In the context of the changes in power relations on the Asian continent, the movements of another power, India, merit particular attention to anticipate future scenarios. Often under-exposed by the media, New Delhi is showing itself to be playing an active role in the area, backed by its 1.3 billion inhabitants.

Like China, India desperately needs to develop a vast infrastructure network capable of connecting it to central-northern Europe, via Iran, central Asia and Russia. This it must also do while avoiding Pakistan, its historical rival, whose geographical position constitutes a serious obstacle to the land of the Ganges.
This problematic situation is aggravated by Sino-Pakistani cooperation that has led to the creation of the new port of Gwadar, in south West Pakistan at about 700 kilometres from the coastal city of Karachi and situated in a zone that is strategic to access to the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. This port allows Peking the benefit of a formidable bank facing the Arabian Peninsula and Iran, bringing China and Pakistan to create an infrastructure corridor connecting Gwadar with the Chinese province of Xinjiang.

To counter these Chinese moves, New Delhi has increased cooperation with Teheran, deciding to invest in the Iranian port of Chabahar, in the region of Balukistan, located less than 100 km from its rival structure of Gwadar. The accord between the two countries was signed in June 2015 during the visit to Iran of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who signed off investments in the port of Chabahar amounting to about 500 million dollars, the first time India invested financially in a foreign port.
India also committed itself to providing the equivalent of 400 million dollars in steel for the construction of a railway line from Chabahar to the city of Zahedan, a short distance from the border with Afghanistan, a country in whose process of stabilisation India is playing a determining role (from 2001 to today it has invested two billion dollars).
In August 2016 a trilateral summit was held between Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia, in the Azerbaijan capital for the purpose of realizing the ambitious project of a ‘North-South Corridor’ (already on the table since April of the same year), capable of connecting India to northern Europe, passing through the crucial median states, most important of which were obviously those present at the Baku meeting.
The new infrastructure network, formed of port, railways and motorways, will cover a distance of around 7,200 km, helping to reduce drastically the time required to move goods between the various Eurasian states (and, in the future, those of Africa). According to the intentions of the planners, this project will reduce by 14 days the time required for the transit of goods between India and Russia, also halving the time at present required for Indian ships to reach Europe via the Suez Canal, even though the Canal was only recently widened in August 2015.

According to this project, Indian ships would leave Mumbai, calling at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, in the Straits of Hormuz, the stretch of water at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, where they would then send their cargoes by land. The goods would then pass through Baku, Astrakhan, reaching Moscow and St Petersburg and then entering Europe. Besides the above-mentioned states, the work would also benefit all those bordering states where there would be a collapse of the time and cost required for moving goods in a zone that is strategic for the future of the world economy.
The consequences of this grand project will be felt in various countries, some of which will be considerably damaged. One of these is Egypt where the Suez Canal, fundamental to the passage of world maritime traffic ever since it was opened in the XIX century. Besides this Arab country, the other great excluded state is Pakistan, compelled to assist at its own outflanking by its historical rival, India. It is more difficult to analyze the effects that this work would have on different European states where it is possible to imagine that the preference shown by the project for the northern part of the continent may, together with a reduction in Suez traffic, be to the detriment of Mediterranean Europe.

Among the major beneficiaries will be the states of Central Asia which may form part of the New Silk Road, reinforcing their own strategic role as transit countries for goods and energy. Along with them, Russia will have the opportunity to develop its own economy, especially in times when the price of crude oil is dangerously low, with serious damage to the coffers of countries, Russia especially, that owe a significant part of their income to the sale of oil and natural gas.
In this context, India, with a growth rate among the highest in the world (at present above 7% pa), will play an important role in its own development. New Delhi, in fact, does not yet have an industrial sector comparable to the great exporting powers, above all China, with an unemployment rate in the agricultural sector of about 60% of the total, against 28% in services and 12% in industry.  Its support for the North-South Corridor is, therefore, a sign of the desire of the Indian government to aim at the industrialisation of the country, so as to achieve, in the medium term, a significant increase in exports. This objective would increment the possibility of Indian commercial development, especially if it succeeded in concretising, within a reasonable time, an agreement on free trade between India and the European Union, something that has been talked about for years, which would allow New Delhi to integrate more fully into the rich markets of Europe. (F.R.)

The new centrality and strategic importance assumed by the Indian Ocean have unquestionably created competition based upon economic development and investment in infrastructure. This challenge, launched by the major powers of the area, has also been taken up by much smaller actors such as Oman, favoured by its geographic position that aims at increasing, in the immediate future, its influence and self-assertion in a strategic area of the first order.

The country, with just over four million inhabitants, aims, in coming decades, at playing a decisive role as a commercial hub between India and the Middle East, facilitated of course  by its desirable geographic position straddling different, and in some cases, contrasting  worlds. The history itself of the country makes it a natural bridge between the different souls of Islam and the different ethnic groups of the area. The only state to be neither Sunni nor Shiite, Oman has within itself a clear Ibadi majority, an Islamic denomination descended from the Kharijites (despite the denial of this by the Ibadi themselves), that broke away from the two main branches of Islam during the VII century.

