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Kenya. Mombasa. The first East African port, threatened by congestion and competition.

It is East Africa’s first port, but its development is being challenged by a series of rival projects in Berbera and Djibouti to the north, and Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo to the south. Almost everywhere, the Emirati company DP World controls the traffic.

By far, the port of Mombasa which was built before Portuguese explorers arrived in the region and was known as “the city of merchants”, is the largest on the eastern coast of Africa. In 2023, the total volume of cargo discharged and loaded at the port reached 35.96 million tonnes. It also handled 1.62 million TEU of containers representing 61 percent of its total capacity of 2.65 million TEU. The state-owned Kenyan Port Authority (KPA) which manages the port expects the traffic of Mombasa to increase up to 47 million tonnes by 2025.
The wider Mombasa port complex now managed by the Danish company AP Moller Maersk, comprises 19 berths, a grain terminal, 2 oil terminals, 6 container berths and 12 berths that handle general cargo. It includes the Kilindini Harbour , the Mbaraki wharf operated by the Bamburi Cement company and the Mbaraki Bulk Terminal that deals with petroleum products. The port also hosts the biggest grain handling facility in Africa. Leading exports include avocado, coffee, tea, vegetables, cashew nuts, fish fillets, and other foodstuffs and beverages.

Port of Mombasa. Cargo operations in the container terminal. Shutterstock/ Ungureanu Catalina Oana.

Transit cargo accounts for about 20 percent of the total volume of traffic since Mombasa is the main outlet for Uganda which accounts for 61 percent of the transit traffic as against 17 percent for South Sudan and four percent for Rwanda. It is also the main outlet for the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo which account for 14 percent of the transit volume. According to the KPA, cargo destined for Burundi through Mombasa more than doubled in the first six months of 2023 compared to the same period in 2022. Such traffic is facilitated by railway connections to Uganda and Tanzania and road connections to South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi.
According to KPA’s Managing Director William Ruto, the improved performance is owed to increased efficiency in operations including the expansion of container handling berths, increased automation of services, acquisition of modern ship and cargo handling equipment. The container vessel turnaround time has improved indeed from an average of three days in 2022 to two days in 2023, reducing the dwell time for containers to three days, from four days.
Yet, the port of Mombasa risks to lose its regional leadership. Kenya’s neighbours are indeed expanding and modernising their port infrastructures. Mombasa’s position is under threat namely because of the ascendance of political considerations over economic interests, claim maritime business sources.
In 2015, the KPA and DP World were encouraged by the Kenyan government to set up a partnership but docker unions who feared job cuts and privatisation opposed to the move.
In a report published in 2022, the London-based African-led Advisory services firm GBS warned that the dominance of Mombasa is being challenged by other regional facilities that are less resistant to badly needed reform. Maritime consultants warn indeed about the “shrinking capacity” at the Mombasa Port which is suffering from congestion, delays, mismanagement and frequent industrial action, accordingly. Kenyan ports have been facing increasing pressure due to rising cargo volume and limited capacity which led to delays in cargo handling and increased costs for shipping companies.

Kilindini Harbour, Mombasa. Photo: CC BY-SA 2.0/Andrew Thomas

Contrasting with William Ruto’s optimistic perspective, a report over the best performing container harbours, published in 2022 by the World Bank and S&P Global Market Intelligence, lists in that order Djibouti, Berbera in Somaliland, Mogadishu and Dar Es Salaam as more performing than Mombasa. One symptom of the congestion problems in the Kenyan port is the 20 percent decrease to 2.3 million tonnes of the volume of transshipment cargo destined for other ports.
“Africa’s Ports: Fast-tracking Transformation” report lists Mombasa, along with Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Cape Town, South Africa, as facilities with short-term infrastructure deficits. The report, compiled by the Africa CEO Forum and Okan, a strategy and financial advisory firm, says that without investment, the situation risks worsening in the face of growing demand. Globally, shipowners are looking to maximise profits by carrying more cargo on fewer but larger ships, which can reach 20,000 TEU capacity. Ports are increasingly challenged to provide space to accommodate these monsters.
Dar es Salaam Port is undertaking infrastructural and institutional reforms which may threaten Kenya’s position as a regional hub if plans to build six berths there and in Bagamoyo with public-private partnership financing go ahead. The US$ 421 million Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway Project (DMGP) is being implemented since 2017 to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Dar es Salaam Port. The project, co-financed by the Tanzanian government, the World Bank and the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, involves the reconstruction and deepening of seven berths to 14.5 metres in order to enable the port to handle large vessels.

Container terminal in port of Mombasa. 123rf

In October 2023, the Dubai-based global port operator DP World signed a 30-year concession agreement with the Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA) to operate and modernise the Dar es Salaam Port, connecting it to the hinterland through a network of roads, highways, railways, and dedicated freight corridors. This modernisation includes investments in cold storage facilities to enhance the agricultural sector,
According to the Shippers Council of Eastern Africa (SCEA), the lobby representing importers and exporters of goods, Ugandan and Rwandan companies are gradually increasing volumes through Dar Es Salaam via the central corridor of only 1,300 km through Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Eastern DRC. Dar es Salaam is becoming a regional transshipment hub for tea, coffee, tobacco, oilseeds, cotton, sisal, cashew nuts and copper although it also faces congestion problems. The average waiting period for a ship to offload cargo is five days there. By end 2023, the KPA reported that some ships destined for Tanzania were being diverted to Mombasa.

A beautiful view from a boat of the waving sea and the green coastline in Lamu. The Lamu Port is meant to replace Mombasa’s Kilindini harbour as Kenya’s largest port facility.123rf

Despite the competition, cargo volumes at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam ports have kept growing. In January 2024, Tanzania announced the completion of the DMGP and plans to expand its maritime infrastructure as it opened storage for cargo destined to four East African Community (EAC) states. According to its director Mrisho S. Mrisho, the Port of Dar es Salaam intends to handle 24 million tonnes of cargo in 2023/2024 fiscal year. Besides, the Tanzanian authorities have allowed the China Merchant Holding to develop a 20 million TEU container capacity at the port of Bagamoyo which will be the largest of Eastern Africa. Another regional competitor for Mombasa is the port of Djibouti which has undertaken extensive developments, increasing efficiency at its Doraleh Terminal which is the main outlet for the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone opened in July 2018.
Meanwhile, Kenya has also developed its own domestic alternative. In 2014, the KPA agreed with the China Communication Construction Company for the construction of three berths in the Port of Lamu that forms part of the Lamu Corridor linking it to Sudan and Ethiopia. The idea of Lamu as an alternative to Mombasa emerged in 1975. In 2012, the late President Mwai Kibaki, the then Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir laid the foundation of the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET). When completed, the Lamu Port is meant to replace Mombasa’s Kilindini harbour as Kenya’s largest port facility. It would comprise a railway terminal, storage tanks, container freight stations and oil pipeline, oil refineries and several airports. But this project has been stalled owing to regional security concerns on the border with Somalia and political instability in Kenya. Indeed, the corridor should comprise the Lamu-Ethiopia-South Sudan highway, the Lamu-Juba-Addis Ababa railway and a 2,240km pipeline linking oil fields in South Sudan to a new oil refinery at Lamu Port. But the Uhuru Kenyatta administration failed to allocate sufficient resources to the project, with only three berths completed in eight years and the port is currently underutilised because of lack of infrastructure to link it to Ethiopia and South Sudan. DP World aims to operate the three berths in Lamu and create a special economic zone, focused on agricultural activity and servicing the Lamu corridor.

Liquefied cargo carrier in port of Mombasa. 123rf

Yet, the economic viability of the Lamu port is threatened by a recent development. Indeed, Ethiopia, its key target, has turned its focus on the port of Berbera in the non-recognised state of Somaliland, which is set to become the most modern port in the Horn of Africa once completed. Berbera operated by DP World is indeed the closest sea outlet for Ethiopia, an 11-hour journey by road. In May 2016 the Government of Somaliland signed a 30-year agreement with DP World to develop and manage Berbera Port at a cost of $442 million. Recently the DP World Group say that the port, which can currently handle 500,000 will expand into handling one million TEU and up to 2 million TEU at a later stage. According to GBS, Berbera is “the most exciting seaport facility in the region” while the World Bank forecasts that the volumes of cargo handled in Berbera will increase from 3 million to 18 million tonnes between 2016 and 2050. Nevertheless, the KPA keeps defending Mombasa’s leadership. It has expanded the new container terminal of the Port of Mombasa to include two new berths with plans to proceed with a third one. The KPA managing director also announced in early 2024 the dredging of the port channel to accommodate bigger vessels. The KPA’s list of projects includes beside the new Kipevu Oil Terminal - an offshore island facility at the Port of Mombasa that was completed in January 2022 - the third phase of the second container which will increase its capacity by 400,000 TEU which will be funded by the Japanese International Corporation Agency (JICA). At Mombasa Port, DP World has been allocated four berths and turn them into a modern terminal capable of handling one million TEU, remaining thus the main regional player. (Open Photo: Container and tanker vessels in port of Mombasa. Shutterstock/ Druid007)
François Misser

Puerto Rico. Dancing in circle.

