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Mission. It’s worth it.

They come from three different continents: Asia, Africa and Latin America. They study theology in Granada Spain. The reason why they chose the mission. Here’s what they told us.

My name is Tran Minh Thong, although my baptismal name is Peter. I was born in Vietnam on All Saints’ Day 1993. I was the youngest of six siblings. Like all families, mine had its wounds, and in the Vietnamese cultural context, being the youngest, I had no say in the decisions
my family made.

When I started high school, my friends and I became addicted to gambling. I spent money, wasted time, neglected my health and got lost in the virtual world. In those years I didn’t care about my future, I only thought about having a good time and being on the Internet. My life had no meaning or motivation.

However, I felt a strange energy, like a voice whispering inside me. I began to participate in the Pro-Life Movement, which defends life from the womb, and also in the charismatic movement. For the first time, I experienced that God is alive and close to me.

One day, praying in a corner of my room, I told him: “I want to offer my life for the Mission in Africa”. It was no coincidence that I met a Comboni missionary, and as I read the missionary testimonies that he sent me, my love for the Mission increased.

Eventually, I entered the Comboni Missionary community in Saigon, Vietnam, where my second life began. It was like finding a life jacket in a rough sea. I was thirsty for an orderly, healthy and courageous life because I was aware that I had thrown a lot of time out the window and had to recover what had been lost.

After several years of formation in the Philippines, I made my first religious profession and consecrated my life to the Lord for the Mission. I arrived in Spain a few months ago, after being assigned to the community of Granada to continue my training. I am discovering this country, its history, its climate, its food and, above all, its people.
The first challenge I have to overcome is the language, which is
not easy for us Asians.

Another challenge is living in an international community with so much to offer but in which I sometimes find myself lost because I am the only Asian. I know it’s part of missionary life and that I will make it eventually. We live in a world that rejects God’s presence, but in which there are still people who seek Him. I believe that the Holy Spirit is constantly at work in the world and in the Church.

Emmanuel Alejandro, “If you want to, talk to him”
I’m Emmanuel Alejandro Majia Sanchez, I’m 31 years old and originally from Magdalena, in the Mexican state of Jalisco. I have always known the Comboni Missionaries because every month they carry out missionary animation activities in my parish, especially accompanying the so-called Comboni Ladies. Despite their advanced age, most of them continue to support and give their best for the Comboni Missionaries.

My mother did not belong to this group, but she always collaborated with the annual campaigns of the Comboni Missionaries. After her passing 21 years ago, my family kept that commitment. The coordinator of the Comboni Ladies, Maria de Jesus Altamiro, was a key person in my decision to enter the Comboni Institute.

In 2014 I entered the diocesan seminary of Guadalajara, but I left the following year. On the way home, my parish priest asked me to help him as a sacristan for a few weeks while I found work, but what was supposed to be a few days turned into four years.

Every time she saw me in the parish, María de Jesús asked me a question that made me uncomfortable: “Are you going to spend your life cleansing the temple?” One day she said to me: “The Comboni Missionary is coming next Friday. If you want, talk to him.”

Even though I replied that I didn’t want to know anything about seminaries or anything like that, I spoke to the missionary, who gave me the biography of Saint Daniele Comboni. I read it and I was impressed by his tenacity; on 18 August 2018, I began my Comboni formation.
On May 13, 2023, I took my first vows and was sent to Granada
to study Theology.

I arrived in Spain on October 5th, when the course had already started at the Faculty of Theology in Granada, so all I could do was unpack my bags and start the lessons. The first week I learned about my apostolic position in the Calor y Café Association, where migrants in irregular situations are helped. After all the road travelled, a mixture of pain and joy, sleepless nights and early mornings, tears and smiles, I can say that missionary life is worth it.

Justin, seeking the will of God
My name is Justin Assey Yao. I was born in 1997 in Grand-Popo (Benin). I am the fourth of a family of five children who grew up in a simple, believing and peaceful family environment. As a child, I left my village to go with my aunt to Gonzagueville, Ivory Coast. I completed my
primary studies there.

In 2009 I received baptism and first communion. That same year I returned to my country, to Benin and precisely to Cotonou, to continue secondary school.

My missionary vocation was born in the ordinary context of my life. At the end of the fifth year of confirmation catechesis, our catechist asked us how we would serve the Church after receiving the sacrament. The question awakened the flame of the Lord in me.

I later joined the group of altar boys in my parish, which strengthened my life of faith and my vocation, and when I had the opportunity to learn about Comboni’s missionary life I was overwhelmed by his missionary zeal, by his love for Christ and his charism of evangelizing Africa despite the difficulties and unreliability of resources.

I decided to become a Comboni missionary the day Comboni Father Leopoldo Adanle was ordained in my parish. I got in touch with the vocation promoter and entered the postulancy in 2016.

In this first stage of formation there was no shortage of difficulties, which I resolved through prayer, the advice of the formators and the support of my brothers in the community. On May 8, 2021, I made my first religious profession and I have been in Granada, Spain for three years to complete my theology studies.

As missionaries we are called to study, observe, dialogue and understand the culture and modus vivendi of the place in which we find ourselves to better integrate and proclaim Christ. In a world where the message of the cross and the spirit of sacrifice proposed by Jesus seem to conflict with the search for individual and material well-being, we must bear witness to Christ, which is why it is worthwhile being missionaries today. Throughout our lives, we must continue to seek the will of God, whose love for us is permanent, even in the midst of our wilderness and vulnerable humanity.
(Photo: From Left: Emmanuel Alejandro, Tran Minh and Justin)

 

 

Peru. The Feast of the Sun.

June 24th marks one of Peru’s main holidays: Inti Raymi, in the Quechua language, which means “Festival of the Sun”. It is the most important cultural event in Cusco, which was the capital of the empire.

The Inca Pacha Kutiq (1418-71) founded the Inca Empire. In the Quechua language, Inca means ‘lord’, ‘king’, ‘monarch’, ‘emperor’ or ‘chief’. However, spiritually, it meant that he was the ‘Son of the Sun God’, ‘Apu Inti ‘in Quechua, the creator god in whom he and the people believed.
The Inca Pacha Kutiq made the city of Cusco in southern Peru the capital of the Inca Empire, which extended north to southern Colombia and south to central Chile. Then, a hundred kilometres from Cusco, he ordered the construction of Machu Picchu, the imperial and holy city, at 2430 meters above sea level in the Andes.
The city of Machu Picchu, 530 meters long and 200 meters wide, included houses, plazas, shrines, temples, cemeteries and aqueduct systems. It also had stepped terraces for agriculture and animal husbandry, especially llamas.

The Inca Pacha Kutiq made the city of Cusco in southern Peru the capital of the Inca Empire. Pixabay

One of the most emblematic elements of the sacred city was the sun clock (Intihuatana), built of stone and located at the highest point of the city. In the 1430s, Pacha Kutiq established the Inti Raymi (Festival of the Sun) in the city of Cusco, to be celebrated annually on the day of the winter solstice in the southern hemisphere – the day on which the sun is furthest away from the Earth.
The ancient Incas followed the setting of the sun – Apu Inti (Sun God) – also called Apu P’unchau (God Day) – when the days grew shorter in the weeks preceding the winter solstice. To ask him to start his cycle again, to bring warmth and life back to Earth, a majestic ceremony was held, which was initially called Wawa Inti Raymi, or Festival of the Sun Child.
The population prepared for the feast by fasting for three days.
During this period, no bonfires were lit in the cities. But during the festival, the Inca Pacha Kutiq ordered a new fire to be lit and distributed to all the houses. At dawn on the day of the festival, which was attended by representatives of the entire empire, the Inca Pacha Kutiq went to the main square and waited for the sun to rise. When the sun rose, people knelt with their arms outstretched. The Inca Pacha Kutiq stood up and blessed the population with two golden vessels.

