TwitterFacebookInstagram

Nicaragua. Bosawás Biosphere Reserve, Under Threat.

Illegal logging and deforestation for agriculture and livestock activities are destroying the Bosawás Biosphere Reserve.

The Bosawas Biosphere Reserve in north-eastern Nicaragua, the largest forest reserve in Central America, covers an area of 2,420,000 hectares and constitutes a key element in the Mesoamerican biological corridor connecting protected areas of Belize, Costa Rica, Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama. It is also the largest rainforest in America, after the Amazon. The Bosawas National Natural Resource Reserve, whose name comes from the first letters of the Bocay River, Cerro Saslaya and Río Waspuk, was created in 1991. Subsequently, in 1997, the United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Commission (UNESCO) declared Bosawas a World Biosphere Reserve.

But this protected area, inhabited by the indigenous Miskito and Mayangna groups, is at risk. According to the Humboldt Environmental Centre, in 1984, Bosawas had 1.6 million hectares of forest composed of broadleaf trees; from 1984 to 2010 almost 600,000 hectares of the reserve were cleared and replaced with ranch lands and farms. Another 92,000 were cleared, between 2012 and 2017, for the production of basic grains and livestock. The deforestation is driven by an intense internal migration of people from the Pacific coast and the central area of the country looking for fertile land and space. Furthermore, its location, on the border with Honduras, makes this protected area particularly vulnerable to illegal logging.

At the end of last year, army troops seized 6,527 logs of wood that was cut in the Bosawas reserve. In 2014, authorities seized 1.400 m³ of wood extracted illegally, still, from Bosawas. According to the National Institute of Forestry (INAFOR), the wood seized was only a small part compared to the amount that was extracted in the reserve. Most of the wood, whose destination are the Asian markets, is smuggled to Honduras through the border ‘blind spots’.
According to the U.S. organization InSight Crime, ‘The illegal timber trade in Nicaragua has become a major problem in recent years. The export of granadilla – a precious wood used to make musical instruments and furniture – increased to US$6 million from $100.000, between 2008 and 2011. In 2012, authorities seized more than 1.300 m³ of granadilla’.

The timber mafias

China’s voracious demand for wood drives illegal logging and favours the activity  of ‘mafias that operate with the help of corrupted officials and carriers in Nicaragua, like in other Latin American countries’, according to InSight Crime. ‘Honduras is the main destination of much of the wood coming from Nicaragua. More recently, Honduran armed groups have crossed into Nicaragua to chop down the precious wood’.
The  report: ‘Green Carbon, Black Trade: Illegal Logging, Tax Fraud and Laundering in the Worlds Tropical Forests. A Rapid Response Assessment’, released by INTERPOL and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2012, estimated that the total illegitimate global timber trade is worth between $30 and $100 billion annually.

The 2012 UNEP-INTERPOL report also contends that, ‘Illegal logging is not on the decline, rather it is becoming more advanced as cartels become better organized. Illegal logging accounts for between 15% and 30% of global timber trade… unless national authorities and law enforcement agencies develop responses commensurate with the scale and the complexity of the problem, the crimes of a minority can endanger not only the development of the majority, but also the innovative initiatives that are being implemented to reward those countries and communities that promote ecosystem services aimed at improving forest areas’.
In May 2017, some indigenous leaders in Nicaragua said that loggers offer weapons to their communities in exchange for illegally logging forests in their territory. “They say, ‘you have problems, give me 1,500 cubic meters of wood. We are going to facilitate weapons to you so you can fight against the colonists’”, Hilario Thompson, a representative of the indigenous party Yatama, said. The ‘colonists’ refers to people who occupy indigenous lands without permission.
According to data from Global Forest Watch, the Bosawás Biosphere Reserve lost about 6.5 percent of its tree cover between 2001 and 2014, mostly concentrated in the south.
UNESCO has expressed concern about the accelerated deforestation in Bosawas. Kathleen Rogers, President of the American organization Earth Day Network, has explained the importance of this biosphere reserve for the maintenance of stable climatic conditions throughout Nicaragua. “Tropical rain forests, being the most abundant sources of plant life on earth, play an important role as carbon sinks; trees and plants absorb carbon dioxide, and carbon remains ‘trapped’ in the wood and in the soil itself,” said Kathleen Rogers. “The Bosawas Reserve also helps to generate a cloud cover in the region that regulates the temperature, and that, at the same time, provides rain. The cloud cover is a vital barrier against extreme climates in the region”, she added.

According to biologist Jaime Incer Barquero: “The destruction of the Bosawas Biosphere would affect the entire Nicaragua, because, especially in this era of climate change, the forest can prevent natural calamities such as droughts and floods. Forests, in fact, can soak up excess rainwater, preventing run-offs and damage from flooding. Plants and trees can also help provide clean water and mitigate the effects of droughts by releasing water in the dry season. Forests can even prevent droughts since they produce atmospheric moisture and therefore rainfalls”. They are also natural barriers that reduce the impact of wind and hurricanes.
Incer Barquero urged to halt the invasion of colonists in the reserve in order to prevent the destruction of the Bosawás. “Forests regenerate naturally, but this process takes years”, he said. “Reforestation is not the best solution. The succeeding forest could never have the same dimensions and biodiversity as the original forest. So human beings should protect what is left and let it regenerate naturally”. (N.A.)

Thailand. Much is unknown in the Country of the Smile.

It is now almost five years since the coup d’état that took place in Thailand on 22 May 2014. This year on 24 March, it will hold elections which could have serious consequences for the Country of the Smile, now grim and uncertain, led formally by civil institutions but inflexibly guided by the National Council for Peace and Order (the military junta).

All this hinges on a government made up mostly of generals led by Prayut Chan-ocha who was responsible for the repression of the Red Shirts-led protests in 2010 which cost the lives of around ninety people – mostly demonstrators and two foreign journalists – and hundreds of wounded.Five years ago, the intervention of the men in uniform was justified by the desire to put an end to tensions which, in previous years, more than once found expression on the streets of the capital Bangkok with dramatic effect. This objective was not achieved, as is apparent from the fact that not only do the deep-seated and untreated divisions still exist, but the gap between rich and poor and the discrepancies of opportunity have grown even wider.

Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha.

Few Asian countries are afflicted with such inequality as Thailand, a country where progress was motivated by abundant confidence from abroad with investment, tourism and strategic interests that fostered the boom of the ‘seventies and ‘eighties. This also encouraged the myth of a quality of life and basic happiness that denies the problems that many of its 67 million inhabitants experience and suffer from.
Today, the world looks at ancient Siam trying to imagine how it will turn out in the near future, with embarrassment or perplexity at the current restoration led by the Prime Minister and former general and head of the Prayuth Chan-ocha regime. It is to him that article 44 of the post-coup Constitution gives the power to intervene unquestioned in all areas and with full impunity for actions past or future, including those of his high and medium-level officials. The outlook is that he – with little or no challenges from the opposition who were substantially prevented from running an electoral campaign with the possibility of reactions – will be brought to power by a pro-military party or be declared premier elect by a parliament without opposition.

The basic thesis of Thailandese policy for a decade has been that of ‘reconciliation’, the pretext for the coup of September 2006 and that of May 2014. The concept of ‘reconciliation’ is one that may be interpreted according to one’s desires and interests but it contains a basic truth: the deep chasm between the administrators of power, based in Bangkok and in central and southern regions, and the majority of the population based in the north and east. These realities are separated by an abyss in opportunity, wellbeing and interests but they are co-participants in a semi-feudal structure with an extensive network of patronage that increases backwardness, incompetence and corruption.
The system runs parallel to political and administrative structures that aim to present the image of an advanced country, affable and open to investment and innovation. It is an image, or rather a reflection of reality that is no longer sustainable as shown by the flight of investors, and of companies already present, towards other goals and the pressures brought by the mass media and international lobbies on the themes of freedom of expression, human rights and democracy.