If you take a walk at sunset along the northeastern beach of Puerto Rico at the end of July, you can hear the sound of drums giving the welcome to nightfall. Groups of black people get together
in front of their houses or under coconut trees ready to dance to
the rhythm of the drums.

The smell of fried fish and cries of joy announce the Saint James feast held in Loiza, a village that combines Spanish culture and African traditions. Here, people celebrate with enthusiasm and in typical African Boriquen style (‘Boriquen’ is the indigenous Indian name for Puerto Rico) the feast of the town’s patron saint, St. James the Apostle, the
Yoruba people’s Shango.

Bomba Dance in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. CC BY-SA 2.0/ chispy2

It is an annual multi-day event that occurs around July 25, the feast day of Saint James, who is believed to have appeared in a tree trunk, years ago.  An event that has been celebrated, in the inhabitants’ words, “since God walked on earth”, referring to it as a feast, whose origins are lost in the mists of time. The majority of the population in Loiza is black. Through the centuries, the joining of Yoruba and Christian elements has given rise to strong religious syncretism in this community.
In fact, in the Yoruba culture, brought by the Nigerian slaves, Shango is the deity of war and lightning, and has the power to call down fire from heaven and destroy the infidel. Shango is depicted as a warrior on horseback, just like St. James.

Three statues
There are three images representing Saint James. They are related to three different groups: Santiago de los Hombres (Saint James of the Men), Santiago de las Mujeres (Saint James of the Women), and Santiago de los Niños (Saint James of the Children).
Each of these statues are guarded, throughout the year, by three people, usually women distinguished for their devotion to the Saint. They are in charge of preparing the statues for the celebration. The statues will be carried in procession through the town from the church. The guardians of the statues enjoy widespread prestige in the village. Before celebrating the feast, preparatory novenas are held.

Bomba dancer in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. CC BY-SA 2.0/ chispy2

These novena songs, are readapted to the typical African rhythm and tone, and have particular emotional and spiritual impact on the devotees. During the celebrations, people follow the three statues carried in procession through the streets of the village, singing and dancing in their traditional costumes. The three statues play a specific role in the traditional celebrations: the ‘caballero’ figure represents the force of good in the fight against evil. The ‘vejigante’ image is the antithesis of the ‘caballero’ figure, it represents evil, the devil that St. James must fight. The ‘vejigante’  mask has a grotesque facial expression with exaggerated nose and teeth and has horns on the front or on the side of the mask. The ‘vejigante’ has become a popular symbol of St. James’ feast. The  ‘Viejo’ (the old man) figure, fallen into disuse by now, represents an old man wearing rags, who wanders about  looking for gifts. St. James’ celebration with its processions, dances, music, and mass celebrations is still one of the most popular and traditional ‘fiestas’.’Bomba’ dancing is the main attraction during Loíza’s festival of Santiago. The black labourers, who worked on plantations created the ‘bomba’ in the 18th century as their primary social dance.

Vejigante in the Puerto Rican Museum of Art. CC BY-SA 2.0/Šarūnas Burdulis

Distinctive ‘bomba’ styles have developed in various parts of the island, such as: sikti, coembé, kalindti, yulti, cocobalé, babu, calindti, all words of African origin. Given the long history of slavery, colonialism and the attempts to strip black people of their African culture, it is important to the Puerto Ricans to highlight, by names and symbols, the African legacy. The ‘Bomba’ dance is to these people a representation of self-affirmation and an attempt to preserve and recuperate their real image and history. ‘Bomba’, among slaves living along the coastal areas where they cultivated sugar cane, was a way to reassert their dignity and recover their past. Basically ‘Bomba’ came to be a language in common, among African slaves who spoke different languages. It represented an important moment of unity and cohesion.
‘Bomba’ dances, songs, the beating of drums during the feast of St. James, usually express the alternative language, and reflect a deep social organization, an understanding of social reality and a way to express feelings of joy and concern.

Dancing in a circle
The participants of the dance create a circle that includes musicians, among them at least two drummers, and singers. The women’s voices are predominant. Dancers enter the circle and begin to dance. Next, dancers approach the drummers and offer salutes to express respect. From this point, the dancers improvise accents to challenge or converse with the high-pitched drum. The more equally matched in skill that the drummer and dancer are, the more intricate and satisfying the ‘bomba’ will be. It becomes a dialogue between dancers and drummers.

Afro-Puerto Rican women in Bomba dance dress. CC BY-SA 4.0/ Spreadofknowledge

‘Bomba’ is a body language dance. Various ‘bomba’ rhythms, verse structures, and intensities guide the dancers in movements and attitudes. Each rhythm calls for a different attitude. It is an important moment of cultural performance to the people of the village. It is also a way to express different realities: the need of a non-linguistic communication for those who are victims of social and economic oppression. The chance to express through music and dance what would be prohibited in a different context. A moment and a place where individuals through body language and music-talk feel socially free in an atmosphere of mutual respect. Still today, ‘Bomba’ reflects the African heritage brought by slaves: it is a cultural expression that resists the pressures of the modern world. ‘Bomba’ is a source of identity and dignity for people who were marginalised due to racial and class discriminations. This dance is an instrument of integration and cohesion resisting socio-political and economic pressure. St. James’ feast and the ‘bomba’ dances have kept Loiza people attached to African traditions. These celebrations, even if influenced in recent times by modernization, symbolize the dignity of a people who continue to make a significant contribution to culture. (Open Photo: 123rf)

Ester Padilla

 

DR. Congo. Apple accused of buying conflict minerals by Kinshasa.

The DRC government accuses Apple of buying conflict minerals and funding armed groups in the east of the country. However, boycotts of these minerals and sanctions have so far proved ineffective
in curbing the violence.

On 25 April, lawyers hired by the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accused American tech giant Apple of buying conflict minerals and threatened legal action if the practice continued.  In a letter to Apple CEO Tim Cook, London-based lawyer Robert Amsterdam demanded answers about the sourcing of minerals used in the company’s products. The lawyers claim that the products Apple buys are “tainted with the blood of the Congolese people”. Paris-based lawyers William Bourdon and Vincent Brengarth also sent the formal notice to two Apple subsidiaries in France.

Apple CEO Tim Cook. CC BY 4.0/European Union, 2024

According to the French lawyers, “Apple has consistently relied on a number of suppliers who purchase minerals from Rwanda, a mineral-poor country that has exploited the DRC and plundered its natural resources for nearly three decades. Now Rwanda is also a producer of tantalum, tin and tungsten (the 3Ts), which are used in the electronics industry to make smartphones and computers. This prompted the European Union to sign an agreement last May to secure supplies of these minerals for the manufacture of solar panels and electric vehicles. However, the French lawyers claim that Apple bought minerals smuggled from the DRC to Rwanda, where they were laundered and “integrated into the global supply chain”.
Their accusation is based on reports that may suggest such a scenario is plausible, but no smoking gun has yet been provided. The allegation is also based on the fact that Apple’s efforts to source its minerals ethically are “notoriously inadequate”.
According to the report, “Apple appears to rely primarily on the vigilance of its suppliers and their commitment to Apple’s code of conduct”. Most importers like Apple rely on certification from the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative (ITSCI), which has numerous and serious shortcomings, the DRC government’s lawyers claim. According to a report published in October by the Belgium-based International Peace Information Service (IPIS) and the Dutch NGO PAX, importers of 3TG metals such as Apple rely on refiners and smelters to disclose key information. But information about the country and mines
of origin is often not disclosed.

Woman from North Kivu. Military conflict in the region since 1998. Shutterstock/Sam DCruz

Both NGOs stress that EU importers’ reports are often deficient in providing information on the origin of minerals, as the data stops at the level of the smelter or refiner. As a result, China is often listed as the country of origin. The DRC government lawyers’ accusation is also based on a report by the British NGO Global Witness, which in 2022 accused the ISTCI programme, set up by the industry over ten years ago to ensure the supply of ‘conflict-free’ minerals, of contributing to the laundering of these minerals, child labour, human trafficking and smuggling out of the DRC. Global Witness claimed that industry sources at the time argued that the ITSCI programme had been set up deliberately to launder minerals.Several sources accuse the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels of smuggling the minerals that finance their activities into Rwanda or other neighbouring countries.
The M23’s seizure of the mining town of Rubaya, where tantalum is mined, in early May 2024 adds to the suspicions. However, it is not clear why Apple was specifically targeted by the Paris and London lawyers, as Tesla, Intel and Samsung are also named by the activists as companies dependent on ITSCI for their supplies.
In any case, Apple denies the allegations. “Based on our due diligence … we have not found a reasonable basis to conclude that any of the smelters or refiners of 3TG (tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold) identified in our supply chain as of 31 December 2023 have directly or indirectly financed or benefited armed groups in the DRC or any adjoining country.

