Following the expulsion of French troops from Mali, Burkina-Faso and Niger, the leaders of these countries are extending their pro-sovereignty policies to the economic sphere. Together with Senegal, they have embarked on a new policy of resource nationalism.

One of the key figures behind these changes is Kemi Seba, whose real name is Stellio Gilles Robert Capo Chichi, a 43-year-old French-Beninois binational who has been advising Niger’s president, General Abdourahmane Tiani, since August 2024, a year after the July 2023 military coup that ousted the pro-French president Mohamed Bazoum. Kemi Seba, who founded the NGO “Urgences panafricanistes”, claims to be a successor to Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness Movement and to have been trained by Louis Farakhan’s Nation of Islam.

Kemi Seba. CC BY-SA 4.0/Boubs Sidibe

He sees himself as the spiritual heir of the late presidents of Ghana, Kwame Krumah, and Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara, although for a time he adopted black supremacist rhetoric. For several years he has been campaigning against the “degenerate neo-liberal global elite” and the CFA franc, which he considers to be a neo-colonial currency. In an interview published last October by the Turkish news agency Anadolu, Kemi Seba, who describes Niger as a “laboratory of the Pan-Africanist revolution”, announced his ambition to liberate the Sahel from the transnational corporations that exploit the region.In addition to the withdrawal of French troops from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger between 2022 and 2024, the three countries of the Alliance of Sahel States, founded in July 2024, have begun to rename streets and monuments that recall the French colonial past. On 18 December 2024, 25 squares, streets and monuments in Bamako changed their names.  The streets of Faidherbe, Brière de l’Isle and Archinard now bear the names of local heroes such as Mamadou Lamine Drame, Banzoumana Sissoko and El Hadj Cheick Oumar Tall. Similar decisions were taken in Burkina Faso last April and in Niamey last October. Last December, Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye also called for the renaming of several avenues in Dakar to honour the country’s heroes.

The ruling military leaders, from the left: Capt Ibrahim Traoré (Burkina Faso) Colonel Assimi Goita (Mali) General Abdourahmane Tchiani (Niger). Photo Archive

Since 2023, the members of the Alliance of Sahel States have been pursuing a policy of resource nationalism. The first shot in this nationalist crusade came from Burkina Faso, where in February 2023 the junta seized 200 kilograms of gold mined by a subsidiary of the Canadian group Endeavour Mining on the grounds of “public necessity”.
Then, in 2024, the Burkinabé junta nationalised the Boungou and Wahgnion gold mines, which were owned by Canadian miner Endeavour Mining. The plan is also to increase domestic processing of local ores, as evidenced by the government’s approval in November 2023 of the construction of Burkina Faso’s first gold refinery.
“We are going to get our mining licenses back,” Burkina Faso’s President Ibrahim Traoré stated earlier this year “and we are going to mine it ourselves”, he said. This nationalisation process meant a renegotiation of contracts with foreign firms and the assertion of more control
over the mining operations.
On 2 January 2025, a judge in Mali ordered the seizure of three tonnes of gold from the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold, which owes the government a total of $5.5 billion. The decision follows a dispute with the Malian authorities over a contract based on new mining regulations, during which Mali detained senior executives and issued an arrest warrant for Barrick’s CEO, Mark Bristow.

Loulo-Gounkoto Gold Mine Complex in Mali. Photo: Endeavour Mining

The government then seized the stocks from Barrick’s Loulo and Gounkoto mines in western Mali and transported them by helicopter to the state-owned Banque Malienne de Solidarité in the capital, Bamako.
As a result, Barrick announced on 13 January 2025 that it would have to suspend mining operations in the country and filed a request for arbitration against Mali with the Washington-based International Centre for Settlement of Investment. Two weeks later, the Bamako government and Barrick began negotiations to resolve the dispute over the Canadian mining company’s alleged non-payment of taxes, the seizure of its gold stocks and Barrick’s agreement to the new mining code, which gives the state a greater share of mining revenues and eliminates tax exemptions for mining companies.
In November 2024, the Malian military also arrested the CEO and two employees of Australian company Resolute Mining, before releasing them after the company signed a $160 million deal with the government. Other mining companies, such as Canada’s Allied Gold, B2Gold and Robex, did not face such problems because they had previously agreed to review the terms of their contracts and paid to settle tax and customs disputes.So far, Mali has raised more than $1 billion by negotiating new contracts or renegotiating old ones, according to Economy Minister Alousseni Sanou. Reforms in the mining sector are expected to bring in another billion dollars a year and increase the national budget by 20 per cent. The leader of Mali’s junta, General Assimi Goita, also said in January that these new revenues would make it possible “to pay off part of the internal and external debt and to pay for military equipment”.

