If we analyse the actual reality of the continent from a security point of view we can see that if the fight against terrorism and insurgencies in Africa seems to be the priority for external partners, there are others major security issues that are not managed properly. But foreigners are not giving them the same level of attention reserved for terrorism and insurgencies.

First of all, the risk of a conventional international conflict cannot be underestimated. The tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea could lead to a full-scale war. But in April 2018, the tensions between Algeria and Morocco also increased. Rabat threatened to intervene militarily in Western Sahara if Saharawi groups (supported by Algiers) did not withdraw from this area. At this moment a war is still not likely, especially because the military balance is in favour of Algeria. According to Akram Kharief, a military analyst quoted by ‘Middle East Eye’ (7 April 2018), the two neighbours have more or less the same number of troops (150,000) but Algerian security forces are much better equipped (in terms of tanks, warplanes, etc.), even if, on paper, Moroccan security forces are better trained. But the escalation of the tones served as a memo that terrorism is not the only security issue that must be solved.

Another rising threat for security in West Africa are the clashes between pastoralists and farmers. Especially in Nigeria, but also in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, the causalities of this kind of violence are increasing. Between 2012 and 2016 more than 2,500 people died in gunfights in sub-Saharan Africa. This phenomenon is fuelled by arms trafficking that is also a consequence of the ongoing conflicts in countries like Libya and Mali. Tensions between herders and farmers on issues like access to water and land, grazing paths, ethnicity and religions, have increased in these latest years to the point that the old dialogue mechanisms between the two groups are no longer used. The smallest incident leads to violence. Pastoralists are now routinely armed, and farmers have created self-defence militias. African governments are not yet able to manage those conflicts. Nigerian authorities imposed limits to the activity of nomadic herders in order to avoid contacts with farmers, but pastoralists are opposed to these measures that go against entrenched traditions.

Terrorist groups and criminal organisations are exploiting the weakening of some of the states of the region. Mali is one of the most evident examples of this trend. Tuareg autonomists tried to separate the North of the country but opened the way to jihadists. Bamako lost the control of those areas where different jihadists groups found refuge. Only the intervention of French troops stopped the extremist march southward to the capital. Therefore, re-establishing the rule of law and eradicating phenomena like corruption and inability to provide basic public services are universally considered as pre-conditions to guarantee stability.
But some Western governments seems to prefer shortcuts. They are willing to cooperate with African authoritarian regimes to maintain stability on the continent, turning a blind eye to their deficiencies in providing public services and to corruption. Dealing with a dictator is easier and apparently quicker. But usually it implies a ‘give and take’ in terms of funding and political legitimation. Authoritarianism is also one of the elements that leads to the emergence of terrorist groups and insurgencies. Unemployed youths who find no job opportunity, feel oppressed by the regime and who cannot emigrate, could choose to join extremist or insurgent groups. That is to say, authoritarianism is also a source of instability. Establishing democracy and supporting economic and social development are, in the medium to long term prospect, the best tools to create stability and fight extremism. But they are expensive in terms of time and resources, and difficult to sell to the public opinion. It is also true that African authoritarian regimes can find help elsewhere (like China) if Western powers start to push for democracy. But the Westerners have many tools to influence the civic society and the populations of those countries and can support the oppositions.

In these days ‘security’ seems to be the keyword for some Western countries where cooperation with African countries is concerned. Sure, security is a major issue that needs to be considered. In some countries (like Mali, Niger and Nigeria) insurgents and jihadists can push the entire system (politics, the economy, civil society) into a downward spiral towards chaos. Nevertheless, security remains only one of the elements of the many problems, together with bad governance, poverty and corruption.Western governments seem to acknowledge that military operations must be only one of the tools used to guarantee security in Africa. But then they prefer to rely only on troops. They also preach the importance of democracy and rule of law for the stability of the area, but then they support some authoritarian regimes that give a false idea of stability. This sort of double standard fuels resentments in the populations that help extremist groups to thrive.

Andrea Carbonari
Security Analyst

After the beginning of the crisis in Mali in 2012, external powers have increased the deployment of troops in Africa to stabilise the area and to neutralise terrorist groups.

This deployment is often followed by the creation of military bases that can lead to a stable military presence in the region. But is this strategy useful? There are some reasons to doubt this. We will focus on two Western countries which are particularly active in Africa on the security level, the United States of America and France. It must be noted that if their military moves on the continent are more or less mediatized, other countries (like China or Russia) are also active but keep a low profile.