At least eight million people in eastern DRC depend in a way or another from artisanal mining. File swm

Even assuming that Apple or other companies have unintentionally funded armed groups in the DRC, it is not clear that stopping their imports from the DRC would significantly improve the security situation there. Since 2010, the United States and the European Union have imposed sanctions on actors involved in the illegal exploitation of the 3T minerals. On the ground, however, the ongoing armed conflict continues to have a severe impact on the civilian population. At the end of 2023, more than 100 armed groups were still active in the provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tanganyika, including several groups with fighters from neighbouring Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

M23 fighters move along the road towards Goma. CC BY-SA 2.0/MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti

In January 2023, the German liberal Friedrich Naumann Foundation quoted the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) as concluding that despite more than a decade of efforts to stop ‘conflict minerals’, the level of conflict in eastern DRC had not noticeably decreased. Militarisation in and around artisanal 3T mines has decreased since the implementation of responsible minerals initiatives in the sector, but at the same time militarisation in artisanal gold mines has increased.
In some cases, sanctions and boycotts have worsened the humanitarian situation and led to growing opposition to such measures from local civil society, whose grassroots organisations representing the interests of millions of artisanal miners are not consulted by those initiating these policies in the United States or Europe.  It is conservatively estimated that at least eight million people in eastern DRC depend in one way or another on artisanal mining, as miners, customers, suppliers or relatives. Families rely on this income to buy medicines or pay school fees.
Congolese civil society organisations argue that the lists of Conflict Affected and High Risk Areas (CAHRA) drawn up by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the EU or the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI), in which 500 companies participate, discriminate against their country, while the non-inclusion of Rwanda and Uganda gives these countries a safe status that encourages mineral smuggling through their territories. This position is also supported by 20 EU NGOs, including ActionAid, Global Witness, Diakonia and Justice & Paix.
Armed groups have been supported in part by revenues from minerals, but it is money, not mining per se, that is their primary objective. For rebel groups, mineral extraction is a means rather than an end in itself.  These armed groups move on to other criminal activities, such as illegal gold mining, illegal logging or charcoal production, wildlife trafficking or extortion at roadblocks.

North Kivu. FARDC soldiers reinforce their presence in and around Goma. CC BY-SA 2.0/ MONUSCO/Clara Padovan

Another unintended consequence of preventing Apple or other companies from sourcing their minerals from the DRC is that the government’s FARDC troops and their Wazalendo militia allies could be negatively affected. For years, the Belgium-based International Peace Information Service (IPIS) and other observers have warned that the FARDC has been the armed group most involved in the region’s mines.
What will be the reaction of the FARDC if they cannot any longer extort money from the artisanal or more formal miners ? The Congolese soldiers receive miserable wages. A large part of them is siphoned by corrupt officers who also sell sometimes weapons and fuel to the rebels they are supposed to fight. In such conditions, the most likely scenario is that the FARDC soldiers’ priority will be to choose other preys rather than fight ethnic militias. In the end, sanctions designed in Washington or Brussels will miss their targets as long as social and political issues concerning both military and militias are not addressed by the government. And the Kinshasa authorities may sweel shoot themselves in the foot…(Open Photo: 123rf – Apple)

François Misser

Niger. Jihadists aiming for Niamey.

The most serious threat is that the extremists will expand south and close the access routes to the capital. The military actions of the military junta have so far brought little results. Civilian casualties
have increased.

After the latest coup in Niger, all the countries in the central Sahel region are governed by military juntas and we have therefore entered a new phase of the conflict against jihadist extremism which has been going on for over a decade.Last year Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger also formed the new Alliance of Sahel States (AES) which, as announced in March, will deploy a joint military force to fight against the jihadist cartels that have long been established in the tormented region of three borders,
the Liptako-Gourma.

The military junta led by Colonel Abdourahamane Tchiani, took power in July 2023. ORTN

It is not yet known how the AES will act and how many personnel it will make available, but the new external partners – Russia, Iran and Turkey – raise fears that the approach to terrorism will be mostly security-related and armed. A strategy which, as reported by Human Rights Watch, has already caused serious violations and war crimes against the population in Mali and Burkina Faso, exacerbating the conflict.Some data confirms how the situation on the ground is worsening: half of the deaths from terrorism in Africa in 2023 occurred in the Sahel, where victims increased by 38% and civilian victims by 18% (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project – Acled).
The military junta in Niger (CNSP), led by Colonel Abdourahamane Tchiani, took power in July 2023, justifying his action as “necessary” to take control of a “continuously deteriorating situation” in the fight against terrorism.In reality, according to Acled, the levels of violence and attacks were down by 39% in the country in the first 6 months of 2023 and the coup seems to have instead worked in favour of the jihadists, given that the year ended with an increase of 9% in violence (231 events reported) and victims (48%).

Open fronts
Due to its geographical position, Niger is busy on several fronts. In the north (Agadez region) and in the centre (Tahoua region) it also has to deal with banditry and illicit trafficking with infiltrated al-Qaida cells. To the south-east, in the Diffa region, it has to deal with the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram.
But the focus of the violence is concentrated in the Tillabéri region where the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (Jnim) and the branch of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (Eigs) are active.
It is in the latter region with long and porous borders with Burkina Faso and Mali that attacks continue to occur. The last one of significant severity occurred last February, and caused the death of 23 Nigerien soldiers in an ambush claimed by the EIGS.
Since the latter terrorist group got the better of the Jnim last year for dominance in the neighbouring Malian region of Menaka, the extremists of the Islamic state have increased their actions in the Nigerien Tillabéri, with strategies more inclined to the killing of civilians and the use of kamikazes. “The most serious threat for Niger is that the extremists, who now have control of the borders in the northwest, also expand to the south and close the access routes to the capital,” says El Hadj Djitteye, president of the Timbuktu Centre for Strategic Studies on the Sahel, as Niamey is located right in the centre of the Tillabéri.

Nigerien Army in the north. They also have to deal with banditry and illicit trafficking involving infiltrated al-Qa’ida cells. Shutterstock/ Katja Tsvetkova

Today the situation may become more complex and fragmented because the Alliance of Sahel states has begun to equip itself with aerial equipment, such as drones supplied by Turkey. It is certainly a point in their favour, but “it pushes the jihadist cartels towards more complex, fragmented strategies and above all towards simultaneous attacks with frequent indiscriminate violence”, explains the analyst. The repeated use of airstrikes leads to an increased risk of targeting civilians and simultaneously pushes armed groups to respond with remote violence (e.g., improvised explosive devices, land mines, mortars and rockets) and suicide attacks, methods which also endanger the defenceless population. El Hadj Djitteye claims that the former Nigerien government of President Mohamed Bazoum had “attempted dialogue with local communities and undertaken rehabilitation and disarmament programs”. For this reason, in his opinion, there had been steps forward, which unfortunately “the military-only approach undertaken so far will cause to vanish into thin air”.

Marco Simoncelli

 

 

 

South Africa. Durban. Missed opportunities to divert ships to avoid Houthi attacks.

As Africa’s largest port, Durban faces many challenges that are hampering its development. These include congestion, lack of reform and competition from other regional ports.

Managed in a landlord capacity by the Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA), the port of Durban is the largest in Africa. It has strong maritime connections with the rest of the world and a unique geographical location on one of the world’s busiest international routes between the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. During the fiscal year 2023/2024 , the volume targets were 81.4 million tons for the bulk cargo and  826,033 automotive units. The port also hosts facilities for the fishing industry, shipyards, cruise liner vessels and recreational boating.
Durban is also the second main container port of Africa after Tangier-Med in Morocco, with a target of 4.2 million Twenty-Foot Equivalent units (TEU) in 2023/2024.
Established in July 1977, the Durban Container Terminal operates as two terminals Pier 1 and Pier 2, handling 65% of South Africa’s (SA) container volumes.Yet, the port of Durban is facing a number of serious challenges which threaten its development and efficiency. The most important is the congestion of the harbour.
According to UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport in 2020, the median stay in South African ports was 3.32 days in average as against in 2.02 neighbouring Mozambique and 1.05 in Namibia.  The World Bank’s 2022 Container Port Performance Index (CPPI) ranked Mozambique’s Beira Port (a private joint-venture between Mozambique Ports and Railways and Rotterdam-based Cornelder Holdings) as the most efficient in Southern Africa.

