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The Water in Olive Lake.

Monday, 1 June 2020 8:00

Long, long ago, a mother and her son lived by Olive Lake below Olive Mountain. The mother was very, very old and could not work anymore. Her young son rented a plot of land from the landlord and laboured on it all the year round. But despite his industry year in and year out, their life never improved; they never had enough food or clothing.

The young man began to marvel: “Why is it that the water in Olive Lake, that doesn’t stay still, is yet turbid? Why is it that, in spite of all my hard work, I still am so poor?”
Then he heard that one could seek advice from the God of the West in one’s difficulties and decided to go there and find an answer to his questions. He was not one to let a matter rest, once he had decided on it. So he made sure that the stocks of fuel, rice, oil and salt would last his mother for some time. Then he set off the very next morning.

For seven times seven days he walked, his face turned towards the west. Parched with thirst, he knocked at a hut and asked for a drink. The kind old woman inside invited him into her house and treated him hospitably. Then she asked him: “Why is it, young man, that you’re panting so? Where are you hurrying to?” “I am going to the Western Heaven,” he replied, “to ask the God of the West why the water of Olive Lake, although it never stays still, is yet turbid and why I labour all the year round and am still poor.”

When the old woman heard this, she gladly seized the opportunity. “Will you find out something for me too? I have a daughter, eighteen years of age, who is very beautiful and clever. Yet she has never spoken a word in all her life! Would you ask the God of the West why she cannot speak?” “I shall ask for you,” the young man promised readily.
After a night in the old woman’s hut, he walked on towards the west again, for another seven times seven days. At the end of that period, he felt very tired. As it was getting dark, he knocked at the door of a hut.

An old man opened and invited him in. After he had put some food and drink before him, he inquired: “Where are you going in such a hurry that you’re sweating all over?” “I am going to the Western Heaven to ask the God of the West why the water in Olive Lake doesn’t stay still and yet is turbid, and why is it that I labour all the year and am still poor,” the young man answered. Thereupon the old man said with a laugh: “How very fortunate! I too have a question.

There’s an orange tree in my orchard, with leaves a lush green. But why doesn’t it bear fruit?” “I shall be glad to find out for you,” the young man promised readily. The next day, he continued his journey. Suddenly he came to a wide, wild river. There was no ferry. How could he get across? He sat down on a big stone by the riverside, wondering what to do. Suddenly, a gust of wind covered the sky with dark clouds and sent the river roaring. After a while, the storm subsided and a beautifully coloured cloud appeared in the sky.
From the rushing river, a dragon called up: “Hey, young man! Where is it that you’re travelling to with such speed?”

“I am going to the Western Heaven to ask the God of the West why the water in Olive Lake doesn’t stay still and yet is turbid, and why is it that I labour all the year and yet am so poor,” the young man replied. “Then you can ask a question for me, too. I harm neither men nor animals, and I’ve chastised myself for a thousand years here. Why can’t I rise up to Heaven?” “I’ll be sure to ask this question for you,” the young man promised the dragon readily, and then the dragon carried him across the river on his back.

After the young man had gone westward for more than a day, he came to a big, old city with a palace. When he asked the gate man where the God of the West lived, he was taken to a magnificent hall in the palace. In the middle of this hall sat an old man with silvery hair and beard. This must be the God of the West, thought the young man. But before he could utter a word, the old man addressed him smilingly: “What is it you come here for, young man?” “I have four questions to which I would like you to give me the answers.”

The God of the West assented, but first told him: “Our rule here is: ask one and not two; ask three and not four; ask only odd but no even numbers of questions. Now you have four questions. Think it over and decide which one to omit!” The young man was hard put to it to decide. He thought the questions over and over again. His own question was very important. But the three other questions were also important. Perhaps he’d better put other people’s business before his own, since he was allowed to ask only three questions and not four. So he decided to give up his own question and ask the three others.

When they were answered satisfactorily, he went away happily from the palace of the God of the West. At the riverside, the dragon was waiting for him: hat about my question?” “The God of the West said you must do two good deeds before you can rise up to Heaven.” “What deeds? Tell me quickly!” the dragon urged him.
“Carrying me across the river is one. The other good deed will be to knock off the pearl which shines on your head at night.”

Again the dragon carried the young man across the river and then asked him to help knock the pearl off. Two horns shot out from the dragon’s head and he rose up towards Heaven immediately. When he was piercing the clouds, he called down to the young man: “Take the pearl as my reward for you!” The young man took the shining pearl and went on his homeward journey. When he arrived at the old man’s place, the first question asked was: “Did you do as you promised?”

“Yes, I did. And the God of the West wants me to tell you that nine jars of gold and nine jars of silver are buried at the bottom of the pool in your orchard. If you dig the jars out and water the orange tree with the water from the pool, the tree will bear fruit.” The old man called his son and together they scooped the water out of the pool. Then they started to dig, the young man helping them. They dug for some time, but neither gold nor silver appeared. But they did not give up. They dug deeper and deeper and there – they found nine jars of gold and nine jars of silver! As soon as they had taken the jars out, clear water sprang from the bottom of the pool and filled it in a moment.

The old man watered the tree with the clear water, as he had been advised. And as soon as the water was sprinkled on it, every branch of the tree bore fruit. Soon the whole tree was laden with golden oranges. The old man was so happy that he didn’t know what to say. The young man was asked to stay for a couple of days more and rewarded with a lot of the gold and silver. Then the young man took his leave and went on till he arrived at the old woman’s house, carrying with him the pearl that shone at night and the gold and the silver.

The old woman ran out to meet him and inquired: “Have you done what I asked you to do?””Yes,” he answered. “The God of the West wants me to tell you that your daughter will be able to speak when she sees a young man after her own heart.”
The girl came in while her mother was talking to the young man. She blushed like a rose when she caught sight of the young man and smiled shyly. Then she asked slowly: “Who is this, Mother?”
The old woman was so happy that she reeled in her excitement, clasping the girl in her arms and shedding tears of joy. Since the young man was so brawny and honest, she advised her daughter: “This is a day of good omen, my child, since you spoke your first words today. Let it be the day of your marriage!”

The young man then took leave from the old woman and went happily towards home, with his pearl that shone at night, his gold and silver, and his young bride.When he reached home, he found that his aged mother had cried her eyes blind with longing for her son. The young man wanted his mother to see how clever and beautiful her daughter-in-law was, but all she could do was to feel the girl’s smooth cheeks. He also wanted her to see the gold and silver.
But she could only listen to the clinking of the metal. Then he took out the pearl and waved it before her eyes. But no matter how the pearl shone, all the mother saw was darkness.