In terms of numbers and places, it is difficult to assess the exact dimension of USA military intervention in Africa. Several analysts and journalists tried to calculate the number of troops and military sites and their location. According to Steven Feldstein in a paper published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (9 February 2018), there are more than 6,000 USA troops stationed in Africa in about forty-six military sites of different nature. These troops have been sent there to contain the terrorist violence (which is supposed to be on the rise) and to guarantee political stability to the countries of the region.
The deployment of these troops follows a model called ‘light footprint’. That is to say, the number of soldiers effectively deployed (‘boots on the ground’) is kept at a minimum and the counter-terrorism offensive is a mix of special operations and airstrikes (operated mainly by drones). Officially, military operations conducted by US soldiers are only a small part of the complex and are flanked by cooperation and training of local security forces.

The main hub in the US military network on the continent is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. The command centre responsible for Africa (AFRICOM) is still based in Stuttgart (Germany), even if from time to time news of a transferring on African soil are reported. The establishment of such a structure in an African state seem to be a thorny issue, due mainly to political reasons. Several smaller bases (in many cases temporary) are connected to Camp Lemonnier in states like Senegal, Ghana and Gabon. There are also air bases that host drones in Tunisia, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Kenya and Somalia. From a technical point of view, according to the estimates there are two ‘Forward Operating Bases’ (FOB), thirteen ‘cooperative security locations’ and thirty-one ‘contingency locations’. According to Eric Schmitt (New York Times, 22 April 2018) 4,000 military personnel operate in Camp Lemonnier.

It is in particular the new airbase in Agadez (Niger), built to host drones, that drew the attention to the increasing US military effort in Africa. Niger is considered a hub both for extremist operations in the Sahara Desert and for illicit trafficking (especially human trafficking) towards Europe. Together with Mali, Niger has become a major theatre of operations for Western countries. US drones hosted in Niger fly over countries like Libya to collect information or to kill extremists. Schmitt reports that in Niger 800 US soldiers operate. More or less the half of this contingent is deployed in the Agadez base. (A.C.)

Apparently, the US government’s discretion on its military initiatives in Africa is due to two reasons. First of all, US public opinion is basically hostile to an excess of military intervention in stormy areas. Second, the desire not to fuel an anti-US sentiment that is very easy to stimulate in many countries, especially in Muslim communities. 

From a geopolitical point of view, the US fight against terrorism in West Africa can be described as a ‘proxy war’, in which the African armies are the proxy. US advisors, coming from Special Forces, advice, train, equip and support local troops that do most of the fighting against jihadists.

Even in a ‘light footprint’ perspective, US troops in Africa are scarce, due to the need for Washington to fight in multiple continents. And also their resources are scarce. US Defense Secretary James Mattis stated in January 2018 that he was trying to assess if conventional forces can be used to support the Special Forces in Africa and in other theatres of operations. This measure could increase the effectiveness of US military effort that at this moment relies on Special Forces personnel that, even if it is trained to operate under stress in critical situations, is overstretched. At this moment, US Special Forces must cope with a wide range of factors (culture, ethnicity, rivalries, etc.) at multiple levels (local, regional, national and international), while fighting an enemy that is capable of penetrating into different theatres, even if it has not a strong and wide popular support.

France and the others

France also intervened in Africa to fight extremism, but with a different approach from the USA. France is a power with deep roots and wide interests in the region. As an example, most of the uranium used in French nuclear power plants comes from Niger. According to data reported by Reuters (23 February 2018), there are 4,000 French troops in West Africa. Undoubtedly, due to their common history, Paris has a deep knowledge of the area and has strong links with many of the governments. But, for the very same reason, it is in a risky position. Every move it makes can be (and often actually is) perceived as an attempt to reinforce its neo-colonial power on the former subjects. And the governments of the regions, even when they actually ask for it, can be sanctioned by the population as lackeys of the French.

European countries like Italy and Germany are also sending their troops into West Africa, mainly to try to manage the problem of illegal immigration coming from sub-Saharan Africa. Even if they try to keep a low profile, they are put under pressure by their own public opinions and by African population. Hostility towards foreign intervention is on the rise in some Western African countries. This is true especially for France, but also countries like Germany and Italy suffer the consequences of this state of mind. The support for some authoritarian regimes in the areas worsens the situation.
Together with one to one cooperation, another tool to increase stability in the area is the financial support for multilateral African initiatives, especially when they translate into military effort by African states. As an example, on 23 February 2018, donor countries pledged about 500 million US dollars to support the so called G5 Sahel military force, composed by troops from Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. The G5 Sahel force is tasked to fight jihadism from West Africa. Its command base is Mali and it is supposed to employ up to 5,000 troops.