Aerial view of the Durban container port. CC BY-SA 2.0/ Media Club – IMC-KZN-00074G

Durban ranked 341 out of 348 global ports. In Southern Africa, Beira (Mozambique) ranked much higher (223) followed by Maputo (Mozambique), Port Elizabeth (South Africa), Walvis Bay (Namibia), Luanda (Angola) and Ngqura (South Africa).
One of the main problems is outdated and insufficient port equipment which according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), means that despite its dominant position in Africa, the performance of Durban is sub-optimal. The port is one of the most expensive in the world, basically due to high cargo dues.
A World Bank report published in May 2021, ranked the Ports of Cape Town, Ngqura and Durban as among the worst ports in the world in operational efficiency. Moreover, a worrying aspect, underlined by the report SA-TIED (South Africa-Towards inclusive economic development) published in 2021 with the support of the United Nations, the European Union, the South African government and local and international research institutes, is that the average terminal efficiency of South African container ports has decreased from 76 to 66% between 2010 and 2019 while regional and global peers increased from 67% to 88%. Weather conditions may also worsen the situation. In January 2024, 100 km-an-hour winds have indeed interrupted container operations across the Durban, Cape Town, Ngqura and Port Elizabeth container terminals during two weeks, with 63 vessels kept waiting before Durban. In addition, the landlord authority, the TNPA has done little to stimulate competition between its ports.

The port of Durban is facing a number of serious challenges. The most important is the congestion of the harbour. Courtesy Transnet Port Terminals

Durban and the other South African ports are also increasingly facing the competition of other regional ports and corridors. One of them is Walvis Bay, in Namibia, which competes with Lobito (Angola) and the South African ports for the evacuation of products from the landlocked countries and regions of Southern Angola, Katanga, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana as well as the Northern Cape province in South Africa. By 2025, it is planned that 2 million tons will be evacuated through the Walvis Bay-Ndola-Lubumbashi Development Corridor, 9 million more through the Trans-Kalahari Corridor from Angola, Botswana, and South Africa and 6 million through the Trans Orange corridor from South Africa.
The container capacity at Walvis Bay is being expanded from 350,000 TEU to 850,000 TEUs in 2025 and to 2.2 mil in 2045. It will enable it to become the first port of large container ships on the West Coast in the southern hemisphere. Due to a favourable business environment, the time required for customs clearance is shorter there (2 days) than in South Africa (5 days). Yet, Durban still retains a comparative advantage. The leasing price of land for warehouse is cheaper than in Walvis Bay.
The Angola port of Lobito is another potential competitor. Indeed, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Zambia are trying to revive the Lobito corridor with a support from the United States and the European Union which considers that connecting the Zambian and Congolese Copperbelt with the Atlantic is a geopolitical move in their race against China which dominates the strategic supply chains for the energy transition. One of the advantages for mining houses in both the DRC and Zambia is that the distance between the mining capital of Kolwezi (DRC) to Lobito is only 1,600 km or half the distance to Durban.

Durban and the other South African ports are also increasingly facing the competition of other regional ports and corridors. Courtesy: Transnet Port Terminals

The Lobito corridor has a railway line which was entirely rehabilitated in 2019 by a subsidiary of the China Railway Construction corporation until the Congolese border. In July 2023, the DR Congo and Angola officially granted a 30-year concession to the Lobito Atlantic Railways consortium to operate, manage and maintain the line, between Lobito and the DRC’s Copperbelt. This consortium, led by Singapore-based commodity trader Trafigura, which includes Portuguese construction firm, Mota-Engil and Belgian railway operator Vecturis, will invest up to US$555 million in the project.The promotors are banking on the booming demand for critical minerals necessary for the world’s transition to clean energy to attract investment in the region since the International Energy Agency projects that demand for rare earth metals – primarily for electric vehicle motors and wind turbines  – will grow by three-to-seven-fold by 2040. Likewise, according to IEA, the demand for copper will increase by 40%, nickel and cobalt by 60-70% and lithium by almost 90%.Trafigura says the Lobito Corridor will offer the DRC and Angola the fastest export route
to Europe and the Americas.
So far, the DR Congo has been relying on three routes for its exports of metals and minerals: to Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Beira (Mozambique) and Durban. But all are congested. The US International Development Finance (DFC) has conducted due diligence for a potential financing package of U$ 250 million for the project announced by President Joe Biden at the May 2023 G7 meeting in Japan. Yet, there is a bottleneck on the Lobito corridor: indeed, 400 km of railway to the mining town of Kolwezi on the Congolese side badly need to be rehabilitated and by early 2024, the investment had still to be secured.

One of the main problems of the Durban Port is outdated and insufficient port equipment. Courtesy: Transnet Port Terminals.

In order to face all these challenges including the competition of other regional harbours, and the address the country’s ports operation problems, the South African government decided in 2021 to create a clear separation between the roles of the infrastructure owner, which is the Transnet National Ports Authority, and the terminal operator, which is Transnet Port Terminals. The purpose was that the functional and legal separation of these roles, which were operating divisions of the same company, would enable each to be fulfilled more independently and with greater efficiency. Among other projects for the ten coming years, the Ports Authority decided to deepen the entrance channel of Durban harbour and widen it from 122 to 230 meters. In January 2024, the TNPA announced plans to privatise several aspects of South Africa’s port operations. To this end, it hired a team of contractors to run the eight terminals that lack operators.
The TNPA hopes that this arrangement, which will last for three years, will smooth the transition to new long-term operators for the terminals. Yet, the reform is a delicate one since powerful dockers unions which fear job losses are hostile to such privatisation.

Durban is the most advanced and largest port in Africa.Courtesy: Transnet Port Terminals

These port improvements announced by the TNPA come at a time when large numbers of ships are being routed around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid hostilities in the Red Sea where Houthi militants in Yemen are targeting Israeli-linked vessels in solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza. By the 24 December 2023, 125 ships had been diverted from the Suez Canal around Cape Town. But the congestion problems of South African ports mean that shipping companies face difficult choices over where to refuel and restock, analysts say.
Durban is the most advanced and largest port in Africa, so ships rerouting around the continent have not many choices for berthing for replenishment, despite its congestion says a logistics consultant. But when they can, vessels routed around the Cape which need for bunkering in route, are trying to do so either in Walvis Bay or in Port Louis (Mauritius) depriving Durban and other South African ports from business opportunities, say shipping line companies sources. (Open Photo: Harbour of Durban. CC BY-SA 3.0/ below)

F.M.

Africa. To make a difference.

A climate activist, a cultural producer and a writer. Three African women with a proposal: Redefining the African narrative.

Vanessa Nakate is much more than an African Greta Thunberg because the reality of the continent is more complex than that of Europe when reflecting on the effects of climate change. But the Swedish activist inspired her to take action when, in 2018, temperatures began to rise in Kampala (Uganda) and she decided to go on hunger strike in front of Parliament to criticize the inadequacies of African governments regarding the climate.
Although she has not yet turned thirty, Vanessa Nakate is already a point of reference in international forums. She founded the Youth for Africa’s Future and the Rise Up Movement, is the spokesperson for the Fridays for Future (founded by Thunberg), and participated in the latest United Nations conferences on climate change, where she protested because the most polluting countries on the planet, led by The United States, do not keep their economic promises to those who suffer the most: only 4% of global pollution is attributed to the African continent.

Vanessa Nakate. “No voice is too small to make a difference” CC BY-SA 4.0/ Paul Wamala Ssegujja

“My country relies heavily on agriculture, most people living in villages and rural communities struggle to get food due to high prices. Lack of rain means hunger and death for the less privileged,” she said in an interview.
Based on the evidence, Nakate insists on how climate change will expose 118 million of the poorest Africans to drought, floods, and extreme heat by 2030. The young Ugandan activist is part of a network of local activists who demand action that cannot wait. “Instead of asking how far climate activism has to go, we need to ask how far environmental destruction has to go before our leaders wake up and do what is necessary to combat the problem,” she declared to Future Planet last year.In 2021 she published the book A Bigger Picture: My Fight to Bring a New African Voice to the Climate Crisis, which encapsulates what she has learned from her years of activism: the certainty of increasing poverty and inequality generated by climate change, as in the case of the Congo River rainforest, which by the year 2100 could lose thousands of plant and animal species on which 70 million people depend. At the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2020, she denounced racist treatment by the media when she was cut out of a photograph in which she appeared with other young climate activists.
UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador since 2022 and recognized in 2021 by Time magazine as one of the 100 global leaders, Nakate has managed in five years, through her Vash Green Schools project, to operationalize 39 solar panel installations in Ugandan schools. “I am a terribly shy person, but I found the strength and courage to make a banner and stand before Parliament in 2019. No voice is too small to make a difference and no action is too small to transform the world,” she declared in a forum after recalling that her activist friend Evelyn always says that “we can’t eat coal and drink oil, and money will be useless on a dead planet.”