Whereas these aspects were formerly, in  part, taken for granted, they are now more evident and the famous Thai ‘smile’ seems more and more tarnished and less spontaneous while news sources report an increase in social unrest, manifesting itself still more in a society with one of the highest rates of social media penetration in the world.
International pressure on the regime is not concerned only with the development of democracy, respect for rights and civil liberties but also with situations (slave work, human trafficking, illegal fishing, immigration management, the protection of asylum-seeking refugees and the plundering of the environment) due to which the USA, the EU, and various governments and organisations have demanded immediate action and threatening sanctions.

The contribution of perhaps three million foreign workers, often forced into illegal work by obsolete laws that are, in part, difficult to enforce and in part open to occasional abuses, is essential to the construction industry, agriculture and fishing, but it is hardly recognised and even less rewarded. With their pay lower even than the minimum local pay and subject to the needs of the employers and the constant risk of abuse or expulsion, the immigrants suffer the brunt of nationalist and xenophobic inclinations fomented by propaganda on cultural unity and historical dominance in the region.
Indoctrination motivates adherence to roles and institutions that are deeply underlined by the present regime. It starts right from the first years of school with an abundance of associated benefits, unfettered populism and continual pressure, censure and insistent reminders of a national identity based mostly on respect for authority. All these conditions have brought about a lack of participation and the inability to react without parallel as well as backwardness on the cultural level that has become a serious danger to development. (S.V.)

The Maritime Silk Road in South-East Asia.

  • Written by:

The definition of The Maritime Silk Road seems never ending. The initial interest of the Chinese government in their South-East Asian neighbours is being gradually concretised in the form of a series of projects. Malaysia, Indonesia and Myanmar are the countries
most involved.

Since its announcement in 2013, the Chinese Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative, part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed first of all at collaborating with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The reason for this is obvious: its Asian (China-ASEAN) partners represent a market of more than 2  billion consumers and the third largest market in the world by trade volume.
Furthermore, the manifest interest in the ASEAN is in line with a history of close commercial exchanges that reached their peak during the Song Chinese dynasty (960-1279).

The MSR is a project in continual development and is shaped by the needs of the Chinese economy and geostrategy. Among these, and playing a major role, is China’s Blue Economy, which is nothing less than the sustainable use of maritime resources to create economic growth and safeguard the oceans. It is a relevant fact that, in 2017, the Chinese Blue Economy amounted to more than 1,000 billion dollars, almost 10% of the GNP. In fact, about 60% of Chinese international commercial goods are transported on maritime routes. For this reason, China has begun to provide consultancy and financial programmes for the construction of port infrastructure in partner countries, as well as acquiring ports along the MSR through leasing contracts between state-owned companies and local governments.
Among the ASEAN nations, Malaysia, Indonesia and Myanmar have been the more receptive towards the Chinese MSR initiative. Malaysia, as a co-founder of the Association and China’s main trading partner in South-East Asia, has recognised its own dependence on maritime transport and the limited economic resources of the ASEAN financing companies. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has as its main purpose to guarantee funds for local development and to combat social inequality, and cannot guarantee the sums necessary for the optimal development of infrastructure in the entire region. At this juncture, China came in, setting up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), operating since 2015, composed of 86 members with an initial capital of 100 billion dollars. Malaysia, due to its geographical position, is of course a partner which is essential to the project of the New Silk Road.

Around 80% of Chinese imports pass through the Strait of Malacca and this makes the world power extremely dependent on its viability. The synergy between the two countries has led to the investment of 10 billion dollars to enlarge structures in the Strait, led by the Chinese company PowerChina International and its Malaysian partner Melaka Gateway KAJ Development.
A 99-year leasing contract was granted to China for an offshore port structure in Malacca. In addition, among the maxi-projects approved by the Malaysian government along the MSR, there is also the construction of the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP), an industrial estate resulting from a joint venture shared by the two countries. China has agreed to purchase 40% of the quotas of the port structure with a location contract of 60 years. This enthusiasm was recently dampened by the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad who has adopted a more cautious stance with respect to the projects promoted by Beijing.

The maritime ambitions of Indonesia

A slightly different approach is used in managing relations with Indonesia where President Joko Widodo (2014) seems to have anticipated the Chinese diplomatic iter, placing at the centre of its policies the geographical potential of the archipelago and the need to work on structural weaknesses.
Widodo insists on a new regional vision in which Indonesia emerges as a maritime power and the guarantor of peace. There is an excellent opportunity, therefore, to cooperate with China in three areas: the development of port structures, the increase of logistical capacity and the facilitation of the transit of international commercial goods.

After his election, the Indonesian President launched a five-year plan to the tune of 50 billion dollars for these areas, thus opening up the country to foreign, and especially Chinese investment. This includes the development of 24 strategic ports along three imaginary routes crossing the archipelago. One of the projects is an industrial centre with an area of 3,000 hectares on the eastern outskirts of Java, made up of an off-shore port and a residential area to create a manufacturing and commercial hub for all the Asiatic area. Other projects involve the expansion of the port of Tanjung Priok, the busiest in the country, and Kuala Tanjung Port to the north of Sumatra. Ports planned for smaller cities like Makassar and Sorong will reduce logistics costs which, at present in Indonesia amount to around 24% of the GNP. The MSR has therefore raised hopes and interest for acts of maritime cooperation in Indonesian territory. The Chinese port of Ningbo Zhoushan and China Communications Construction Engineering Indonesia have signed a memorandum of understanding with the operators of Indonesian ports to develop the new port of Priok and Kendal International Port. Despite the presentation of commercial agreements hitherto, no direct investments have been made.

The strategic vision of Myanmar

The government of Beijing has adopted a tougher stance towards Myanmar, a country with enormous potential: in fact, adequate infrastructure could connect its ports with the Chinese province of Yunnan, allowing goods to by-pass the Strait of Malacca. This integration between the maritime and railway parts of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would also have other qualities, such as the reduction of problems related to the pro-American countries (like Singapore and Korea) and to piracy in the area of the Strait, and would reduce dependence on maritime transport for the import of energy resources.

Chinese interest is palpable as is seen by the construction of an off-shore port costing 7.3 billion dollars and an industrial area costing 2.7 billion dollars in the Special Economic Zone of Kyaukpyu. This city is also the location of an oil pipeline terminal and a gas pipeline (built with the help of a Chinese company) reaching Kunming in Yunnan province. According to the terms of the contract, China’s CITIC Group Corporation will manage operations in the area for the next 50 years. Nevertheless, the internal political instability of Myanmar and fears of becoming deeply indebted to China have slowed the progress of the contract, even though, since  2017, the CITIC has been officially in possession of 70% of the quotas of the port project.
In conclusion, the advance of the MSR in South-East Asia is proceeding at different speeds but with similar methodologies: large-scale loans and the purchase of infrastructure quotas seem to be the two essential characteristics of the Chinese modus operandi. Some governments, bewitched by the high commercial visibility offered and the economic availability of China, accept the projects proposed while almost ignoring the financial dangers to which their countries may be exposed.

Benedetta Mantoan

 

China’s Economic Interest in Africa.

China is present and active in almost all countries of Africa. In 2015 China invested about 35 billion Dollars in Africa and so has surpassed Europe or the US as Africa’s main trading partner. The China-Africa Summit of 2018 further demonstrated the growing importance of China in Africa. During the Summit President Xi Jinping offered to invest another 60 billion dollars in Africa during the next three years.

Meanwhile, the influence of the old colonial powers continues to wane. The indications are that  China is about to push the ex-colonial powers out of the African market but how Europe intends to save herself from the impending loss of its African marketplace is reserved for history.