The esplanade of Sacsayhuaman a few minutes before the Inti Raymi celebration. CC BY-SA 3.0/ Martin St-Amant

The high priest then made animal sacrifices and, studying their hearts, made predictions. The ritual also involved offerings of corn, coca leaves, chicha (a handmade alcoholic drink made from coca) or fruit and potatoes to the earth, to ask the solar deity for a good harvest.
On the same occasion, the Inca Pacha Kutiq was reaffirmed as the supreme leader of the empire and the Sun was confirmed as the supreme entity that helps the harvests and keeps the population alive.
In 1572, forty years after the arrival of the Spanish in Peru, the Inti Raymi festival was banned by the Spanish viceroy Francisco de Toledo, who considered it a pagan ceremony and contrary to the Catholic faith. The last Inca participation in the celebration was in 1535. However, the Inca continued to celebrate the festival in secret away from the Spanish authorities, and a mestizo named Garcilaso de la Vega recorded the details in his famous work Comentarios Reales.
About 372 years passed and, in 1944, Faustino Espinoza Navarro, a Peruvian writer and actor from Cusco, decided to promote the recovery of the Festival of the Sun by carrying out a historical reconstruction.
Since then, the festival has established itself as a public cultural event and attracts over one hundred thousand tourists every year.

The Great Celebration
The sun always shines on June 24 in Cusco. On this day, more than 700 actors dressed in multimotored Inca costumes, condor feathers, quipos (a textile artifact composed of multicoloured ropes and knots), yellow broom flowers and corn chicha in their hands, welcome the other actors who play the Inca and his wife. The character playing the Inca Pacha Kutiq comes dressed in red with a crown of gold and feathers. The other actors play the high priest, the Incan nobility and the delegates of the empire. The staging takes place in three specific places of Cusco of great historical importance: Coricancha, Plaza Mayor and Sacsayhuaman.

Cusco. Inti Raymi at Sacsayhuaman. CC BY-SA 3.0/Cyntia Motta

The first act of the staging, in the Coricancha, the golden temple built by the Inca Pacha Kutiq, begins with the entry of the sinchi (the general of the Inca army), followed by the imperial army, by the acla, women chosen as wives and priestesses of the Sun, invested with sacred qualities. Then the t’ika t’aqaqkunas – women who spread flowers on the ground for the passage of the Inca king – and the pichaqkun (men responsible for chasing away evil spirits with straw vases).
Finally, the Inca Pacha Kutiq appears, with his wife (coya) and his kumillo, the one who carries the achiwa, a parasol made of coloured feathers, and the high priest Willaq Umu.
The Inca Pacha Kutiq and the high priest make the offering to the Sun, whose image is, as in the past, a golden circular figure. All this takes place to the rhythm of traditional music, dance and song.
The second act of Inti Raymi takes place in the Plaza Mayor, in the historic centre of Cusco, where the main altar is located.
The Inca general orders the entry of the army, musicians and delegates from the four regions of the empire. Then the Inca Pacha Kutiq arrives, carried on a litter by eight servants, and goes up to the main altar with the high priest, where the so-called Coca Ceremony takes place.
This consists of the sacrifice of a lama and the offering
of coca leaves to the Sun god.

Cusco. In March 2001, the Inti Raymi was declared a Cultural Heritage of Peru and a Ritual Ceremony of National Identity. CC BY-SA 3.0/Cyntia Motta

Finally, the Chuquipampa esplanade in the Sacsayhuaman fortress is the third and main act of the event. There, surrounded by an evocative musical atmosphere, the Inca Pacha Kutiq and his entourage arrive to pay respect and admiration to the Sun.
The Inca Pacha Kutiq recites a prayer in the Quechua language and simulates the sacrifice of a camelid, so that the high priest can predict prosperity and well-being for the following year.
The Inca Pacha Kutiq is then confirmed as the supreme leader of the empire and the Sun as the supreme entity who helps the crops and keeps the people alive. All the actors leave and the celebration ends.
The message of the Festival of the Sun is that its triumphal return on the shortest day and after the longest night reactivates nature and this is a reason for joy and celebration. Inti Raymi is not a celebration exclusive to Cusco, but to most of the Andean populations of the countries of the former Inca Empire, southern Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile and northern Argentina. In March 2001, the Inti Raymi was declared a Cultural Heritage of Peru and a Ritual Ceremony of National Identity. (Open Photo: The golden statue of The Inca Pacha Kutiq in Cusco. 123rf

Fernando Félix

 

 

 

 

 

Guinea Bissau. The environment and the local culture, keys to development at Bijagós.

How to improve the relationship between local communities and the environment. The great wealth of biodiversity of the Bijagós archipelago. The inhabitants are the custodians of their ecosystem.

The rainy season begins and with it the turtle counting activities in the João Vieria Poilão Marine National Park (PNMJVP). This area belongs to the Bijagós archipelago, located off the coast of Guinea-Bissau, West Africa. It is the third largest colony of giant sea turtles on the continent and every year both the body that manages the protected areas and the population welcome this responsibility with the same enthusiasm.Bijagós is a group of islands and islets declared a biosphere reserve by UNESCO in 1996. Of the 88 islands, 22 are inhabited, with a population of 33,000, although the population is mainly concentrated on five of them.

Antonio Pérez, director of the João Vieria Poilão Marine National Park (PNMJVP) since 2018. (Photo: Sara Martín López)

Biosphere reserves are developed under the “Men and Biosphere” Program (MaB). Selected for their scientific interest, they are mainly based on three criteria: conservation and protection of biodiversity, sustainable economic and human development and logistical support for research and education activities.
The MaB is an intergovernmental program that seeks to establish a scientific basis for improving the global relationship between people and their environment. Launched by UNESCO in 1972, it proposes an interdisciplinary research and capacity development agenda focusing on ecological, social and educational dimensions to improve the livelihoods of human beings. This proposal should include innovative approaches to economic development that are socially and culturally appropriate and environmentally sustainable.

The work of protection
The Institute for Biodiversity of Protected Areas (IBAP), created in 2014, manages the protection of natural spaces with very clear objectives: to promote the conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity, as well as support the creation and management of protected areas.
The challenges of the PNMJVP are more specific: the protection of biodiversity and island ecosystems, the conservation of sea turtles and colonial aquatic birds, the protection and valorisation of the cultural heritage of Bijagós, the contribution to the regeneration of fish resources and the development of eco-tourism.
In addition to the dense palm trees, jungle, mangroves, paradisiacal white sand beaches and crystal-clear waters, the Bijagós archipelago is not only a perfect destination for ecotourism lovers’ dream holidays, thanks to its diversity, but for biologists and scientists it is also a natural laboratory that offers a scenario for studying possible cures for the world’s deadliest diseases.

A group of elderly people at a meeting. Their entire culture revolves around nature, from which they draw everything from food to medicine. The elderly population is fundamental for the transmission of this wisdom. (Photo: Sara Martín López)

Antonio Pérez, originally from Bissau, has been the director of this park since 2018. Here he leads and coordinates activities related to conservation and awareness. “The turtle counting season lasts four months, from August to November. The number of turtles welcomed into the park varies greatly depending on the stage of maturity of the individuals ready to lay their eggs and taking into account various factors such as environmental threats and physical conditions. Green turtles and hawksbill turtles are the most common in this archipelago”, explains Pérez, and adds that “even if we have not reached 100,000 units, the number is high, almost close to that of Costa Rica. In 2020 we reached 60,000 nests on the island of Poilão, which makes us the third most important place on the Atlantic coast.”
To cover this reception period, the Institute for Biodiversity of Protected Areas (IBAP) and the population of the island are responsible for the process. This is one of the reasons why awareness meetings are held in the various villages in which the entire population is invited to participate.These meetings are two-way. On the one hand, the different problems that the population faces in daily life are presented and the islanders are informed and made aware of the protected fishing areas within the PNMJVP and how they can actively contribute to its conservation work. On the other hand, they are encouraged to form associations and present initiatives to participate in projects led by international organizations.

Daily life
The people who inhabit these islands maintain a subsistence economy in which they extract and consume what they need from nature, which results in a high degree of conservation and respect for the environment. The inhabitants are the custodians of their ecosystem.
One of the tasks undertaken and promoted by the local population is collective work. Through associations, they meet periodically to discuss various issues. The awareness work they carry out is extremely important, since maintaining environmental balance directly affects the livelihood of the population.