The young man felt very unhappy. He thought fervently: “If only my mother could see!” At the very thought, his mother’s eyes became seeing again.The young man was amazed that his wish was instantly fulfilled. Waving the pearl, he thought again: “If there were no wealthy men in the village, the poor would not be oppressed!” And it did happen that all the wealthy men died.
The young man then understood that the pearl was not an ordinary pearl that it could not only shine at night, but grant people’s wishes.
From that day on, the water in Olive Lake was no more turbid and the life of the poor became sweet as honey.

A Story of the Han People – China

The Catholic Church in Algeria. Weavers of Brotherhood.

Monday, 1 June 2020 8:00

“This is no longer the time for clashes between believers. Following the example of our martyrs, we are apostles of dialogue and peace in an Islamic land”. A conversation with the Archbishop of Algiers,
Mons. Paul Desfarges.

The Basilica of Our Lady of Africa looks out over the blue Mediterranean from the top of a 124m-high outcrop, to the north of Algiers. Inside and to the rear, on the semi-circular apse is an inscription: ‘Notre Dame d’Afrique priez pour nous et pour les Musulmans’ (Our Lady of Africa Pray for us and for the Moslems). Besides French, the invocation is also written in Arabic and Kabyle. “The Church in Algeria is a Church of encounter – the Jesuit Archbishop of Algiers, Mons. Paul Desfarges tells us – We have a mission: we must weave webs of friendship, of fraternity and peace with everyone. We are called to disarm hearts without being afraid because of our weaknesses and vulnerabilities”.

Mons. Paul Desfarges, archbishop of Algiers.

Mons. Desfarges, 75, French by birth but an Algerian citizen, has led the Archdiocese of Algiers since 2016 and, since 2015, has been President of the regional Episcopal Conference of North Africa which includes the ecclesiastical circumscriptions of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Western Sahara.
The life of the Church in Algeria has a history of bloodshed. Priests, religious men and women (including the seven Trappists of Tibhirine and Bishop Pierre Claverie) were killed because they were not ready to leave that Moslem country during the ‘black decade’ of Islamic terrorism which, from 1991 to 2002, claimed more than 150,000 victims. Those dark years began with a military coup d’état that aimed at preventing the birth of an Islamic republic and were marked by attacks and clashes between the armed forces and fundamentalists.

Martyrs of Algeria.

Mons. Desfarges comments: “The life of each one of them was a life given to God and to Algeria. Lives lived under the banner of acceptance, sharing and of service”. Then, recalling the beatification on 8 December 2018, in the Sanctuary of Notre-Dame di Santa Cruz at Orano of the nineteen martyrs of Algeria, he stated: “We cannot but associate our blessed ones with the thousands of brothers and sisters who, faithful to their creed, their conscience and their love for the country, lost their lives during the tragic years of the crisis in Algeria. This includes the 119 imams killed for refusing to condone violence. Together with them there were intellectuals, journalists, mothers and fathers of families who opposed the armed groups. Still today they continually say to us: this is our Islam, the Islam of conviviality”.
Mons. Desfarges dedicated his most recent pastoral letter to dialogue with Islam. More than once he speaks of Moslems as ‘our brothers and sisters’, and holds that many of them “give us a wonderful witness of faith and charity” despite “the difficulty we have in giving Islam its place in the history of salvation” and that “yes, some of our Moslem brothers and sisters will precede us in the Kingdom of God”. “Dialogue is not a matter of sociology or psychology – Archbishop Desfarges adds – God first entered into dialogue with his creatures. Then, in the footsteps of his Son, the disciple goes out to all. This is why the starting point is prayer: even for those who reject us. It is by prayer that we fight against evil and ask the grace to forgive the wounds we received”.

Recently, some Evangelical churches were closed by government authorities. Mons. Desfarges adds: “We immediately expressed our closeness to the reformed communities. We are confident that the Ministry for Religious Affairs will resolve the problem. The constitution of Algeria recognised freedom of worship. Even though there are some difficulties, I do not think it makes sense to speak of persecution. We are no longer in the context of religious confrontation but of encounter between believers”. “This peaceful atmosphere is shown by two facts – the Archbishop continues – the first is the proposal on the part of Algeria and accepted by the UN to celebrate the 16 May each year as International Day of Peaceful Coexistence. The second is the matter of the Hirak, the non-violent demonstrations that have been going on for ten months with people filling the squares.
The Church is attentive to this movement which aims at opening new horizons for the country. Some have noted that the Hirak began two months after the beatification of the martyrs. There is no apparent connection but the ways of the Lord are infinite…”.

The Catholic community is a small minority in Algeria: 8,000 faithful among 41 million inhabitants. There are 39 parishes in 3 dioceses (Orano, Costantina and Laghouat) and one archdiocese (Algiers). Out of 98 priests, 47 of whom are diocesan, 57 work in the archdiocese of Algiers, together with around 80 Sisters; half the religious women present in Algeria, belong to 20 different institutes as well as around ten institutes of men. Speaking of the Catholic community, the Archbishop says: “We are indeed a universal Church in the sense that we bring together different cultures, languages and nationalities. We have Catholic Algerians, women who are married to Moslems and personnel who work here but are from abroad. One meaningful component is made up of young Africans: they are in their hundreds and come from about twenty different countries to the south of the Sahara and they give us shining testimony. Then, we are also a Church that is becoming less French: the celebrations are now in Arabic or English”. The Archbishop then refers to the migrants who have Catholics among them. “They are in a very difficult situation. Often they are stopped at the borders. Caritas is providing humanitarian assistance especially for the weaker ones like the women and children. Among them there are also some prisoners who are helped by our chaplains”.

What about conversions? “We do not engage in proselytism. The ‘new’ faithful whom I have personally received have completed a long period of searching. Then, when they knocked at my door, they said: we want to know Jesus. This was because they felt loved by a God of joy and forgiveness. Certainly, we want them to be Christians who are not opposed to their Algerian brothers and sisters. Some Moslems are already asking: ‘And why not? In addition, many Moslems were touched by the Document on Brotherhood signed by Pope Francis and the Great Imam of al-Azhar.” The Archbishop quotes it. ‘It does not involve both parties in the same way but it reminds us that it is faith that brings the believers to see others as their brothers and sisters to be loved’.

Genevieve Devey

Mongolia. An Unstable Democracy.

Monday, 1 June 2020 8:00

The advisability, possibility and feasibility of the elections for the new Mongolian parliament, the single house Grand Hural with 76 seats, planned for 24 June and presently unconfirmed, are inevitably intertwined with the ongoing emergency due to the spread
of the Covid-19.

The spread has reached epidemic proportions though, in Mongolia, it has been somewhat contained, both for geographic reasons (an extensive, scarcely populated country), and because of the immediate closure of land borders with the People’s Republic of China at the end of January and those with Russia at the end of March which isolated the country from the rest of the outside world.

President of Mongolia Khaltmaagiin Battulga.