NoViolet Bulawayo. Writer
Elizabeth Zandile Tshele was born in Tsholotsho Department, Zimbabwe, on 12 October 1981. Known in the literary world as NoViolet Bulawayo – the name recalls her mother, who died when she was just 18 months old, and the town where she grew up, the second largest in Zimbabwe, after Harare. Her literary career has been brief, with only two books published, We Need New Names (2013) and Gloria (2022), She was known from the start for her ability to describe, explain and recreate the difficulties, suffering, joys and sorrows of a country that was transformed, in a few years, from a British colony to a promising independent nation – at the hands of a then enthusiastic Robert Mugabe – only to fall into a state in which repression – with Operation Gurkurahundi, led by the army, in which almost 20,000 citizens considered dangerous to the regime were eliminated, poverty, hyperinflation or attrition led to the disillusionment and emigration of a large part of the population.
These themes, permanent in Bulawayo’s literature, are also a way to position herself in the face of the reality of her native country: “The criticism is totally intentional. In the times we live in, I believe that not being an activist is not an option. Above all, if we tell the stories of vulnerable people”, she said recently in an interview, in the presentation of her book: We Need New Names.

NoViolet Bulawayo. “I believe that not being an activist is not an option” CC BY-SA 4.0/ EuphoricOrca

In this novel, the condemnation was disguised, among other tricks, as simple children’s entertainment. Bastardo, Sabediós, Chipo, Stina or Darling, some of its protagonists, played at being countries, and the winners chose the United States, Switzerland or Canada – destinations of much of the emigration from the southern nation – as a reward for the victory, while the losers embodied South Africa, Botswana or Tanzania. In real life, those who remained in post-colonial Zimbabwe suffered from an increasingly despotic Mugabe, while those who left, like Bulawayo herself – who left at 18 for the United States to complete her academic education and start his literary career – found themselves in a context far from the ideals, the myths and dreams they had before embarking on the migratory project.
This pioneering work placed her on the shortlist for the 2013 Man Booker Prize, making her to be considered the first black African capable of winning the prize. She received due recognition when she was awarded the Caine Prize (2011) for her story Hitting Budapest, the Etisalat Prize and the Hemingway Foundation Award.
In addition to lecturing at Cornwell University, between 2014 and 2018 she was part of the pan-African literary initiative Writivism. Four years after leaving that project, she returned to the fray with Gloria, a work in which many analysts see parallels with Orwell’s Animal Farm. Bulawayo uses satire to denounce a power – that of the late Mugabe and that held by the current president, Emmerson Mnangagwa – for which the author is not a comfortable figure. “I know the government is not passionate about my work, but I’m not worried.” And she adds: “If I remain silent, I will in no way help resolve this situation.”

Koyo Kouoh. Cultural Producer
She lived until the age of 13 in her native Cameroon, then emigrated with her family to Zurich, Switzerland, where she studied economics. In 1995 she went to Dakar (Senegal) to interview the director Ousmane Sembène and discovered that she wanted to dedicate herself to culture. She started with literature and cinema, then with photography, and in 2008 she launched the RAW Material Company project – an art centre, exhibition hall, artist residency and debate space – in Dakar.
In 2019 she arrived in South Africa. After 20 years of participating in biennials and curating cultural projects, it is now the Zeitz Museum of Contemporary Arts Africa, known as Zeitz MOCAA, in Cape Town, where Kouoh is investing all her talents as CEO and Chief Curator.
Upon taking on the role, she recalled that her obsessions as a curator, “women, politics, artists creating universes, diaspora, the idea of modernity and, of course, the digestion of colonialism with an emphasis on South Africa”, would have been at the centre of his choices. In fact, she has not stopped fighting to ensure that the representation of Africa is far from the usual negative and pejorative connotations. “I’m interested in the stories and paradigms we offer about ourselves,” she told the New York Times in August, referring to artists from the continent and the diaspora who represent an “expansive culture.”

Koyo Kouoh. “Proud of the beauty of African culture”. Photo: University of Pittsburgh

The MOCAA was opened in 2017. Shortly thereafter, its first director, Mark Coetzee, resigned. Nigerian curator Azu Nwagbogu served as interim director until Koyo’s vitality came like a whirlwind to resolve the almost total lack of a work system, employees, funds… Then came the pandemic and the museum was closed for seven months. “There was an urgency to come back to life,” Koyo said, convinced she would succeed. To ensure that an average of 2,000 people visited MOCAA every day since the beginning of her mandate, she postponed the exhibition of works by prominent authors such as Tracey Rose or Otobong Nkanga and began with an open call to any artist, amateur or professional, from Cape Town who would like to share their work. “Many South Africans have a psychological barrier to these art spaces, but our proposal brought them here, they came to see their works in the museum.” She then opened the space to artist residencies, discussions and meetings and created a global board of advisors for MOCAA. Her personal, social and educational experience in Africa and Europe allowed her to make the decision to return to the African continent when she had her first child as a single mother. “I couldn’t stay in Europe, in that saturated space. I had become a mother and I couldn’t imagine raising a black child there,” she explained about a decisive moment in her life. She then adopted three more children.
She declares herself a “conscious addict” of shoes, clothes and food, although what obsesses her is showing that on the African continent, there is enormous “mutual support, generosity and care”. She is part of a professional generation that declares itself “proud of the beauty of African culture”. (Illustration: Tina Ramos Ekongo) – Carla Fibla Garcia-Sale & Javier Farinas Martin)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Music. Aziza Brahim sings Sahrawi time.

Her sixth album, Mawja, returns to traditional sounds, reconnecting the Western Saharan artist with the stories and rhythms of her family. And to the struggle of the women and people of this land of conflict.

Aziza Brahim was born in 1976 in the Hammada of Tindouf, a Sahara Desert plateau in western Algeria nicknamed “the Devil’s Garden” for its inhospitality. Over 173 thousand Sahrawis have lived here for 48 years, living in exile in refugee camps located in the autonomous areas of the Tindouf Wilaya. Recognized as the voice of the Sahrawi people, we met Aziza Brahim on the occasion of the release of her sixth album Mawja:
a 10-track project produced by the label specializing in world
music Glitterbeat Records.

Over 173 thousand Sahrawis have lived here for 48 years, living in exile Hammada refugee camps located in the autonomous areas of the Tindouf Wilaya. File swm

How and when did you realise that music would be your way of life?
I was 6 or 7 years old when I discovered that I could sing, that I had a voice capable of entertaining and pleasing spectators. My maternal grandmother organized “competitions” at home where she and my mother were part of the jury and in which all the boys and girls of the family participated. I worked very hard during the performances.
The fact that I won them all made me think that maybe my voice was acceptable. But only a few years later, in Cuba, when I was the lead singer of the school band, did I begin to think about dedicating myself to music professionally.

“My commitment to spreading the Sahrawi cause” File swm

What inspires and influences you?
My maternal grandmother Ljadra Mint Mabruk [ed. internationally renowned poet and activist for Sahrawi liberation and self-determination] was my first ever influence. She has always motivated my creativity by challenging me to put her verses and her poems into music.
She was a real school for me, a source of learning also as a person due to her tenacity, conviction and pride. Regarding the artistic aspect, she conveyed to me her pleasure in poetry and music. Furthermore, I assimilated many musical influences from the old haima radio [ed. haima is typical Sahrawi tent] of my grandparents.

Are you committed to making the Sahrawi question known?
My commitment to spreading the Sahrawi cause is very simple: it consists of being and singing as a Sahrawi. Every daily act for us is a political act. Our way of speaking, our way of dressing, and our sense of belonging to the community are all political acts. Of course, I faced multiple obstacles in talking about it. Moroccan censors, for example, have sometimes tried to hinder my concerts.

“I sing to reaffirm the power of women”. File swm

How do you think the Sahrawi cause is treated and addressed at a global level?
The Sahrawi population has been in the refugee camps of Hammada, one of the most inhospitable deserts in the world, for almost 50 years. We live in haima or precarious buildings with serious shortages, no comfort, in minimal conditions. After the Covid-19 pandemic, international aid has greatly reduced. The situation is increasingly difficult for the refugee population.The international community is incapable of finding a solution: it seems that interests are more important than rights! I think that the major mass media do not want to inform about the Sahrawi struggle because it is not in their media interests. In my opinion, we must try to put this conflict under the spotlight because there is an entire population in limbo that suffers due to the silence, passivity or oblivion of the world political class.

Tell us about your latest album Mawja…
The creative process of Mawja’s songs helped me a lot to come out of a deep anxiety crisis. We may translate Mawja as Wave. It’s the word my grandparents said when they turned on the radio we had in the haima. The main themes are the passage of time, the tension between past and future, and the situation of the Sahrawi people. I wanted to pay homage to my grandparents’ great haima, the place where I was born and raised. Furthermore, I dedicated a prayer to my grandmother Ljadra Mint Mabruk [ed. Duaa], who passed away in October 2021. I sing to reaffirm the power of women, to remember the Sahrawi games of my childhood and the mythical bird Bubisher who brings good news to my culture.