Fishermen collecting the nets in an old traditional fishing canoe near the island of Orango at sunset. Shutterstock/TLF Images

As in any formal meeting, an agenda is followed, the names of the participants are noted and minutes are drawn up as a summary of the work. In these meetings, questions are raised, and discussed and future activities are established according to a timetable. The whole population is invited: young people, elderly people, women and children.
People’s awareness about biodiversity conservation is very high. They know that their survival depends on maintaining natural resources. Their entire culture revolves around nature, from which they draw everything from food to medicine. The elderly population is fundamental for the transmission of this wisdom, which is different on each island since each has its ecosystem and its species to protect.
On some of these islands and villages, there is no western impact. There are no roads, no cars, no hotels, no electricity, no running water. In these corners of Bijagós, it is understood that economic development will be based on projects linked to the conservation of the environment, species, renewable energy, ecotourism and cultural values. (Open Photo: An island of Bijagós, UNESCO Biosphere Reserve. Shutterstock/Anton_Ivanov)

Sara Martín López

Burkina Faso. A climate of fear and violence.

The country has long been going through a phase of instability and violence that threatens its survival. The rise to power of the military has not improved the situation. On the contrary, it has actually worsened it by aggravating a series of pre-existing problems. At this moment, there is no way out of this state of affairs, which risks having serious negative repercussions on the region.

On 20 September 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, leading several branches of the armed forces, seized power in Burkina Faso, becoming the youngest head of state in the world. In doing so, he overthrew another military junta, the one led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Henri Damiba, who had ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kabore
in January of that year.

Burkina Faso Political Map with capital Ouagadougou. 123rf

Kabore was elected in 2015, after a popular uprising had put an end to the regime of Blaise Compaoré, also a military man who came to power by force in 1987.Since its independence in 1960, Burkina Faso has thus experienced several coups d’état. The weakness of its institutions has been aggravated in recent years by the aggression of jihadist groups (linked to Al Qaeda or the Islamic State) that have infiltrated the territory from neighbouring countries (especially Mali), exploiting the shortcomings of the public administration and latent ethnic and religious tensions. During the lengthy period of Compaoré’s rule, it seemed that Burkina Faso was spared regional instability and increasing attacks by jihadist groups. Compaoré had even carved out a role for himself as a regional player in mediating conflicts. But this was only an optical illusion. In reality, the progressive weakening of institutions under Compaoré due to phenomena such as corruption created the conditions for jihadists to infiltrate.

Captain Ibrahim Traoré, Transition President of Burkina Faso. Lamine Traoré / VOA

According to some sources, Traoré decided to carry out the coup because he did not agree with the way the fight against the rebels was being handled by the military high command. The problem is that at the moment he seems mainly concerned about remaining in power. His fears are fuelled by the knowledge that there is a strong resentment towards him by armed forces officers like himself, perhaps with a higher rank than his, who have been ousted. An attempt to overthrow him organised by the military and civilians was reportedly foiled in September 2023. He has profoundly changed the security forces by, among other things, creating 25 Rapid Intervention Battalions (BIR), military units loyal to him to which he gives orders directly. In addition, he increased the recruitment of the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), a paramilitary corps that supports the army in the fight against extremists.Besides domestically, Traoré sought to strengthen himself internationally. First, he has forged ties with regional partners in the same situation, starting with Assimi Goita, who seized power in Mali in a coup. Then he forged ties with Moscow, especially about internal security.

A new alliance
The military junta in power in Burkina Faso has formed a strong alliance with those of Mali and Niger, and the three, which are at loggerheads with the other countries in the region, have formed the Alliance of Sahel States. On 16 September 2023, they signed the so-called Liptako-Gourma Charter, which gave birth to such an organisation. It takes its name from the region, also known as the ‘area of the three borders’, that lies on the border of the three states. This area, however, has in recent years become one of the epicentres of insecurity in the Sahel region, due to the extremist groups operating there.

Ingall, Niger. Armed soldiers. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have formed the Alliance of Sahel States. Shutterstock/ Katja Tsvetkova

The Charter lays the foundation for an alliance for collective security and defence, which could be extended in the future to states in the region that share its values. In fact, among other aspects, the charter also provides for the fight against rebellions that may break out within its members. Indeed, while it contains statements of principle against external interference in the life of a state, it indicates the conditions under which members may intervene on the territory of another to suppress an insurrection. Since the three regimes have established themselves by force, it is safe to assume that the Alliance is not only an instrument to counter jihadist terrorist movements, but also a tool to ensure the three juntas remain in power in the face of a possible popular uprising (due to discontent) or a coup attempt carried out by a faction of the armed forces dissatisfied with its own condition.
Truth be told, there are doubts as to whether one of the three armies would then concretely intervene to come to the aid of another, if only because each of the three faces a considerably problematic situation in terms of security and has deficiencies in terms of equipment and training. In Burkina Faso, for example, large parts of the territory escape the control of the institutions due to the attacks of extremist groups.
But, if only in principle, the way has been cleared for armed
intervention by the allies.

West African money CFA. iStock/ peeterv

On 28 January 2024, the three allies announced their decision to leave the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional political body of which they had been members until now and which had condemned the three coups in several ways. Among other things, the juntas accused ECOWAS of being influenced by foreign powers, of not supporting their fight against instability and of having implemented ‘unjust’ and ‘inhuman’ sanctions against them after the three coups.
There is also a plan for the three countries to abandon the currency common to many countries in the region, the CFA Franc (another remnant of French colonisation), and create a new currency, which should be called the ‘Sahel’. The problem is that at present there does not seem to be the economic basis to implement such a project. The idea of a new currency seems more of a propaganda initiative than a serious project. It is undoubtedly part of a broader debate, which concerns all the countries using the CFA Franc and which has led regionally to the idea of a new single currency for all members. This project has been slowed down first by the Covid-19 pandemic and then by resistance from some parties.  (Open Photo: Burkina Faso Flag. 123rf)
A.C.

Where to go…

Distrust seems to be growing not only among ethnic groups but also among religious communities. And this translates into attacks against the faithful gathered to pray in churches or mosques. And the junta bears its share of responsibility in all this.

To stay in power, Traoré, in addition to the measures seen above, frequently resorts to calls for the mobilisation of the population against Burkina Faso’s alleged internal and external enemies. A group of supporters of the president (called ‘Wayiyan‘) has been created in the population, who frequently demonstrate in the streets to support him.
Moreover, he seems to lean towards certain sectors of the Burkinabé Muslim community, and in particular towards Wahabi currents. He is the son of practising Muslims but is not practising on a personal level.

Mosque in the rural area. The Muslim community, the majority in Burkina Faso, had long felt excluded from the positions of power. File swm

On the contrary, according to some, he was initiated into traditional religion. Apart from these aspects, the Muslim community, the majority in Burkina Faso, had long felt excluded from the positions of power occupied by the Christian minority. Traoré’s rise to power and experienced by some as a redemption for this community. The problem is that this rebalancing would take place not in a democratic framework, but based on prevarication and force.
So, there is a risk of aggravating religious tensions, which have already been exacerbated by the actions of the jihadists.
The dynamics described above seem to be leading to a progressive disintegration of Burkina Faso, with a loss of territory to extremist groups and with a tearing apart of the social fabric and the breaking of the rules of coexistence between ethnic communities and between religions. To this must be added the abuses against critics of the regime, with the possibility of the loss of legitimacy of the institutions in the eyes of a large part of the citizenry.