Uranium mine in Niger. The Niamey government has announced that Niger will seek to attract Russian investment in the uranium sector. File swm

Meanwhile, in the wake of the July 2023 coup, Niger’s military junta withdrew the licence for the Imamouren uranium mine held by French nuclear giant Orano on 19 June 2024. This is a serious blow to Orano, which is 90 per cent owned by the French state, as Imamouren is one of the world’s largest deposits, with an estimated total of 200,000 tonnes.
Then, in October 2024, Orano announced that its subsidiary Somaïr, 63.4% owned by the French company and 36.6% by the State of Niger, would cease production because, according to management, it could no longer operate in the country. Shortly afterwards, on 8 November, the mining minister, Ousmane Abarchi, announced that Niger was seeking to attract Russian investment in the uranium sector. The Niamey authorities also took operational control of Somaïr at the end of 2024, while Orano retaliated on 20 December by announcing its intention to take Niger to international arbitration.

The new government in Dakar states: “We cannot continue to sign agreements that end up impoverishing the 50,000 local fishermen whose pirogues no longer have access to the resource that is being depleted by foreign fleets”.

The wave of resource nationalism has also reached Senegal. On 17 November last year, the government in Dakar announced the end of the fishing agreement with the European Union, in line with new policies following the election of a nationalist president in March 2024 who promised a fairer distribution of natural resource revenues for the benefit of the Senegalese people. “We cannot continue to sign agreements that end up impoverishing the 50,000 local fishermen whose pirogues no longer have access to the resource that is being depleted by foreign fleets of factory ships, including European ones,” say the new authorities in Dakar.
Some observers warn that the Sahelian states’ new rhetoric, based on sovereignty and rejection of Western partners, risks scaring off foreign investors. But supporters of the juntas counter that new partners looking to expand their influence in the region, including China, Russia and Turkey, are ready to fill the gap. Whether the interests of the local population will be better served remains to be seen. (Open Photo: 123rf)

François Misser

The Arab country is among the major supporters of the Rapid
Support Forces (RSF) under the command of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti.
RSF is the main recipient of the gold trafficked by the militia’s leaders, starting with the leader Hemeti and his family. But the rich state of the Emirs is also the cornerstone of a series of connections that end up fuelling the conflict with their weapons.

Peace in Sudan passes through the United Arab Emirates. This is because Abu Dhabi is the magnetic north of a sort of compass of chaos and the conflict in the African country, one of the worst humanitarian crises on the planet, seems to be emblematic of this.

Etihad Towers in Abu Dhabi. The Arab country is the backbone of various triangulations that play a role in the conflict. 123rf

From the small country of the Arabian Peninsula, illegal trafficking and opaque connections start and flow together, nourishing interests and fuelling instability in various parts of the world. The Emirates have found a privileged interlocutor in the hostilities that have continued since April 2023: the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under the command of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo known as Hemeti.
Abu Dhabi is the backbone of various triangulations that play a role in the conflict: identifying them helps shed light on a complex war that is relevant to the interests of many.

From Abu Dhabi to Ndjamena
On 20 October 2024, the RSF shot down a cargo plane in the Malha area, north of Al-Fasher, in the western region of North Darfur. The militia claimed on social media that it had destroyed an Antonov plane used as a bomber by the Sudanese army.
The wreckage of the aircraft turned out to be an Ilyushin-76. One of the crew members was wearing a badge identifying him as an engineer from Airline Transport Incorporation, a company based in the United Arab Emirates. A few hours later, when they realised their mistake, the RSF removed the video of the celebrating soldiers.
This “incident” would confirm the data of a United Nations report which refers to at least 86 flights departing from the United Arab Emirates and landing on the runway in Amdjarass, in eastern Chad, since the beginning of the conflict in Sudan.

