A glance at Africa’s major intelligence agencies

In the African regions, North Africa has the longest tradition of intelligence. In Egipt, The General Intelligence Service (GIS) is the main agency and one of the oldest and most influential services on the continent. Responsible for both internal and external intelligence. Among the most sensitive dossiers it has handled are the mediation between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, the control of the borders with Libya and Sudan and the Rafah crossing and the fight against jihadist groups in the Sinai Peninsula. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi owes his rise to power and the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood to their loyalty.

The low-intensity conflict between Morocco and Algeria is managed for Rabat by the Département de la Documentation et de la Sécurité Extérieure (DDSE) and for Algiers by the Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale (DSGN). While the Moroccan services are recognized for their willingness to cooperate with international intelligence communities, especially in the fight against groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS in North Africa, the Algerian ones are known to be among the most hermetic, centralized and ruthless.
In East Africa, the leadership is held by the Kenyan National Intelligence Service (NIS). With a modus operandi inherited from the British Special Branch (SB), the agency has so far proven fundamental in stemming the incursions of cells of the Somali group al-Shabaab.

The Flag of Ethiopia. 123rf – The Logo of NISS

The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) is the intelligence agency of the federal government of Ethiopia responsible for “gathering information of national interest”. The NISS depends on the Ministry of Peace. The Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service is the national intelligence and security agency of Tanzania. The Agency works closely with other national and international intelligence agencies and security bodies for “the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and protection within and beyond the borders of Tanzania.”
The Eritrean National Security Office or NSO is the intelligence agency of Eritrea. The agency reports directly to the Office of the President. In 2021, the Council of the European Union imposed sanctions against the NSO for being responsible for “arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances of persons and torture by its agents” in Eritrea. The NSO has a tight grip on the Eritrean diaspora in Europe and North America.The Internal Security Organization (ISO) is the Uganda government’s counterintelligence agency responsible for providing national security intelligence to Uganda’s policymakers. In recent years, it has been notable for its activities against internal dissidents.

In West Africa, the primacy on the cyber front belongs to the Ghanaian Cyber Security Authority (CSA). The agency is under the Ministry of Communications. Instead, the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) is Ghana’s domestic intelligence agency. The BNI is an integral part of the National Security Council, which oversees matters of counterintelligence and internal security in Ghana. The BNI has the power to interrogate and detain people suspected of subversion without trial for an indefinite period, for reasons of the national security of the Republic of Ghana.
As regards the fight against regional security, Nigeria’s National Intelligence Agency (NIA) must be recognized.
In the Great Lakes region, the National Intelligence and Security Agency is a Rwandan security and intelligence agency (NISS). It was created in 1994 by the Republic of Rwanda following the Rwandan genocide. It is the most sophisticated weapon in the hands of President Kagame.The NISS is present in Eastern Africa, Belgium and the United States
The Agence Nationale de Renseignements (ANR) is the government intelligence agency of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The agency’s role is to ensure the “internal and external security” of the state. The agency has been heavily criticized by several organizations for its failure to respect human rights.

Flag of South Africa. 123rf – The Logo of SSA

In Southern Africa, the SSA (State Security Agency) of South Africa is recognized as the most advanced intelligence agency in Africa in terms of technology and availability of economic resources. It is delegated to national security, economic espionage and the protection of strategic infrastructure. It can conduct operations outside its territory, this includes Europe, the Middle East and North America. In recent years, the SSA has focused its attention on two main areas: The activities of Al-Qaeda and similar groups abroad about the security of South Africa and the activities of illegal South African mercenaries, especially in Africa and Iraq.Controlling dissidents with the use of violence and entering the economic sphere is the case of the CIO (Central Intelligence Organization), the national intelligence agency of Zimbabwe.
The CIO controls Terrestrial Holdings, a network of companies active in various sectors: from the hemp trade to the exploitation of solar energy, from coal extraction on 50,000 hectares of land near Lake Kariba to tourism. (Open Photo: 123rf)
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In many African countries, intelligence agencies are used by those who govern as a tool for social control and repression of dissent. From Kagame’s Rwanda to al-Sisi’s Egypt, the evolution of an apparatus that should serve the state and not those who hold power.

It was New Year’s Eve 2014 when Patrick Karegeya, former head of Rwanda’s external intelligence services, was in a suite at the Michelangelo Towers in Johannesburg. On the other side of the corridor, waiting for him in another room, was an old informant of his. The bait moved and the trap was sprung. Karegeya will be found dead twenty-four hours later, strangled with a towel.
Accused of desertion and insubordination by the Kigali regime, he had managed to escape to South Africa in 2007, where he founded the opposition party in exile, the Rwanda National Congress.

Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Photo Pres. Office – The Logo of National Intelligence and Security (NISS).