Ouagadougou. A quiet moment, with nobody in the vast Place de la Revolution / Revolution square. iStock/ mtcurado

The measures put in place by the junta do not currently seem sufficient to guarantee its long-term survival. Despite cooperation with the Russians and other allies, the Burkinabé security forces are currently unable to defeat the subversive groups due to manpower and equipment shortages. The divisions within the armed forces between officers who benefited from the coup led by Traoré and their comrades sidelined could further slowdown the fight against subversive movements. The VDP also suffer from workforce and equipment shortages and complain of a lack of trust in them by the military.
Russia declared in 2023 that engagement in Africa is a strategic factor for it and therefore it is difficult to imagine that Moscow will withdraw from the region, at least in the short term. However, due to the conflict in Ukraine and the resulting international isolation (even if only partial), it is unable to deploy resources at least economically comparable to those that France and Western countries as a whole could deploy. These, however, are reluctant to intervene in support of Traoré and his clique because they are held back by aspects such as human rights violations against opponents and minorities (such as the Fulanis) and, in general, by distrust for a regime that is critical of the West because it is inspired by Pan-African rhetoric.
Some leaders of the countries in the region seem to be observing the evolving situation in Burkina Faso with concern. First of all because, as seen before, some of their armed forces officers might be tempted to take up arms like Traoré and then go to other military juntas and Russia for help. Secondly, because a possible final collapse of Burkinabé institutions would in any case have negative consequences for the security of the region. Jihadist groups, which the armed forces in Ouagadougou are currently trying to counter as best they can, would have even more freedom to manoeuvre. On the other hand, the crisis in Burkina Faso is also the child of the crisis in Mali, which in turn is also the child of the collapse of Gaddafi’s Libya.

Militant Jihadists in a village. CC BY-SA 4.0/ aharan_kotogo

The experience of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger shows that military coups are not an effective solution to the problem of countering insecurity, particularly about the fight against jihadism. This problem requires a multidimensional effort on the economic, social and security levels that only articulated political management can provide. In other words, the military is only one tool among others in the fight against this phenomenon. Moreover, the remedy cannot be worse than the evil. Indeed, the damage done to the social structure of Burkina Faso in terms of increasing ethnic and religious tensions and the abuses against critics and opponents of the regime are likely to far outweigh any positive effects of the military dictatorship.
The very real risk is that the final bill will be paid by Burkinabe citizens, including those who support Traoré and his junta at the moment. (Open Photo: Ouagadougou. Woman riding her bicycle in the rush traffic of the Capital city. iStock/ U.Ozel.Images)

Andrea Carbonari

 

 

 

 

Descent into chaos.

In Burkina Faso, the terrorist threat emerged after 2015, the year in which the first president after the lengthy period of the Compaoré regime was democratically elected.

In 2016 jihadists started to penetrate the country from Mali. Since then, the situation has steadily worsened. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED, that collects and analyses information concerning conflicts worldwide) data, 7,600 civilians were killed in 2023, compared to 1,414 civilians in 2022, and 757 in 2021. As the data show, despite the military coming to power in 2022, the situation has not improved, quite the contrary. What made it worse were certain measures implemented by the men in uniform, such as the indiscriminate use of the VDPs.
A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG), clearly describes the spiralling out of control of the violence (Burkina Faso: Arming Civilians at the Cost of Social Cohesion? 15 December 2023).

Attack of jihadist militants on a military base in Burkina Faso. CC BY-SA 4.0/ aharan_kotogo

Acts of violence committed by security forces or jihadists lead to reprisals that help attract new recruits to the army or the VDPs but also to jihadist groups. Burkina Faso is going through a circle of violence and vengeance where any massacre (committed by jihadists or pro-government forces) leads to another massacre. These conflicts risk to put an end to cohabitation and bring to the falling apart of the country.
Burkinabé authorities failed to get back the control of their territory without endangering the population. In their effort, pro-government forces seem to drag communities into the war at the risk of making them more vulnerable, both from a security and an economic point of view. In reality, the government forces seem to overlook the risks that the populations run from the rebel attacks, which are firmly entrenched in some territories, and demand total cooperation from them. Those who do not openly and decisively stand against the government run the risk of being abused by the armed forces or the VDP. But those same people may suffer reprisals from jihadists since the government is able to control an area in a stable manner and therefore the return of extremists in force is always possible.

Mistrust
Given the difficulties encountered by the armed forces in the course of the repression of the insurgency, the authorities (particularly under Traoré) began to make extensive use of the VDPs, which also constitute one of the pillars of power in the society of the new junta. This has been partly useful in terms of military success and control of the territory. On the other, it is creating considerable problems in terms of social cohesion and co-existence between ethnic groups.

Rural village in Burkina Faso. Serious concerns between the Mossi and the Fulani.123rf

The most obvious and dangerous aspect of this dynamic concerns relations between the Mossi and the Fulani (also called Peul). The Mossi – an ethnic group making up 50 percent of the population of Burkina Faso –  are the majority within the ranks of the VDPs at a national level. On the opposite side, the Fulani –  Burkina’s second-largest group (they are around 10 percent of the population)  – are generally not recruited. This phenomenon is particularly evident in areas where the Fulani are the majority of the local population or are deeply implanted. It causes the Fulani to accuse the Mossi of defending their interests to the detriment of those of the community and of committing abuses against them, on the strength of the fact that they have weapons and the cover of central intelligence. Similar dynamics have been observed, on a smaller scale, in territories where the Songhai (another ethnic group) make up the majority of the VDP in a territory where the Tuareg and Fulani make up the majority of the inhabitants.
The Fulani, a nomadic population traditionally devoted to pastoralism and of predominantly Islamic religion living between Senegal and the Central African Republic, are finding it increasingly difficult in many contexts to be accepted by the settled populations (mainly devoted to agriculture). In addition to the classic problems of relations between farmers and herders, such as herd transit and competition for access to water sources, religious radicalism and jihadist propaganda have been added in recent years.

The Fulani, a nomadic population traditionally devoted to pastoralism and of predominantly Islamic religion. File swm

Not only in Burkina Faso, in fact, several extremists have launched appeals to the Fulani communities to join the rebel groups (the only ones who would defend their interests). These appeals, which have had a certain success given the malaise of part of the Fulani, have naturally had the main effect of casting suspicion of treason on a community that was already seen as alienated by sectors of the population due to its traditional nomadism (which has been declining in recent decades). Because of the hostility towards them, particularly by the VDP, the Fulanis are reluctant to join the security forces and cooperate with them, even when they do not intend to cooperate with the jihadists. But their attitude of equidistance between the two fronts is not actually accepted by the armed forces, and this fuels suspicion of the Fulanis. At the moment, the Traoré junta does not appear to be particularly preventive towards the Fulanis, but it does not seem to have so far put sufficient measures in place to reduce the respective mistrust between the parties. (Open Photo: Soldier with assault rifle and flag of Burkina Faso on military uniform. Shutterstock/Bumble Dee)

A.C.

A new partner.

Each of these three ‘rebel states’ has forged more or less strong ties with Russia, the global player that has been most active and unscrupulous in Africa in recent years.

This growth in influence has been primarily at the expense of France, the colonial power. In some ways, ties with Paris remain strong. Suffice it to say that French is the official language of Burkina Faso and Niger, as well as one of the most widely spoken languages in Mali. But France has long since become a favourite target of anti-colonialist propaganda that is on the rise in many West African states. This propaganda is probably also fuelled by Russia, which has every interest in ousting a competitor from these areas and asserting its own role.
In reality, Russia’s is a comeback. Moscow had in fact supported in several ways the revolutionary experience of Thomas Sankara, the military and political leader who in 1984 transformed the former French Upper Volta into Burkina Faso (‘Country of Upright Men’).

Burkina Faso Soldiers conduct security measures during training on small unit tactics, at Camp Zagre. Photo: US/ Brittany Slessman.

After the failed coup attempt in September 2023, thousands of Russian military and paramilitary personnel arrived in Burkina Faso to carry out various tasks, including training special corps members and contributing to the security of the head of state.
It is difficult at the moment to say how long Russia’s support will last, given the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and its at least partial political and economic isolation. Moreover, in other contexts, such as the Central African Republic, Moscow’s support has proved invaluable to the local government in the fight against rebel groups, but not decisive, and accompanied by drawbacks such as the demand to be able to extract the country’s mineral resources without control. Similar logic could be repeated in Burkina Faso. But until one or more external partners (African or otherwise) intervene with concrete support in terms of troops and weapons in the fight against the jihadists, Moscow will have an easy time presenting itself as the solution to Burkina Faso’s security problems. It has to be said that there is no lack of suspicion towards the Russians on the part of Burkinabé officials, who do not look favourably on the fact that Moscow’s men have penetrated the top echelons of the state and local security apparatus.

