and an average quadrupling of fuel and transport costs, with consequent delays in the delivery of goods (12-15 days more).

The initiative of Washington and London has largely degraded the operational and military capacity of the Yemeni militias, but it is undeniable that all this will not lead to a total reduction in the
scope of the threat represented, nor the risk of the same conditions recurring shortly.

Furthermore, the US and UK strikes have contributed to broadening the geographical scope of the regional conflict beyond the main scenario of Gaza, making the situation even more sensitive to future enlargements and threats. Furthermore, this condition represented a novel factor for all the actors involved more or less directly in the military dynamics, effectively facilitating a favorable change of pace especially for the Houthis and Israel.

A dynamic that is well suited to the Houthis, as it allows them to act with two different hats (dialogue and attack) using the usual tool of the “stick” (now wide-ranging military attacks) and the “carrot” (willingness to continue the national dialogue in Yemen).

This means exploiting the Palestinian cause functionally to justify attacks on global maritime trade, conditioning its strategic capabilities, and exerting new and more multilevel pressure on the United States and Saudi Arabia – actors involved in the Yemeni dynamics. Therefore, the Houthis’ effort to insert themselves into the Gaza conflict is aimed at strengthening its domestic consensus base and curbing internal (loyalist government of Aden) and foreign (USA and Saudi Arabia) opposition, while cementing the positioning and regional status of the movement in the so-called Iranian-led “axis of resistance”, which also includes Hezbollah and Hamas.

The situation is equally advantageous for Israel: the escalation in the Red Sea and a possible encapsulation of Hezbollah in the ongoing dynamic against Tel Aviv has already had the merit of shifting international attention from Gaza and the West Bank. At the same time, all this has allowed greater and more direct involvement of the United States in crisis scenarios, directing the focus on Iran’s role and relations with its regional proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.

At the same time, the escalation of the conflict also reinforces the vision of the conflict carried forward by the Netanyahu executive, which aims to exploit tensions with Iran and its regional partners to remain in power in Tel Aviv for as long as possible. This is despite the clear collapse in the polls and the Prime Minister’s confidence even in the face of his radical government allies.

Tehran itself, which remained essentially on the margins of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, has maintained an ambivalent role of pressure and openness to dialogue, although it continues to profess its disinterest in getting involved in a war with regional potential. However, the activation of the Yemeni scenario – in which in any case the Iranian role remains mostly convergent with the Houthi agenda and with an anti-Saudi function – and, above all, of the Lebanese one – especially if Hezbollah were to be dragged into the Israeli clash – would have undefined but more exasperating effects, in which it would, however, be unlikely to imagine maintaining the ambiguous and opaque strategy like the one prepared up to now by Tehran.

This is the same strategic dilemma that would effectively force the United States to also raise the level of commitment, despite both the presidential campaign for the November 2024 elections has already started with too many unknowns and concerns for the Biden Administration, and Washington’s lack of will to find itself exposed on multiple opposing and contemporary military fronts (Ukraine and the risks of a possible crisis in Taiwan must never be minimized).

A similar scenario is therefore counterproductive for the United States itself, which would not only favour the regional and international propaganda of Iran-Russia-China but would also undermine the popularity – already low – of the White House in the Arab countries.

The latter are suffering from a reduced decline in trust towards their US partner and have long exploited the new context, including that of the Red Sea, to strengthen their quest for non-involvement in the war between Israel and Hamas and reorient its international interests. All without forgetting the risks and repercussions on the respective national public opinions in terms of popularity and legitimacy caused by the ambiguous diplomacy of the Arab actors in the political and military campaign of contrast in Tel Aviv, Gaza and the West Bank.

Therefore, the clear increase in regional tensions and the expansion – at least geographical – of the crisis scenario beyond the Palestinian context, will lead to a clear change of pace between all the actors involved, with the risk of acting in the dark. The danger, therefore, will not only lie in the already evident consequences for international trade, but in the increasingly asymmetric threats to national security and, more generally, to Middle Eastern instability. (Open Photo: The cargo ship transporting containers across the Red Sea.123rf)

Giuseppe Dentice/CeSI

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