President of Chad Mahamat Déby Itno. He received more than a billion dollars in exchange for the guarantee of support for the RSF through the Chadian city of Amdjarass, to be used as a supply centre. Facebook

The war is mainly between the RSF and the regular Sudanese army (Sudan Armed Forces, SAF). The cargo of the flights in question, according to documents examined by Reuters, consisted of weapons hidden among humanitarian aid. The transporters were reportedly the same four companies that the UN had accused of trafficking weapons to the militias of General Khalifa Haftar  – a strongman in eastern Libya and a supporter of the RSF in the conflict between 2019 and 2020: ZetAvia and Flysky Airlines from Ukraine and FlySky Kyrgyz and Sapsan Airlines from Kyrgyzstan. According to the reconstruction by The Africa Report, in July 2023, the Emirates offered the Chadian President, Mahmat Déby, more than a billion dollars in exchange for the guarantee of support for the RSF through the Chadian city of Amdjarass,
to be used as a supply centre.

The special relationship with Hemeti
It passes through Chad but is aimed at reaching Hemeti’s men. The relationship between the government of Abu Dhabi and the RSF was strengthened during the war in Yemen, which began in 2014 and has reached a stage of prolonged ceasefire that has now lasted for more than a year. RSF militiamen have fought against the Houthi militias on behalf of the Emirates. The road that connects the Sudanese militia to Abu Dhabi is paved with gold. The Dagalo family’s companies control the exploitation of the precious resource in Darfur, where half of Sudan’s reserves are estimated to be found. 75% of Sudanese gold is trafficked and ends up on the Emirates market.
These figures are not isolated on the continent: according to a report last May by the NGO Swissaid, about 40% of all African gold exports are undeclared and of these 93% are destined for the Emirates.
Reuters reported that Abu Dhabi disclosed $7.4 billion worth of gold imports from 25 African countries that had not declared any
exports to the country.

Gold market in Dubai. About 40% of all African gold exports are undeclared and of these 93% are destined for the Emirates. 123rf

Documents reviewed by Reuters in 2018 and 2019 showed that Algunade, a company owned by the Dagalo family, was already sending about $30 million in gold bars, or about a tonne, to Dubai every three weeks. The Emirates is the world’s third-largest importer of the precious metal, which in turn accounts for 70% of Sudan’s exports. Legal sales of the metal generated $1.5 billion in revenue for Khartoum in the first 10 months of 2024, almost all of it destined for the Arab country. That figure does not include gold that escapes official channels in a volume similar to that legally exported. These Dagalo family businesses have their tax residence in the Emirates and have allowed the RSF leader to finance an army that exceeded 100,000 soldiers at the beginning of the war against the SAF.

Western hypotenuse
The Emirates and several European countries have a long-standing relationship in the defence sector. In 2014, a $200 million deal was signed between the state-owned Serbian arms company Yugoimport and the Emirates holding company Earth.
For example, weapons from the Balkan country have been found in Sudan. The French parliament’s 2024 report on arms exports shows that French companies have supplied €2.6 billion in military equipment to the Emirates between 2014 and 2023. Armoured vehicles manufactured in the Arab country and equipped with French-designed defence systems are part of the RSF’s current arsenal, according to a report by Amnesty International. This would be a violation of the arms embargo that the European Union imposed on Sudan in 1994.

