TwitterFacebookInstagram

Drug Trafficking and Terrorism.

Drug trafficking is a global business. It is finding its way ever more perniciously into growing economies, corrupting and destabilising them while making them the target of the  leading extra-regional powers,  altering the geopolitical equilibrium of the future.

This is evident when we consider drug trafficking as a new form of geopolitical power or, rather, of transnational geo-economic power that is capable of substantially affecting both the economic and political spheres by harming the social fabric and generating a dangerous, vicious circle in which the illicit economy becomes indispensable to that of the nation. Such a situation, which increases the phenomenon of ‘narco-states’, ‘narcocracies’ or, even worse, ‘narco-democracies’, is capable of infecting not only the economy of developing but also those of developed countries, polluting the institutions and structures of civil society, the independence of governments and financial institutions.

To understand the nature of the phenomenon, it suffices to realise that the illegal cocaine business is worth around 500 billion dollars annually and that the overall criminal economy amounts to around 3% of Gross Worldwide Production.
The ‘ndrangheta’ – the most powerful Italian mafia – is, at this moment in time, seen as one of the most powerful criminal organisations in the world, as well as being the main and undisputed leader in Latin America.
That area, together with the Sahel,Afghanistan and Central Asia, represents one of the main centres for the production and distribution of narcotics that have as their privileged destinations the European,United States,Russian and Chinese markets. In this context are the estimates provided by the United Nations which show that more than 200 million people (around 5% of the world population) are habitual users of heroin, cocaine and/or synthetic drugs.

UN estimates echo those of the UNOD (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) that show that consumers may have increased in recent years by as much as 50% only among the 166 members of the organisation. This tendency started to develop in the year 2000 and, as the Argentinian political expert, Norberto Emmerich, author of the book Geopolitica Y Narcotraffico, rightly states, it is simply the result of the expansion of global capitalism that requires the deregulation of many economic activities without taking into account the negative consequences of this policy.
In fact, globalisation is seriously casting doubt on the cardinal principles that form the basis of the nation state, the first among all the fruits of the so-called ‘state sovereignty’, transversely conditioned today more than ever before. State authority has been placed in a position where it must cede large portions of its authority and responsibility in areas that were traditionally within its ambit and so become merely the administrator and executor of decisions taken by those transnational bodies whose desire for power, orientations,identities and networks do not always appear to coincide with national interests but, on the contrary, often conflict with them.

The ambit in which this tendency has imposed itself are many. However, those most emblematic are the ones that concern monetary and foreign policies, both of which are fundamental to economic and commercial relations and  reports that determine the well-being of a people. The picture that emerges is one of a weak state, subject to the decisions of the transnational market, a state whose weakness is reflected in its (lack of) control of criminal activity which, in such a system, finds it easier to expand, thus acquiring, in effect, a transnational character. Those who, like the drug traffickers, are able to produce riches swiftly, also know how to bring the correct pressures to bear in order to affect the laws and codes of the market to their own advantage. As a result, the power vacuum created by the absence of legality is, as is well known, occupied by the mafias which obtain the power to impose their own will on the already weakened state with its ineffective arms and no great desire to defend itself. (F.R.)

Territory control.

The colossal and internationally important business of drug trafficking, now run by criminals of all races, is also participated in by various factions of terrorist groups and guerrillas.

According to data provided by the DEA (Drugs Enforcement Agency) entitled ‘Combating organised international crime’, it emerges that the ties between drug trafficking and terrorism continue to grow (even if this is nothing new), to the extent that both realities are superimposed, one on the other, in some areas.
The connection between these two subjects, apparently far removed from each other by their different strategic objectives and ideological visions, lies mainly in satisfying mutual needs. Guerrilla and terrorist groups, being well set up in the territories, guarantee traffickers the freedom required to operate within those territories securely and undisturbed. Since they are anti-system forces, they are also capable, thanks to their military equipment, to counter police operations. This is an ideal situation for the traffickers who, while paying for such services with large sums of money, work undisturbed and employ their people exclusively in operations connected with peddling.

Apart from benefiting from outsourcing the security services, drug traffickers may also avail of logistic support that enables them to set up laboratories within those territories where such organisations represent the sole valid interlocutor. Drug proceeds allow terrorist organisations to finance their own undertakings; in this regard, the Taliban are one of the more important objects of study. At the end of the nineties, drugs were considered by the Afghan Jihadists to be contrary to Islamic principles, but soon the demands of the war changed this conviction to the extent that drug trafficking was seen as the main economic activity capable of meeting the needs of the war economy.
Consequently, following the American invasion, the Taliban moved from simply controlling the production of opium to administering the whole process. The death of Mullah Omar in 2013 marked a turning point in this regard since the death of such a figure brought about the fall of the only remaining resistance to such a modus operandi. After that date, the trafficking in narcotics became so necessary within the movement as to become institutionalised.

Drugs produced in Afghanistan reach Europe from three important directions: the Northern route; the Southern route and the Western route. The Northern route easily crosses Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), and then moves towards Europe both across Kazakhstan and Russia and across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Southern route transits Pakistan through the frontier of Balukistan. From there it reaches China and, by sea or air, is sent to the most varied of destinations (Africa, Europa, United States and Oceania). Lastly, the Western route passes through Iran, then towards Turkey and from there, going on through the Balkan States, it reaches Europe.
The evolution within the Taliban is of interest also to other guerrilla and terrorist groups that are undergoing a transformation from within with combatants who become drug traffickers, thus creating new autonomous cartels. This allows them to administer the whole process and gain greater profits. This mingling that has taken place in some areas makes it difficult to see a clear distinction between the two realities to the extent that a new reality is identified and this new phenomenon has been given the name of ‘narco-terrorism’. (F.R.)

 

Kyrgyzstan. A Geopolitical Pivot.

Kyrgyzstan merits to be called a ‘geopolitical pivot’. It is a territory that, due to its geographic characteristics, occupies a central position in super-power rivalry.

A landlocked country, it is prevalently mountainous and Tian Shan Range occupies 65% of its territory. To the east it borders on the Chinese province of Xinjiang, a highly strategic location for Peking, to the north of Kazakhstan. To the east it borders on Uzbekistan and to the south it shares a border with Tajikistan. The population is around five million – of whom 75% are Moslem and 20% Orthodox – composed of many ethnic groups including the Kyrgyz (around 64.7% and descendants of the tribes that settled the Tian Shan in ancient times); the Uzbeks (14.5%); the Russians (12.5%); and various other groups, many numerically small, such as: Uighurs, Dungun’s, Ukrainians, Tartars and even Germans whose ancestors were deported during the second world war from the Polish regions of Ukraine conquered by the Soviet Union.

Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest countries in central Asia with over 40% of the population living below the poverty line. Its economy is mainly tied to a pastoral agricultural system and its mineral deposits such as gold, uranium, oil and antimony. It also has large reserves of coal (estimated at 2.5 billion tons), mostly in the area of Kara-Keche, in the north of the country.
The country, with its capital Bishkek (situated in the plain near the border with Kazakhstan), gained independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991 with, apparently, a policy reform, in the person of the President Asker Okayed, who favoured a gradual change to liberalism that was obviously unsuited to the weak state apparatus and the clan-based social structure, with power in the hands of the leaders.
It also experienced further problems due to the 1993 arrival of refugees from civil war-torn Tajikistan, and from Afghanistan where the Taliban had taken power.
In order to handle these problems, Okayed followed an authoritarian path, due in part to the support he received from the USA which was then involved in the Afghan theatre and received in exchange the concession of airspace and permission to open a base at Manas (closed by the USA in 2014).In 2005, due to the high level of corruption, the conditions of extreme poverty and the division between the industrialised north and the impoverished south, even today a cause of instability, Kyrgyzstan became the stage for violent protest demonstrations that began after the parliamentary elections on 27 February, 2005 that gave rise to the ‘Tulip revolution’.

The popular uprising compelled President Askar Akayev to resign and seek refuge in the Kirghizstan embassy in Moscow. This was one of the elements that brought analysts to ask whether Moscow was behind these events in order to protect its own territory and respond to the ‘coloured revolutions’ instigated by Washington in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004. However, the hypothesis was shown to be unfounded when the ‘Tulip revolution’ chose another pro-American president, Bakiyev, who, through a popular revolt, was dethroned in 2010 unjustly accused of having created a despotic and family regime that suppressed all forms of opposition.In 2010 Roza Outnbayeva, leader of the protests, took power and set up a provisional government to reorganise the country. After a few months, an important referendum was held that transformed the country into a parliamentary republic, increased the powers of the prime minister and tried to guarantee internal cohesion and pacification, despite the famous clashes that took place in the city of Osh, between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks.The 2011 presidential elections conferred the presidency on Almazbek Atambayev, an exponent of the social democrat party who remained in power until October 2017. Unlike his predecessors, Almazbek Atambayev showed that, in foreign policy, he was very close to Moscow to which he granted control of the air base at Kant until 2032, and joined the Eurasian Economic Union, something that caused discontent in China.

The recent elections in October 2017 saw the election, at the second poll and with 55% of the votes, of Sooronbai Jeenbekov, the candidate supported by his predecessor president Atambayev who did not stand due to the mandate rules of the constitution. When speaking of the 2017 elections, it is important to emphasise that, unlike what happens in other places in central Asia, in Kyrgyzstan the competition for election is real, involving different political agents and marking a positive achievement for a country that, only in recent years, has entered the democratic system and that, since independence, has had to deal with the lack of cohesion among the various minorities that increased an underlying tendency to conflict in some areas – such as that of the Fergana Valley, divided between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – which even today represents a dangerous threat to the country.

The problem of national cohesion is not the only problem in internal security; it is also bound up with the even more pernicious problem of the Islamic threat which, even if in Kyrgyzstan it has established itself in a less important way with respect to its neighbouring countries, due partly to the repressive tactics used by the local authorities, its development is not to be excluded. In fact, according to experts, the country has all the characteristics – ethnic divisions, widespread poverty, and proximity to countries with radical groups – that allow for the sudden spread of that threat.

We must also add that the Islamist organisations present in the country run the arms and drugs trades in collaboration with local organised crime and the corrupt sections of the authorities, making Kyrgyzstan a preferred transit junction for opium products (produced partly in the country but mostly from Afghanistan) destined for the Russian and European market. The intertwining of criminality with corrupt sections of the authorities, together with the porosity of its borders and the morphology of the terrain, render ineffective the counter-measures employed by the state.
Again, we must not underestimate the environmental problem caused by the wide use of chemicals in agriculture and the bad management of water resources. In reference to the latter, it is to be underlined that the environmental problems contribute to the increase of poverty of entire populations, exposing them to the call to terrorism and religious fanaticism. (F.R.)

Burundi. The May referendum: a “death warrant” for the Peace Agreement.

According to the opposition, the referendum would be a “death warrant” for the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement and increase the risk of a civil war.

The constitutional referendum scheduled for the next 17 May could prolong President Pierre Nkurunziza’s rule until 2034.
If accepted by the electorate, those constitutional changes would enable the head of state who has served already three terms since 2005 to stand for two further ones from 2020.
The proposed changes would also reintroduce the post of Prime Minister and reduce the number of Vice-Presidents from two to one. They also involve increasing the presidential term from five to seven years but would restrict the President to two consecutive terms.  The changes would also reduce the parliamentary majority required to pass legislation. Key provisions of the Arusha Agreement which meant to protect ethnic or political minorities, such as the need of two thirds or three quarters majorities for certain decisions will be dropped. Yet, the new constitution would not change the 60% quota of Hutus and the 40% quota of Tutsis and the minimum of 30% quota of women in the government and the parliament. Likewise, the 50% ethnic parity between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority in the army and in the police would remainted untouched.

For the opposition such reforms are a “death warrant” for the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in 2000 under the auspices of the late South African President Nelson Mandela, which put an end to a civil war which claimed more than 300,000 lives between 1993 and 2006. The Arusha Agreement which is the primary source of inspiration of the current constitution clearly stipulates indeed that no president can serve more than two terms. And it was Nkurunziza’s interpretation of the constitution, arguing that he could serve three terms because his first one in 2005 was just a parliamentary appointment, not an election result that sparked in April 2015 the current political crisis.
Besides, the referendum would consolidate the nearly sectarian rule of the President whose wife, Denise, is the leader of the Church of the Rock. This evangelical church, according to the French political scientist Thierry Vircoulon, has become the  antechamber of the presidential power. All government members have joined this church whose reverends teach that Nkurunziza was chosen by God to become president. Reverend Denise Nkurunziza is blaming in her sermons those who “pray badly”. «God is on our side. Our enemy will not achieve anything since the one who is fighting me is fighting God”, declared her husband at a congress of the ruling CNDD-FDD party in June 2016.

Nkurunziza has also been promoted as “Supreme Everlasting Guide” by the CNDD-FDD on the last 11 March in terms which compare with the North Korean cult of personality. No wonder that his critics call him ironically “his majesty Nkurunziza 1st”. But those who fail to pay they respect to the “majesty” get in trouble. Two local officials from the northern town of Kiremba were charged with “conspiracy against the president” in early March, after players from the Kiremba football team roughed the President, during a match against his “Alleluiah” team.
Observers predict that the “yes” will likely win with an overwhelming majority and that the 50 percent participation rate needed to validate its results will be reached. The official campaign will only start two weeks before the vote. But while the President, his wife and the ministers incite citizens to participate, the “no” supporters are not allowed to campaign. A climate of intimidation is prevailing all over the country, tells SouthWorld an executive of the opposition coalition National Council for the Respect of the Arusha Agreement (CNARED. Over the last weeks, dozens of opposition militants have been arrested. According to CNARED sources, the President even warned in a recent speech in Cibitoke that those who oppose the referendum, would be given “a passport for the hereafter”. Since the April 2015 revolt against Nkurunziza’s wish to run for an unconstitutional third term, the repression has been harsh. “Today nobody dares to move a finger in Burundi. The methods are even crueler than the mere assassination of opponents. Corpses are mutilated. The aim is to deprive the defunct from a decent death, even in the hereafter he will lack something. And the corpses are ostensibly exposed as deterrents. This is extremely disturbing in such a religious society”, tells SouthWorld a CNARED source on conditions of anonymity.