Old friends
Relations between Paris and Ouagadougou have soured since September 2022, after the current junta’s rise to power. Shortly after the coup, it terminated the military agreement between the two countries that had been signed in 1961 and removed the French troops that were present on its territory. To come to some recent events, on 16 April 2024, the Burkinabé government announced that it had expelled three French diplomatic officials, accused of subversive activities. On 1 December 2023, four other French officials were arrested in Ouagadougou and put in prison. They are currently still in Burkina Faso in a guarded residence.

Two men from Burkina Faso show their support to Russia for the reopening of the Russian embassy in Ouagadougou in 2023. Chérif Konaté / VOA

In reality, this situation is mainly the consequence of several factors on the French side as well. For years, France has been struggling to obtain the resources (in economic terms first of all, and then in terms of human resources and armaments) necessary to ensure its presence in West Africa in the same way as in the past or, at any rate, to such an extent as to guarantee a certain political influence.
In other words, France was already weakened before the arrival of the Russians and the rise to power of military juntas in these states. And this weakness was the result of a crisis at the level of the French political leadership, which seems to have basically not yet decided
what role to play in these contexts. Then other actors intervened to
take advantage of this situation.

Niger. Aerial photo of Fort Madama. France was already weakened before the arrival of the Russians. CC BY-SA 3.0/Thomas GOISQUE

In this context, no actor (individual country or organisation) has yet emerged at the regional level that is able to make a significant impact on the security situation, for instance by acting as a deterrent to groups interested in seizing power by force. Nor is there anyone capable of forcing the hand of the military juntas and pushing them to organise a transition to democracy. Interests between countries differ politically, and within civil societies, there are sectors that are opposed to armed intervention or sensitive to the anti-colonial propaganda of the military juntas. This makes both the action of individual governments and that of organisations such as ECOWAS problematic. Governments which, of course, fear the contagion effect, and thus that someone in their armed forces will follow the example of Traoré and Goita and drive them out. But they do not have the tools to counter the three rebels. So, in the case of Burkina Faso, there is currently no one on the horizon who could from the outside put effective limits on the junta’s action. (Open Photo: Flag of Russia on military uniform. Shutterstock/ Bumble Dee)
A.C.

Mohammed Abu-Numer. Building Peace.

A Palestinian transplanted to the United States committed to peace and dialogue, and founder of the Salam Institute, he is the winner of the 2024 Niwano Prize, the “Nobel of Religions”.

A professor in International Peace and Conflict Resolution at the American University in Washington, Mohammed Abu-Numer stood out for his “contribution to the cause of peace”. This is the reason why he was awarded the 2024 Niwano Prize by the Japanese Foundation.

In the statement the Niwano Foundation states: “What is most impressive about his work is his holistic contribution to the cause of peace,” it read, noting that his contribution “integrates education with conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities, particularly through his profound understanding of forgiveness and reconciliation in Islam and applying it effectively in practice.”

Abu-Nimer’s commitment, moreover, is a commitment that has been carried out for many years and relaunched in recent months, after the Hamas attack that triggered Israel’s war in Gaza. His life has always been spent for peace and interreligious dialogue, both as a scholar and as an active and committed person in the field.

The choice of the Award also demonstrates the importance of maintaining vigilant attention towards an area such as the Holy Land which is still today the scene of clashes and violence of a confessional, political and social nature. In the motivation, the promoters underline the educational work promoted by Abu-Nimer, in an attempt to resolve conflicts and encourage activities aimed at “building peace through the profound understanding of forgiveness and reconciliation in Islam”.

His contribution is not only theoretical but is applied effectively in practice and which has greater significance today “in light of the ongoing conflict” in its lands of origin, where “one of the most devastating wars” in the world is taking place.

Abu-Nimer, who currently teaches at the American University in Washington, is also the founder of the “Salam Institute for Peace and Justice”, which has always directed attention towards the “differences” between Islamic and non-Islamic communities, initiating projects that embrace different cultures and faiths intending to build peace and sustainable development, particularly in Muslim-majority nations.

Originally from a village in the North of Galilee, at the age of twenty, he took part in a training course on dialogue which marked his life and professional path and led him to engage personally in meetings and discussions between Muslims and Jews, between Israelis and Palestinians, paying particular attention to the areas of greatest
conflict and tension.

Since the 1990s he has also explored the critical issues between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, relations between Buddhists and Hindus in Sri Lanka, Islamic-Christian relations in the Philippines, in the Balkans and various African countries. He was also among the first to organize projects in Saudi Arabia and to work in several Arab countries.

The Niwano Peace Prize, named in honour of Foundation founder Nikkyo Niwano, aims to recognize and encourage those who significantly contribute to inter-religious cooperation, fostering global peace. Nikkyo Niwano envisioned peace not only as the absence of conflict among nations but as a dynamic harmony within individuals and communities. (Photo:Kara Lofton)

Dario Salvi/MM

Nigeria. Charismatic Islam surprises Lagos.

In the country’s most populous city, Muslim prayer groups have adapted to a scenario marked by the growth of Pentecostal Churches. Borrowing aspirations and rituals of a spiritual sentiment far removed from the traditional Islamic world.

Lagos, one of the most complex realities in West Africa, defies easy classification. Extending over 1,000 square kilometres, the megalopolis presents an intricate mosaic of seemingly contrasting yet interdependent realities. It is precisely in the megalopolis of Lagos that the multifaceted panorama of a newborn nation like Nigeria unfolds, where different realities seem to coexist in an apparent balance in a condition of continuous dynamism.
One of these changing realities is certainly that of religion. To understand its fluidity, it is necessary to start from the 1970s, a period that marks a significant turning point in the evolution of the nation. It was precisely in those years that Nigeria freed itself from the authoritarianism of the military government, beginning a period of fragile and unstable civilian governments. This step will not only open the way to conflicts of a political nature but also above all religious ones.

Lagos. Muslims attending Friday prayers, during the holy month of Ramadan at Lagos Island Central. Shutterstock/ Tolu Owoeye

During the decade in question, Nigeria experienced a period of unexpected economic good fortune thanks to its oil. The country did benefit from the embargo on crude oil imposed since 1973 by OPEC members on nations close to Israel, in the context of the tensions triggered by the Yom Kippur War. However, towards the 1980s, a series of endogenous factors, together with the collapse of the price of oil due to the discovery of new energy resources, determined the abrupt end of the Nigerian economic boom. These were also the years of the Structural Adjustment Plans that affected the whole of Africa: international financial institutions condition support for developing countries on the adoption of neoliberal economic policies. Also in Nigeria, this translates into strong privatizations in the public sector, increased economic inequalities and a general economic crisis felt by the population.

The growth of the “Gospel of Prosperity”.
It is precisely in this context of crisis and instability that the rapid success of Pentecostalism takes place, capable of providing hope to the needs of a population now disillusioned with the state and its institutions. The “prosperity gospel” preached by Pentecostal churches offers a message of salvation, economic well-being and individual empowerment, a rhetoric that the country desperately needs.
The promise of an inevitable divine intervention through prayer and the revelation of a subsequent miracle capable of improving the condition, even material, of the individual translates into the affirmation of the doctrine of prosperity even on the public scene.

It is in Lagos, that Muslims, perceive the need for change. 123rf

Aspiring politicians are beginning to see Pentecostal groups as an electoral resource to turn to, and some are actually able to succeed thanks to their political support.The progressive insinuation of Pentecostalism into the private and public life of the nation ends up causing concern among members of the Muslim community. The protagonism of this new form of charismatic Christianity pushes Islam into profound introspection, reevaluating its position and influence in society. However, it is not simply opposition between two religions competing for the public scene: Islam, in Nigeria, chooses a different path; adopting a strategy that Islamic orthodoxy would consider as “Bid’ah“, an unacceptable and aberrant modification of the religion.