Afterwards, more than once, President Khaltmaagiin Battulga, an exponent of the Democratic Party, a former fighter and minister for Roads, Transport and Construction, asked to have the date postponed, a possibility not only connected to the present crisis but also a confirmation of the persistent tensions between the Head of State, elected in July 2017 with an absolute majority in a two-term system, and a government that emanates from the parliament and is led by Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh of the Mongolian People’s Party. From a certain point of view, unless the situation again becomes critical, there is nothing new in the Mongolian contest, where tensions between the major posts in the state are constantly present in political life, as is the case with those within the Grand Hural.
In one sense, one may say, it is the political situation that represents, together with its continentality, the principal limitation of that comprehensive development that is defined, both for its isolation and extension, and for its potential, the ‘New Frontier’ of Asia.
A surprisingly lively country, for years it has been among those with the fastest growth in the continent.

At the centre of the last electoral campaigns was the exploitation of the enormous mineral resources of the country, a potential ‘volcano’ of development but also a lighted fuse of indiscriminate development, unbalanced and largely dependent upon foreign interests. It is a democracy that is followed with interest, on the crest of the wave of full self-determination obtained through the peaceful revolution of 1990 and sealed by the Constitution of 1992 which ended the Soviet-style system that governed it for about seventy years through the Mongolia People’s Party. Mongolia has always been a country extremely attentive to political affairs, despite the objective difficulty of half the population – the almost two million nomads who live a pastoral life in their tents scattered across the steppes or in the desert, in extensive regions cut off by freezing temperatures and floods for several months of the year – to keep informed and make their voices heard.
This enthusiasm for democracy is demonstrated by the fact that, in previous elections, almost 90 per cent of those eligible voted, even though the electors often had to accomplish a long journey on horseback to reach the nearest polling station. However, in recent elections the number of voters collapsed, underlining a new sense of helplessness in front of uncontrollable events. Among these was the arrest for alleged corruption on the eve of the elections of 2012 of the former President of the Republic and leader of the Mongolian Revolutionary Party, Nambaryn Enkhbayar.

The more immediate ‘dangers’, after that of political instability, derive from the need for strategic security of the two powerful neighbours, Russia and China and, as regards the latter, its unending need for raw material. We may say that the delicate balancing of alliances and concessions has guaranteed Mongolia – 1,564,100 square kilometres and with a population of 3.2 million – its independence, at least formally, from the beginning of the XX century.
On 1 December 1911, Mongolia took advantage of the end of the Chinese empire to end a centuries-long unwanted embrace, and so reconnect with its own history and traditions. The attempt only partly succeeded since, within a decade, the country came under Soviet influence, even becoming, in 1924, a real ‘satellite’ of the USSR and, consequently, in the aftermath of the Second World War, a neighbour to be viewed with hostility by communist China. This continued until, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, Peking succeeded in affirming itself, despite strong resistance, not territorially but in the matter of natural resources. Formally, the dominant élite sought to keep a certain distance from growing Chinese pressure, but the People’s Republic of China managed to make itself responsible for more than half of foreign investment in Mongolia.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, Mongolia began its own search for prosperity, maintaining an equal distance between itself, Russia and China in order to consolidate its independence and stability. It took its full place on the international scene as a guarantee of participation, recognition and… good business. (S.V.)

Dependent Economy.

Monday, 1 June 2020 8:00

The question present in the recent history of Mongolia is whether the potential of the country will be transformed into real progress and with which policies.

Up to recent times, the world seemed to have discovered a peaceful country that was stable and potentially one of the richest in the world. Underneath the ground there is an abundance of coal, gold, uranium and other precious resources that are beginning to run out elsewhere. Since its opening in 2013, the Oyu Tolgoi mine, deep in the Gobi Desert, the biggest copper mine in the world, has attracted the interest of all the western world all too willing to benefit from it, to Ulaanbaatar. However, the riches of Oyu Tolgoi mine were ceded to multinational groups of companies and the mineral riches, apart from the fact that they are not inexhaustible, are greatly subject to the fluctuations of the market. Development is hampered by the repayment of debts due to the emission of state bonds, the fluctuations in the price of coal and copper, and also by the ongoing reconversion of energy-generating installations in China and elsewhere, as well as the traumatic global consequences of the present pandemic. Finally, there is the possible impact on the already emptying Mongolian coffers of ‘gifts’ to the various electorates during or after the electoral campaign.

The difficulty in guaranteeing a balanced development is demonstrated by the reduction in the Gross National Product which went down by 17.3 per cent in 2011 and 7.2 per cent in 2018, as well as the all-too-slow reduction of the population living below the poverty line of 2 dollars per day, which was reduced from 38.8 per cent in 2010 to 28.4 per cent in 2018.It must be borne in mind that the current year was seen as a year of rebalancing after 2016 dominated by parliamentary and 2017 by presidential elections, and also the substantial bailout by the International Monetary Fund; followed by 2018 which was considerably depressed and 2019 when there was a slight recovery due to the sustained sale of coal.

The feeling of delaying is today relaunched by the wait for concrete results from the constitutional amendments approved last November in which it is explicitly stated that the state of Mongolia must receive the major benefits from the exploitation of mineral deposits (designated as ‘strategic deposits’) entrusted to foreign companies. The law has not actually been applied, and its meaning seems uncertain, if not simply something ready to be used as a lever in future negotiations on concessions. Whatever the case may be, the approval has concentrated even more attention on the Oyu Togoi mine, entrusted to the Anglo-Australian multinational Rio Tinto which must handle the unbudgeted costs that risk setting the company and the government on a collision course.For a decade, the Mongolian economy was dependent upon the price of raw materials and variations in the international mining industry. Again in 2018, copper guaranteed a regular income on investments with Oyu Tolgoi alone contributing 6 per cent of GNP which then stood at 13 billion dollars. The trend continued last year but, like other benefits, it depends on too close a relationship with the People’s Republic of China which has already shown signs of opening towards other sources of supplies of various minerals and has reversed its policy of depending on coal for energy production. Agriculture, tourism and technology are sectors in growth, even if only very late.

President of Mongolia Khaltmaagiin Battulga with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

A high degree of dependency on foreign support in the economic field requires a careful foreign policy. Nevertheless, while in past years its existence, both multilaterally and bilaterally – especially in connection with industrialised countries and potential partners or investors who, overall, are meaningfully described as ‘close thirds’ – has been tangible, under the Battulga administration relations became fossilised except those with Vladimir Putin’s Russia with which the president shares an interest in unarmed hand-to-hand combat techniques.
Having failed, due to widespread opposition, to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and having barely avoided a crisis with Turkey because of an attempt to kidnap a teacher living in the Mongolian capital apparently close to those opposed to President Erdogan, Mongolia also failed to host the Trump-Kim summit in June 2018 which was held in Singapore, Mongolian diplomacy still presents itself as a mediator to reach a negotiated and definitive settlement to Korean North-South tensions. (S.V.)

Myanmar. Elections 2020. Hope for change?