The opposition is also blaming the regime for the forced enlistment of voters. But the division of the opposition plays as well in Nkurunziza’s favour. The vice president of the Burundian Democratic Front (Frodebu) Léonce Ngendakumana campaigns for the “no”, whereas the party leader Frédéric Bamvuginyiumvira campaigns for the boycott as most of the CNARED leaders, because he considers that the competition is unfair.
Attempts to promote a dialogue between the government and the opposition have been ignored by the authorities. The government has rejected the call from the Roman Catholic bishops’ conference in September 2017 for the resumption of peace talks with CNARED. As a result, the relations have become quite tense with the government after the Catholic Church condemned the “diabolical doctrines” spread by “hypocritical liers”, of some of these evangelical churches, which support the regime. CNARED urged the international community to take initiative to prevent the referendum that threatens to dismantle the Arusha Peace Agreement. On the last 8 January, CNARED warned against the risk of a resumption of the civil war and of the rejection of the dialogue by Nkurunziza which could legitimate the activities of armed groups such as the FNL, the RED-TABARA and the FBP which fight for the return of the constitutional legality.  CNARED also urged the Burundian army to stand up and defend the Arusha Peace Agreement and the Constitution. Eventually, the opposition coalition urged The Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) to accelerate prosecutions against the authors of crimes against humanity in Burundi.

Yet, the armed resistance is in disarray. Two leaders of the rebel Forces populaires du Burundi (FPB), Jérémie Ntiranyibagira and Edward Nshimirimana were arrested in Tanzania and extradited to Burundi on the 22 October 2017. Burundi left the ICC on the 27 October 2017, after that the ICC authorised the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda to open an inquiry for war crimes or crimes against humanity committed since the beginning of the crisis in April 2015.
According to the Prosecutor, 1,200 persons were killed, thousands were illegally detained, thousands were tortured.and hundreds of disappearances have occurred between April 2015 and May 2017, 413,490 people sought asylum in the neighbouring countries.
EU’s sanctions including visa bans and assets freeze against some Burundian officials and the suspension of the bilateral cooperation with the government, do not impress either Peter Nkurunziza who relies on other partners. China will continue its support to Burundi told the press in May 2017 the Chinese vice-president Li Yuanchao during a visit to Bujumbura, arguing that Beijing does respect Burundi’s sovereignty. China which is coveting Burundian nickel and rare earth resources is namely financing a presidential palace, roads, schools and a 15 MW hydroelectric dam, on top of budget support and food aid. “No foreign country seems ready to get involved military to prevent Burundi to become an even harder dictatorship”, deplores SouthWorld an observer.
Meanwhile, the country is falling into the abyss, with a 65% unemployment rate among the youth, according to the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres. Three out of the eleven million Burundians relie on food aid for their survival owing to bad crops and the consequences of the political crisis. (F.M.)

 

 

 

 

 

DR Congo. The Commitment of the Church to the People.

A sound formation, pastoral competence, a political vision and single-mindedness are the distinctive traits of Mons. Fridolin Ambongo Besungu, the new coadjutor bishop of Kinshasa.  

The appointment of Mons. Fridolin Ambongo Besungu as coadjutor Archbishop of Kinshasa alongside Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo, resulted from the desre of Pope Francis to lend them his support in facing the extraordinary challenges facing Congolese Catholics, victims of a repressive power which, since 31 December 2017, has had in its sights the peaceful marches called for by lay Catholics. A few days after his appointment, speaking with journalists, Mons. Fridolin described the situation, strongly expressing the voice of the Church.

First of all he assured the Christian community that the episcopate is “united and indivisible”, contrary to what the regime propaganda insinuated. He then reaffirmed his determination to support the people of DR Congo at present committed to respect for the Constitution and the rule of law through the implementation of the agreement reached on 31 December 2016 between the majority and the opposition, mediated by the Episcopal Conference. The agreement provides for a transition phase leading to elections instead of those planned for last December and now re-scheduled for December 2018.
The Coadjutor Bishop clearly stated that the ban on demonstrations is against the Constitution: “We are prophets – he insisted – and the role of the prophet is to alert the people when there is danger on the horizon ». He even mentioned some technical questions saying, for example, that he was against electronic voting as this would open the way for post-election disputes since there is no agreement among the political classes on the use of this means “.

This is a sign that the Vatican not only wants to show its support for Cardinal Monsengwo but also wishes to make it obvious that to the Kabila government that this 58 year-old bishop will be the next Archbishop of Kinshasa. To put it briefly, those in power should have no illusions about a change of policy after the Cardinal has completed his mandate. Fridolin Ambongo Besungu belongs to the Capuchin Friars Minor Order. He was ordained priest in 1988 and has a sound formation with great sensitivity towards human rights. Having qualified in moral theology at the Alphonsian Academy in Rome, he taught this subject for some years at Kinshasa Catholic University. He was Bishop of the diocese of Bokungu-Ikela from 6 March 2005 and was then made Archbishop of Mbandaka-Bikoro on 12 December 2016. As Vice-President of the Commission for Justice and Peace of the Congolese Episcopal Conference, he had a prominent role in the negotiations leading to the St. Sylvester Agreement in 2016.

With reference to the candidature of President Joseph Kabila, the new Archbishop is extremely clear: “It is a question which ought not even be asked. The Constitution is clear and it does not allow a third mandate. The St. Sylvester Agreement is also clear. I do not see how we can talk of a new candidature. It is true that the President himself has never spoken out clearly, despite the insistence of the international community and also of the Episcopal Conference. However, I do not think it is important to insist on this problem; we should be more concerned with knowing if and how the presidential majority is preparing for the elections and whether it has another person in mind.. He is also very critical of the opposition. “The opposition is divided, even fragmented. But this is part of the regime’s strategy: divide to stay in power”.

Kabila has succeeded in atomizing the opposition which is no longer a dynamic force. They are scattered in small pieces that do not succeed in agreeing either on a programme or a candidate.”
In conclusion Mons. Fridolin Ambongo says “The critical moment will be next June when, according to the electoral calendar, the list of candidates will be published. We will then see what happens and who it will be and especially we will see whether Kabila will be a candidate or not. It will show whether the elections will really take place “. (F.M.)

Tajikistan. Great Power Interests.

Tajikistan, situated at the heart of central Asia, was a transit area crossed by caravan trails between Europe and China.

The country borders Afghanistan to the south; China to the east (the Xinjiang region); Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to the north and again Uzbekistan to the west. The territory is mostly mountainous, closed between the Turkestan Range, the Zaravshan Mountains and the Gissar and the Pamir Ranges.
The inhabitants number 8.73 million of whom 96.7% are Moslem with two thirds belonging to the Tajik ethnic group (Persian-speaking); there are also small, poorly integrated minorities within the fabric of the state: Uzbeks (25.9% located to the north in the Fergana Valley), Russians (3.5%), Tartars and Kyrgyz. There are also about a thousand Afghan refugees present and minorities of Tajiks are to be found in neighbouring countries (Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan etc.).