“We may translate Mawja as Wave.”

Mawja is a return to simple songs, far from the electronic elements I played with in Sahari [2019]. There is a mix of traditional and modern instruments of roots music. I fused rhythmic elements of my Sahrawi culture with Iberian, Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and West African musical traditions. There is a profound fusion in this album between different types of traditional music. For example, different flutes are used: the ney, the Chinese hulusi and the Aymaran mohoceño. These traditional elements are then joined by more contemporary sounds and instruments such as the electric guitar, the drums, the double bass or the flamenco tres: a new instrument created by Raúl Rodríguez, an excellent Andalusian guitarist who plays it in the song Haiyu ya Zuwar. (Open Photo: CC BY-SA 4.0/Elekes Andor)

Nadia Addezio

Angola. A common home.

The Commission for the Pastoral Care of Migrants (CEPAMI) and other civil society organizations have been working for years to give a dignified life to the thousands of migrants and refugees
in the country.

“The fundamental objective of CEPAMI is that refugees and migrants should move away from anonymity and invisibility and there is always a community that is spiritually and socially prepared to welcome, protect, promote and integrate everyone, without distinction”, says Sister Carla Frey Bamberg, executive secretary of the Episcopal Commission
for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People of Angola
and São Tomé (CEPAMI).

Sr Carla Frey Bamberg, executive secretary of the Episcopal Commission for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People of Angola and São Tomé (CEPAMI). (Photo: José Luis Silván Sen)

Sister Carla, born in Paraguay but of Brazilian nationality, remembers how CEPAMI began in 2006 to promote, coordinate and animate the pastoral care of refugees and migrants and is today present in 19 Angolan dioceses and São Tomé.At the same time, Sister Carla Frey says that although CEPAMI is a commission of the Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé, its management and financing are the responsibility of the Scalabrinian Missionary Sisters.Currently, the missionary is supported by a team of three people and in each diocese, there is a structure made up of a priest and a group of lay people. The missionary confirms that more than 350 migrant pastoral workers, scattered throughout the country, have been trained since 2006 to carry out this specific work.

Refugees and migrants
Angola currently hosts about 57,000 refugees and asylum-seekers. This population is largely composed of DRC refugees and asylum-seekers, out of which 17% came during the 2017 mass influx from the Great Kasai. Other nationalities also make up the population of concern to UNHCR across Angola, such as Guineans, Ivorians, Mauritanians, Somalis, Sudanese, and Eritreans, totalling about 50,000 living mostly in urban areas.The vast majority of refugees and asylum seekers live in the capital. CEPAMI organizes training courses and develops professional training projects in sewing, hairdressing, literacy, cooking and manicure for these people in three neighbourhoods of the city. Although women are the priority, young people at risk of falling into drugs or prostitution are also invited to participate.
More than 30% of the Angolan population live on less than a dollar a day, but refugees and asylum seekers are, according to the Scalabrinian missionary, “more vulnerable than the rest of the local population, because they are undocumented and invisible to Angolan institutions”.

View of Luanda. The vast majority of refugees and asylum seekers live in the capital. File swm

Sanzala is a neighbourhood of Luanda where many refugees are concentrated, mostly Congolese, but also Burundians and Rwandans, and many of their children do not receive an education. Ângela Maria Paulo Osório, a Rwandan born in Angola and coordinator of CEFAMI activities at the refugee centre, said that one of the priorities is education and this has meant that many refugee children have been able to enter public schools with a good knowledge base.”
CEPAMI’s work within the country also focuses mainly on raising awareness through conferences and training workshops related to human mobility, to which, among others, public officials, educators and university students are invited. The convocation takes place on behalf of the Church and, thanks to the cordial relationship that CEPAMI maintains with the Secretary of State for Human Rights, Ana Celeste Cardoso, there is always active representation of the Government. Since she arrived in Angola just over a year ago, Sister Carla Frey has participated in conferences and seminars in 11 dioceses. For the Scalabrinian missionary, these activities are possible “thanks to the formidable commitment of the lay people who work in the field and who provide the necessary information, even on delicate and serious issues that we denounce, such as human trafficking”. She adds: “We know that the sale of children and human organs is increasing dramatically in Angola, which worries us greatly.”

 Synergy
To join forces, in 2016, CEPAMI promoted the creation of the Angolan Network for the Protection of Migrants and Refugees, which brings together various ecclesial organisations – the Jesuit Refugee Service and the Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace – , international organisations – the UNHCR – and Angolan civil society organisations – the OMUNGA Association, specialised in the defence of human and cultural rights. Together, they are working to broaden the scope of action in the protection of migrants and refugees.
The network meets regularly to reflect on and report concrete situations to the competent institutions.

Congolese refugees in Angola. The country currently hosts about 57,000 refugees and asylum-seekers. UNHCR/Lina Ferreira

One of the initiatives of interest is that every year, at the end of September, the immigration fair is organised, a cultural festival in which, in addition to the various refugee communities, Angolan and foreign businessmen participate. Each group or country has a booth where they display their music, food and other manifestations of their culture. “On that day, everything is shared – says Sister Carla – everyone tastes food from all over the world and no one goes hungry, it’s a very interesting cultural activity.”Another important event is a reflection conference, held every year in October. Members of the Government and various embassies participate in the meeting, but especially representatives of the various refugee and immigrant communities in Angola.
The purpose of these meetings, as Afonso Pedro Chamangongo, of the Episcopal Justice and Peace Commission, says, is to “help break down barriers and create links between institutions and refugees”. (Open Photo: canstockphoto)

Enrique Bayo

 

 

 

 

Tunisia. The future in the hands of young people.

While the country is in the grip of a serious economic crisis, in the oasis city of Tozeur, the OxyJeunes youth Centre focuses on schooling and civic education: “Today our children are agents of change”, the director Moufida Hachef tells us.

Sugar, canned goods and some typical sweets are the products collected thanks to the collection in the shops of the Ras Edhraa district, in Tozeur, which will end up in the parcels destined for the
neediest families in this area inhabited largely by Bedouins
from the surrounding villages.

The idea comes from Asma, Mahmoud and their friends from the OxyJeunes Youth Centre, all born and raised in the oasis city surrounded by the Tunisian desert, 450 km south of Tunis, which until a few years ago was a thriving tourist destination. Today, however, Tozeur is struggling amid an unprecedented economic and social collapse.

The terrible crisis that has hit Tunisia is hitting harder here than elsewhere, precisely because the wealth of the area, together with the nation’s most prized dates, has always been represented by holidaymakers, who dropped significantly after the Islamic attacks and then disappeared completely during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Many hotels have never reopened since then, as is the case with numerous tourism-related businesses. In the meantime, the effects of the war in Ukraine, with the collapse of cereal imports and the increase in raw material prices, have hit Tunisians hard and today the situation is worsened by the drought, which is slowing down local production.

Thus, despite the iron fist of president-boss Saïed against speculators, empty supermarket shelves are now the norm and various products, from milk to flour, are rationed. In Ras Edhraa, due also to unemployment which reaches 25%, many families struggle to put food on the table: the packages prepared by the OxyJeunes youths will allow them to have something to eat.

The Centre is a creation of the “Amal pour la famille et l’enfant” association, a local reality created to give a chance for a future to a generation that grew up in a climate of disillusionment, after the hopes generated by the Jasmine revolution of 2011.

In a country where every year 100,000 students leave school before the age of 16 and where psychological disorders often arise at a very early age, it is essential to invest in young people, who make up a third of the Tunisian population but for whom there is no network of support that prevents cases of social hardship and deviance.

For this reason, some of the objectives of the Centre are to combat school dropout, cultivate the talents of young people in the most varied sectors, promote their potential but also their protagonism, and train them in active citizenship.

An after-school club, therefore, operates at the Ras Edhraa Centre, with reinforcement lessons for various subjects and foreign languages, but cultural, socialization and training initiatives are also organized on issues such as children’s rights, non-violent communication, environmental protection and more “There are various ‘clubs’ with proposals ranging from artistic workshops to sporting activities”, explains one of the centre’s operators.

They also underlining the attention to the families from which the children come: “For mothers, who often have no studies behind them, Amal offers literacy courses, while trying to train parents in their responsibilities and the value of education for the future of their children, who in many cases they would instead prefer to see leave for Europe.” Poverty remains a very strong driving force that pushes thousands of Tunisians to abandon their homeland.

In recent years, therefore, the association has decided to focus on the age range from high school to the start of university. An intuition of the director – and soul of the structure – Moufida Hachef, a 36-year-old who herself grew up in a poor family and achieved a baccalaureate in English Literature and Civilisation. “In these young people I see our future – explains Moufida -. We started with simple activities such as editing videos, writing a CV or using the internet.”