The Nasfat
It is in Lagos, an important crucible of religious realities, that Muslims, especially those who speak Yoruba, perceive the need for change. New ideas therefore began to mature within Islamic prayer groups as early as the 1980s, becoming more widespread starting from the 1990s, as in the case of the Nasrul-lahi-li Fathi Society of Nigeria, or Nasfat.Founded by a group of bankers educated in Ibadan, Nasfat positioned itself as the promoter of an “Islamic renaissance” that would also influence subsequent groups.In the Nasfat mosques, we observe the pinnacle of a charismatic interpretation of Islam, where the imams adopt attitudes and preaching styles similar to those of Pentecostal pastors. The threat of the effectiveness of Christian propaganda, capable of recruiting new believers, is strongly perceived and manifests itself in the clear attempt to learn and employ charismatic pathos in one’s mission of “Dawa” (proselytizing action).

Muslim faithful praying under a bridge in Lagos. Shutterstock/ Oluwafemi Dawodu

This is how around Lagos, next to the advertising signs where sermons and meetings with famous Pentecostal pastors are promoted, you can find just as many advertisements where the names of imams and “ulama” (religious experts) who sponsor meetings and prayer sessions stand out aimed especially at the faithful. This assiduous advertising activity, initially adopted only by Pentecostal groups, is gradually absorbed by the Muslim community, also through social media, with the same flashy graphics and communication style.
If the success of many Pentecostal Churches, especially among young people, can also be attributed in part to the rhythms of the Gospel, which transform services into an interactive and engaging experience, even in “charismatic” mosques the element has begun to incorporate music.This practice unquestionably challenges any traditional dogmatism, according to which music and musical instruments are considered “haram” (forbidden) and consequently associated with evil activities. The choice of days dedicated to prayer also undergoes
a significant change.

The choice of days dedicated to prayer also undergoes a significant change. File swm

The adoption of the practice of carrying out Sunday prayers at the same times as Christian ones represents a clear adaptation to the needs of Nigerian society, where Sunday is a weekday and consequently more practical for the faithful than salat-al-jumu’a (Friday prayer) prescribed by Islamic rule. In addition to being justified as a way to avoid presenting oneself as less devout than Christians, “Islamic Sunday” poses a challenge to official institutions that still do not recognize Jumua
as a public holiday.
Furthermore, an extension of the duration of the “salat” (prayer) is observed. If in other traditional mosques, the prayer ends in no more than ten minutes, in the case of Nasfat it can last for hours, similar to long Pentecostal services. In addition, Christians are no longer the only ones who practice “Night Vigils”, or long sessions of nocturnal prayers. Today, in the streets of Lagos you can meet Muslims engaged in the same practice, as happens during “Laylat al-Qadr” (night of destiny) in the last days of Ramadan.

The reasons for change
From this picture, there emerges heartfelt anguish on the part of Muslim faithful at being marginalized and ostracized compared to their Christian compatriots in numerous aspects of public life in Nigeria. The incompatibility of some religious precepts with a society driven by a desire for progress and material realization means that these emerging Islamic groups transform, at least in part, the religious institution
into a business model.
Organizations such as Nasfat aim to train young Muslims who are educated and aware of their mission of spiritual awakening, but who are also active agents in the national public scene through “empowerment” activities aimed at strengthening their economic position.

“Islamic Sunday” poses a challenge to official institutions. File swm

Practical advice, loans and investments for small businesses offer concrete support to promote the economic development of the community, including through Tafsan (Nasfat in reverse), which is emerging as the fulcrum of the group’s financial activity. It is a multifunctional company that mainly deals with the organisation of pilgrimages and also with the production and sale of a malt-based non-alcoholic drink, Nasmalt, with more ambitious plans for the future, such as the establishment of a bank that operates in accordance with the principles of Islam.
Nasfat then organizes courses aimed at every segment of the population, including some dedicated to women’s activities. The latter begin to play important roles of power, comparable to those of the imams, arousing disapproval from the most fundamentalist faction of Islam but at the same time underlining an internal drive towards the reform and updating of the religion which therefore develops beyond simple competition with Pentecostal Christianity.

Lagos. It is one of the most complex realities in West Africa. File swm

In the charismatic reform of Islam promoted by Nasfat, a significant change is observed not only in religious practices but also in theological concepts. This transformation includes interpreting the Prophet Muhammad not only as a spiritual leader but also as an example of a successful businessman. Furthermore, similar to the conceptualization of spiritual warfare in Pentecostalism, charismatic Islam also recognizes the existence of a perpetual spiritual battle between beneficial and evil forces.The changes taking place within the Nigerian Muslim community, particularly in Lagos, are not unanimously shared by all the faithful. Clashes, theological discussions and disagreements on the part of followers and sometimes their leaders are frequent. Also, for this reason, the adoption of charismatic rhetoric and practices is not to be interpreted as a simple attempt to emulate the Pentecostals, but as an internal reform, promoted by agents who actively operate within the religious panorama of the country.
It is still an ambiguous process, which finds fertile ground for experimentation; a terrain that on a small scale reflects the entire context of Nigeria, where contradictory elements collide and different realities dialogue, continuously influencing each other.

Ahlam Taik

 

Uganda. Ker Kwaro. The Guardian of Acholi culture.

A cultural institution representing the Acholi chiefs. Their rules for society today.

The Acholi are a Luo-speaking group of people living in the Northern Uganda, and they are believed to have migrated from Bahr el Ghazal in South Sudan. By about 1,000 AD. Starting in the late seventeenth Century.  Ker Kwaro Acholi is a cultural institution representing the chiefdoms in Acholi. This Institution comprises 54 traditional leaders who are heads of clans (Rwodi singular Rwot or chiefs) of the Acholi people, each clan in the Acholi region represents chiefdom.
The institution is the custodian of Acholi cultural practices and traditional values. Ker Kwaro dates back to 1400AD when the Luo ethnic group started a migration southward through South Sudan. By 1912, there were 50 well-established hereditary chiefs in Acholi land. According to history, the institution and ideology of ker Kwaro are crucial to the development of an Acholi society and identity was introduced into north-central Uganda by the Paluo.

Acholi chief. By 1912, there were 50 well-established hereditary chiefs in Acholi land. Photo: Richard Buchta (1845-1894)

The Paluo were part of the same Migration that came down through South Sudan, they were the first Luo in parts of Acholi and the new ruling Babito Dynasty in Bunyoro Kitara. The Babito moved into core areas of Bunyoro and eventually adopted the Bantu Language of the majority there. While the Paluo settled in the very north of the kingdom and continued to speak Luo. The Paluo were a part of the Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom, their experience and ideas of society and government were shaped by that Kingdom. Three related aspects of this Paluo experience were vital to the development of the new political and cultural order in Acholi. The basic Paluo concept of rwot was hereditary rulers who enjoyed great prestige, and respect organized tribute payments to rulers in recognition of their authority and possessed the royal regalia most importantly the Royal Drums as a symbol of their rule.These features embodied the fundamental ideological elements and principal centralizing structures in the Acholi chiefdoms.

Acholi Village in the North of Uganda.File swm

When the Paluo arrived in Bunyoro-Kitara, their traditions were asserted. The Paluo joined the Bunyoro-Kitara, and they accepted the authority of the Bunyoro-Kitara king whom the Paluo called Rwot.
Rwot in Paluo meant not only the Bunyoro-Kitara king but also the heads of the Paluo chiefdoms. Each Paluo Chief owed allegiance to the Bunyoro-Kitara King.Within his own Chiefdom, a chief seemed to have a smaller-scale replica of the king. They received allegiances and respect; they collected tributes keeping some and passing some on to the King
of Bunyoro-Kitara.

Payira Paico and Paibona Aspect.
Another aspect of the origin of ker kwaro acholi is the aspect of Payira, Paico and Paibona. There is another belief that the three indicate a close association of their origin, especially their royal origin. The three ruling lineages assert that one of their ancestors was the famous Labongo, leader of the early Luo when they quarrelled and separated at Pubungu. Paico and Paibona traditions add that Ayira, Acoo and Abona were brothers and their father was Labongo.