The majority of the population live in the western valleys, in the autonomous province of Gorno-Badakhshan. The cities are somewhat small and are together home to only a quarter of the Tajiks. The rest of the people live in the countryside. The main centres are the capital Dushambe that was developed as a city only in the Soviet era, and Hudsand, an ancient city on the Silk Road, today populated mainly by Uzbeks.After achieving independence in 1991, Tajikistan went through a civil war that ended in 1997 and saw a struggle between factions following different ideologies (one was Islamic and the other a westernised ideology that was pro-Russian but also open to the USA).
During those years, the country was the main cause of instability in the entire region with armed Islamic groups intertwined in common anti-government action. The end of the clashes was sanctioned in Moscow in 1997 with a peace agreement negotiated under the auspices of the UN, the OSCE, Russia and Iran. The agreement created a sound basis for collaboration with Russia.

The civil war left the country in a disastrous state both economically and institutionally – destroyed by weakness and corruption. Government was set up with two houses of parliament made up of a representative Council and a National Council, both dominated by the Popular Democratic Party with Emomali Rahmon, the head of state since 1994, as its leader.Countering the terrorist threat is the number one priority for the government which, in recent years, launched intransigent policies aimed at preventing an Islamic presence in civil and political life and even the prohibition of long beards for men and the veil for women – thus giving rise to protests by Moslems present in Tajikistan and raising the level of a conflict that often broke out in clashes and protests.

In fact, Tajikistan is the country that is seeing an incredible increase on its territory of radical groups. From data received from the Tajik internal ministry, a worrying situation seems to emerge with estimates of around 1,200 Tajiks joining Daesh to fight in Syria and Iraq. At the same time, according to the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, in 2016, Tajikistan had the highest number (as many as 27) of suicide bombers involved in terrorist attacks worldwide, making it a reserve for Islamic State recruiting which in 2015 had succeeded in recruiting the commander of the Tajik Special forces, Colonel Gulmurod Halimov who had received years of training by the USA forces. Hamilov took over the leadership of the Islamic State in Central Asia and constitutes in himself a great threat due both to his military capacity and his leadership qualities that make it easy for him to gain recruits. The government point of view is confirmed in a report by the Central Bank of Tajikistan which shows the flow of finance to militias in the country or of Tajik origin, underlining especially the role of the Islamic rebirth Party.

A further priority of the government is the struggle against poverty given that the economy, apart from illicit trafficking, is greatly dependent on money sent home from abroad, 90% of which comes from Russia with more than a million Tajik inhabitants.
Aluminium, cotton and cereals are among the main products of the country. Nevertheless, it is necessary to bear in mind the considerable mining potential (gold, silver, strontium, zinc and a small quantity of coal, tungsten and uranium) and the important water resources that China intends to develop with a series of infrastructure projects. In this regard, on 25 February 2015, the Tajik parliament ratified an agreement between the government and the Chinese Tajik-Sino Mining company, centred upon the development of the Zarnisori Shimoli mineral deposits, located in the administrative region of Sughd, in the north-east of the country. This is a Chinese strategy that involves the interests of the Tajik government that aims at escaping from political and economic isolation. It must also be pointed out that China is making interest-free loans to the Tajik companies employed in the urban up-grading projects and those in the transport sector.

Some help was also given to the economy of the country by the USA that, for strategic reasons connected with the Afghan conflict, launched a series of humanitarian programmes and projects aimed at stimulating market reforms. To date, however, the partnership with the USA is more a matter of form than substance. In this regard we can see how Tajikistan joined the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism, network that involves Pakistan, China, Iran and Afghanistan that intends ‘To safeguard the principles and international norms regarding the maintenance of peace and security, the mutual respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression and non-interference in the internal policies of member states’.
Moscow plays an important role in the security of the country, making itself the major guarantor of the security of Tajikistan which will allow a motorised division of the Russian army – already present since the early nineties – deployed along the Afghan-Tajik border. This involves seven thousand men with the task of training the local authorities and to counter drug smuggling and terrorism. As well as that, Russia has set aside about one billion dollars to reinforce equipment in its three Tajik bases. The territorial disputes with Uzbekistan and the republic of Kyrgyzstan over the fertile and strategic Fergana Valley, represents a further threat to internal security and regional equilibrium.

Filippo Romeo

FIFA World Cup/Africa. The Road to Russia.

The 2018 FIFA World Cup to be held in Russia will be the greatest sporting show on earth this year. Between 14 June to 15 July, 32 team will make billions of people dream, enjoy and weep. Africa will be represented by five nations. 

 Because of the political and military involvement in different areas around the world, several groups and politicians have put Russia as World Cup host in serious question. But  the implication of Russia in sport’s systematic doping affairs has also mattered. However, football fans say that each and every World Cup host nation has faced questions about their  suitability to stage one of the biggest and most prestigious sport events. Russia not less so.
Since December 2010, when Russia was allocated the 2018 tournament, the government in Moscow has prepared for the show this summer to impress the world.  And president Putin likes the idea of the show.

Thirteen teams from Europe, five from Africa, five from South America, five from Asia (including Australia) and three from North and Central America will set the way for the this year’s greatest sporting show on earth. FIFA has selected 36 referees from all over the world for the World Cup.The games will be played in 12 venues in the 11 host cities spread across the country – from the border with Asia in the East to a western outpost that is closer to Berlin than it is to Moscow. Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow (81,000 capacity) will be the main World Cup central venue. The Stadium will host the opening game (14 June, Russia v Saudi Arabia), three other group matches, a semi-final and the final itself. The final of the 2014 competition in Brazil was watched by 1.01 billion people live, with the entire competition watched by over three billion viewers. The numbers are expected to rise even higher this year.

African teams

Since October 2015, 40 African teams have played in 127 matches with 315 goals scored, in their attempt to reach the finals in Russia. Only five have qualified: Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia and Senegal.

For Egypt, it will be the first appearance in the finals after 28 years. The Argentinian manager Hector Cuper will use 4-2-3-1formation, a defensive and practical method. It is a tactical approach that the fans do not like too much, since they favour a more aggressive approach. However under Cuper, the Pharaohs have also had an impressive goal record.Two players are to be looked at closely: the Arsenal midfielder, Mohamed Elneny, who has become an important and influential player. He is the one who takes the unfashionable midfield job; and Mohamed Sahah, the current African Footballer of the year. Mo Salah is already a star among the Liverpool fans. He has been there for only one season but his creative style and eye for goal will make the difference. There are real hopes of finishing second in Group A after Russia.