The fact that China is making huge investments in Africa and has become the biggest trading partner have available records. However, less known or rather less talked about are the other strategies with which China is using to gain more influence over the African media, the military and even control strategic infrastructures in Africa.

The new Chinese Silk Road is meant to link not only China and Europe but also some 20 African countries. China is supposedly building an impressive infrastructure to connect those counties.  The latest example is the 4 billion railway link between Mombasa and Nairobi, which is planned to link eventually five other countries in the region. China now has her own police points called ‘South African-Chinese Community and Police Co-operation Centres’. It has rejected the appellation of ‘Police Stations’ for these centres. The development is still new; only time can tell what it will finally become.

While it seems that Africa will profit from an improved Chinese infrastructure, Chinese loans contribute to a debt crisis for many African countries and create a growing dependence of China. Some of the projects are economically not viable and when a country is unable to repay their debts, China tends to pay itself by taking over  their mineral resources, the public energy supply, or seaports and airports.  Zambia is on the verge losing its national airport from the Chinese creditors. Some countries like Sierra Leone have seen the danger of accepting such credits and have cancelled contracts to build a new national airport.

Obviously, the goal of an increasing military involvement of China in Africa is to secure its land and sea trade routes. In Djibouti, China has begun with the construction of a huge military base just next to the American base. It is meant to become a hub of the new silk road project. China is also becoming the most important arms supplier and provides military equipment to some 22 African countries. The formation programs for police and army officers strengthen China’s influence in the security sector.

In recent years China has also provided financial and military support to UN-Peacekeeping missions in DR Congo, Mali, Sudan and Southern Sudan. The latest attractive export to Africa could be China’s very efficient electronic surveillance systems which are able to identify people’s faces. Dictatorial regimes in Africa will willingly embrace it.

Meanwhile, a worrisome angle is the quality of the infrastructures that the Chinese build for the African Governments. In Nigeria, the much-applauded Abuja-Kaduna railway commissioned in 2016 has already got stories of breakdown of trains. The Chinese infrastructural development in Africa are designed to keep her in control of these infrastructures. What can be other explanations there? In all these, Africa’s lack of bargaining power has left her very vulnerable both to Europe and China. While relatively keeping her standard, Europe uses here traditional ties to force her wishes down the throat of Africa. However, China uses an unorthodox “as you want it strategy” which has left African nations with substandard infrastructures and debt burden.

Furthermore, in the past, China used to fly in temporarily Chinese workers to realize major projects, like the TANZAM railroad line from Lusaka to Dar-es-Salaam. Nowadays such workers tend to stay in the country and start enterprises or work as craftsmen and even as street hawkers. With their cheap Chinese imports, they enter into direct competition with small local traders, which can create tensions. But in the meantime, African businesspeople have learnt themselves to operate worldwide and import their own goods directly from China. There are no reliable statistics about the number of Chinese living in Africa but estimates vary from one to two million. On the other end, some 200,000 Africans are living in China; 80,000 of them are students.

Additionally, China has for many years invested large sums to buy shares in important media companies to influence communication policies, spread pro-Chinese propaganda and silence critical voices. Chinese-owned media companies, like the StarTimes Group, run TV-Program in 30 countries and are an efficient instrument to propagate China’s interests and Chinese culture. About 50 years ago, the walls of houses in remote African regions were covered with colourful pictures from the magazine “China Today”.

In recent years China has intensified efforts to project a positive image of the country, its political ideology, culture and language. Following the example of western countries, China runs 48 cultural centres in Africa and come second place after France that has 180 centres. These “Confucius Institutes”, which are often linked to national universities, offer cultural programs and language course in Mandarin, which attract a growing number of students.

The trend is, however, becoming a thing of concern because of obvious reasons. Chinese interest seems to be solely about economic gains. Europe exhibited such an interest in times past even though religion was used to blunt its sharp edges. Now we know better! China appears not to have any country economically powerful enough to check its onslaught. This monopoly leaves the historically weakened African countries in a very precarious situation. Hence, journalists and civil society in some countries are beginning to question more brazenly the long-term aims of China on the continent.

They criticise the exploitation and racial discrimination of African workers in Chinese-owned companies. Even though the raised voices are yet to get coordinated and to form a synergy, the concerns are real, and the fears have historical antecedents in the European exploit in the African continent. Perhaps, the new thing is the benevolent ‘win-win’ approach which China temptingly presents to the Africa leaders. The emerging indices show that the African countries must be weary of the baits that China throws.

Wolfgang Schonecke

The Jesuit Refugee Service. The African Microcosm In The Streets Of Addis Ababa.

  • Written by:

Ethiopia is Africa’s second largest refugee hosting country with more than 800,000 of them in its territory. They are victims of wars, persecutions or natural disasters. There is just one centre for refugees in Addis Ababa and it represents the microcosm of some of the problems that affect the African continent.

The large outdoor patio where several young people play volleyball, table tennis and table football or chat with their friends apparently could be a public space of any city. In reality, this is the courtyard of the only urban refugee centre of Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, the sixth largest migrant hosting country in the world, and the second in Africa, after Uganda.The wounds generated by the most serious conflicts that affect Africa are cured  in this courtyard. Most of the people who arrive at the centre every day come from Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

“The refugees of different nationalities escape from different tragedies and problems. Eritreans flee a brutal and oppressive  regime and compulsory military service for life; Somalis escape from Al Shabab’s terrorism, violence and atrocious drought; the Sudanese escape from violence, insecurity and hunger; the South Sudanese from the violent conflict and the famine that are ravaging and emptying the country …  “, says Eyesus Mulugeta, director of this  centre run by the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) along with the Intercultural Foundation, the Jesuit NGO for education and development.
Neway Alemayenu, a manager of the centre, says that the geographical proximity has facilitated also the arrival of a relevant flow of Yemenis seeking refuge in Ethiopia. They try to escape from bombing, famine and cholera. “The  situations in Yemen and South Sudan are currently the most dramatic”.

Education and sport

The philosophy of the JRS is based on sport, education and entertainment These are the tools that help to manage the drama lived by each migrant and help them integrate in the new community where they have just arrived.
“We help refugees to integrate until they can return to their cities, which is what the majority of them want”, says Mulugeta.

The JRS is a day centre. Migrants are not supposed to spend the night there, but they can attend Inizio moduloworkshops, courses, and sports during the day. The centre opens very early in the morning and closes at five in the afternoon. Refugees at the JRS can participate in the activities that include training and leisure such as: English and computer lessons, classes of music, education programs for adults, teenagers and children. “Basically we help urban refugees – who usually live in precarious living conditions – to integrate into society and have opportunities”, Alemayenu explains.Besides training and entertainment, the JRS  also provides psycho-social support, information and guidance on migrants’ rights, and a service for carrying out legal and social procedures.
“Refugees are often asked to fill out paperwork in order to get help or access to an opportunity of whatever kind, and we help them to fill the forms, and at the same time we offer them  psycho-social support and recreational activities.

The JRS, since the 80s

Although the JRS people began to provide assistance in East Africa in the 1980s, they settled down in the region only in the 90s and in the middle of that decade they started to focus efforts on urban refugees of Addis Ababa. “Those were years characterized by the Rwandan genocide, by the wars in the Great Lakes region and by thousands of Sudanese fleeing towards Ethiopia and Uganda.