Djibouti has become a hub for the foreign military intervention in Africa, not only for the USA. Camp Lemonnier is in reality a former French base that the Djibouti government leased to the USA. France is still present in the country with a Foreign Legion base. Also, Italy created a military base in this small country with a big strategic importance, due to its position in the Horn of Africa. And both China and Japan have military bases in Djibouti. The United Arab Emirates are building military sites in Eritrea and Somaliland (a part of Somalia which claims to be independent), and also in the Horn of Africa.

Russia is trying to establish a military presence in Africa too. In North Africa, Moscow is apparently supporting General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia operating in the East of the country. Russia, linked with Egypt, is supporting Haftar with the hope of creating a naval base in Libya. And it is developing a cooperation with Tunisia in the field of security, among other things by giving Tunis satellite-images for tracking terrorist groups that operate in North Africa. According to ‘Mondafrique’, Moscow is planning to create an air base in Berengo, in Central African Republic, a country devastated by a civil war.
These events show that in Africa there is a real scramble for setting up military bases that sees the competition among powers from all over the world willing to increase their influence. Countries with a long tradition of military presence in Africa (like France, but also Great Britain) now have dangerous rivals. (A.C.)

According to Feldstein, an analysis of the African situation leads to the conclusion that the US military strategy for this area is not based on a sound assessment of the reality.

Confronting data provided by two well reputed databases The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Feldstein reaches the conclusion that terrorist violence is declining in Africa, after a peak achieved in 2014-2015. Much of this decrease is due to the decline of the Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram, which is linked to the Islamic State (IS). Both IS and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Al Qaeda branch operating in North Africa, are still dangerous but their threat is diminishing. On the other hand, US military effort in Africa is sharply on the rise.

According to Feldstein, IS and its affiliates, except for Boko Haram, are small groups and their attacks constitute only a small part of the number of attacks committed in Africa. By making IS one of the main targets of its counter terrorism operations, Washington is conflating its status, transforming its militants into some sort of heroes and helping them in their propaganda and recruitment campaigns.According to E. J. Hogendoorn, deputy African program director for the International Crisis Group (quoted by the New York Times), “the deployment of armed drones is not going to make a strategic difference and may even increase local hostility” to Washington and to the Nigerian government.

Even if they claim to defend ideas shared by many in those countries, like the religious faith of a major part of the population and the hostility towards corrupted regimes that are influenced by foreign powers, in reality extremists do not have much support among the population. There are some disenfranchised sectors of these societies that have a positive view of jihadists. And these sectors are a source of funds and a recruitment basin for terrorist groups. But they are not the majority. Religious leaders, civic society activists and some reputed politicians are effectively contrasting terrorist propaganda. The fact that in some areas like Mali, jihadists have to resort to drug trafficking (in terms of escorting the convoys through the desert) shows that they have problems in finding ‘legitimate’ sources of income.

There is also a minor factor to consider when assessing the utility of Western military support to local troops which we can call ‘unintended consequences’. African soldiers trained by Washington, such as Yahya Jammeh in Gambia and Amadou Sanogo in Mali, have organized coups in their countries, chasing out democratically elected leaders. The acquired military capabilities can therefore be used to create political instability and fight against democracy. And if they do not organize a coup against a legitimate government, local militaries can use the skills and the equipment acquired to quash oppositions to a dictator.

Militarization of aid

On a general level, there is a ‘militarization’ of the aid to Africa, especially for the United States. In recent years, also during the Obama administration, the funding of governance and policy programmes to support the African partners was slashed. Diplomacy and development aid are not used to their potential. Therefore, the political, economic and social crisis of this area do not find a concrete political response, if we exclude political rhetoric. This vacuum is therefore filled by the military that in the US has become a multi-use tool. These dynamics are the consequence both of a disengagement of the political leadership and of the initiative of the military hierarchy.

In 2018 the National Defence Strategy, in the paragraph titled ‘Support-relationships to address significant terrorist threats in Africa’, the US security apparatus states: ‘We will bolster existing bilateral and multilateral partnerships and develop new relationships to address significant terrorist threats that threaten U.S. interests and contribute to challenges in Europe and the Middle East. We will focus on working by, with, and through local partners and the European Union to degrade terrorists; build the capability required to counter violent extremism, human trafficking, trans-national criminal activity, and illegal arms trade with limited outside assistance; and limit the malign influence of non-African powers’. It seems clear that in reality contrasting the influence of foreign countries in Africa, especially China, is a geostrategic priority for Washington and counter terrorism is a tool to enter into the arena. (A.C.)