After 20 years, Morocco is back and in Group B, it seems the struggle will be an Iberian affair: Spain and Portugal. However, Morocco could take advantage. French manager Hervé Renard has presented an impressive record in qualifying, with a strategy based on a tight defence at the back with a 4-5-1. Three players must be taken into consideration: Mehdi Benatia, who plays for Juventus in Italy and is currently one of the best defenders and a clever reader of the game; Hakim Ziyech of Ajax and Southampton’s Sofiane Boufal should also contribute interesting surprises and fantasy to the game.
On 26 June, African fans will enjoy the big match between Nigeria and Argentina in the super modern St Petersburg stadium. Group D throws up some interesting encounters. If the bookmakers give Argentinians first place, the second will be between Croatia and Nigeria. The Super Eagles will not lose their opportunities. So far the 4-3-3 opening formation has served Nigeria well but, according to the game, the German coach Gernot Rohr may use a more cautions 5-3-2 approach. Chelsea’s Victor Moses and Arsenal’s Alex Iwobi will make the difference. Kelechi Iheanacho of Leicester, a 25 year-old forward has an impressive   goal record. Nigeria is a young team and under captain John Obi Mikrl will show what they can do.

In Group G, there are two big European teams: England and Belgium. Many Belgian players are in the Premier League in England and England has only lost once in the previous 21 encounters with Belgium. But this time it could be different. Both are favourites. Tunisia, having spent 12 years out of the World Cup, are ready to show what they are capable of. The Tunisian coach, Nabil Maaloui can use a 4-2-3-1 or 5-3-2 tactical aproach, depending on the opposition. One player in particular, the midfielder for Sunderland, Wahbi Khazri, is very dangerous when running with the ball. What is sure is that the Eagles of Carthage will not be in Russia as tourists!

Senegal is in the last Group H and they arrive to the World Cup after 16 years, with remarkable talents. Sadio Mané, a Liverpool hero in the Priemier League, has fantastic pace and vision and a brilliant eye for goal. Cheikho Kouyaté is a central midfielder with West Ham United. He is a tall, and strong player whose abilities will make him a key figure in the squad. The manager Alious Cissé will adopt a 4-3-3 formation based on pace and a mentality of putting pressure on the opposite team. The bookmakers give Poland the odds as favourites along with Colombia who arrived as quarter-finalists four years ago. However Senegal will certainly make their presence felt.
Millions of African fans will watch the games with joyful hearts and enthusiastic enjoyment with the hope that one of the African nations will make real history in the 2018 FIFA World Cup competition.

John Mutesa

 

 

Central Asia. A Great New Game.

The region of Central Asia, because of its geographic location, has always been considered a historical place of interest for, and of confrontation between, the great powers, as well as the stage for the famous ‘Great Game’ between the British and Russian Empires.

Following the implosion of the Soviet Union that led to the independence of the Central Asian republics, the region again drew the attention of the great strategists and especially of the American Brzezinski who, in his chief work ‘The Grand Chessboard’, published in 1997, holds that the key to global power is control over Eurasia and the Central Asian republics. Still today, Central Asia continues to be one of the great centres of encounter and confrontation between the great powers present on the global scene, (namely the Russian federation, the United States and China) in which the local governments assume a progressively more active role by adopting multi-vector policies. The attraction of this area  is substantially determined by its strategic geographic position which makes it a veritable geopolitical joint between oriental Asia, South East Asia and Russia, Europe and the Near East.

Besides its geographic position, the region is attractive for its abundant metals and rich deposits of oil, gas and water, making it one of the richest areas of the planet. It is for these reasons that many analysts view the area of Central Asia the origin and final end of the majority of the political upheavals that affect other areas. In particular, there is no lack of those who speculate that the United States policy of chaos – that in the last twenty years has destabilised various vast areas of the world – aimed at moving the geopolitical centre of gravity to the two most sensitive areas: the Mediterranean and Central Asia, to be exact. It must also be said that the well-known USA ambition, since the collapse of the USSR, by means of the establishment of two military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to prevent any possible Peking-Moscow axis (that nonetheless is being created), is today being hindered by these two great protagonists which, due also to their geographic contiguity, have established sound relations with the states of the region.

Russia, in particular, in its efforts to regain its role as an international giant, has carved out for itself a role as the leader in the former Soviet space and, through the make-up of the Eurasian Union, has bound to itself the most important regional actor, Kazakhstan. Close political and economic ties are also maintained with Turkmenistan – through the dense web of gas pipelines, going back to the Soviet era, that still tie the gas exports of the country to Russia – and with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. China – the other great actor on this stage – has tied with various countries of the region, without, however, interfering in their internal political affairs, by means of a series of very advantageous economic agreements, not least by means of the construction of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, a gas pipeline more than 1,800 Km long that runs from Turkmenistan as far as the Chinese Xingjian province, passing through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Besides breaking the Russian monopoly on the export of gas from Central Asia, it has created a valid alternative to the transit of oil imports that pass through Hormuz and the Malaccan Straits.

Nevertheless, it would not be unreasonable to speculate that the quiet of the Central Asia region may be broken by upheavals similar to those that happened recently on the south bank of the Mediterranean since this area, too, presents some elements of fragility, one of which is the return home of combatants from Syria and Iraq and the instability of some countries, especially Tajikistan whose economy is based exclusively on trading in narcotics facilitated by the long and porous frontier that it shares with Afghanistan. With reference to the phenomenon of combatants, it is important to note that a large number have left Central Asia and, seeing the percentage of combatants in the population, we conclude that Turkmenistan occupies sixth place in the world with 72 inhabitants per million enlisted in Isis; Uzbekistan is in ninth place and Tajikistan in thirteenth. Last, but not least, there is also the possible factor of the fragility of Afghanistan which, having never been completely pacified, could re-explode at any moment, spreading the effects of the deflagration through the entire region and, in particular, in those areas (such as that of Chinese Xinjiang) where embers still burn below the ashes. (F.R.)

DR Congo. Most popular politician risks to be excluded from the presidential race.

Congo’s most popular politician, the former governor of Katanga, Moise Katumbi, might be excluded from the presidential race.

For the last two years, the 53 years old flamboyant Congolese business and former governor of Katanga, Moise Katumbi Chapwe who declared himself a candidate to the presidential election in May 2016, is coming ahead in most opinion polls. One of the last ones, conducted jointly by the New York based Congo Research Group (CRG) and the Kinshasa-based BERCI consultancy showed that 78% of the Congolese have a favourable opinion of Katumbi, whereas 74% think that President Joseph Kabila should resign to enable a smooth transition. Katumbi is the most popular leader with a 24% support, ahead of two other opposition leaders, Felix Tshisekedi (13%) and Vital Kamerhe (9%), of Adolphe Muzito, a former Prime Minister of Joseph Kabila (8%) followed by the incumbent (6%) who is not allowed to run. Indeed, under the 2006 constitution, President Kabila, whose mandate expired on the 19 December 2016, cannot remain in office more than two terms.

Katumbi is undeniably the favourite for the election which has been postponed already twice to December 2017 and to December 2018, owing to delays orchestrated by the presidential side. The man who made a fortune in several businesses, acting namely as a service provider of the mining industry of Katanga, was named person of the year 2015 by the Jeune Afrique panafrican weekly. He acquired a widespread popularity as governor of Katanga between 2007 and 2015 and as chairman of the Lubumbashi TP Mazembe football club which won five times the Africa Champions League
On the last 12 March, Katumbi who lives in exile in Belgium since 2016, launched in Johannesburg a new party called “Ensemble pour le changement” (together for change) with several heavy weights of the Congolese political spectrum including former ministers of Joseph Kabila and of the late President Mobutu Sese Seko.