A few days after the murder, Rwandan President Paul Kagame utters lapidary words: “You cannot betray Rwanda and not be punished for it. Anyone, even those still alive, will pay the consequences. Anyone. It’s only a matter of time.”
On May 28, 2024, the journalists’ collective Forbidden Stories published an investigation entitled “Rwanda Classified”, which also focuses on the repression carried out by the Rwandan authorities against opponents and critical journalists.
The information provided by 50 journalists from 11 different countries revealed intimidation, threats or assassination attempts aimed at silencing all critical voices, both in Rwanda and abroad. In Belgium alone, the report counts around twenty repressive and surveillance actions over the last decade. These include four suspicious deaths of Rwandan citizens since 2004. The systematic persecution of opponents is a reflection of how Kagame has placed Rwandan intelligence, the National Intelligence and Security Services, at the service of his stay in power.

Family affairs
The past and recent history of African intelligence is full of these episodes. If there are presidents to depose, coups to organize, opponents to suffocate or traitors to suppress, it is through the secret service rooms that the decisions that count pass. African countries have inherited a method in part from the European powers that colonized them, but after the season of independence, they began to create their own, shaping it according to the diktats of those who hold power. On the other hand, there is little to be surprised about in Africa’s secret services remaining more at the “service” of the leadership than of the institutions.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. CC BY 4.0/Pres.Office. In the background, the Pyramids 123rf – The emblem of The General Intelligence Service (GIS).

No matter how many precautions one may take, keeping control of such a complex machine as intelligence is a delicate undertaking that requires absolutely trustworthy figures to manage it. In Egypt, too, the structure that manages the 007s has become a family affair with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi who has placed his firstborn Mahmoud at the top of the GIS (General Intelligence Service), the most powerful of the country’s mukhabarat – responsible for internal security and counter-espionage and today headed by Hassan Mahmoud Rashad.

Politicized services
The American historian Ryan Shaffer has written two volumes on the evolution of African secret services, African Intelligence Services: Early Postcolonial and Contemporary Challenges and The Handbook of African Intelligence Cultures (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023). Among the cases analysed is that of Eritrea where the National Security Office (NSO), headed by General Major Abraha Kassa, reports directly to President Isaias Afwerki, in power since 1993.

According to Shaffer, the control that the Eritrean services exercise over citizens, both internally and around the world, is so widespread that it is comparable to that exercised by the Stasi in East Germany.Because they are seen as an instrument of control and repression, the activities of gathering, analysing and sharing information and predicting threats, the secret services in Africa receive on average much less funding than the police forces. “Most African countries give priority to the police over intelligence,” says Akram Kharief, a defence and security analyst. “Although in recent years the African services have shown greater interest in new intelligence techniques and in the surveillance of telephone and Internet communications. The emergence of Islamist terrorism has encouraged more investment in the Sahel countries too.” These processes are, however, slow in decision-making compared to the speed with which new threats loom over security. “African intelligence agencies are not evolving because of a lack of transparency within them and because they are used exclusively to preserve regimes and as political police forces,” Kharief continues. “To stimulate their evolution, a political transformation of African governments would first be needed.” This, according to the analyst, is not happening in his country, Algeria: “The Algerian secret services are old, their weak point has always been excessive involvement in politics, which has now made them the skeleton in the closet of the Algerian government.”

In search of autonomy
In recent years, the African Union has attempted to fill some of the gaps in African intelligence. In 2002, the African Standby Force (ASF) was established, a political and military tool for rapid response to crisis situations, which so far, however, has not been able to accelerate the processes of collegial resolution of regional tensions.
In 2020, the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA) was created, designed as a bridging structure for cooperation between African intelligence agencies.

Nigeria Police Force. Most African countries prioritise the police over intelligence. Shutterstock/Tolu Owoeye

The main source of economic resources, advanced equipment and know-how, however, remain the old and new extracontinental allies. “What survived from the relations with the former colonial empires has drawn the current African map of intelligence cooperation,” Kharief points out. “The Francophone countries have maintained strong ties with France and the members of the Commonwealth have remained close to Great Britain and the United States. I do not think, however, that adherence to Western standards is necessarily a sign of development or progress for an intelligence service. The South African secret services were initially compliant with British standards, and they also benefited from the experience acquired by former members of the MK (military wing of the African National Congress, ed.) in the communist bloc”.