Dancers from acholi region ready to perform a cultural dance. CC BY-SA 4.0/ Ngumenawe

They proclaim the royal lineage of the three chiefdoms as early Luo then they also link from early on, the smaller chiefdoms of Paico and Paibona and then the larger and powerful Payira. Paico and Paibona lived near Payira during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Payira became the largest and most powerful chiefdom in Acholi he overshadowed and dominated his neighbors’ claims of brotherhood stretching back to the early luo of Pubungu.
The three settled in the central zone of Acholi where there is a higher percentage of royal lineages than anywhere else in Acholi, they settled in the central zone of Acholi to date.Meanwhile, Acholi’s claims of ties to Pubungu are rare. Bunyoro\Paluo is invoked far more often than Pubungu to assert Luo origins. The only Acholi groups whose traditions include reference to Pubungu are the royal lineages of Alero, Patiko, Pawel, Koc, Bwobo, Paico, Paibona and Payira.

First Luo Chief and Royal Regalia
The Paluo Chief possessed royal regalia originally conferred as gifts by Bunyoro-Kitara kings.The Paluo concept of rwot referred to a cluster of the general attributes of attitudes towards political leadership.The Paluo makes the relationship between the Ker Kwaro, tribute and royal drums clear.The Royal Regalia included Royal drums, Royal Spear, Royal Stool and Royal Beads.It is believed that the first Paluo Leader was a woman named Nyawir. The royal regalia conferred on Nyawir included a Drum, Stool, Spear, and beads. That is the origin of the royal regalia used
in the Ker Kwaro to date.
When the second Paluo chief Rwot Pajao took over, the Bunyoro Kitara rulers who were now Babito and not Bachwezi gave him similar regalia. But in both instances, the most important regalia were the royal Drum.
Bunyoro Kitara political Culture as experienced by and filtered through the Paluo served as a model for Chiefdoms in Acholi.

Authority and Roles
One crucial characteristic of these chiefdoms was the limited power and authority of those at their head. The problem came from the small size and small population of the chiefdom, the rwot sharing political power with village lineage heads. Another limit on the power of rwot was the dissatisfied members of the chiefdom to migrate.
Chiefs (Rwot) and royal lineage (kal) used many strategies to establish the new order and their leading place in it. Both rowdy and other members of Kal frequently forged marriage alliances with potential or newly joined subordinates royal narratives traditions in particular recount many instances in which rwodi(chiefs) provided food to eat, a place to settle, military protection or assistance for those in difficulty. The ability to arbitrate disputes that individual lineage heads or the heads of multiple-village groupings could not.

Traditional dress for Acholi women. CC BY-SA 4.0/ Bettycath

Rwodi represented them and were acknowledged by their followers as rainmakers an especially attractive power in the dry and uncertain physical environment of Acholi.
Positive enticement brought lineage into chiefdoms such as the continuing importance of existing lineage leadership, each lineage continued to choose its head and the lineage head with the assistance of his elders also continued to organize lineage-based production control the material meant the ideological rules of the marriage, conduct and interpreted lineage rituals, settle most internal lineage disputes and manage lineage affairs.
Most Lineage heads (rwodi or Lodito Kaka singular Ladit Kaka) took on new roles in the chiefdom in their capacities as the main advisors of the rwot. Lineage heads worked with rwot to settle disputes between lineages and the chiefdom and also disputes between the chiefdom and outsiders like other neighbouring kingdoms.
They also helped determine and collect compensation for wrongs and crimes committed and organized major chiefdom rituals such as the annual planting and harvesting ceremonies. Coordinated and supervised tribute collections and services.

The Raka-raka dance is a traditional dance from the Acholi people. CC BY-SA 4.0/ Kateregga1

Within most lineages, heads not only continued to play primary roles in their lineages but became key people in polity-wide rituals as well. Many took specific chiefdom-wide and chiefdom-oriented ritual duties, they oversaw the maintenance of the royal regalia, some took care of rwot’s abila (shrine) some kept the rainstones(ame) used for making rain and others arranged funerals and burials when rwot died and also helped select and install his new successor.
Chiefdom-wide rituals focused on the gods or spirits(Jogi or Jok) distinct from the ancestors. Because they are part of the belief systems of a wide range of contemporary central Sudanic and Nilotic people.

Succession
The succession of a rwot belonged to the youngest son of the wife who had undergone installation with the deceased rwot known as dako Ker (chief wife). Succession was also based on consideration of several preferences and not rigid stereotype rules. Qualities such as generosity, intelligence, proper manners and behaviours towards others counted more than the order of birth. Village lineage heads who were prominent elders of the royal lineage(Kal), and dako ker of both the deceased and succeeding rwot often played important roles in the selection
of the next rwot.

Back home after school. File swm

Four features marked succession rituals in many chiefdoms.  Royal regalias and other common symbols associated with rwot were the royal drum (bul ker) would be played royal, royal spears (tong ker) and other regalia would be displayed rwot and other participants would be seated on royal stools (kom Ker) draped in leopard or lion skins.
Dako Ker the chosen successor often specially picked to be installed with him had a role in the ceremonies, she was a caretaker of the royal regalia. Specific lineage and lineage heads had particular roles in the succession ceremonies, one lineage may be responsible for playing the royal drum during the installation of a chief, others provide councillors who sit next to the succeeding rwot and dako ker, another lineage may provide a lineage head to anoint the succeeding rwot with oil, All roles are signified positions of these lineages and their heads within the chiefs and provided highly visible avenues for individual lineage and pride.

Ker Kwaro today
Today the cultural institutions still exist though their roles have now changed as compared to the past, today Ker Kwaro has helped in facilitating reunification and reintegration of ex-combats in their communities, through performing traditional cleansing (Mat oput), mediation, harmonious relationships and resolution process, and maintaining and emphasising the Acholi traditions and customs. The institution is still a hereditary institution with all its chiefdoms intact. (Open Photo: A traditional Acholi dancer. CC BY-SA 4.0/ Ngumenawe)

 Irene Lumunu

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brazil. The gospel sails along the river.

In the Prelacy of Labrea, in the state of Amazonas, the Laguna Negra hospital boat, in collaboration with the Epifania Community, serves to announce the Gospel and improve the health conditions and quality of life of the indigenous and riverine population.

In 2006, the Epifania Community began a mission in the Prelature of Labrea, sending four missionaries to help with pastoral training in the Parish of St. John the Baptist in the Municipality of Canutama. Working with the population on the banks of the Purus River, a tributary of the Amazon, immediately presented itself as a great challenge. But one of the missionaries’ greatest concerns is the health situation.
Municipal centres have small clinics that function without any structure. It is not unusual to witness people dying from snake bites due to a lack of serum. Tropical diseases, which are widespread during floods and ebb tides, cause damage, especially to children.
In January 2007, faced with this challenge, the community decided to launch a project aimed specifically at the riverine and indigenous population, using a hospital boat that would travel along the Purus River, to provide medical and dental assistance to these populations.

During the mission voyage, daily services begin at 8.00 am and end at 5.00 pm. Photo: Epifania Community.

The project concerns the four municipalities that make up the Prelature: Labrea, Canutama, Tapauá and Pauini, located in the central-southwestern region of the State of Amazonas. The boat is owned by the Prelature of Labrea and has two medical offices, a dental surgery, three cabins with beds; a kitchen with a stove, cabinets and a bread maker, as well as other staff amenities. During the mission voyage, daily services begin at 8.00 am and end at 5.00 pm.
At the start or end of each day, there are prayers or Mass presided over by the priests who accompany the journey. Various activities are carried out: medical visits with clinical examinations, blood pressure measurement, the administration and supply of drugs; dental care (extractions, fillings, prophylaxis, consultations and preventive discussions on oral hygiene), medications and urgent care with the administration of intravenous and intramuscular drugs; home visits with medical assistance for the elderly and bedridden, in addition to spiritual support provided by priests.

An interesting aspect of this project is the involvement of volunteers. Photo: Epifania Community.