As shows the CRG-Berci polls, Katumbi has a nationwide support, being the preferred candidate in 16 of the DRC’s 26 provinces. “Another Congo is possible. We say “no” to dictatorship. The time is no longer for predators but for builders”, said Katumbi in a video-recorded speech, during which he highlighted the priorities of his programme: national reconciliation, fighting corruption, putting an end to impunity, increasing the education and health budgets and diversifying the economy out of the mining sector. Katumbi also promised to mobilise up to 100 billion dollars of investments, to encourage public private partnerships, and unlock provinces through the maintenance of 23,000 km of roads and the rehabilitation of the railway network. The ex-governor of the mining rich Katanga has lots of plans to boost the production, consolidate the DRC’s strategic lead on the cobalt and copper markets, by adding value to minerals and use the profits to finance modern infrastructure and improve water and electricity access.

 

Yet, despite his popularity, there is no guarantee that Katumbi will be able to run. Indeed, the former governor of Katanga is the target of a real judicial persecution. Moïse Katumbi is facing a number of trials, which are called a “mascarade” by the Roman Catholic Bishops Conference CENCO. By end June 2018, he will be facing a trial by the Supreme Court for his alleged involvement in the recruitment of “mercenaries”, after the arrest of his four bodyguards in May 2016.  Curiously, the ANR national intelligence and the Congolese justice disagree upon the date of the alleged offence.  In May 2016, Moise Katumbi was also sentenced to three year prison for the alleged illegal acquisition of a real estate property. Then, in March 2018, a Congolese judge filed charges of forgery against the former governor because he held Congolese identity documents during a period where he was an Italian citizen. Under the 2006 Constitution, Congolese citizens are indeed not allowed to retain a double nationality. According to Jeune Afrique, Katumbi retained the Italian citizenship between 2000 and 2017. Now, the Congolese Justice is only targeting Katumbi, despite the fact that over 100 other Congolese high ranking politicians retain another nationality, points out the Brussels-based daily La Libre Belgique. The paper stresses that more than a third of the 120 Senators are Belgian citizens. The list includes former Prime Minister Samy Badibanga and the current Ministers of Labour and Budget. On the last 3 April, Moïse Katumbi tweeted that these manoeuvres did only strengthen his will to pursue his fight to free his country.
He also confirmed that he was candidate for the forthcoming presidential election and reminded that he was born in Katanga and descendent of the late King Baysoka, Msiri.

Another challenge for Moïse Katumbi is the opposition’s incapacity to present a united front at the president election. By end March, the leader of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, Felix Tshisekedi was elected as presidential candidate at a party congress while other politicians also expressed their wish to run. The risk is that even if they gather together more votes than the candidate of the pro-Kabila People’s Party for Reconstruction and Development (PPRD) and its allies, the latter could theoretically have a chance to win.  Indeed, a controversial constitutional reform voted in 2010 by the parliament reduced the vote to a single round from two.
Since Kabila is not allowed to run under the constitution, one of the last scenarios he is envisaging is a Medvedev-type scenario, report insiders in Kinshasa. According to the spokesman of Kabila’s allied Unified Lumumbist Party (PALU), Christian Wolf Kimasa, there has been an agreement that in return for PALU’s support to Kabila at the presidential elections in 2006 and 2011, Kabila and his PPRD party would back PALU’s candidate at the following election. A meeting on the last 19 March between Kabila and the 92 years old PALU chairman Antoine Gizenga fuelled the rumours of such deal.

 

Accordingly, Kabila would back Gizenga and once elected, the old man would resign after a few months. Then, he would be replaced by Kabila who would in the meantime become speaker of the Senate and in this capacity, would become automatically interim President, thus in a comfortable position to organise his own election. It is everyone’s guess in Kinshasa that Kabila’s election would be substantially eased by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) which is not trusted 69% of the Congolese, according to the CRG-BERCI polls.
This distrust could be justified. The opposition, the civil society and diplomats are suspicious of CENI’s acquisition of South-Korean made voting machines. Interestingly enough, the South Korean government itself told Jeune Afrique weekly it was concerned by the risk that these machines might be used by CENI to obtain undesired electoral results. The US ambassador at the UN, Niki Haley also warned the Congolese government that it should abandon the use of these machines because they did not look reliable and bore a risk of questioning electoral results. There has been a precedent. The fraud in the compilation of votes by CENI computers was the main reason why the elections were declared as not credible in 2011 by international observers.
François Misser    

Niger another Afghanistan.

Under the Guise of Security and Resources Niger Has Attracted Ever More Foreign Intervention. And Not All of It is Benign.

Niger, until not long ago a forgotten and poor country on the margins of the oil producing states of North Africa, has acquired much greater strategic importance since 2011. Niger’s importance, with all its international consequences, is destined to grow especially as former colonial and new powers project their wider political aims in the country.
In an arc of time of about 900 years, between the tenth and nineteenth centuries, Niger was home to the kingdom called Hausa, which includes parts of present-day Nigeria (with which Niger shares the Niger River). Niger, then as now, controlled trade and caravan routes that linked the Sahara and North Africa with the fertile regions of the Sahel (such as southwestern Mali). This culture, started to erode in the 1500’s and ultimately capitulated in the 1700’s after the French conquered Niger, consolidating it into a full-fledged colony in the 1800’s along with other lands of West and North Africa. The French held Niger until August 3, 1960 (date of independence). But, France has not let go its colonial legacy altogether, maintaining close ties to Niger and its neighbors through the Francophonie network and the CFA Franc currency. Now, as then, France and other developed economies have an interest in what Niger hides under its soil.

Niger became a presidential republic. Since 1999 it has a new constitution, launched in July 1999. Governments have changed between military dictatorships and transitional governments. The parliament was dissolved several times after coups of state close to each other. The last such coup occurred on 18 February 2010 at the expense of President Tandja Mamadou.
The election of April 2011 brought the current president, Mahamadou Issoufou. Interestingly, unlike other African countries which held elections in the past decade, there were no protests, challenging Issofou’s legitimacy after winning.
That said, Issofou was the target of an assassination attempt just a few months after becoming president.

Resources and Foreign Involvement

To better understand the frenzy of rising international involvement – especially from the former colonial master of France – in Niger, note that the country has some of the richest uranium and diamond resources in the world. France’s nuclear energy and uranium mining giant corporation, Areva, extracts most of its uranium in Niger. But, China wants a piece of the ‘radioactive’ action as well. And Beijing and Paris have engaged in something of a local dispute over an area, rich in uranium resources in the northern desert. But, China has already secured exclusive access to a uranium mines in Azelik, beyond Areva’s reach. China plans to build at least 100 nuclear reactors over the next decade, which means appetite for Niger’s mineral wealth will increase.