A Beninese group of people. The Intelligence Service should serve the people, not those in power.123rf

For African services, maintaining autonomy from powers that base their strategies for penetrating the continent on economic investments or intelligence manoeuvres is one of the central challenges of recent years. For intelligence analysts, it is enough to think of what was achieved by the Russian secret services to oust France from the Sahara countries and take over. It was excellent intelligence work.
Caught between these dynamics and authoritarian leaders who have little or no intention of giving away the power they hold, African intelligence should, first of all, equip itself with internal transparency mechanisms that define hierarchies, relationships with executive bodies and objectives more clearly than in the past. Otherwise, they will continue to serve those who govern and not states and peoples. (Open Photo: African Mask. 123rf)
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Investments that are lower by more than half the global average, a lack of coordination and cooperation plans between the intelligence agencies of the various countries. The risk of being at the service of the political elite of the moment. Little attention to cybersecurity. We discuss this with Annette Hübschle, research director of the Global Risk Governance Programme at the University of Cape Town Law School (South Africa).

Many African countries allocate less than 1% of their national budgets to strengthening their intelligence agencies, compared to the global average of 2%. Would investing more resources be enough to improve their performance?

Annette Hübschle, research director of the Global Risk Governance Programme at the University of Cape Town Law School.

Low resources are certainly an aspect that needs to be considered. But increasing them alone will not allow African countries to address and solve deeper systemic challenges. There are legitimate concerns about the misuse of intelligence resources, often used, for example, to spy on political opponents or to safeguard the interests of ruling elites rather than addressing urgent threats to national and regional security. To improve in this area, African countries need to equip themselves with more transparent oversight mechanisms, assign clearer mandates to their intelligence agencies, and build internal know-how to address shared threats such as terrorism, organized crime,
and cyberattacks.

Among the challenges to be faced is the need to coordinate and cooperate more. Are there plans in the continent that go
in this direction?
Lack of coordination and cooperation within individual states and between country agencies often reflects broader issues of mistrust, political rivalries and divergent national interests. Addressing these issues requires more than just technical solutions. It requires political will, shared governance visions and defined accountability systems. Strengthening regional platforms, such as the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC), could help incentivise greater collaboration. However, care must be taken to ensure that intelligence sharing is not misused to target political dissidents or suppress opposition movements, as has been seen in several instances on
the African continent.

British Secret Intelligence Service building, known as MI6, London. The concept of aligning with “Western standards” deserves critical scrutiny. 123rf

Which African state has the most advanced intelligence services approaching Western standards?
The concept of aligning with “Western standards” deserves critical scrutiny. Why should African intelligence agencies aspire to adopt models that may not be appropriate to the specifics of their socio-political realities? Instead, African intelligence should develop its own standards of excellence, focusing on principles such as civil society engagement, human rights protection, and the challenges of ensuring national and local security. This approach could offer lessons to Western standards, not the other way around.

How are African intelligence agencies investing in cybersecurity? Are some countries more advanced than others?
Cybersecurity is emerging as a growing priority on the continent, although currently only for a few intelligence agencies.
This leaves significant disparities between countries, with levels of investment and growth in domestic expertise varying significantly. Countries such as Kenya and South Africa have made great strides in this area. However, even in these countries, there can be risks, with tools and resources put to use in cybersecurity that could be misused to spy on political opponents or civil society activists. Investments in this area must always be accompanied by strong ethical and legal safeguards to prevent potential abuse.

There are legitimate concerns about African countries’ sovereignty and the imposition of external directives. 123rf

Is the influence of extra-continental actors, from the United States to Israel, from Russia to China, on African intelligence services,
still too great?
Foreign influence in Africa is a complex issue. Partnerships with countries such as the United States, China or Israel can provide African countries with technical support and resources. At the same time, there are legitimate concerns about African countries’ sovereignty and the imposition of external directives. Sometimes these partnerships can exacerbate rather than resolve domestic challenges, such as strengthening regimes that abuse intelligence services to suppress dissent. African countries need to critically evaluate their relationships with these powers, ensuring that their involvement with these partners is in line with their national interests and that these partnerships help them develop internal capacities to reduce their dependence over time. (Open Photo: 123rf)

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The market is expected to reach $700 billion by 2050. However, cybersecurity is a growing concern, with increased attacks and significant losses in countries such as South Africa and Nigeria. Often, regimes use technologies to survey dissent.

It was in January 2018 that an investigation by the French newspaper Le Monde revealed espionage activities conducted by China in the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa, in the buildings
built by the Chinese state company China State Construction
Engineering Corporation.

Addis Ababa. African Union Headquarters. From 2012 to 2017, the data contained in the computers used by the organisation’s employees was transferred to Chinese servers in Shanghai. UN Photo/Antonio Fiorente

For five years, from 2012 to 2017, the data contained in the computers used by the organization’s employees were transferred to Chinese servers in Shanghai. While sensitive information escaped at night, during the day an army of bugs captured voices in the rooms and along the corridors. Shortly after, a cell of Mustang Panda, a group of hackers in the pay of Beijing, stole the footage from the security cameras: “If you let them build the entire system, it’s obvious that they’ll listen to you,” a Western diplomat commented on the news while it was still hot. In Africa, most of the telecommunication infrastructure was set up, in fact, by two Chinese giants, Huawei and ZTE.