General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemeti, in a video produced by the Rapid Support Forces (Screengrab)

However, the links between the RSF and the EU do not end there. In 2014, a platform to contain illegal migration known as the Khartoum Process was established, which is based on cooperation between EU countries and countries along the migration route from the Horn of Africa. Brussels asked for Khartoum’s help to stem the flow of migrants to Europe at a time when the RSF was largely responsible for patrolling the borders. Meanwhile, according to a report by the Dutch think-tank Clingendael, Hemeti’s militias allegedly organised a system whereby they received money from migrants to smuggle them into Libya in military vehicles. And the US? Last September, former President Joe Biden and his counterpart Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan signed a multi-billion-dollar cooperation agreement that made the Emirates a privileged strategic ally of Washington. A policy with paradoxical implications: last month the US Treasury sanctioned Hemeti and seven companies linked to his militia and based in the Emirates. At the same time as announcing the measure, former Secretary of State Antony Blinken also accused the RSF of being responsible for “genocide” in the ongoing conflict. (Open Photo: Flag of United Arab Emirates on the background of sunset sky. 123rf)

Mohamed Ahmed Al-Kasalawi

The lack of a government agricultural policy, the impact of imports, fishing agreements and climate change all have a direct impact on Gambians’ diets. Local initiatives to increase fruit and vegetable production aim to address these issues. Three young Gambian women are working on a fertiliser that will improve the country’s
agricultural opportunities.

Almost all of a country’s politics can be summed up in a plate of food. When it’s full, everything is seen in a better perspective. If it becomes empty, nerves set in. But if the mechanisms to fill it are lost, political instability sets in and, eventually, with the exhaustion of hopes for change, flight. In every country, food is usually a brief summary of its history and available resources.
The Gambia River flows through the country of the same name, a strip of land inland from Senegal, on the coast of West Africa. Half a century ago, most of its inhabitants could feed themselves with rice produced in the smallest country in continental Africa. Fish was abundant and was used to prepare recipes such as bennekinno (rice with fish); Peanuts, a crop imposed during the time of British colonialism, gave rise to domoda (rice with peanuts and meat).

Traders at the fish market in Gambia. Fish is becoming more expensive due to the fishing treaties signed with the EU and the arrival of Chinese ships on the country’s coasts. CC BY-SA 4.0/Thukuk

Today these dishes still exist, but it is increasingly difficult to prepare them: only 10% of the rice consumed in Gambia is produced in the country; the rest is imported.
Every increase in the price of petrol, which affects transportation, translates into an increase in food prices in Gambia. Fish is becoming more expensive, also due to the fishing treaties signed with the EU and the arrival of Chinese ships on the coasts of the country. The presence of fishmeal factories, including Chinese-owned ones, which take supplies from the local market, completes an equation that makes life difficult for Gambians. Even vegetables, in a country of farmers, have become inaccessible as a garnish for meals. More and more inhabitants of the country are trying to emigrate, and the numbers prove them right: 28% of the national GDP comes from remittances sent by these migrants, the real lifeboat of an economy where a bag of rice costs more than 30 euros – and the most common monthly income in the informal economy reaches, with a bit of luck, 100 euros.

From Left: Rose Mendy, Veronique Mendy and Sandren Jatta. Photo: Jaume Portell Caño

Rose Mendy, Veronique Mendy and Sandren Jatta, however, do not even consider it: “I would go abroad just to study,” says the first. They met at university, where they studied Agriculture in the same class, and their minds are full of ideas that they want to implement in Gambia. All three work in centres and companies related to what they studied, but their real ambition is to create their own project where they can apply everything they learned at university and in their first job.

Production and food
“I come from a family of farmers, rice growers. At university I learned the techniques that were used to advise my family,” says Sandren Jatta. Born in Berending, she went from being one of the daughters who helped out at home to advising her parents on which techniques to adopt to improve production. She currently works with Rose Mendy, her university classmate, at the National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI), an institution that depends on the government of Gambia.
The goal of NARI is to use different techniques and cultivation methods to increase productivity and, once the results are achieved, share this knowledge with the farmers of the country.

A young boy watering his vegetable garden. “What we produce will influence what we eat” File swm

It is not an office job. Mendy, Jatta and their colleagues spend entire days during the harvesting phase, transporting dozens of kilos of onions and then measuring which experiments have been the most productive: “Many people think that agriculture is a job without prestige, which is why they advised me against it. I studied finance to work in a bank, but the countryside has always interested me”, says Mendy, born in Albreda, on the banks of the Gambia River. His family also grows rice. “What we produce will influence what we eat”, adds Jatta.
In the shops of the country, there are almost no products made in Gambia, apart from bottles of mineral water and cashew nuts packaged in plastic bags. In the markets, a large part of the fruit and vegetables are imported: oranges and apples from South Africa, tomatoes from Morocco, potatoes from the Netherlands or bananas from the Ivory Coast sum up the prospects of a country with almost no industry and stagnant agriculture.