In some ways, given that the anarchy that began in 2011 has not shown any signs of producing stability in Libya, Niger has attracted more interest from oil companies, which would have otherwise preferred to explore Libyan fields. Niger started to produce oil since 2011 with the support of China’s ‘China National Petroleum Company’ (CNPC) at a rate of 20,000 barrels a day with potential to go as high as 80,000 barrels a day. Britain’s Savannah has also struck oil near the CNPC fields, while Algeria’s Sonatrach has also announced finding oil in northern Niger during recent field work Sonatrach, Africa’s largest oil company, holds complete rights over a large oil site just 100 kilometers from the Algeria-Niger border. The border region is very rich in hydrocarbons. Indeed, Niger has become a priority area for Sonatrach, as the compromised security situation in Libya has discouraged exploration in the Sahel (as well as Libya).
The oil discoveries suggest that Niger, already exploited for its mineral wealth will attract more attention from foreign powers, interested in securing the territory to facilitate exploration and production of resources. Controlling African migration from the Sahel is the other reason. It’s a combination that makes Niger one of the most ‘attractive’ magnets for world powers and large resource corporations. Expect the latter’s ‘realpolitik’ goals to be veiled in arguments of ‘solidarity’ and ‘humanitarian’ platitudes.
And, of course, over the past few years, American and European involvement has increased in Niger. Many were surprised to learn of this just a few months ago. On October 4, 2017, four American soldiers – along with five Nigerian ones – were killed in Niger. The Pentagon revealed that the United States has deployed some 800 troops to Niger after news of the episode broke. Less surprising was the catch-all culprit of choice blamed for the attack: ISIS.

Security and Migration

That would be an obvious question. But, the official American position is that U.S. troops (800 of them) are in Niger to offer support for refueling, intelligence and surveillance. Asa footnote, US Defense Secretary James Mattis revealed that Americans are helping the locals learn how to defend themselves. In other words, there are American ground troops in Niger. In the weeks following the attack, more details emerged about the American ‘mission’ in Niger. Most of the personnel deployed there appears to be involved in operating drones and related air force reconnaissance from a rapidly growing base. Meanwhile, a smaller number of special forces troops are training and advising Nigerien troops on methods of combat to use against the alleged ISIS – or Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) –  combatants that have penetrated the region. Indeed, the US special forces, even as they advise the Nigerien armed forces, are not the main ‘show’.

The ultimate American goal, operated directly from AFRICOM (US Africa Command) is to set up a larger and more permanent support base in Agadez, a famous town along the Tuareg routes linking the Sahel with the Sahara and Libya. The American publication Politico claims that there’s more to the American mission in Niger than the Pentagon has conceded. The U.S. appears to be setting up a veritable African base – and during the G.W. Bush years there was talk of setting up an AFRICOM command center in Niger – from where to launch surveillance missions all over North and West Africa, including Libya, where the United States for the ‘inevitable’ purpose of conducting counterterrorism operations. Not surprisingly, the US has used the promise of ‘training’ to gain access to Niger and set up a base from where to conduct a wider array of American strategic goals. Thus, many of the troops consist of construction crews, who are assembling another drone base in Niger’s northern desert.

The current drone base is being managed from Niamey to continues assisting the French in Mali – and other countries in the region – to fight the various AQIM, ISIS and Boko Haram. The US has also positioned troops in Burkina Faso and Cameroon for similar purposes in a mission that has most of the Lake Chad Basin region under surveillance.
The American presence in Niger does not represent a whim for the current Trump administration. The deployment began under President Obama in 2013, presumably to help the already present French troops confront the instability and fallout from the collapse of the Qadhafi leadership in Libya and the AQIM takeover of northern Mali, Niger’s neighbor to the east. The French had intervened in neighboring Mali in 2012.  Other European countries, namely Germany and Italy, were supposed to have sent smaller support mission to Niger. But, as far as Italy’s role, there is confusion. France does not appear to welcome the Italian intervention, even if outgoing Prime Minister Gentiloni has addressed Parliament over this issue, confirming the deployment of 470 troops. The Italian mission would, based on official statements, help monitor terrorism and migration phenomena. Of the two, migration is the bigger pretext. And as with all forms of exterior it’s producing an interesting, and not so favorable, outcome.

In 2015, under pressure from the EU, the government of Niger (and, note, Nigerien citizens are a small minority among the migrants who end up departing for Europe from Libyan shores – most of whom are Nigerian) has enacted Law 36. It specifically targets the illegal trafficking of migrants. The Law targets all who engage in facilitating migration – that is offer shelter and/or transportation for those on the move in inclement territory.
Yet, in Niger, where most are poor, and a tiny minority are ‘rich’, there are vast social asymmetries. Thus, Law 36 has exacerbated local tensions because many people live off activities that are ‘semi-legal’ or illegal. The Law has had some success in reducing the flow of migrants, but the economic repercussions for the ‘facilitators’ have caused internal tensions to rise.  In a country and a part of the world where institutional authorities and their decisions are part of a wider conspiracy of corruption and limited wealth concentration, instability ensues. Ironically, such instability is what then opens socio-political avenues to such groups as AQIM or others. If Niger has not become another Afghanistan – that is a massive failure of Western democracy exports – it could yet achieve that dubious status.

Alessandro Bruno

 

 

Singapore. Towards a vibrant and missionary Church.

The journey of the Catholic Church. Commitment to authentic interreligious dialogue. Social works. Education. An interview with His Grace William Goh Seng Chye, Archbishop of Singapore

A City-State of South East Asia, Singapore is the fourth largest financial centre in the world with an important role in international trade and finance. Its port is one of the five busiest for operations and traffic on a world scale. It has a population of 5.3 million inhabitants of which 75% are of Chinese descent, with Malaysians (13,5%) and Indians (9%)”.  Around 42% of the population are foreigners, living there to work or for studies. In the services sector, 50% of the workers are foreign. Singapore is the second most densely populated country in the world, second only to the Principality of Monaco. Most of the population of Singapore belongs to a religious faith. Buddhists and Taoists make up 43%. Numerically, Christians are the second largest group with around 383, 000 Catholics, or 9% of the population and Protestants 11%. Moslems and Hindus each amount to 14%.

Since 2013, the Catholic Church has been led by sixty one year-old Archbishop Grace William Goh Seng Chye. In his view: “Today, it is in Asia that the main challenges to the Catholic Church are to be found. The Asian continent is different from all the others in that it is extremely varied as regards religions, cultures and economic situations”.
In this context, Singapore is distinguished by being a reality in itself: “It is a very particular Asian country characterised by much economic and technological progress, similar perhaps to South Korea and Hong Kong. Singapore is a unique country, the expression of a highly educated cosmopolitan society. More than 40% of its inhabitants possess at least one university degree”, Archbishop Goh Seng Chye affirms.
One of the characteristics typical of this wealthy City State is the relationship between institutions and religion. “Unlike nearby countries such as Malaysia – the Archbishop explains – Singapore has a secular government. Nevertheless, we may describe it as a ‘multicultural and multi–religious State’.
The government is secular in order to maintain the unity of the nation, but many of the ministers and functionaries profess a faith.
The State is not against but in favour of religion seen as a fundamental component in the development of the country. The government provides considerable support for all the religions without distinction”.