The current geopolitical situation is not so distant from the recent past of the Horn of Africa. There are still internal armed conflicts going on in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, and thousands of people are forced to flee their countries, while others have moved internally. Repression and persecution by oppressive regimes is increasing, as is the exodus towards neighbouring Ethiopia, where according to the JRS, there are more than 20,000 Eritreans in Addis Ababa alone.
Inizio moduloOn the other hand, the elections that have taken place in recent years in Uganda, DR Congo, Rwanda, Burundi or Kenya have affected, according to Amnesty International, political and human rights developments and have led to serious migrations. According to UNHCR, Ethiopia has currently become home to some 300,000 South Sudanese, who represent the largest group of refugees, which is followed by more than 250,000 Somalis, more than 150,000 Eritreans, 40,000 Sudanese, more than 3,000 Kenyans and some 10,000 refugees from countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yemen, Burundi or Djibouti. Ethiopia is one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in the world. In this context that shows migration flows steadily on the rise, Ethiopia is playing a key role in the geopolitical situation
of the Horn of Africa.

Besides the humanitarian reasons for the reception of refugees, Mulugeta adds those of diplomacy. “We must welcome refugees also for diplomatic reasons. We offer them training and formation  so that the day they can go back home, they will be able to help to restore the political situation of their country. In this way, we are also sure that our neighbouring countries will be our friends”.

Sara Cantos

 

Economy. Risk factors.

  • Written by:

Bangkok seems to be a champion of futuristic architecture but its lights simply overwhelm without removing either its own multiple dark areas or the darkening shadows of the country.

The present contingency, with the creation of a speculation bubble, the flight of capital, failed investments, populist policies and the rigidity of a self-referential system which pretended to be unique but ended up by being simply obsolete and a failure in the present world, reminds many of the time before the financial crisis of 1997-1998. This, having started in Bangkok, spread through much of Asia with such rapid contagion that it set Thailand back twenty years just when it was about to emerge from under-development, according to international parameters, but in which it still remains today.

The second South-East Asian economy after Indonesia, Thailand has for years been last with respect to growth and, above  all, in innovation and entrepreneurship. It is weighed down by political upheaval and even more by the chains of a system which de-motivates participation, creativity and the emergence of new protagonists.
According to official data, the Thailandese economy could grow by 3.8 per cent. These data, however, seem to contain many unknowns, both internal and external. This is lower than the  4.2 per cent which the authorities have optimistically and with ample propaganda continued to sustain for most of last year despite the obvious difficulties in guaranteeing impetus in tourism, production and especially in exports. The Internet, social media and the use of passwords by information networks have helped to undermine considerably the optimistic image of military and civil authorities, bringing to light repression, failures, corruption, latent violence and nationalism, incentivised by those in power which render ineffective the statements and publicity through which they would wish to attract foreign business and individuals without affording them protection and equality of dignity.All these elements have dissolved – assisted by frequent reports on the repression of dissent and the use of ad hoc laws in favour of the status quo and the élite – a capital of trust based too much on easy profits and mostly on the exploitation of a poorly paid workforce and resources that are today much less available and not on the overall growth of the country.

In the economic sphere, the now unstoppable optimism of the public institutions is being contrasted by the pragmatism of private financial operators who, last December, through the words of Sanan Angubolkul, Vice-president of the Commission for Investments, foresaw that “products like sugar, precious stones, gold and rubber will suffer losses given the results of the first ten months of the year”.
In the opinion of Sanan, risk factors in 2019 will include higher prices for petroleum products, unstable exchange rates and clashes over customs duties involving the world powers. The previous electoral campaign will also carry some weight and even more so the election results, just as a role will be played by an economic and foreign policy of delaying. This will prolong the periods of adherence to such treaties as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to which – as confirmed by the minister for Trade – his country will not agree for now, since it did not meet the deadline of 30 December last year. There are limitations to the announced policy of bilateral agreements at regional level with the export of a reduced amount of products to China, India, Southern Asia and Hong Kong.

Faced with a situation which, anywhere else, would demand that adequate countermeasures be identified and implemented, the government has once again upheld the thesis that an economy that is far from its former momentum is the victim of a global slow-down that affects its exports and tourism. Without planning for any concrete measures, even in the monetary field, demanded for years of the regime which – for many observers is not merely a suspicion – has kept the local currency, the Baht, at a level considered unrealistic against the main global currencies to favour the local oligopolies, guarantee luxury imports and raw materials at low prices and to facilitate the purchase of weapons for the armed forces. This, and more, has been done partly to compensate for the reduction in income from exports, tourism and failed investments and partly to shower with monetary rewards those groups which the regime seeks to involve in a twenty-year project guided by the military under the protection and on behalf of the aristocracy and monopoly groups.
This project is not as easy as it once was, being in a situation that is in danger of igniting due to the lack of a prestigious reference point such as the king who guided it for seventy years, providing it with objectives, identity and unity.

The death of the King

On 12 October 2016, with the death of the King, the 67 million Thailandese were deprived of the figure, at once hieratic and paternal, the only one the majority of the people had known. At the age of 88, after ruling for seventy years – the longest reign of the sovereigns of his time – Bhumibol Adulyadej, Rama IX, passed away leaving in the country an emptiness perhaps impossible to fill.
Almost always with his camera hung round his neck and his notebook in hand as he travelled around the provinces to discover the needs and feelings of his people, Rama IX was an enlightened technocrat, born in the United States in 1927 and educated abroad up to the age of eighteen when he was recalled to his native country from a life of study and comforts to receive a crown that was certainly heavy due to the circumstances of his accession and his young age.

He was called to lead a poor and backward country that had only with difficulty emerged unscathed from the conflict of a World War, but which, in the following decades, would be of prime importance in blocking the advance of communism in South-East Asia as the base for American operations in Indochina. Under its sovereign, Thailand launched itself into development backed by foreign investment and tourism and also by the use of the territory and a self-sufficient economy developed and promoted by the sovereign himself.
On the night of 1 December 2016, Thailand once again found the certainty essential for a country which had always a close relationship with its monarch. By accepting the hereditary principle of the formal invitation to succeed his father with the official name of Maha Vajralongkorn Bodindradebayavarangkun and the dynastic name of Rama X, both the express will of his father and that of the elite, who always relied upon the monarchy, were concretised.
The succession of the sixty two-year old prince was not challenged since he was the sole male heir. Sanctioned at the death of his father by the approval of General Prayut Chan-ocha, both head of the junta and Prime Minister but not yet (at the time of writing) sealed by an official enthronement ceremony, this will involve the weighty legacy of the eighty two-year old sovereign, the only one whom the majority of Thailandese knew and loved with the intensity of children towards a father but a father with a semi divine aura nourished by official hagiography. It must be stressed, especially in the present context of the country that the questions regarding the monarchy are subject to a Draconian law of lèse-majesté, increasingly used to stifle any opposition.
The royal palace has just announced that Thailand’s king is to be officially crowned in an elaborate three-day ceremony held on May 4-6 this year.  (S.V.)

 

 

Political Uncertainty.

  • Written by:

Thailand is now witnessing the disappearance of its myth as a ‘Teflon Country’, unmoved by any crisis and capable of regaining its solidity after temporary setbacks. Officially, such things are never due to internal reasons but only to international contingencies.

Apparently immune to what it sees as from outside, Thailand is occupied solely with presenting an image of a paradise for investors, a Garden of Eden for tourists and a free port for all profitable traffic. It is an image, or rather, a reflection of a reality that is now no longer sustainable. On the other hand, it is actually the Thailandese analysts and media that speak of ‘a lost decade’. Those years, from 2007 to 2017, saw the collapse of elective democracy, however unrealistic, and the advent of a situation having as protagonists the armed forces, determined to no longer be at the service of the elite but, as from May 2014, to govern the country in all areas. It was not an original situation, given the coups, successful or not, since 1936, the year in which the monarchy changed from being absolute to constitutional under pressure from a military dictatorship that effectively took control.

Thailand has not emerged unscathed from its more recent convulsions. Political uncertainty, tensions as well as ever-present accentuated nationalism, have alienated capital and investors. The outstretched hand of Beijing meets some of the needs of the regime but scepticism, corruption and suppressed participation cloud the official optimism. International opinion polls, analyses and tests show that, though it is still among the top ten in ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations), with a strong industrial sector, Thailand is the country least prepared culturally to face change. The cocktail of openings for foreign capital, the availability of resources, a docile workforce and an infrastructure that launched the country without disturbing the internal status quo, now seems to have evaporated, bringing to light needs and problems that were avoided for far too long.