Monday, 1 June 2020 8:00

Later this year, Myanmar is scheduled to hold its third general election in six decades in a landmark development for the country’s democratic transition.

While details remain unclear amid the global coronavirus pandemic, as of now the Southeast Asian state is set to hold its expected polls as the ruling party faces manifold challenges that could pose significant risks for the future trajectory of reform and freedom.While Myanmar had been under the rule of the military, known as the Tatmadaw, for a half-century, an opening in the 2010s saw subsequent political inroads made that turned the country into a rare story of hope for democracy and freedom in Southeast Asia. The changes culminated in the assumption of power by the long-time opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), led by democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, following a landslide win in free national elections held in November 2015.

Nearly five years on, while Suu Kyi and the NLD have undertaken reforms in some areas, they have not lived up to the high expectations that existed when they took office. Politically, at home, Suu Kyi’s relationship with ethnic groups has worsened over the years as hopes for national reconciliation and decentralization have dimmed, and her ties with the military – which continues to exercise significant independent influence – remain strained. Abroad, though Myanmar has reinforced its foreign alignments, the balance of those alignments continues to be hampered by the legacy of the Rohingya crisis, which soured ties with some Western countries including the United States and reinforced Myanmar’s continued dependence on China.

Security-wise, the country’s ongoing ethnic conflicts, which have plagued it since independence in 1948, earning the title of the world’s longest-running civil war, have shown few signs of abating. Despite initial hopes for peace and talk of a temporary ceasefire amid COVID-19, a series of structural challenges – including lingering civil-military tensions, fierce divisions among its various ethnic groups, and the influence of insurgent groups, including the new Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) – suggest that there is little chance of things truly changing for the better until the dust settles after 2020 polls.

Economically, while the NLD has made some efforts to encourage businesses, this has largely been an area of missed opportunity. Major issues remain in areas such as jobs, infrastructure, and foreign investment, in part exacerbated by the aforementioned stalled efforts at national reconciliation. Though Myanmar itself has thus far not been majorly affected by COVID-19 relative to the rest of Southeast Asia, the virus has nonetheless further dimmed economic prospects in the near term, with the NLD as of now set to enter into the 2020 elections with the lowest growth rates since the country’s opening began.

The confluence of these political, security, and economic challenges reinforce the reality that the NLD will enter into 2020 elections amid a much more sombre atmosphere than the hope displayed in the historic 2015 polls that brought it to power. The NLD is facing waning support in certain ethnic and urban areas of the country. More broadly, even though the elections could help consolidate the country’s fragile electoral democracy, these underlying challenges have also heightened anxieties about polls themselves, including whether or not they will be held on time, will proceed in a free and fair manner, and will be held peacefully in the country, especially in conflict-ridden areas.

To be sure, despite these challenges, it is far from doom and gloom for the NLD heading into polls expected later this year. While the ruling party has had a rocky road during its term in office and has at times admitted as much, for now, the fact is that the 2020 elections still remain the NLD’s to lose, with Suu Kyi herself continuing to retain significant popularity in most of Myanmar and little appetite for the military to return to power. It is also important to keep in mind that the focus on COVID-19 can cut both ways: It can exacerbate the NLD’s governance challenges, but it can also reinforce the case for continuity and political stability and take the focus away from the party’s own problems, thereby cementing its expected return to power.

Even so, the realization of an expected NLD election win, albeit one smaller than the landslide that the party had recorded back in 2015, will not change the sobering reality of the NLD’s tough road ahead and the prospects for Myanmar’s democracy and reform moving forward. While a second term for the NLD would keep the prospects for reform intact, the dizzying array of issues it will have to deal with – from constitutional reform to managing ethnic conflict – remains daunting. And as the years progress, other variables, including discontent among smaller ethnic parties, maneuvering by elements within the military to maintain or even increase their political influence, and the NLD’s succession dynamics beyond Suu Kyi herself, mean that the ruling party’s continued ability to govern Myanmar may be far from assured.

This is not to say that Myanmar’s upcoming polls are unimportant: indeed, if and when they are held and whatever their limits, competitive elections will be a landmark development in helping consolidate fragile electoral democracy in the Southeast Asian state. But a broader, future-oriented perspective must be kept in mind even as the focus is on the dynamics and then the results of Myanmar’s upcoming elections in the coming months. Otherwise, the window of hope for change in the country that we saw open in the early 2010s could soon begin closing and the country’s trajectory could take a turn for the worse.

Prashanth Parameswaran
Southeast Asia Analyst

Mexico. Pre-Hispanic city of Uxmal.

Monday, 1 June 2020 8:00

The ancient pre-Hispanic city of Uxmal and its three surrounding sites: Kabhá, Labná and Sayil admirably demonstrate the social and economic structure of late Maya society.

One of the great mysteries of humanity is the sudden disappearance of the extraordinary Mayan civilization at the end of the eleventh century which would contribute so much to the knowledge of sciences and arts worldwide.The city of Uxmal is located in the southwest of the state of Yucatán, precisely in the centre of the Puuc region. The word ‘puuc’ is derived from the Maya term for ‘hill’. Since the Yucatán is relatively flat, this term was extended to encompass the large karstic range of hills in the southern portion of the state, hence, the terms Puuc region or Puuc hills. Uxmal was founded around 700 AD and in the Late Classic period, around 850-920 AD, when most of the city’s main structures were built, its population reached about 25,000 people making Uxmal one of the largest cities in the Yucatán. Its buildings date between the years 700 and 1000, and are oriented according to astronomical phenomena, such as the ascent and descent of Venus.

In this region an architectural style emerged – and an art of its own – known as Puuc, which is distinguished by a rich ornamentation with symbolic motifs, facings of thin squares of limestone veneer over a cement-and-rubble core; boot-shaped vault stones; decorated cornices around columns in doorways; engaged or half-columns repeated in long rows; and lavish use of stone mosaics in upper facades, emphasizing sky-serpent faces with long, hook-shaped noses, as well as frets and lattice-like designs of crisscrossed elements and on the corners representations of Chaac, god of rain. Upon entering the area, one sees the wonderful Pyramid of the Foreteller which dominates the ceremonial centre. It is 35 metres high with its elliptical base measuring approximately 85 by 50 metres; monumental stairs are located on the two sides of the structure. Several metres separate it from the so-called Quadrangle of the Nuns, as the Spaniards called it thinking it had been inhabited by Mayan priestesses.
This architectural complex is made up of four structures on different platforms arranged around a large trapezoidal patio of 65 by 45 meters. The building located to the north seems to be the most important since it is on a higher platform compared to the others.The facades present a rich combination of decorative motifs such as lattice, columns, huts, the masks of the rain god, owls, symbols of the planet Venus, geometric elements, and human figures, either standing or sitting.