Collaboration between State and religion is exemplified by the personal commitment of the Archbishop. “I was appointed Presidential Counsellor for Minority Rights and Religious harmony. Furthermore, thanks to the activities of the interethnic and interreligious government organs, there are many opportunities for dialogue between all the components of the cosmopolitan society of Singapore. Our ability to live together peacefully, especially when people are of different religions, is really a miracle. One of the many initiatives has been the formation of an NGO, the Inter-Religious Organisation (IRO), and, thanks to generous help from the government, this is a meaningful place for sharing different experiences of faith”, the Archbishop stated.He then continued: “Unlike what is happening in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, in Singapore the religions neither possess nor seek political power and for this reason dialogue is easier and the common end is the good of the country”. The Catholic Church in Singapore has 33 parishes served by 70 diocesan priests and 78 religious.

Social Works and Education

The Archbishop of Singapore sees the social works as “the main missionary front for the local Church”. “We have many organisations that assist the needy such as Caritas Singapore which directs a further 25 associations. In Singapore, funds and donations collected through our initiative may not, by law, be used for projects abroad, unless this is made clear to the donors beforehand. In the case of humanitarian initiatives beyond the national borders (Cambodia, Vietnam, The Philippines, Myanmar), the Archdiocese set up Caritas Humanitarian Aid & Relief Initiatives (CHARIS). The faithful are very much involved and provide much support, so giving witness to their faith among the least important”, Archbishop Goh affirms.

The Archdiocese gives particular attention to the education of the youth. In this regard, His Grace declares: “In each of the more than 35 Catholic schools we form the hearts of the children first, before their minds. We do not want leaders who live for themselves but people concerned for their neighbour. This is an aspect in which the Christian schools, both Catholic and Protestant have worked very hard and it is a precious heritage for the governing classes of the country. If today Singapore is a successful nation, this is also due to the fact that most of the government have frequented mission schools, even if many of them are not Christian. It is also due to the teaching of Gospel values that Singapore dedicates much attention in promoting life and the family.

Each year, the Church in Singapore receives around 3,000 newly-baptised but conversion is not the only proposal of the Catholic community. “Our aim is build up a Church that is vibrant, evangelical and missionary, – Archbishop Goh reiterates – this is also the ten-year plan of the archdiocese. My involvement is to make Catholics more aware, not only in Singapore but also abroad. To this end we have created the Catholic Theological Institute of Singapore (CTIS), to educate students for a new evangelisation among the multiple cultures and religions of our continent since the formation of the laity is fundamental to the mission. (Paolo Fossati)

 

Nigeria. The Bishop is not a traditional Chief.

In the end, Mons. Peter Okpaleke resigned. He was rejected by local priests and a group of Christians because he didn’t belong to the Mbaise ethnic group, predominant in the small diocese of Ahiara, in the southeast of Nigeria.
A missionary who has spent forty years in Nigeria explains the reasons and what is to be learned from this episode.

During the Synod of Bishops for Africa in 1994, when reports of the genocide taking place in Rwanda reached Rome, the late Archbishop of Onitsha, Most Rev. Albert Obiefuna, was credited with saying, “The blood of ethnicity is more powerful than the water of baptism for us”. This points to the importance of ethnic identity and solidarity in Africa and it alerts us to the danger of ethnic conflict, even in the field of religion.

Secondly, the position of a traditional ruler, a Chief, is of the greatest importance for an ethnic group in Africa. Just as the Chosen People of the Old Testament demanded a king, so too in most African tribes a Chief is chosen according to their tradition and he enjoys immense moral authority over his people. And since the distinction between “what belongs to Caesar and what belongs to God” is not as clear-cut in African society as in the West, it happens that a Catholic bishop in Africa can be seen to occupy a position similar to that of a chief among his flock. It would be an abomination for a stranger to assume the position of Chief over his people, and that attitude can easily stray into the field of religion. This scenario must be borne in mind when reflecting on what took place in the Diocese of Ahiara (Nigeria) after the death of Bishop Victor Chikwe in 2012.
Unlike most dioceses in this country, which have many ethnic groups and clans, Ahiara has just a single clan of the Igbo people, the Mbaise.
It is by far the smallest diocese in the country (a mere 425 sq. km.) and is completely rural. Ahiara itself is no more than a village and, as everyone knows, old traditions die hard among agricultural people.  The conversion of the Mbaise clan to the Catholic faith was almost total, and vocations there are so plentiful that it is often claimed that Ahiara is the ‘Ireland of Nigeria’. The Diocese of Ahiara was frequently referred to as the ‘Diocese of Mbaise’ – and so it seemed to be: a particular Church for the Mbaise clan.

Ahiara may be the most Catholic diocese in Nigeria but, given the strong sense of identity of the Mbaise people, the essential catholicity of the Church may not yet (in little more than a single generation) have permeated the people’s acceptance of the Catholic Faith. This may help to explain what has taken place there over the past five years but, by no means, justifies it.
To reject a bishop appointed by the Pope may seem outrageous and even schismatic to any Catholic in Europe but, just as in other areas of life people hold conflicting views and values, so too in this case; and the faithful of Ahiara have shown no wish to reject their Catholic faith or to break away from the Church.
I have studied carefully the statement on Ahiara issued by the Congregation for the Evangelisation of Peoples and published by it on 26th February, and I thank God for the wisdom behind it.  It follows a long process of prayer and dialogue, during which the mistaken position assumed by many in Ahiara must now be realised by all but the most intransigent of the ‘rebels’.
It is a pastoral statement, which seeks to heal and to explain the true Catholic faith, which is never exclusive but embraces people “from every tribe and language and people and nation” (Rev. 5:9).

The generous resignation of Bishop Peter Okpaleke, the appointment of Bishop Lucius Ugorji as Apostolic Administrator, the rejection of canonical sanctions, and the particular concern of the Holy Father “who does not intend to appoint a new Bishop in Ahiara”, is a wise solution to a protracted and difficult problem.  It will dispel the confusion of the faithful in Ahiara and give the priests the opportunity to turn the page on the past and to build a more authentically catholic Catholic Church in their diocese.It must be admitted, however, that this episode has sullied the fine reputation of the Church in Nigeria, and is a caution to the Church in all of sub-Saharan Africa.  The warning given by Archbishop Obuiefuna at the Synod of Africa in 1994 (above), at the time of the genocide in Rwanda, remains apposite and is timely.

Fr. Raymond Hickey

 

Advocacy

Mongolia. Batmunkh Luvsandash. A Steward of the land.

Determined to protect his homeland from mining, Batmunkh Luvsandash’s activism resulted in the creation of a 66,000-acre protected area in Dornogovi province in April 2022,…

Read more

Baobab

The Nyanjira smile.

Once upon a time, there was a girl of enchanting beauty. Her name was Nyanjira. She had soft, smooth skin and a very sweet smile that…

Read more

Youth & Mission

Pope Francis to Young People. “¡Hagan lío!”

During his pontificate, Pope Francis has placed young people at the centre of his pastoral attention, recognising them as key players in building a better future.…

Read more