Amal also has an office in Tunis where she manages a professional training centre and a reception centre for single mothers. She has managed to return to the network of the Jeunes des 2 Rives programme, which aims to educate the new generations of Mediterranean countries in citizenship and international solidarity, through local construction sites – such as the one held in Tozeur and dedicated to environmental sustainability in the oasis – and abroad.

“Some of us  – says Moufida – took part in exchanges in Morocco and France: a precious opportunity to see the world and also to realize that the solution is not always to emigrate because living conditions can be harsh even outside Tunisia”.

As they increased, the more ‘historical’ visitors to the Ras Edhraa Centre began to become its beating heart: “Slowly they began to take on some responsibilities, to help us with activities for the children and to engage in volunteering.

Today this structure is their second home. Its name, which is a play on words between the terms ‘oxygen’ and ‘youth’, reflects the opportunity to breathe the freedom and joy of expressing oneself, without stereotypes or gender discrimination. Here boys and girls have the same roles, everyone lends a hand and is involved in decisions.”

This gave rise to an Advisory Council made up of ten members, which organizes various community service activities: in addition to the food collection for poor families, the volunteers have recently carried out a project to redevelop some school buildings in the neighbourhood through repainting, cleaning and creating murals.

“Our Centre has become a real point of reference for families  – says Moufida  –  and I try to make them understand that this can represent a springboard for their children towards a better future. Among the young people who have passed through here, some have now become teachers, those who work in the world of theatre… in whatever sector they have chosen to engage, they are becoming actors of change. It is people like them who hold the future of Tunisia in their hands, starting with their community.”

Chiara Zappa/MM

Nigeria. Lagos, the largest complex in the Guinea Gulf faces huge challenges.

The Lagos complex, with the new Lekki container port and the neighbouring Tin Can Island port, is the largest maritime hub in the Gulf of Guinea. But Nigeria’s ports face many challenges, including congestion, corruption and piracy.

With an annual cargo volume of 27 million tonnes, the Port of Lagos is the second largest seaport in West Africa. The original Apapa Port, opened in 1913 and located on the Bay of Benin, remains the country’s oldest and largest in terms of both land area and cargo handled, with a total area of 80 hectares.
It has five private terminals operated by AP Moller, ENL Consortium Limited, Apapa Bulk Terminal, Greenview Development Nigeria Ltd and Lilypond Inland Terminal. These facilities handle cereals, grains, machinery, construction material, vehicles, food, minerals, fertilisers and industrial raw materials. The port also houses a crude oil and petroleum terminal beside four fishing wharves. In addition, it also boasts from a container capacity of 1,000,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU).

Port of Lagos. It has five private terminals. Photo: Nigeria Ports Authority

In 1975, a second port was established at some 7 km from the centre of Lagos to the West of Apapa to cope with growing congestion problems. The Tin Can Island port handled in 2021 a cargo volume of 1.6 million tons including liquid bulk, dry cargo, roll on roll off and breakbulk on its 12 berths capable of accommodating 260 meters long vessels.
The port is also boasting from a container terminal managed by a consortium made of the China Merchants Holding International, the China Africa Development Fund and the Geneva-based Mediterranean Shipping Company which was designed to handle 650,000 TEU annually.
Nigerian ports handle 2/3 of imports, mainly industrial equipment, refined petroleum, chemicals and food, and 1/3 of exports, mainly crude oil. Over the last five years, Nigerian ports handled an average of 77.6 million tonnes per year. However, data from the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) shows that in 2023, traffic volume was below this level at only 70.48 million tonnes, while container traffic was 1.57 million TEUs, down from 1.68 million TEUs in 2022. There is a lot of room for improvement in the profitability of container terminals: on average, about 80% of the total export container traffic is empty. On the other hand, the average turnaround time of vessels will be four days in 2023, compared to 5.2 days in the previous year, due to the positive impact of the new Lekki Deep Seaport, located 65 km south-west of Lagos, which will achieve an average turnaround time of only one day.

Ships berthed at the Apapa wharf in Lagos. Shutterstock/Alucardion

According to Nicolas Sartini, the executive vice-president of the ports and terminals of the French-based CMA CGM Group which holds the sub-concession of the Lekki container port which was built in the Lagos Free Zone, this new infrastructure can accommodate vessels of a 18,000 TEU capacity and should be a game changer in West Africa. But under one condition: accordingly, it is necessary to improve the access roads to the port and the future industries including a cement factory scheduled to be built around the port. The new port which started its operations in 2023, is a partnership between the China Harbour Engineering Company which obtained the wider port concession for 45 years and has built the port, the Tolaram Group from Singapore, the State of Lagos and the Nigerian Port Authority.
The total investment of $ 1.65 million includes the construction of 50 hectares area with two container berths and a total annual capacity of 1.2 million TEU. Upon completion of the final phase, the port will reach a total capacity of 2.7 million TEU, larger than that of the port of Abidjan, just after the Ghanaian port of Tema which should reach a capacity of 3.5 million TEU by 2025.

Maersk Line arrives as MV Leto Monrovia leaves the port of Lagos. Shutterstock/ Dumbra

With the construction of the Lekki Deep Seaport, the NPA expects to improve the port efficiency and cost-effective port operations and to reduce the delays in the import of raw materials and equipment. To that effect, the CEO of the NPA, Mohammed Bello-Koko has made plans for advancing automation and digitalization.
The NPA also hopes to capitalize on the African Continental Free Trade Area agreements to develop the port activities.
Yet, a number of challenges must be addressed. One of the most important is the congestion at the Port of Lagos which explains why a significant portion of the cargo destinated to Lagos or originating from there transits through Cotonou (Benin) and Lomé (Togo). Lagos depends also sizeably from the collaboration with the ports of Abidjan, Tanger and Tema. Lomé is a serious competitor with a volume of cargo of 22.6 million tonnes and a container capacity potential of 1.5 m TEU in 2019. It is estimated that inefficient service delivery and gridlock have made Nigeria lose a total of 56 million tons of cargo to Togo, Benin, Cote D’Ivoire and Ghana between 2016 and 2020. The Danish consultant Dynamar estimates that the port of Lagos is losing $ 55 million per day because of the congestion.
According to the European Journal of Maritime Research, in November 2022, the Nigerian ports had the highest cargo dwell time in West Africa, being 475% times higher than the global average of 4 days, 64% higher than that of Cotonou, 53% higher than that of Tema and 156% higher than that of Lome. The average dwell time in Nigeria was 23 days in 2017 against 9 days for Cotonou, 14 days for Lome and 15 days for Tema. Accordingly, the transactional dwell time (spent in formalities with customs authorities) accounted for 73% of the total cargo dwell time. Nigeria ranked 110th on a list of 160 countries established by the World Bank in 2018, in terms of port logistics.

View of Lagos. Due to the large urban population and port traffic volumes, Lagos is classified as a Medium-Port Megacity. File swm

According to the French strategy consultant OKAN Partners, port logistics has improved since the average time spent by a ship at berth is now lower than two days in Nigeria like in Ghana or Togo. But the immobilization of containers in Apapa is still too long (22 days as against 12 days for Douala and Luanda).
According to the Manager of Lagos Port Complex  Apapa, Charles Okaga, many challenges still hamper its efficiency, including the manual examination of cargoes by customs due to lack of scanners and the poor access roads. Beside logistical challenges, the efficiency of the port is also negatively affected by fraudulent customs practices.
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which is mainly perpetrated by Nigerian gangs remains challenging. Pirates are often well armed and violent. They attack and hijack ships and kidnap crews along or far from the coast in rivers, anchorages, ports and surrounding waters. Generally, all waters in off Nigeria remain highly risky, reports the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce. Vessels are advised to be vigilant as many incidents go unreported. Kidnapping for ransom remains the biggest risk for crews. In 2023 alone, 23 incidents were reported in the Gulf including one hijacking, seven kidnappings, one combination of both and firing upon vessels on four occasions. There were also 10 boardings , according to the US Office of Naval Intelligence January 2024 report. Incidents occurred in Angola, Togo and Ivory Coast rather than in Nigeria itself. Clearly, after a significant decline in 2021 and 2022 piracy was on the rise again last year.
The relative progress was owed to Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project, launched by President Muhammadu Buhari in June 2021 with the creation of  “The Integrated National Security and Waterways Protection Infrastructure of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency’ (NIMASA) which  allowed a combination of Nigeria’s navy, army, air force, and police to cooperate to counter piracy.