Its following of this cult, substantially opposed to violence and especially tolerant towards other faiths, even allowing mixed marriages with people of different religions, has constituted a perfect cultural hinterland for a nation that more than once has shown its willingness to act as mediator between the powers of the region, representing an objective factor of stability in the troubled Middle East. Furthermore, this has allowed it to take an equidistant position relative to the polarisation of the states of the area between Ryad and Teheran, and in this way to gain considerable consideration by all the international actors that pursue stabilizing solutions in that quadrant. Moreover, the country is following a policy of diversifying the economy through the development plan Oman’s National Programme for Enhancing Economic Diversification intended to guard the country against over dependence on oil. This plan, entrusted to Omani and international experts, is meant to develop the tourist, industrial and logistics sectors, also foreseeing the creation of two areas of special taxation, together with incentives for the labour and employment market.

The jewel in the crown of this gigantic project is, however, the construction of the port of Duqm, a coastal village located about 550 km south of Muscat. The population has increased from 3,000 people in 2013, then mostly engaged in fishing, to 27,000 today and it is expected to reach 100,000 by 2022. This may not be a huge number in real terms but, considering how much Duqm has grown in just a decade, it is indeed impressive. The budget for Duqm over the five-year period 2015-2018 will amount to around 87 billion dollars: apart from the port, an international airport and an oil refinery capable of processing 230,000 barrels of crude oil per day will be built. Alongside the government investments, private sources will also play an important part, already providing 750 million dollars. Also worthy of mention are the creation of the Al-Soud International School and the planned construction by a consortium of German companies of a 1,000 watt solar energy station which, once built, will be the biggest in the world. One of the more ambitious plans of Oman is to look to renewable energy sources with a target, by 2030, of providing 25% of Oman’s energy needs.Nevertheless, the importance of Duqm is not only economic. Together with Sohar and Salalah (in the north and south of the country respectively), it is one of the three port structures outside the Straits of Hormuz on which Oman can rely (apart from the capital, obviously), in terms of proximity to the Persian Gulf.

This location allows Muscat to offer to the world secure commercial bases that are immune from the tensions of the Gulf, without, at the same time, losing any of the precious opportunities provided by its geographical proximity. This enviable consideration is such that some analysts have come to speculate on the possibility of the US Navy moving to Oman ports.If one considers the crucial role played by Aden in Yemen in the XIX century, due to its importance for the British Empire, and that of Singapore in the last thirty years of the XX century and the start of the XXI, as a fundamental base for the US naval military forces in pursuing its economic interests in the Orient, it may well be that, today, Duqm may assume notable importance in the new geo-political context.

Filippo Romeo

The collapse of the Soviet Union has characterized the birth of new and important geopolitical actors establishing themselves both on the global scenario and in various regional contexts.

The decline of American monopolism and the on-going crisis in European construction are, in fact, accompanying the progressive redefinition of new geopolitical balances with their centre of gravity inexorably moving towards the Orient.
The emergence of a new political framework that is notably more complex with respect to the second half of the XX century, has witnessed both the establishment of new powers, some of them with global influence, and the return to the scene of others, such as Russia, that had been hastily categorized as consigned to history. Both these groups share the desire to re-write the rules of world governance, demanding a role proportioned to the specific weight of each.

The new geopolitical balances taking shape have also modified the geography of world shipping. This fact is anything but unimportant considering that the sea has always been, and still is, the main means of circulating goods. The new geo-economic situation favours the opening of new routes that are exponentially increasing commercial flow towards Asia, causing the displacement of the centre of gravity towards the east, at the expense of the American Atlantic routes.
In this new multipolar reality, where India and China play a major role, the Indian Ocean functions as a connecting logistic platform that assists the promotion of Asian economic development. It actually connects Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, allowing the passage of abundant shipments of energy required to maintain production in the major global economies. A proof of this is that as much as 80% of global goods traffic passes through ports of the Asian continent as is the fact that, in the classification of the main container ports, three of the first ten are Chinese; this is also reflected both in the size of its merchant fleet and in ship-building, so much so that China is seen as the unequivocal leader in this field.

It is therefore correct to hold that the geo-political and geo-economic importance of the Indian Ocean is based on two segments, the first of which doubtless concerns the now stable Chinese economy of which the Indian Ocean is the main transit route. This has required Peking to develop a maritime strategy centred on two oceans, the Pacific and the Indian and to choose Pakistan and Sri Lanka as two fundamental logistic bases. Indeed, China is affected by the dilemma of the Straits of Malacca where the prohibition of passage could be fatal.
Unlike China, India, by reason of its geographic position, enjoys an advantage since its maritime strategy is mainly focussed on the Indian Ocean – from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Lombok.

Given the role that India and China are playing globally, it is clear that the economic security of this area is of vital importance, also for those who have economic relations with these actors, given the new centrality acquired by the area in connecting East, South, South East and Western Asia, as well as Africa and Europe.
The two Powers, after a period of criticism, have again begun to dialogue, placing among their priorities the stability of the area, complete agreement on some global themes and, above all, the conviction that the new world order must be based on multi-polarity to promote the less-developed countries and sufficient economic growth to offset inequality and combat poverty. (F.R.)