Eliana Machado, missionary of the Epiphany Community, said: “In 2023 we carried out around six thousand visits to the coastal populations and indigenous communities, in addition to missionary visits, pastoral activities and Eucharistic celebrations. Our desire is always to bring hope, charity and love to our brothers and sisters along the river. Every year we count on medical volunteers who carry out this mission
together with the Church”.
An interesting aspect of this project is the involvement of volunteers who come every year to provide their service to the indigenous and riverine communities. Monsignor Santiago Sánchez Sebastian, bishop of the Lábrea Prelature, emphasizes that this project is part of a larger project called the ‘Sister Church Project’.“The Sister Church Project was created by the CNBB – National Conference of Brazilian Bishops – at the end of 1972. The objective was to share faith, gifts of grace, pastoral experiences, people and financial resources as gestures of Christian charity towards the Churches of the ‘Amazon.”

Houses along the river. “Last year, we carried out around six thousand visits to the coastal populations and indigenous communities”. 123rf

At the beginning of 1972, the archdiocese of Vitória, in the state of the Holy Spirit took charge of the project with the Prelature of Labrea. The bishop continues: “The missionary projects developed in the Amazon with the support of the sister Churches are a sign, a reminder and a stimulus for the entire Brazilian Church to be truly missionary, ‘in a permanent state of mission’”.
The Prelature of Labrea was created on 05th January 1925, with the Bull “Imperscrutabili Dei consilio” of Pope Pius XI.  It was entrusted by the Holy See to the care of the Order of Augustinian Recollects.
Today, the Prelature is made up of five parishes, with 16 priests serving more than 74,000 people in an area of 68.262 km². Last February, Thiago Mendes Alves, the first priest of the Prelature, was ordained, marking a significant chapter in the ecclesial journey of the region. (Open Photo: the Laguna Negra hospital boat. Epifania Community).

Bernardino Frutuoso

Cameroon. Children are a blessing for the pygmies.

Akas pygmy men spend a lot of time with their children. The attention and affection they show them, as well as the way they bring them up, are unique. Economic and environmental challenges, however, threaten the way of life of these people.

The afternoon sun slips behind the tall trees that populate the Dja River Biosphere Reserve in southern Cameroon. It fades into patches of deep red, orange and purple. Hundreds of birds emit their last chirps before taking refuge in their nests.
In the distance, the cries of monkeys and the bellowing of some other animals. The humid and unrelenting heat of the day gives way to a light breeze that brings relief. Along rainforest paths, young people return to their huts with containers full of matango, a palm plant. They are the last to return home. Before them, women, men and children have returned to their villages, finishing the day’s work.
In Ndjibot, the smoke rising through the palm leaf roofs covering the huts suggests that dinner will soon be ready.

“Children are precious, they are our future, a gift from God” File swm

Meanwhile, in a corner of the village, a group of men are sitting on logs that serve as benches. Most of them have a little boy or girl in their arms. They talk to each other, discuss the day’s events and laugh. The little ones who are already independent play nearby. They run, chase each other, scream. They give the impression of not bothering anyone.
Men with children in their arms are not the most common sight in many parts of Africa, although times are changing, especially in cities. Normally, in most African villages, there is a division of labour and tasks between males and females. Taking care of the house and children is always the responsibility of the women. Women are usually responsible for the nutrition, health, education and well-being of children. They are the ones who carry them in their arms, on their shoulders or their hips, while carrying out any daily task, be it fetching water, cooking, or working in the fields. However, things are very different among the pygmy people. They are characterized by a society in which men and women are equal and share all tasks.

“We protect them and we take care of them” File swm

The inhabitants of Ndjibot are Bakas, one of several pygmy groups that populate the Congo River basin. For generations, like the rest of the population, they have developed their way of living in harmony with the forest, which they consider divine. They take care of it and preserve it. For this reason, they only hunt what they can eat and share the fruits and roots they collect with other members of the group. The jungle provides them with everything they need to live and there is no need to hoard or conserve. They are semi-nomadic and follow the cycles of animals or plants. Traditionally they are organized in small groups, with monogamous marriages and open nuclear families. Children are free and fend for themselves; there is divorce and the elderly are the authorities. Most jobs are not limited to one genre or another; everyone is involved in everything: hunting, fishing, and gathering. They also differ from other people in that children are treated and valued equally.

Pygmy Society
Pygmy groups have non-authoritarian leaders. They use their wisdom only to advise, but each individual is free to make their own decisions. Among forest dwellers, nothing is more respected than personal autonomy. Pygmy society is therefore very egalitarian: only knowledge and competence are valued.

The traditional pygmy house, a sort of igloo made of branches and leaves. File swm

The master hunter – the tuma – and the medicine man – the nganga – gain prestige and recognition when they reach that level, but never authority over the rest of the village. Important decisions that affect everyone are made by consensus and involve both women and men. This lifestyle is also reflected in the education of younger children. Armand Faya says he doesn’t know why he is holding his daughter: “It has always been like this. We all take care of each other. Children are precious, they are our future, a gift from God. This is why we protect them and we take care of them until they start to fend for themselves.”

Towards transformation
Things are changing and the life of the Pygmies is slowly and inexorably changing. For years, in fact, the governments of the various countries bordering the Congo River basin have forced them to leave the forest in which they have lived all their lives and to settle along the roads.
In this way, rulers have a free hand to usurp the lands these people once roamed freely and hand them over to logging or mining companies, mostly foreign. The rest is transformed into agro-industrial farms
and agricultural land for the non-pygmy population or for large multinationals. Or in reserves and natural parks from which
they were expelled where they can neither hunt nor practice
their traditional lifestyle.

The little ones are still considered a blessing and are loved by all the members of the group. File swm

The Pygmies have been forced to become sedentary. This has had many negative consequences for them, bringing some groups, such as the Bayeli, to the brink of extinction. This community, living near the Kibri region of Cameroon, has been driven out of its natural environment to make room for planting large areas of oil palms. Without forests and rivers, they threw in the towel and sank into depression. Alcoholics without a future, the Bayeli are destined to disappear. One of the clearest symbols of change is represented by houses. The traditional one, the mongulu – a sort of igloo made of branches and leaves – was erected in a couple of days. They were easy to abandon when the family moved elsewhere and easy to rebuild when they returned a few months later. Now they have been replaced by rectangular mud buildings with palm leaf roofs, like those of the villages in the area where they were forced to settle. These are permanent structures, meaning they no longer move through the jungle following animal tracks or plant cycles, as they have done for generations. This is not just an aesthetic change but something deeper. The women built the Mongols, while the men went into the forest to look for branches and sticks. Now mud houses are men’s work and women are not assigned to this work.

The jungle provides them with everything they need to live and there is no need to hoard or conserve. File swm

At most they transport construction materials. By doing so, they gradually lost control over the family residence and so, little by little, women see the mechanisms of social power that they traditionally exercised over men and which allowed them to interact on equal terms with them disappear. This is just the tip of the iceberg. Assimilation by the peoples with whom they are forced to share road space is introducing new customs that always work to the detriment of women, as in the case of marriage dowry. “Before, it didn’t exist –  explains Faya – but now parents, copying the Bantu, ask for it.” It’s usually around 50,000 CFA francs (76 euros), plus food, machetes, clothes and household goods. If a man ‘buys’ a woman with a dowry since money is not easy to collect and involves a lot of effort in which the groom’s entire family is involved, he will consider her as his personal property and not his equal, as was the rule among the pygmy peoples. This results in other problems such as gender violence, rape and polygamy, which were previously practically unknown. Likewise, the division of labour between males and females is gaining ground.

Traditionally they are organized in small groups. File swm

All these attitudes are becoming normalised as a direct consequence of the disruption of the balance that once prevailed in the Pygmy culture. Young people also imitate their neighbours in the way they dress, their hairstyles, their cell phones, headphones and motorbikes, for those who can afford them, imitating any other young people of their age. They no longer live in the jungle; they have settled down and adopted new customs. The only thing that seems to have survived the degradation of the Pygmy culture is their parenting style. Parents still take care of their children, playing with them, carrying them, feeding and washing them. Moïse Toixton lives in the village of Namikumbi, sitting on a log, playing with his five-year-old son, Dany. He tickles him. The child laughs. It’s true, that there are things which, despite external threats, do not change. The little ones are still considered a blessing and are loved by all the members of the group.

Chema Caballero

 

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