The decoration of this complex is splendid, which is why it is recognized as an outstanding example of the abstract and geometric art of the Maya. Heading south, one passes through the middle of the Ball Court, which is rather small, 43 by 10 meters, if compared to that in Chichén Itzá. The House of Tortoises is another impressive structure so called from its fresco of sculptured turtles. It is located on the same terrace as the Governor’s Palace, which is probably the finest example of the Puuc style. The palace, a multi-roomed, rectangular building (c. 100 m long and 12 m wide) with a symmetrical layout, sits on a large artificial platform. It consists of 24 rooms and three sections divided by two corridors, whose vaults are the highest in the region. The decoration of the facade of the building has glyphs of Venus, placed on the cheeks of the masks of Chac, god of rain and fertility and there are also eight two-headed snakes above the main entrance. Along the facade, there are thatched huts, garlands, columns, thrones, feather headdresses, numerals with bars and dots appearing in two Chac masks in the north corners of the palace. Basically it is a masterpiece for both its architecture and decoration.

Universal values
Uxmal is considered as one of the most important archaeological sites in Yucatan and one of the most important pre-Columbian monumental complexes in the Americas. This pre-Hispanic city was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1996, following four other monumental and representative sites of the Mayan culture which were previously inscribed on the World Heritage List: Chichen Itza and Palenque (Mexico), Tikal (Guatemala) and Copán (Honduras).
Each site with its own peculiarities, has been fundamental in deepening the knowledge of the Mayan civilization.

The ruins of Uxmal’s ceremonial pyramids represent the peak of Mayan art and architecture in its last stage, in terms of design, distribution and ornamentation, Elements of art from Mexico with those originating in Yucatan were combined together in the extraordinary quality of its buildings and in its decorative art. Uxmal and the other Mayan archaeological sites highlight the exceptional universal values of the Mayan culture.

Pedro Santacruz

The Catholic Church in Libya. “Few but not invisible”.

Monday, 1 June 2020 8:00

It is difficult to be a Church in a place of violence and instability. “We are few but not invisible”. We speak with Mons. George Bugeja,
Bishop of Tripoli.

Libya is a country that lives between chaos and instability. With the killing of Gaddafi in October 2011, the country entered a spiral of violence. It is a country divided between the authority of the government of Tripoli led by Fayez Al Serraj and the militias of the strong man of Benghazi, Khalifa Haftar. In between the balance of power is associated with influential local tribes and, of course, the cluttering presence of many external actors who have no intention of losing the opportunity to gain possession of the great riches of the country and the control of its share on the geopolitical chessboard of the Mediterranean.
It is in this framework, with its sad and dark background, that the Catholic Church continues to be present. “We may be few but we are not invisible”, the Vicar of Tripoli, Mons. Bugeja tells us. We are just a small community surviving in the midst of so much violence and insecurity”.

Mons. George Bugeja, bishop of Tripoli.

The small whitewashed church where all can meet the Maltese Bishop in his Friars Minor habit, is, in fact, dedicated to St. Francis. It is located in the Dahra quarter, right in the centre of Tripoli. It is the only one that has been active in the Libyan capital since the time of Gaddafi’s ‘green revolution’ when – in 1969 – the Rais took power with a coup d’état under the banner of national socialism and the expulsion of foreigners. The property of the Church was confiscated, the houses of prayer (39 in the city) were closed, including the Sacred Heart Cathedral which, after some architectural changes, was fitted for Islamic worship; today it is the great mosque dominating Algeria square.
Monsignor Bugeja, 58, has been Vicar Apostolic of Tripoli since 2017. He states: “we are a Christian community composed entirely of around three thousand foreigners out of a population of 6.3 million. They are mostly Filipinos employed as nurses in the hospitals, and Africans mostly from Nigeria and Ghana, as well as a few from South Sudan.
To assist them here in Tripoli, there is just myself, another Franciscan friar, Friar Magdy Helmi, and eight Sisters of Mother Teresa, working as volunteers in two government institutes at the service of Libyan citizens with mental illnesses”.

“In Benghazi, the See of the other vicariate – the bishop continues – the situation is even more precarious: the church was destroyed when the area was bombed to drive out Isis which had set up its headquarters there. All the religious Sisters left; there are now only two Friars, as well as one in Al Beida close by.
The community is formed by a scattering of Filipinos and Sub-Saharan Africans who gather for worship in a small room at the Children’s Hospital. There we have to start again from scratch”.
“Our activities are all carried out within the confines of the parish structures. We have the Sunday liturgy on Fridays, a holy day for Moslems. We have two masses, one for the Filipinos and one for the other communities, both of which are attended by from four to five hundred of the faithful. Attendance though, depends on the situation in the city; when there are clashes in the surrounding area, people lock themselves in their houses. In the afternoon there are catechism lessons; the children are taught by the Sisters while the adults are accompanied by trained lay people, helped by myself. The Africans also organise Bible study meetings, choir practice and also get together in order to organise community help for people in particular need: they know well the various situations and, when necessary, they know they can come to me to ask for help. On Fridays we also have a small independent market where clothes and food are available”.

Mons. Budeja tells us it is difficult to make a plan of accompaniment since people are continually changing. “ People come here to work and remain here only as long as the work contract lasts. Even those with fairly constant work, such as the Filipino nurses, leave after a few years, not to mention all the people in transit who want to reach Europe. Instability is the norm. There are not many families and they are often divided with the father in Tripoli and the mother at home in their own country. Nevertheless, despite everything, each month we have six or seven baptisms of African children! However, when the children reach the age of five or six, the parents generally send them home to the grandparents, since in Libya they would have to attend a fee-paying school”.It is a situation with serious discomforts that must be borne. The Bishop of Tripoli comments: “ Naturally, many decide to leave. Up to a few years ago, our churches were attended by Poles, South Koreans, Italians, Maltese, Arabs and others, and the celebrations were held over the three days of the week-end; otherwise there would not have been room for everyone.”
” Today things are different but life in the city centre goes on quite normally; offices and schools remain open even when there are clashes in the outskirts. Yes, we have to put up with a lot of trouble. Electrical power is cut off for eight or twelve hours a day, especially in the summer when the temperature reaches 50°. There are many people with enormous problems both economic and in the field of human rights”.

Libya. Migrants gather at the Anti-illegal immigration Agency in Tripoli.