China may certainly be described as the more relevant protagonist in this change, finding itself having to try to contain America
for the purpose of halting (or slowing) the progress
of the Empire of the Centre.

The economic power developed in recent years by the Chinese colossus is supported by a series of strategic infrastructure projects aimed at accompanying, protecting and growing the capacity of the country for expansion. Among these is doubtless the grand project called the New Silk Road, by land and by sea, thought out by Peking, with the main objective of bringing China closer to the rest of the Eurasian continental mass, as well as developing the hinterland areas that have remained behind by comparison with the coastal strip. It is without doubt that the implementation of such an ambitious project will have geopolitical repercussions of no little importance, considering that it aims at bringing Europe and Asia under one infrastructural profile, for the principal purpose of countering American repositioning in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

With reference to land connection infrastructure, since 2011, a railway line is foreseen connecting Chongqing to the city of Duisburg across the three emerging markets of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. It is planned to add to this an 8,000 Km road system that will connect the port of Lianyungang (on the East China Sea) with St Petersburg by way of Xinjiang Uyghur, Almaty, southern Kazakhstan and Moscow. The opening of these important arteries of communication among the Asian steppes will reduce travelling time from Eastern China to Western Europe to ten days, from the fourteen days required using the Trans-Siberian Railway, or the forty-five days by sea through the Suez Canal.
It is clear that the opening of these connections would not only facilitate exchange between the continents but would also increase the volume substantially, and so favour greater economic, but also political, ties at the expense of the United States.

Apart from the Silk Road project, the Chinese government has, as anticipated, the ambition to revive the Silk Sea Route mentioned in the epic of the Chinese explorer Zheng He who, in the XV century, travelled the length and breadth the seas of the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia. The project aims at consolidating Chinese development, and giving more strategic depth to the position of economic domination that, in recent times, China has acquired in the maritime environment. To this end, the country is promoting a naval policy – also through the production of war material – something China had not done since the time of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). This is designed to move beyond territorial waters while creating, at the same time, a security perimeter reaching the second line of the Marianne Islands, on one side, and securing the sea routes passing through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, places at present under the control of the United States, on the other. In this line, China has already begun to work on the route towards the Persian Gulf and Eastern Africa, through cooperation with nearby regional neighbours such as ASEAN.
At the same time it is carrying out what has been defined as the ‘pearl necklace strategy’, the construction of a network of ‘garrison ports’ along the vital Persian Gulf-China maritime route. This explains why Peking is working to reinforce its position in the China Sea and especially to consolidate relations with countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand, all of which occupy strategic positions along the supply routes of the Indian Ocean.

It is precisely through this close-knit web of partnerships and especially through massive investment to build the modern port of Gwadar in Pakistan and the modernisation of the port of Sittwe in Myanmar, that Peking is seeking to create new overland routes for the transport of goods to offer as alternatives to the Straits of Malacca which at present are a log jam impossible to defend against eventual action by the United States. Equally strategic is the project for the realisation (this also is still a work in progress) of the port of Colombo in Sri Lanka, to by-pass India, another historical and regional competitor, which is already placing obstacles in the way of Chinese economic expansion with the launch of the Mausam Project.
A further focal point occupying the attention of Peking is doubtless the South China Sea that divides the territory under the control of China from Indonesia, through which 45% of international maritime goods considered in tons passes, and the security of which is, for Peking, a necessary condition to guarantee the routes that pass through the Indian Ocean. This is a guarantee that can be concretely realised only through the effective control of each and every rock, island or atoll in this sector of the sea bordered also by Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam, almost all of which are strategic allies of the USA, with which Peking is in conflict, as it tries to bring them under its control.

However, the Chinese port network is not confined only to the nearby Asian coasts. It also extends along the coasts that border the Indian Ocean, the coasts of West Africa and as far as those of the Mediterranean. In this context we find that, in Bagamoyo, in Tanzania, the Chinese are creating a port that will join up with the African ports constructed in Guinea, Ghana, Togo, Nigeria, Cameroon, Djibouti, South Africa and Egypt. We may refer also to the port of Piraeus, of strategic importance for shipments across the Mediterranean, where Chinese companies are almost exclusively the administrators.
In order to defend this maritime network that extends from the Pacific to the Atlantic, passing through the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, China understood that it must (as it is in fact doing) maintain military forces that can stand up to its great global rival: the United States. In so doing, Peking is obviously obliged to take into account certain geographic factors that penalise it, one of which is that of being a continental power surrounded by powerful neighbours, unlike the USA that is a maritime power surrounded by neighbours like Canada and Mexico which are certainly weaker or which, in any case, have no reason to abandon their strategic partnership. It is therefore clear that China needs to keep its guard up and to develop greater aggression both regionally and globally that will ensures continued control of those areas that may become vital for the development of its maritime economy. (F.R.)