Nevertheless, unlike its more or less hagiographic past, the danger of recession is still real and social inequality is increasing. Not by chance, perhaps, the often optimistic data provided by the Ministry of Finance and noted by the economic journalist ‘Wichit Chantanusornsiri’ have shown that, in 2018, there were 14.17 million requests for government grants in a population of 67 million. Of these, as many as 7.3 million had an annual income of not more than 30,000 Baht (around 750 Euro). The opportunity gap is also growing. The Office for Political Finance notes that, in 2017, the top ten per cent  of earners in the population had an income 27 times that of the bottom 10 per cent (to be compared with 20.9 in 2000 and expected to worsen), making Thailand the country with the worst discrepancies in income and opportunities in the world.

There is nothing to indicate any improvement with the cost of living on the increase, rising taxes and more job insecurity. Other data show the centralisation of resources in the capital, for example, and the different possibilities of having a good level of education due to the unaffordable fees for those on a minimum wage which, in the capital, is 300 Baht (7.5 Euro), and less elsewhere. Again, the concentration of the land in the hands of 10 per cent of the population is 878 times more than that held by the bottom 10 per cent, notes ‘Chantanusornsiri‘, and 0.1 per cent of bank deposits amount to 49 per cent of the total.
Among the ten ASEAN economies, Thailand is the least culturally prepared to take on the necessary changes which must, first of all, be cultural.Who should manage the changes? The men in uniform dominate the country today, leading it towards a ‘democracy’ which they propose as an alternative to that of the populist and corrupt civil governments that the military regimes ousted, but which has considerable limits with respect to its credibility. Since they took power, a large number of critics have been arrested, politicians of the former government parties, students, intellectuals and leaders of movements with different orientations are in prison or under close surveillance.

Non-authorised gatherings of more than five people are forbidden and reporting and condemnation are incentivised. Censorship of the media is more suffocating towards blogs and social media. After the criminalisation of the distribution or sharing of information not in line with the wishes of the regime, those who access these sites now run the risk of being accused and receiving severe prison sentences. The project for a single gateway to the global network has, and will increasingly have repercussions not only for civil liberties and human rights but also for the economy of the country which, while it would like to launch itself into a new era, instead finds itself in bottlenecks of technology and censorship in such vital areas as communications. (S.V.)

 

Brazil. Bringing hope to the inferno of Cracolandia.

  • Written by:

Living with the street people. Evangelising the “inferno” of drugs. Experiencing “Mission Bethlehem”.

It is just a small plywood house with a few bits of furniture, a chair or two and a wooden bed that is always covered with things. In a corner there is a small kitchen with a few cooking pots. There are a few plates in the sink waiting to be washed.
This is where Father Gimapiero Carraro lives, 56 anni years old, an Italian, a missionary, in a slum in the heart of São Paolo.

For thirteen years now he has shared life with those he calls “my brothers and sisters of the streets”: drug addicts, alcoholics and people with no fixed abode. He is one of the few – perhaps the only one since not even the police will do so – who has succeeded in entering Cracolandia, the land of ‘crack’, a synthetic drug, in São Paolo: a square kilometre in the middle of the city where hundreds of people peddle and consume their drugs in broad daylight. However, it is at night that things happen. Once the shops have closed, the streets begin to fill with the “slaves” of crack looking for peddlers and arguing over a crumb or two of this “drug of the devil”. Just skin and bone with shining eyes and a filthy old blanket over their shoulders and unwashed they wander in the darkness of the night looking for a scrap of crack, “the magical poison”. Suddenly the pavements are lit up with hundreds of cigarette lighters used to “burn” the rocks.  There are women, pale, lean and with dark eyes and cracked lips, with nothing left of their feminine character. Recently, the situation has worsened as the great drug industry has invented OXI, a drug worse than crack (made from the waste of cocaine waste with added chalk, petrol, formaline…).

Father Giampiero tells us: “There is a holy poverty which is that of Jesus and a slavish poverty which is that of destitution and addictions”.
“We came on the streets – he tells us – to live in communion with those who live there: people who, in most cases, feel they have reached the end, rejected by all and with no hope at all”.
He describes his calling as “a calling within a calling. From slaves to saints”.  Like his fellow missionaries, he sleeps under the bridges and on the pavements together with “the people of the streets “.
Years have gone by since but Father Giampietro will never forget the first time he came to Cracolandia: “We were about 200 people marching in procession. I was in front bearing the Blessed Sacrament. Then, right in front of us, a human wall of no less than 500 people appeared. I said a prayer to Lour Lady and the wall opened up, people stepped aside, including the drug pushers, and we passed through them. From that moment on, we repeated those visits among the poor with Jesus in the Eucharist and we never once had any trouble”.

Father Carraro explains how and why the idea arose to bring the Blessed Sacrament into the inferno called: “Cracolandia in São Paolo is surmounted by a large statue of the Risen Jesus belonging to a church of the Salesians. By bringing Jesus there, into that context of absolute misery and neglect, we wanted to show openly that Jesus is Risen and brings resurrection everywhere there is nothing but death. This is not just a nice theory: every time we go to Cracolandia, an average of twenty people join the procession and then ask to be admitted to the Missão Belém movement and try to change their lives”.
In 2005, Father Carraro started Missão  Belém, a movement officially recognised by the diocese in 2010 which has the purpose of incarnating the miracle of Bethlehem among the poor, with the poor and for the poor. Today, this great family welcomes children, the elderly, the sick and people who live on the streets.

The headquarters of Missão Belém is nothing other than Father Giampiero’s house. From there, day after day, the missionaries and their collaborators go forth to meet the lowest of the earth to give them a second chance.
The secret, Father Giampietro explains, is called spirituality, and implies seeing the poor with authentic eyes of faith. “There is nothing poetic about getting up close and personal with the really poor. The situations we come across are terrible: people are often soaked in their own urine, covered with fleas, often under the influence of drugs or alcohol. It is not easy to embrace people like that”, Father Giampietro affirms. And he adds: “During the first year of Missão Belém, Sr. Calcida and I went to Assisi. In the presence of Saint Francis we came to understand something essential: there exists a holy poverty like that of Jesus who became man for us in Bethlehem, and the poverty of slaves, of the victims of alcohol, drugs and exclusion. Our aim is not to make the poor rich but to transform the poverty of slavery into holy poverty. For us the challenge consists in this which we call ‘evangelising Hell’”. Father Giampiero stresses this a lot: “Even though Missão Belém, if we look at the numbers, is the main welcoming entity in Brazil today, ours is still not a social work but a work of evangelisation”.
In a period of 13 years, Missão Belém has helped 100,000 people, with a total of 4 million days of hospitality. “I say this not to boast – Father Carraro points out – but to show what has been done for these people, without the help of the state”.
In Brazil, Missão Belém has 2,200 beds in 170 houses. As many as 60 of these are reserved for the mentally and physically ill.

For the most part, the people who manage the houses are volunteers: people coming from the streets who, once they have recovered, set about serving others full time: “They are about  200, or 1% of the  20,000 who, in total, we have succeeded in ransoming from the slavery of drugs or alcohol”. Father Gilson is one of them: with the physique of a bouncer and a contagious smile. “Today he is a priest but he was a drug addict; he was even one of the founders of Cracolandia”, Father Carraro tells us. “Once out of the dead end of drugs, twelve years ago he came to know us and, with us, little by little he found his vocation and was eventually ordained priest by Cardinal Odilo Pedro Scherer, of São Paolo”.
This is the sort of miracle that happens at Missão Belém. “Marcio, in his former life, used to steal lorries and ended up in prison. Today he is in charge of a series of hospitality houses of ours”. Per In the words of the Gospel: the stone rejected by the builders has become the cornerstone.Today Missão Belém is present in Brazil, in Haiti, in Bosnia and even in Italy, with about a thousand supporters. (G.F.)