What is the Church doing for them? “We have a small Caritas office with a lay woman in charge. It is open on Tuesdays and Fridays and we use it to lend a hand to anyone who comes to us. Those coming to ask for help are mostly Eritrean Christians and Sudanese Moslems. If they are not registered with the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) we help them to do so, or else we send them to the International Organisation for Migrants (IOM) if they want to return to their own countries. We also have a small first-aid clinic where a woman doctor and two nurses work. When we have serious cases, we avail of some NGOs through which we have the sick persons admitted to hospital. When we find cases of unattached women with difficult pregnancies, we can always count on the help of the Danish Refugee Council. From the point of view of material aid, we try to help people pay the rent or, with the help of Caritas Italiana, we help students with their school fees. We have always to be careful where money is concerned as some may use it to pay human traffickers, expecting to be brought to Europe”.It is estimated that there are 200,000 migrants waiting to travel from Libya to Europe. In the past three years, more than 40,000 passed through the refugee camps where they suffered violence and torture. “Some years ago, our ‘Social Service’ was authorised to visit people confined to the camps and to those detained in the prisons to distribute food and pray together with them. This is no longer possible. Nevertheless, among our parishioners there are some citizens of Sub-Saharan Africa who have been in those detention centres and succeeded in getting away from them, either because they paid money or were sick. Now those people who were traumatised, see the Church as a safe place where they are welcomed and protected”.

The Bishop of Tripoli concludes: “ The original sin of this country is that it is so rich! Everyone wants their share of the money. The Libyans would like to find a political solution by themselves but the foreign powers refuse to yield. The problem is that the international agreements are often ineffective. The embargo is a farce: arms are still coming undisturbed, while Europe does not speak with one voice but proceeds in a non-uniform manner with each country intent upon pursuing its own interests. The UN is trying to mediate between the factions but concrete results will take a long time. Nevertheless, I am hopeful. Peace will come and we will be here to welcome it”.

Chiara Zappa

Will China Replace the United States in the Middle East?

Monday, 1 June 2020 8:00

It is not clear how or to what extent the COVID-19 will affect the international order. However, it is clear that it will accelerate the disruption that was already well underway before the pandemic. Complexities and nuances aside the disruption implies a shift of influence in the Middle East and North Africa region away from the West (the United States in particular) toward China.

In the immediate post-pandemic lockdown period, Washington will be focusing on health and the economy – especially as the 2020 election approaches. China will inevitably consider this an opportunity to fill in the vacuum left by a retreating, or at least less focused, American power in the Middle East. Moreover, the Saudi led effort to smash the US shale oil industry by increasing crude production to levels that have created the paradoxical phenomenon of negative prices (because of insufficient storage capacity) will have further reduced the American public’s tolerance for their government’s dense role in the Middle East.
Nevertheless, Trump cannot back away from his stance on Iran, ostensibly aimed at triggering a ‘regime change’ through economic pressure, enhanced by ever stringent sanctions and its military presence in neighboring Iraq. Nor can the US simply walk away from the core Middle East issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; especially, after Trump unveiled his ‘Deal of the Century’ so-called ‘peace plan’.

Unlike Washington, Beijing’s focus will be more economic than military and framed in the context of its Belt and Road Initiative, even if it has built military bases in Pakistan and Djibouti – not the Middle East proper, but well within easy reach. The region is bound to experience shockwaves as hinted above, as regional powers from Turkey and Iran to Israel and Egypt might try to use a growing US vacuum to pursue strategic ambitions of their own from obstructing Kurdish nationalism to gaining more control over key resources such as water, oil and natural gas, or simply for the oldest of reasons: to distract populations from domestic problems, which the pandemic will have magnified. By way of comparison, the Middle East in 2020 could start to look like the Middle East in 1960 that is in the aftermath of the Franco-British failure to seize the Suez Canal and before the United States’ hegemony, which took advantage of Saddam Hussein’s misstep in Kuwait in 1990 to launch a hegemonic effort in the region.

China has quietly already been shoring up its role in the Middle East. And, at least for the time being, this role does not intend to overturn the existing order. Notably, while criticizing the US decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem and the Deal of the Century, Beijing has both reiterated its 1988 commitment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as capital, and kept close ties to Israel – signing multibillion-dollar contracts for the construction of key infrastructure, and even drawing Washington’s criticism – with the Jewish State. But, whereas, Russia has also pursued close ties with Israel for domestic (large Jewish population and high percentage of Russo-Israeli citizens among its financial oligarchs) and strategic reasons (limiting Israeli efforts in Syria and Lebanon to tactical rather than strategic moves), China’s goals, and its diplomacy, appear almost entirely commercially motivated.
In 2017 Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated his government’s position on the Middle East conflict in four points: To promote a political solution on the basis of the “two State program”.To ensure joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. To coordinate the international community by expanding the peace-keeping force. To encourage economic development as the foundation of a lasting peace.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (L) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

As of 2020, it seems that China has made no proposals to obstruct Trump’s machinations with the Israeli Government, including a de-facto annexation of some 30% of the West Bank, fully integrating illegal (under International Law) Jewish settlements, as part of the proposed Peace Plan. After backing the PLO and PFLP, China has all but eliminated any of the ideological links that kept it close to the Palestinian struggle in the 1970’s. Still, Beijing has good relations with Hamas, formally criticizing Israel in cases of its routine destruction of Palestinian property in the West Bank and Gaza. The ever practical Beijing understand that it can broaden its influence over the entire Middle East region, from where it satiates its enormous appetite for oil without the need for military interventions, bases or fleets, by observing wise policies. From a wider perspective, Beijing considers regional stability of utmost importance because it favors trade. It’s why Beijing has close ties to Tehran and Riyadh. Quite simply, China’s ambitious new silk route, the One Belt Road, passes through the Middle East on its way to Europe. The four-point program for Israeli-Palestinian peace was first revealed in 2013 just as Xi Jinping unveiled the One Belt Road project.

In that sense, Trump’s peace ‘Deal’, which essentially buries any remaining hope for Palestinian nationalism, as well as the US president’s pressure on Iran, compromise China’s effort by fueling tensions and conflict. China has criticized Trump’s plan because it undermines regional peace, potentially fomenting a new wave of extremism that could spread throughout the region. Trump’s Deal is largely designed for domestic consumption to court the Christian Fundamentalist/Evangelical vote in particular. His rival-apparent, Democrat Joe Biden, has expressed quiet skepticism over the plan, even if he said that, if elected President, he would not move the US embassy back to Tel Aviv, reversing Trump’s change. The Chinese have reason to back Biden, who would, presumably, be less interested in continuing the trade-war that Trump seems so keen on pursuing. The annexation of the West Bank also depends on the tenure of the Netanyahu-Gantz political alliance, needed to form a government after three inclusive attempts.
But, given the tentative support for the ‘Deal’ from prominent representatives of the regimes in power in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, China would likely choose a way to acquiesce to the plan without posing obstacles. Perhaps, if China could find a way to financially support Egypt and Jordan, it could obstruct the plan by allowing Cairo and Amman to make credible threats to withdraw from their respective peace treaties with Israel.

Jordan’s King Abdallah II walks (R) with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Amman, Jordan.