The US hunting down data centres
A cumbersome presence, to say the least, that the United States is now trying to counter by grabbing the properties of African data centres. Equinix and Digital Realty have won the biggest fish. The only player on the continent capable of holding their own is Africa Data Centre, a subsidiary of Cassava Technologies based in South Africa.

In 2023, there were 23% more cyberattacks in Africa than in 2022. Losses were estimated at 10 billion dollars. 123rf

With the Cloud market constantly growing and the rise of Artificial Intelligence applications, the real security challenge at a global level will increasingly depend on the control of data archives and processors. This also applies to Africa, where the digital market will reach a turnover of over 700 billion dollars in 2050 and where in 2023 there were 23% more cyber-attacks than in 2022, with losses estimated by the Kenyan company, Serianu, at 10 billion dollars.

Regulatory antibodies
For years, the African Union has been equipping itself with regulatory antibodies to deal with these scenarios. In 2014, the Malabo Convention was signed, a community document aimed at increasing cybersecurity and the protection of personal data on the continent, ratified in 2022 with the Lomé Declaration by Togo and the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). In January 2024, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC) unanimously adopted the Common African Position on the Application of International Law on the Use of Information and Communication Technologies in Cyberspace, adhering in many points to the protocols launched by the European Union.

According to the 2024 Global Cybersecurity Index, , the top-performing models are those developed by Mauritius, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania.

However, not all African states are moving at the same speed and in the same direction. According to an analysis by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies in 2022, only three countries have prepared a structured threat assessment plan, with adequate investments: Eswatini, Kenya and Senegal. According to the 2024 Global Cybersecurity Index, drawn up by the International Telecommunication Union, the best-performing models are those developed by Mauritius, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania. Matteo Lucchetti is the director of Cyber 4.0, an organization that provides support to law enforcement, magistrates and prosecutors in the fight against cybercrime. For the Council of Europe, he coordinated a project to support several African states, working closely in particular with the National Cyber Security Authority of Ghana. “In the sector, Accra represents a hub for the English-speaking countries of West Africa, while Senegal is for the French-speaking ones and Cape Verde for those in the area of Russian influence”, he explains. “Ghana has ratified the Budapest Convention of the Council of Europe, adopted by Western countries but opposed by the BRICS bloc. By receiving know-how and devices from Europe and the United States, this country has greatly strengthened in terms of organization, technological protections, reaction capacity and data protection”.

Instruments of repression
While investments in cyber threat intelligence have allowed Ghana and other African countries to improve their performance in gathering and analysing information and predicting threats, a circle of regimes on the continent have instead armed themselves with innovative cyber espionage techniques and tools to repress dissent.

Seven African governments had purchased Pegasus spyware. 123rf

In 2021, four executives of the French companies Amesys and Nexa ended up under investigation for allegedly providing the regimes of Egypt and Libya with cyber-surveillance tools to monitor opponents. In 2020, a Citizen Lab dossier from the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs combed through the customers of Circles, a company linked to the Tel Aviv-based tech firm NSO Group, and found that seven African governments had purchased its Pegasus spyware, software capable of identifying a person’s location with just their phone number, hacking the SS7 (Signalling System #7) system, capturing everything contained in the cameras and microphones built into cell phones, tracking app usage, and following web and social media browsing patterns. The list included Nigeria, Botswana, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Propaganda on the Web
Even on the web, many African states find themselves in the limbo of external spheres of influence. Some are hit by propaganda campaigns, or become their megaphone. The case study of recent years is the activity to discredit the West carried out through TV, radio, newspapers and especially local sites and social networks by former Wagners, in the countries where the military company that went under the name of Africa Corps operates. “When protests against a government erupt, typically those in power turn off the Internet so that opponents cannot communicate with each other,” concludes Lucchetti. “But countering propaganda with more propaganda, in addition to going against the principles of respect for freedom of expression and access to information, is not a lasting solution and also leads to a loss of productivity. Protecting governance from phenomena like these is difficult especially in countries that are fragile on a democratic level. It happened recently with Niger. And now there are fears for Chad.”

About 90% of private African companies operate without cybersecurity protocols. 123rf

Between the cyber militarization manoeuvres imposed by the Kremlin, Chinese investments in infrastructure and cyber governance programs proposed by Western partners, the challenge for African countries is to carve out and defend spaces of autonomy also in the digital dimension. This applies to governments and also to businesses. According to an estimate reported by African Business, about 90% of private African companies operate without cybersecurity protocols, which makes them vulnerable to hacking, phishing and malware attacks. Holes that end up costing South Africa 570 million dollars and Nigeria 500 million dollars every year. (Open Photo: 123rf)

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