 

 

Thai Identity.

  • Written by:

The nation, the monarchy and Buddhism are the pillars commonly attributed to the Thai identity. A mixture of doctrinal rigour contaminated in practice by many Hindu and animist elements, Thailandese Buddhism, which belongs to the Theravada current, is in substance a ‘religion of works’. Offerings, donations and almsgiving are its determining elements, associated for many Thais with experiences of monastic life or periods of spiritual retreat.

The monastic organisation, 400,000 strong with 30,000 temples and monasteries undoubtedly possesses some power, even though it shows cracks on several fronts, including that of morality which is preached but practised little  – as shown by the extreme cases that emerge
in the mass media.

Buddhism is ritualised and accompanies every essential step of social and individual life with a large number of ceremonies and recurrences, some of which form part of the national calendar. It is a kind of Buddhism at the service of the status quo, a source of consolidation for the less favoured groups in the population but providing no stimulus towards equality and justice. The 4.5% of Thailandese who are Moslem (concentrated in the South but with a considerable presence in Bangkok and in other North-Central cities) practice a normally tolerant faith, not excessively rigorous doctrinally or practically, with a broad capacity for co-existence with different faiths. The revival of the 2004 insurgence in the provinces with a Moslem majority has rendered relations between Moslem and Buddhist communities more difficult but this is also due to repressive military action and interests that cannot be ignored.

As an expression of a tiny minority of Catholics (around 300,000 out of 67 million Thailandese, half of all Christians) the local Church (with two archdioceses – Bangkok in the centre and Chiang Mai in the North – and eight dioceses), runs a patrimony of educational institutions through which a good part of the Thailandese elite has passed. Nevertheless, in a situation largely indifferent to it, the Thailandese Church has not been allowed, historically, to take an active part in development but it has been an active participant in humanitarian emergencies.

Today, having only recently completed the renewal of its diocesan and central vertices, it wishes to adopt a role of mediation within the complex situation of the country. The mission ad gentes has, in turn, a concrete role of promotion and development and to its protagonists of various origins it entrusts necessary areas and ‘frontier’ initiatives, especially among tribal minorities, the poor, the sick and the seriously handicapped, and street children… in conditions that are often difficult due both to the ‘fast-moving’ society in which they find themselves working and to the intrinsic characteristics of the country where inequality and exploitation are rarely recognised or condemned.
“It is necessary to re-think the teaching of ethics”, stated the Cardinal Archbishop of Bangkok, Francis Xavier Kriengsak Kovithavanij, shortly after he received the red hat, referring to the fight against corruption, “an unacceptable evil” in a “civilised society”, which is still a duty, especially at a time when the country is going through a period of instability and deep political crisis. In Cardinal Kovithavanij’s view, “what we have seen in Thailand (in recent times) could become a turning point for the improvement of Thailand society”. “The time has come ‘to correct the problem’ (of corruption)”, His Eminence stressed in unusual tones, given the general caution of the Catholic hierarchy which is now moving away from the traditional priority of instruction in prestigious institutions to go out to the peripheries.

Stefano Vecchia

 

Asia 2019. Troubled Waters.

  • Written by:

Important political events will mark the Asian panorama in 2019 while the evolution of strategic and economic questions will play a role in regional and global relations. Once again Chine will take the lead.

 Again in 2019 the gaze of the world will be turned towards China, the economic colossus which, in the second half of 2018 began to slow down appreciably due to duties imposed by the Trump administration amounting in all to a total of 220 billion dollars, almost half the value of US imports from China, and to which Beijing has reacted by imposing duties on almost all imports from the USA, worth 110 billion dollars.

The plan to accomplish the reforms necessary to stabilise the country desired by President Xi Jinping, economic-productive restructuring and the drastic dimensioning of the “shadow” economy which sustained development during the past twenty years at the cost, however, of wide social divergence, is now faced with a slow-down in exports and the growing protectionist tendencies in the West. The gamble of greater openness, coherence and transparency in the Chinese system, as demanded by international investors who are ready for a massive return of the great Far-Eastern country, still finds itself faced with the regime’s need for control and, in an ever increasingly open manner, for strategic supremacy in areas that Beijing sees as its competence or priority.
It is worth noting that the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Republic (in October) occurs in a special year, in a complex situation and that, through its management, China gambles on its future which involves guaranteeing general well-being and adequate assistance for a population that has reached the peak of its demographic growth and is now ageing, redefining the work market.

The year opens problematically for Taiwan after the defeat in local elections on 24 November 2018 of the government party and the recovery of his pro-Beijing opponent, the Kuomintang. The dimensioning of the progressive democratic party of President Tsai Ing-wen opens a time of new uncertainty in a situation which, as recently as in 2016, seemed to have relegated the  succeeding nationalist party of Chiang Kai-shek to the role of a historical relic, a turning point reached two years ago in the guise of independence that excluded any further dialogue with Beijing towards a “two-system country”, for many close to de facto  independence, with the risk of a military intervention by continental China in the “rebel province”.
In question there is also the real potential of the island whose democratic, social, economic and cultural unity will be sorely tried, both by relations with the continent and by new interior balances.
The New Year will also be a year of transition for Japan, with economic-social policies that it finds hard to implement and with the attention of both businessmen and people focussed on two questions. The first is the foreseen increase of 10 per cent on consumer tax. This was budgeted for November 2019, after a slide of three years and almost five since the move from 5 to 8 per cent on 1 January 2014. This increase is deemed necessary in order to deal with the public debt which reached 236 per cent of GDP (152 per cent, after subtracting government assets) and the foreseen increase in social spending despite the risk of a contraction in growth. The funds have already been ear-marked to satisfy ever more pressing needs. First on the list are the free pre-schools and other initiatives to encourage Japanese people to have more children and the guarantee of greater possibility for mothers to continue working in an almost dramatic situation of population reduction.
The second question that will deeply affect the Japanese will be the abdication of Emperor  Akihito on 30 April, the first to do so for two centuries. The designated heir is Prince Naruhito who, on a date still to be established and with an inflexible and antique ceremony, will become the 126th Emperor of an uninterrupted dynasty.  The background includes not only the frail health of Akihito but also his convinced pacifism, shared by the majority of the population. This is in contrast with the more interventionist policy of the government led by Shinzo Abe who intends to change the Constitution to make it possible for the forces of self-defence to participate directly on foreign fronts if requested. A real pacification of the Korean peninsula would render this commitment less urgent but it is unlikely that he would abandon it.

It is foreseeably a year of transition also for South Korea which, though it now views the North more optimistically, has to deal with lower production, youth unemployment, the need to tackle marginalisation starting from the elderly, some of whom are consistently without any pension or assistance. There is also the gap in work opportunities, in a country that sees itself as well off, happy and a promoter of technology widely diffused in Asia but marked by deep divisions such as the role of women and corruption in a society bound by Confucian concepts in which even Christianity, triumphant up to a few years ago, now seeks a more up-to-date role and definition.
There are especially two questions which, for two years now, creating excellent victims in the world of politics and business, have become central to the action of civil society and the judiciary: the attenuation of the excessive power of industrial-financial giants (chaebol) over public life and the moralisation of public life and the end of the political-business marriage at the centre of great scandals. As well as these, there is the matter of peace with neighbouring North Korea, a priority in the programmes of Catholic President Moon Jae-in.