For all of President al-Sisi’s and King Abdallah’s objections to the ‘Deal of the Century’, both leaders know that so long as they receive aid from the United States. Yet, Beijing seems uninterested in altering the geopolitical framework of the region, preferring to honor the founding principle of its diplomacy: not to interfere in a country’s internal affairs. Of course, this does not preclude China from pursuing closer ties with both Cairo and Amman, just as it has done with Tehran, in order to gradually reduce US influence to the point where relations ‘naturally’ shift in a manner, which China can exploit geopolitically as well. Just as in the case of Iran, where Beijing did not wish to see a conflict between the US and the Islamic Republic, it will not deliberately try to displace the United States, risking the shockwaves of Washington’s withdrawal to send a spark in its direction.
The timing is inappropriate. The United States remains the main importer of Chinese goods. Beijing understands that after the 2020 election, whether it’s Trump or his Democratic rival sitting in the Oval Office, the ‘trade war’ with China will become less of a priority. For the time being, Beijing understand that its attempts to establish deeper ties with Middle Eastern States cannot come at the risk of aggravating relations with the Washington.

China is interested in maintaining peace in the entire region, which is essential to completing the One Belt Road project, which will help spread Chinese influence through investments and infrastructure, expanding a regional market extending from the Horn of Africa, to the Middle East, southern and central Asia. A gradual US disengagement from the region can only facilitate this process, and direct interference into US interests in the region could compromise it. The Chinese famously think long term. Legend has it that when President Richard Nixon began courting China in 1973, he asked then Premier Zhou Enlai what he thought about the French Revolution. Zhou responded: “it’s too early to tell”.

Alessandro Bruno

Africa gets debt arrangement to cope with its first recession for 25 years.

Monday, 1 June 2020 8:00

The covid 19 pandemics has caused a recession in Africa which makes the repayment of external debt instalments unstainable and may jeopardises the fight against poverty reduction. The G 20 countries have decided to freeze payments. But this might not enough to to cope with the consequences of the recession.

In a matter of weeks, the Covid 19 crisis has considerably worsened economic prospects on the continent. For the first time in 25 years, Africa should record a negative growth rate in 2020. According to the latest World Bank update on the region, the growth is forecast to fall from 2.4 per cent in 2019 to between negative 2.1 percent and negative 5.1 percent in 2020. World Bank experts project that Covid-19 will cost Africa between U.S. $37 billion and $79 bn in 2020. Rwandan President Paul Kagame says that it could take “a generation or more” for the continent to recover. Accordingly, at least $100 bn in international support to Africa is needed this year alone.
The trend is caused by a combination of factors including the lower demand from the main trade partner, China but also from their partners, less foreign financing resources and lower remittances and tourism revenues. According to the World Bank, in 2020, remittances from migrants to Africa will plunge by 23.1% to US $37 bn in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis. Nigeria which received the largest flows with $23.8 bn in 2019, is the most affected country, followed by Ghana ($3.5 bn)
and Kenya ($2.8 bn).

Oil and minerals producing countries should be the hardest hit. The dramatic fall of the oil prices from 67 $/barrel by end December to only 25 $ on the 4 May 2020 is expected to provoke a 9% fall of the GDP in Congo-Brazzaville where crude oil accounts for 85% of export earnings. Other oil exporters like Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Libya, South Sudan, Gabon, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea are expected to suffer as well. A 2.2 percent drop of the GDP is anticipated in the Democratic Republic of Congo, owing to the fall of copper and cobalt exports which account for 90% of total export earnings, alongside with oil and other minerals. A similar shocked is anticipated in Zambia. South Africa, the second economy of the continent after Nigeria, should face a likely contraction of its GDP ranging between – 0.8 percent and −8 percent.
The UN warns that 29 million Africans could be pushed into extreme poverty, reversing a decades long decline. Some fear the health crisis will spark security crises across the continent, foreshadowed by recent deadly crackdown in Kenya from police enforcing a curfew. In addition, Africa could experience reduced foreign direct investment flows since partners from other continents are redirecting capital locally. Travel bans and lockdowns are limiting crossborder movements. The knock-on effects for the public sector could be severe, in terms of reduced tax revenues, limitations on access to hard currency and rising deficits.

In the Horn of Africa, the damaging impact of the Covid 19 crisis coincides with the worst invasion of locusts since generations. The UN says that 20.2 million people are facing severe acute food insecurity.The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) warned that in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kanya, Djibouti, Eritrea, Tanzania, South Sudan and Uganda, the formation of new locust swarms “represents an unprecedented threat to food security and livelihoods because it coincides with the beginning of the long rains and the planting season have invaded the region.”
According to the FAO, the destruction caused by billions of desert locusts, some in swarms which have the size of Moscow, could have a devastating impact since “the vast majority of the population depend on agriculture for their livelihoods (80 percent in Ethiopia and 75 percent in Kenya). Besides, lockdowns to combat the coronavirus are hampering efforts to exterminate the locusts. In Uganda, authorities were unable to import enough pesticides from Japan, as the pandemics disrupted cargo shipments. The lockdown imposed in South Africa made it difficult to secure the helicopters for locust surveillance.

In such context, the fear is that repayments of the external debt which amounted to $ 365 bn by 2018 could bring Africa’s economy to its knees. In his Easter address, pope Francis called for the cancellation of the debt of poor countries. On the following day, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, made a similar plea, stressing that one third of Africa’s exports revenues goes to the debt service repayment, which he called a “crazy” situation. The message was partly heard; on the 13 April the International Monetary Fund announced an immediate debt relief of $ 500 m. for 25 poor countries (Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tadjikistan, Togo and Yemen). “This provides grants to our poorest and most vulnerable members to cover their IMF debt obligations for an initial phase over the next six months and will help them channel more of their scarce financial resources towards vital emergency medical and other relief efforts”, said the IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva.
The initiatives followed an earlier call from the African finance ministers on the 1 April for such debt relief measures.

On the 15 April, G-20 countries agreed to freeze payments on bilateral loans to poor countries until end 2020. The French President called the measure a “world first”. Yet, this freeze is not the write off some would have expected. One of Africa’s main creditors, China which holds 20 percent of the continental debt, while financial institutions and the private sector hold 32 percent and 30 percent respectively, had a reserved response. The Chinese Foreign Ministry argued that “the origin of Africa’s debt problem is complex and the debt profile of each country varies” but it understood “that some countries and international organizations have called for debt relief programs for African countries”. Then, at the G-20 Meeting, the Chinese Finance Minister Liu Kun declared that “China supports the suspension of debt repayment by least developed countries and will make its necessary contributions to the consensus reached at G-20.”