Barbed wire or razor wire attached to the ship hull, superstructure and railings to protect the crew against piracy attack passing Gulf of Guinea. Shutterstock/ Luciavonu

Another reason for the drop in piracy was the decision in 2022 by the Nigerian government to hire one of the most important gang bosses, the former rebel leader turned strong-man, Tompolo believed to be in control of Nigeria’s strongest militia/criminal network responsible for a majority of the pirate activity in the Gulf. Indeed, on that year, following a period of unprecedented pirate activity and industrial scale theft from oil pipelines, the Nigerian authorities awarded a pipeline security contract worth about $ 200 million per year to Tompolo, adapting the proverb that the best rangers are former poachers. The involvement in 2021 and 2022 of several Western navies from United States, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Italy France and the UK had a deterrent effect: in 2021 and 2022, attack numbers were significantly lower than preceding years. But these foreign navies often lack the legal instruments to arrest pirates. (Ship with oil rig in the background in the Nigerian capitol Lagos. Shutterstock/vanhurck)
F.M.

 

 

 

Guinea Bissau. Democracy can wait.

President Sissoco Embaló does not tolerate dissonant voices and continues to present himself as an authoritarian normalizer of political life. However, he does not control parliament and a second presidential term is not certain.

Since before gaining independence, Guinea-Bissau has been the scene of personalistic disputes and individual ambitions. The assassination of Amílcar Cabral, the historic leader who had led the independence process of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, which occurred a few months before the proclamation of unilateral independence from Portugal (1973), marked the history of the western African country.

Umaro Mokhtar Sissoco Embaló, president of Guinea-Bissau since February 2020. CC BY 4.0/ Kremlin.ru

No longer having a leader, Guinea-Bissau has lost itself between coups d’état – the first, in 1980, by Nino Vieira, against the then president, Luís Cabral -, drug trafficking (so much to transform the small nation into the first narco -African state) and widespread poverty. It is possible to say that there has never been a prolonged period of institutional tranquillity in Guinea-Bissau. The country went from one transition to another, without interruption, until reaching the last presidential experience, that of Sissoco Embaló.

Weak institutions
Embaló is a military man, specializing in international relations and defence policy, who conceives politics as a game with only two categories: winners and losers. He was a collaborator of several African leaders, including Gaddafi, and is accused of winking at Islamic extremism, even though his wife is Catholic. With presidential ambitions, Embaló had carried out a presidential campaign – which then led him to a disputed second-round election in 2020 – with typically populist tones and themes: the death penalty for drug traffickers and bandits, prison for those who beg for a piece of bread in the streets and systematic denigration of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) treated like a cancer to be got rid of.

View of the National People’s Assembly (Assembleia Nacional Popular) in the city of Bissau. Shutterstock/ TLF Images

Friend of then Brazilian President Bolsonaro and advocate of a more aggressive foreign policy than his predecessors, Sissoco is demonstrating a total absence of democratic culture. Human rights are violated, there is a strong limitation of freedom of expression and of the press, and of the rights of association and demonstration, as Freedom House itself (a Washington-based NGO that monitors human rights) confirmed in its recent report. However, to understand the series of alleged coups d’état, shootings and various conflicts that have taken place in recent months, also deserving the attention of the UN Secretary General, Guterres, it is necessary to frame everything in a more general context, typical of the political action of several African presidents.

Power first of all
Embaló’s main objective is to stay in power for as long as possible. He is convinced that he must complete a mission, bring order to the country, preventing the “cancer” of the PAIGC from returning to guide him. In this way, all the tools to avoid the political risk of losing one’s power are good. Firstly, the postponement of the elections, as happened with the legislative elections which were held on 4 June 2023, almost a year late. And which sanctioned the return of the PAIGC to an absolute majority in parliament. Secondly, the sabotage of his opponents, which, however, he has had to live with since last June. The fact that the government led by Geraldo Martins – whom Sissocó himself had appointed, in agreement with the presidency of the PAIGC – was dissolved in a rather unexpected manner, to create a presidential-initiated executive demonstrates that Sissocó is trying to divide his opponents, currently favourites for this year’s presidential elections. Finally, the latest tactic used by the president is the dissolution of parliament, with very weak justification and outside the constitutional provisions.

Street scene in the city of Bissau. Embaló’s main objective is to stay in power for as long as possible.123rf

He did so in May 2022, announcing elections for December, which were then postponed until June of the following year; and he did it again in early December 2023. In short, the strategy to maintain power now seems consolidated: to limit dissonant voices as much as possible (including parliament, but also the press, in addition to the parties that oppose him), and propose himself as the “lone man in command”, the sole normaliser of political life.

Vote 2024
This personalistic and authoritarian plan is causing, however, the opposite effect: great institutional instability, planned and practised by Embaló himself, a country in disaster, and yet another transition in sight, that of the presidential elections. A very delicate step that Embaló will probably try to avoid and postpone as much as possible, as he has always done during his mandate, to prolong his presidential experience. Given the next elections, we can expect just anything from the president in office, given his anxiety about completing the “mission”. (Map of Guinea Bissau on grunge paper. 123rf)

Luca Bussotti

 

 

 

African military spending up 22% in 2023 with DRC leading the push.

African military spending rose by 22% between 2022 and 2023, according to a new report, with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seeing the biggest increase to its military budget globally at 105% as the central African country battles multiple security threats.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in a new report on world military spending, found that the DRC saw the largest percentage increase in military spending – 105%  – by any country in 2023 – greater even than Ukraine. There has been and is protracted conflict between government and non-state armed groups in the Central African country, with an estimated 200 militias and armed groups operating in the region, as well as Red Tabara rebels aiming to destabilise neighbouring Burundi.

In 2023 the DRC’s military spending more than doubled to reach $794 million. The 2023 increase coincided with growing tensions with Rwanda, a surge in clashes with non-state armed groups, and a move by the government to strengthen the DRC’s armed forces after it demanded the early withdrawal of a large-scale United Nations peacekeeping mission in the country. This is being replaced by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIDRC), which includes South African troops.

South Africa has emerged as a key supplier to the DRC, with Paramount delivering 25 Maatla armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to the DRC police in 2023, and 20 Mbombe 4 APCs to the DRC military in early 2023. The Democratic Republic of Congo is also acquiring aircraft from Paramount, and is receiving six Mwari intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.

Last year it emerged that the DRC had acquired nine CH-4 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation. Other recent deliveries include 30 Calidus MCAV-20 armoured vehicles from the United Arab Emirates, various new small arms and light weapons from various suppliers, and seven second hand OH-58 and UH-1H helicopters from the United States.

Africa Intelligence earlier in May indicated the DRC will be acquiring 185 Hizir armoured personnel carriers from Turkey’s Katmerciler this year under a $75 million agreement.

Reports suggest that Felix Tshisekedi’s government has approved an ambitious military spending plan, worth $3.5 billion from 2022 to 2025, after the United Nations eased an arms embargo on the country in 2022. The DRC is looking to buy weapons from suppliers around the world, ranging from Indonesia to Russia.

As a whole, African military spending totalled $51.6 billion in 2023, which was 22% higher than in 2022 and 1.5% higher than in 2014, SIPRI reported. The rise in 2023 can be attributed to the 20% increase in spending by Nigeria – the subregion’s biggest military spender – and notable increases in spending by several other countries including the DRC and South Sudan.

Nigeria’s military spending was $3.2 billion in 2023. This included a supplementary budget that boosted the regular military budget by an additional 34%. The latest increase in Nigerian military spending comes against the backdrop of numerous ongoing security challenges.

South Sudan recorded the second highest percentage increase in military spending globally in 2023. Its spending rose by 78% to reach $1.1 billion, following a 108% increase in 2022.

The growth in spending can be attributed to escalating internal violence and the security challenges that have spilled over from the civil war in neighbouring Sudan, SIPRI noted.

At $28.5 billion in 2023, military expenditure by North African countries was up by 38% from 2022 and by 41% from 2014. Algeria and Morocco are by far the largest spenders in the subregion, together accounting for 82% of North African military expenditure in 2023. Algeria’s military spending grew by 76% to reach $18.3 billion. This was the highest level of expenditure ever recorded by Algeria and the largest annual increase in its spending since 1974.

The increase was facilitated by a sharp rise in revenue from gas exports to countries in Europe as they moved away from Russian supplies. In contrast, Morocco’s military spending decreased for the second consecutive year. It fell by 2.5% in 2023, to $5.2 billion.

Military expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa reached $23.1 billion in 2023, which was 8.9% higher than in 2022 but 22% lower than in 2014. SIPRI reported that world military expenditure rose in 2023 for the ninth consecutive year to an all-time high of $2 443 billion as war, rising tensions and insecurity manifest in various parts of the world.

“The unprecedented rise in military spending is a direct response to the global deterioration in peace and security. States are prioritising military strength but they risk an action–reaction spiral in the increasingly volatile geopolitical and security landscape,” Nan Tian, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme, said to coincide with the release of new data on global military spending. (Open Photo: Republican Guard soldiers with Calidus MCAV-20 armoured vehicles – Présidence RDC) – (Defence News)

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