In Thailand, whose turn it is to preside over ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations), it is expected – unless there is an about-turn at the last minute – that there will be a round of elections with unforeseeable results on 24 February. The regime that took power after the coup in May 2014 did all it could to black out the entire run-up to the elections to exclude any credible opposition and, at the same time, imposed a twenty-year “road map” to consolidate the grip of the armed forces on the sharing of power with the aristocracies and big business. However, the opposition showed itself more than once last year to be growing, especially among the youth, contrasted by a “soft” repression that moves in step with the low tendency to rebel of the Thais and with the capillary infiltration of the regime in all sectors of public life. Even though censorship has been strict and very harsh laws have been enforced – such as that in defence of the monarchy – the internet has become a formidable vehicle for ideas and complaints, both concerning the inability of those in government to re-launch the stalled country  and to keep open a form of detached from traditional movements and parties but which is rather the expression of paths of renewal, of struggles against corruption and privilege that goes against a strongly stratified socially and culturally backward situation.
Quite different and certainly more open to achieved democracy, the biggest economic and demographic power in south-East Asia, Indonesia goes to the polls on 19 April to elect a new parliament and, for the first time contemporaneously, its Head of State. These polls are important and not only because they are the first “double election” which many hope will consolidate and prelaunch the policies of relative openness, decentralisation and development of the final four years of President Joko Widodo. The general situation of the country and, once again, its desire for development to be confronted with its Islamic identity, its aspiration to “unity in diversity” to be weighed against integralist forces, will be central to the choice of the voters but also to the interests of the international community during the coming twelve months.
Of less importance but certainly indicative will be the elections in May in the Philippines – elections for the total renewal of the Camera of Deputies and the partial renewal of the Senate. Here are many motives for an election which, in the Philippine context, always presents problems and issues. In question is also the judgement of the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte in his fourth year and his high-impact, even lethal campaigns – such as that against drug users – carried out prejudicially and with little regard for democracy. It has been subjected to severe criticism by the Church, by broad sectors of civil society and many diplomats. The background is one of a country that grows on alternate days but which, overall, makes heavy work of finding direction and stability, still fighting against various guerrilla movements and the danger of Jihadism in the south of the country. One of the gambles in 2019 will be that of concretising the peace agreement signed in 2018 which has at its centre far-reaching autonomy for its regions with s strong Islamic presence.

It is difficult to see substantial changes taking place in the situation of uncertainty that prevents the economic resurgence of Myanmar whose population remains one of the poorest in Asia despite the tendency towards improvement in profits and the standard of living. While the residual power of the military and the rekindling of the situation in areas inhabited by minorities, including the Moslem Rohingya in the western state of Rakhine, are certainly “thorns in the side” of the Myanmar government, it is also true to say that it causes dialogue to start between the government and ethnic minorities with the purpose of bringing lasting peace to the country. This alienates part of the massive investment foreseen and discourages international openness towards the civil government which remains under the control of the generals. For some time, relations between the government of Naypiydaw and Beijing, the traditional ally of the military regime until, have cooled and dialogue with the de facto executive led by Aung San Suu Kyi, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and now national councillor and foreign minister, seems to have stalled after the suspension or reduction of mining and hydraulic projects and infrastructure made in China.

In the Indian sub-continent, no particularly great shocks are expected in Bangladesh, a country that is gathering pace on the level of incomes, employment and the control of militant and terrorist Islam.
Not very different but a step or two ahead, the situation in India, whose outgoing government  led by the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party and its leader Narendra Modi, will seek confirmation in the elections in May for the Lower House of Parliament (Lok Sabha). The background is five years of economic growth, but also minorities on the defensive due to Hindu extremist action and controversies involving discrimination. The Bharatiya Janata Party is not expected to lose but the voting could mark a turn from the almost plebiscite preference accorded since 2013. Obviously, there is much at stake in a country that is gaining in strength and soon wants to challenge its Chinese rival, relying especially on its demographic resources, but which, in order to enjoy international support and prestige, must be convincing in the field of progress, equality and public morality.

The situation of Pakistan has for a long time been problematic. Identified as a receptacle of religious extremism and Islamic terrorism, the great country, a rival of India and, like it, a nuclear power, will reply much if not entirely on the charism and international profile of Imran Khan, an ex-cricket champion and leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf , the winner of the elections in July of last year.
The task is hard for Khan who must join combat on several fronts: underdevelopment, religious and ethnic sectarianism, political litigiousness, the virulence of religious extremism with its two militant associates, Jihadism and Talibanism.
Taliban extremism is also the great unknown in Afghanistan where, after the renewal of parliament in the October elections, and, if it is not necessary to postpone or cancel them, the presidential election on 19 April where the residual possibility of stability and development will be at stake – something impossible without sharing power with the Taliban who, in 2018 gained territory and negotiating power – as will be the future of international military protection. In brief, it is a country at a crossroads, with little certainty – and backwardness is one of them – and many dangers.

Stefano Vecchia

Ethiopia. Timket. The Feast of the two Testaments.

  • Written by:

The feast of Timket or Baptism of the Lord is celebrated in Ethiopia on January 19, 12 days after Christmas. An original feature with regard to this celebration is that in Ethiopia the Old and New Testaments are combined, since, in addition to commemorating the baptism of Jesus, the Ark of the Covenant or Tabot is also venerated. We can even say that it is the true protagonist of the celebration.

To explain this peculiarity, it is necessary to refer to a deeply rooted Ethiopian legend, still held today as undoubtedly historical in the circles of the Orthodox Church. According to it, the so called Queen of Sheba, who went to Jerusalem to admire the wisdom of Solomon (1 Kings 10: 1-10), was none other than the queen of Ethiopia, who, after her visit to the Jewish king, returned to her land pregnant and gave birth to a son named Menelik I. When he grew up, he wanted to meet his father and made a visit to Jerusalem, where he returned bringing with him the Ark of the Covenant, which he removed from the temple of Jerusalem, replacing it with a fake one. After many vicissitudes, the legend states that the ark was deposited in the city of Axum, where it is still preserved in a chapel near the main church. The ark or Tabot is the most sacred object that the Orthodox Church venerates. Every church has a Tabot, that is, a chest containing the tablets made of wood or stone, which are blessed by the Patriarch and placed in the Holy of Holies, the innermost compartment of the church.

The feast of Timket begins on the eve with the departure of the Tabots of each church to a place where there is abundant water. Around noon, groups of people of all ages begin to take to the streets. Most wear the national dress.  Women wear white dresses, embroidered with crosses and men the gabí or shawl, this one also invariably white. Choirs are formed singing and dancing around a drummer. Generally, they sing church chants, but there are many dances that have little or nothing to do with the sacred. There is also room for traditional dances and for spontaneous dancers who take the opportunity to show their talents.

Towards three o’clock in the afternoon, a group of priests dressed in multi-coloured sacred ornaments and under multi-coloured umbrellas appear at the door of the church. One of them has a particularly hieratic posture and carries on his head a flat object wrapped in rich linen cloths. This is the Tabot. At that moment, a concert of screams and ululations commences. When it calms down, the procession begins its journey to the place where the Tabots of several nearby churches will be gathered. The route can be long, up to five km. or more. All the way, the crowd accompanies the procession with their songs and dances. Once they reach the appointed place, the Tabots are placed inside a large tent, sheltered from the public eye. Songs, sermons, prayers, bustling … will continue well into the night.
In the early morning on the day of the feast, the priests celebrate the Eucharist inside the tent. Then they approach the place of the water which may be a river or pond, bless it and sprinkle the crowd, who will be happy if their clothes are completely soaked.
After that moment, where it is possible, everyone throws themselves into the water, splashing each other, swimming …. Mothers like to immerse their babies in the water.