Alternatives
Two figures summarize one of the structural problems of Gambia. Since its independence, the cultivated area has increased very little (9% in 57 years). In that period, the population has multiplied sixfold. The decline in the use of fertilizers has reduced the productivity per hectare of key crops such as rice. This situation has accelerated a demographic change: the movement of the population from rural areas to cities and peri-urban areas. In other words, there has been a rural exodus that has led hundreds of thousands of people to go from being producers to consumers of food.
The failed agricultural policy has created three countries in one: rural Gambia, urban Gambia and the diaspora. Rose, Veronique and Sandren, born between the late 1990s and early 2000s, fit into this perception, in this case through their studies: “When you want to go to university you have to go to urban areas. There is nothing like this in rural areas, so you have to come,” says Rose.

A view of the city of Banjul. “When you want to go to university you must go to urban areas”. Pixabay

Climate change is another of the obstacles that Gambia’s primary sector faces, as explained by Sandren Jatta. For her, four reasons explain the reduction in some harvests, and two of them have to do with global warming: increased salinisation and the lack of rain: “It doesn’t rain but when it finally rains, the amount is very low,” she laments. And she adds that, sometimes, if livestock is not well monitored, the animals can eat part of the harvest. The lack of fertilizers – or their improper use – completes the picture: “Fertilizers are expensive and many people don’t have access to them. Before, farmers were helped more, they received free seeds; now many don’t have them and are subsistence farmers, they don’t have access to education and they don’t know how to use chemical fertilizers optimally and sometimes they apply too much.”
Veronique Mendy is the one who knows the world of fertilizers the most of the three. She works for a company that uses a formula that is perfectly suited to the situation in Gambia: it fills drums with old fish and mixes them with water, garlic and limestone to transform them into fertilizer. According to Mendy, fertilizers are at the heart of the problems of Gambian agriculture: “There are those who don’t have land, but have water; there are those who have water, but no technical knowledge, or are attacked by insects”, she comments.

Young People. “We must encourage young people to go into agriculture. ”CC BY-SA 4.0/DWreporter

And she smiles, proudly, announcing what she is working on: “What we are preparing serves as a fertilizer and an anti-parasitic. The costs are very low and the goal of the team she works with is to produce fertilizers that are cheaper than imported ones. Mendy lists the prices of raw materials: “The fish comes to us for free or almost; The rest does not cost more than 200 dalasi (less than three euros) to make a 50-kilo bag. “We should add the costs of transportation and energy to produce it.” According to her, if they managed to commercialize it, this ingredient could revolutionize Gambian agriculture: considering that a bag of fertilizer costs 33 euros, for the same price Gambian farmers could get several bags of local fish-based fertilizer.

Overcoming obstacles
Many Gambians do not trust products made in Gambia. “Gambians often prefer imported products,” Veronique Mendy notes. But she trusts the product she is learning to make to overcome this reluctance, and she trusts especially the youth: “We must encourage young people
to go into agriculture.”

The Gambia. Women at the Market. “Gambians often prefer imported products”. Pixabay

They want to combine horticulture – Rose and Sandren’s strong point – with livestock farming, which would be used to produce fertilizer – Veronique’s strong point – with manure. Her goal is to achieve the greatest possible self-sufficiency, importing only items that are not produced in the country. At the moment, they are looking for capital to start their investment: “They are helping us to cultivate a hectare and, in our case, we don’t need to hire an expert to advise us: we can do it ourselves,” explains Veronique Mendy. The goal of the project should be combined with other measures such as improved storage and a more stable electricity supply.
The three young women are looking forward to this and other projects. Because they believe that solutions must be found locally. This is surely a way to help many young people to stay and invest their energies in their own country. (Open Photo: The Gambia. People and fishing boats on one of the beaches of the coastal town, Tanji.  Istock/Salvador-Aznar)

Jaume Portell Caño