Towards the middle of the morning, when the water pandemonium ends, the return of the Tabots to their respective churches begins, accompanied by the crowd who continue to sing and dance. Upon arrival, a particularly solemn dance takes place, performed by priests, deacons or singers. These stand in two rows facing each other. In their right hand they hold the sistrum and in the left the makomia, a long stick with which they mark the rhythm. One or two drummers rotate in the  middle between the two rows. The intensity goes on growing until reaching a peak moment after which the dance concludes.
It is the so-called dance of David and recalls the passage of the Bible (2Sam 6, 12-15) which describes the transfer of the ark to the city of David, while he danced in front of it.
There are cities especially famous for the celebration of Timket to which thousands of pilgrims come from other parts of the nation. Axum, Gondar and Addis Ababa are the main ones, partly because of the suggestive scenery where the celebration takes place. At Axum, it is celebrated in the Mai Shum (Water of the Chief), a very big pond excavated in the rock, in which tradition says the Queen of Sheba came to bathe. At Gondar, Timket is celebrated in the Baths of Fasil, the pool that King Fasil built for himself in which to bathe.

Currently, the pool is filled only for the Timket feast. Addis Ababa is a city too big for the Tabots of its 250 churches to be concentrated in one place. But there is a privileged scenario where the celebration acquires special solemnity and where the Patriarch usually goes. It is the Jan Mieda or Field of His Majesty, a huge esplanade to the east of the city, which Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) used as a racetrack and as a landing field for the first airplanes that flew in Ethiopia. As there is no river or pond in the esplanade, a small pool of cement and tiles was built, surrounded by a fence.
Within it, the priests can perform the liturgical functions in an orderly fashion without being pressed by the crowd.
Both the Tabot and all the ritual that surrounds the feast of Timket speak of the great influence of the Old Testament in the life and liturgy of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
And whatever the explanation of this phenomenon may be, it is necessary to admit a strong Jewish presence prior to the arrival of Christianity. When this came, it assumed much of what in the religious field was already being practiced. This explains the combination, in the Timket feast, of two sacred events that apparently have nothing to do with each other.

Juan González Núñez

The Limpopo River. Collateral Victim Of The Mining Industry.

  • Written by:

The Limpopo River Basin is a fragile environment threatened by the combined pressure, of climate change, urban waste disposal and mining activities.

The sluggish waters of the Limpopo, called Espiritu Santo River by the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama in 1498 and much later the “great grey-green, greasy Limpopo» by Rudyard Kipling, flow from South Africa through Botswana, Zimbabwe to the Indian Ocean in Mozambique
The 1,750 km long River is the main source of life for the 15 million people who live in its 415,000 square kilometres basin. But at the same time this precious ethics asset is fragile. Indeed the Limpopo River has a quite modest mean discharge of 170 cubic meters/second. Rainfall is seasonal and unreliable. In dry years, the upper parts of the river, flow for 40 days only or even less, especially in the arid upper part of the drainage basin, in the Kalahari Desert.  But during the rainy season, terrible disasters may occur as well as that was the case in February 2000 when heavy rainfalls, due to a cyclone, caused catastrophic
floods in Mozambique.

Model projections by the University of Zululand suggest a down trend of the flow as drying is projected across the basin. Other sources also estimate that the present water scarcity is likely to be exacerbated in the future by climate change and that this will pose a problem of water allocation between different users ranging from irrigated agriculture to mining. Today, the use of water irrigation is dominant. But this will change by 2025, with climate change making water scarcer, anticipate climatologists. The situation is critical for some time: water demand exceeded scarcity in 2000 and in 2005, the main tributary of the Limpopo, the Olifants River ran dry. This fragility is expected to have serious consequences on the exceptionally rich biodiversity of the basin  In the North-Eastern corner of South Africa the river borders indeed the Kruger National Park.

Between the Mokolo and the Mogalakwena Rivers, high concentrations of hippopotamus are found.  Zambezi sharks or bull sharks which tolerate fresh water, are often spotted in the lower parts of the river in Mozambique. Crocodiles are also common. It is no coincidence that one of the main tributaries of the Limpopo was named the Crocodile river. The destruction of mangroves in the estuary is also a matter of concern, since the livelihoods of many rural people there depend on the ecosystem goods and services. Mangroves provide indeed fish crabs and firewood to the local people. For this reason, the United States Agency for International Development (US AID) partnered with the Centre for the Sustainable Use of Coastal Zones in Mozambique to work with the local communities in Xai-Xai, in order to replant and rehabilitate mangrove vegetation in the river estuary.
Land degradation and pollution from pesticides and nutrients from the agro-industry are posing increasing threats to the wildlife.

Water is contaminated with bacteria and algae. But one of the main causes of pollution is the mining activity which is intense in the river basin with a total of about 1 900 mines in the basin. In 2010, mining activities accounted for 10 percent of water use but by 2025 mining activity is expected to grow by 30% and energy by 26 %, adding to the pressure from rapid urban growth and energy projects on the basin’s water resources. A 45% increase of water demand by 2025 is indeed projected.The pressure will also increase particularly in Mozambique, where recent discoveries of large deposits of coal and natural gas will impact future water requirements. There is already much need of more regulation. In South Africa, 125 mines were operating without a water license revealed a South African parliament investigation in 2010. Along the river, particularly in South Africa and Botswana, sand mines for construction purposes are degrading local environments, which is leading to riparian degradation, including wetland destruction, bank erosion and increases water turbidity.  In 2014, the Bosveld Phosphates Company had to pay a Rand 2.55‑million fine after local inhabitants managed to prove that it had polluted a tributary to the Olifants River, in the Limpopo River Basin. The spill polluted waters which irrigate farming land in western Mpumalanga and killed hundreds of crocodiles and fish in the Kruger Park.

Acording to the south African newspaper Mail and Guardian, Sasol’s petrochemical complex at Secunda and Eskom’s power stations along with the mines that supply them Eskom — are adding doses of pollution to the river.  Tests from the University of Venda showed elevated levels of metals and other pollutants in fish and showed  that tiger fish in the Olifants were half the size they would have been if they were healthy. High levels of pollution acid drainage from old mines from Mpumalanga Highveld effluent are also reported by other sources.
Data on water quality in the Olifants River, collected in the Kruger National Park by Venda and Rhodes universities researchers also point to a threat which is worse than mining. Accordingly, the more dangerous pollution comes rom wastes emanating from municipal wastewater treatment plants. The result is appalling: South Africa’s water and sanitation department, lists most of the plants along the Olifants River as being in a poor or “critical” state.
Finally, the presence of all the coal power stations along the river and the construction of the huge 4,800 MW thermal Medupi power station in Mpumalanga is raising much concern among the local farmers. They fear that these projects will pump large quantities of water from the Crocodile River tributary which feeds the Limpopo. Engineers from the South African electricity corporation ESKOM claim that the Medupi thermal power station will be using a dry cooling technology which saves water, unlike older generation power stations which use vast amounts of water to cool their systems. But the farmers point out that the mining capacity needed to feed the huge Medupi power station will induce a considerable pressure on the water resources anyway. The consumption of water by the coal mining industry to reduce the hazards of fires and explosions and to manage the dust produced during the processing state, is very high indeed. It is estimated that it amounts to 250 litres per ton of coal.

François Misser

Photo Gallery – Jubilee 2025. Pilgrims of Hope

Advocacy

Maria Ressa. Information that gives hope.

“We want to create a federation of international journalistic organisations that collaborate in this effort, starting from the global South,” says Filipino journalist and 2022…

Read more

Baobab

The Leopard, the Dog and the Tortoise.

Once upon a time, there was a leopard. He had a huge walnut tree that was full of nuts. Stingy as he was, however, he forbade…

Read more

Youth & Mission

Mission. In the school of life and humanity.

Three young Comboni missionaries from three continents share their vocation stories and missionary experiences. Fr Victor Cunanan Parungao from the Philippines reflects on 15 years of…

Read more