Now, China is unlikely to engage itself on the path of total debt forgiveness, especially on concessional loans and commercial loans, which represent the majority of African debts owed to China. Rather than outright relief, postponement of loan payments, debt-restructuring and debt/equity swaps are more likely options. There are precedents. In the case of Ethiopia, in 2018, China agreed to a restructuring of debt, including a $4 billion loan for the Addis-Djibouti railway, extending the repayment terms by 20 years. But in Burma, China converted debts into the acquisition of equities in new dam projects.
Another option could be to forgive zero-interest loans. In 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced forgiveness of all such loans for least-developed African Countries. But this kind of loan makes up only a small portion of Africa’s debt to China.
The Finance Minister of Benin, Romuald Wadagni thinks that the moratoriums on the servicing of the bilateral public debt of African countries or write-offs may indeed provide an immediate budget relief but risk to cause a deterioration of their perceived credit quality, which could impact their access to capital markets. While some experts fear that debt forgiveness may benefit corrupt elites, Paul Frix, the former head of the Belgian cooperation agency AGCD suggests that one of the ways to avert such risk would be to convert debt services into development project finance.

François Misser

Gaye Su Akyol. Dreamer of the Turkish Sound.

Friday, 1 May 2020 8:00

A mixture of Anatolian pop and oriental folk, gypsy resonances and western sounds. A committed voice denouncing the incoherences
of its land.

Anatolia is a peninsula that forms part of modern Turkey. What the ancient Romans called Asia Minor has been the cradle of a number of civilisations, from that of the Hittites to those of the Kurds and Armenians and the Ottoman civilisation of Suleiman the Magnificent.
It is a country with a large Moslem majority (97%, only 2% of which are Christian). Like most of Turkey, it is a complex land that maintains a troublesome and precarious balance between modern impulses and western trends, regurgitation of traditionalism and radical Islam.

The typical music of this land is Turku, an expressive genre derived from sung poetry which not infrequently echoes themes and protests with a social background. The main instrument is the saz, a long-necked lute also called ‘the Saracen guitar’, and it is still today the typical instrument of Turkish folk. Among the better known artists, including those outside the country, is Gaye Su Akyol, whom the reliable British newspaper The Observer has called the icon of the ‘new sound of Istanbul’; not to mention the Financial Times which labelled her ‘The Wonder Woman of Anatolia’, due also to her look that includes silver boots and a large golden cloak.

Gaye Su cleverly mixes the pop music of her native Anatolia with oriental folk, gypsy resonances and typically western sounds, more or less traceable to the rock sub-culture. Following the tendency common to many of her colleagues, Turks and non-Turk alike, Gaye Su is involved in making a watertight synthesis not only between East and West but also between modernity and tradition. All of this is enhanced by a very attentive sensitivity to the problems, tensions and unease of the present time that are even more inconsistent where she comes from. She is a female artist who, with her music, condemns the incoherencies of Turkey and the modern world.

“Many Anatolian centres are authentic cultural bridges”, she recently affirmed, and this is especially true in music circles, starting from the Hellenistic experience along the coasts of the old Ottoman Empire. “When I was young, I often used to travel around the country with my family and could see with my own eyes the exceptional anthropological diversity that characterises the Turkish world”. She takes as her guide a very clear premise: “Behind our traditions there is the breath of our forefathers which may be mixed with current ideas and thoughts.
I am still a dreamer and as such I always have within me a desire to change the world”.

Already with her debut album issued in 2014, she took social problems to heart with an anthropological approach that marked her cultural formation. Gaye is trying to make a reckless synthesis between Nirvana of Nevermind and the great masters of her land, from Selda Bagcan to Muzeyyen Senar. At the dawn of the twenties, she is a symbol of the new Turkey, a libertarian icon who continues to dream of a different future for her land and for her people.

Franz Coriasco

Zimbabwe. In search of the lost city.

Friday, 1 May 2020 8:00

Grand Zimbabwe is one of Africa’s largest and most complex archaeological sites. Its origins and decline are mysterious,
and we visited it.

The origins of Grand Zimbabwe – Dzimba-Dzemabwe in the Shona language: The Stone City – date back to 800 AD. That’s when, in the last great Bantu migration, Black African populations descended from what is present-day Zambia to the areas beyond the Zambezi River, settling in the plains at the foot of the eastern highlands, which is now south-eastern Zimbabwe. Previously, only the San ethnic populations (the Bushmen) inhabited the area.A small group of Bantu chose to settle in the ideal conditions along the banks of the Mutirikwe River. And their choice would prove to be accurate.

The water course was navigable. And it was a tributary of the Save river, for hundreds and hundreds of kilometers, served as the only river route that crossed the great Chimanimani mountain range – a natural barrier between the inland and the Indian Ocean coastline. It was along this water highway that Arab merchants based in Sofala reached the hinterland, encountering the Bantu peoples of Grand Zimbabwe and establishing a profitable trade network.
Towards the end of the ninth century, nearly twenty thousand people lived in the city, and hundreds of villages and communities revolved around what became an important centre for trade.

A Granite Heart
Grand Zimbabwe was built using square and locally hewn granite blocks from the surrounding hills and from the Matabeleland. These were cut and laid dry on top of each other. The oldest nucleus is now known as the Acropolis, located on the granite hill overlooking the esplanade. That’s where the the sovereign resided. Centuries later the large enclosure (now known as The Great Enclosure, or ‘Imba Huru’), the most famous complex in the city, was erected.

It consists of an elliptical enclosure of cyclopean walls, in the interior of which stands the famous Conical Tower, built in a shape resembling a truncated cone; it may have been a a symbol of fertility, reminiscent of a phallic form . Or it could have functioned as a granary. Visitors to the site can still notice decorative motifs on the upper parts of the walls, produced using the laying of the blocks and believed to represent the City’s social organization, the power of the sovereign, and an invocation for fertility.The older wives of the sovereign lived in Imba Huru, where religious ceremonies were also officiated.
The priests studied astronomy, as the stelae located within the enclosure, depicting various astral constellations, show.

Moreover, the very shape of the walls, their dimensions and their relations with the Pi, the constant used to calculate the area of a circle symbolized by Greek letter Pi, betray the priests possessed deep mathematical insights. Perhaps, the Arabs, who made regular visits to the settlement, transmitted this knowledge. Beyond the southern gate there is a third complex, known as “The Valley” and it consists of a series of stone houses, probably inhabited by dignitaries and priests.

A Mysterious End
The civilization thrived for more than five hundred years. Then, around 1500, it mysteriously disappeared within less than half a century. Nobody knows exactly why the inhabitants abandoned the site. A prolonged period of drought and famine, an epidemic, or an economic crisis linked to a decline of the gold trade could have been responsible, forcing the inhabitants to move away. Moreover, archaeologists suggest migrations from the north overwhelmed both the Grand Zimbabwe (and the empire it controlled) on several occasions. Today, only the ruins of the majestic civilization that once thrived in the region are visible. They are located just a few kilometers from Masvingo, down the valley, where the ‘Great Enclosure’ and its conical tower stand against the ‘Acropolis’.

Stone Symbols
Without realizing it, as you walk through the alleys and the steps you shift from the granite construction of the Hill to an area of masonry buildings, where terraces, steps, squares and ramparts merge. Here the natural and the artificial coexist in perfect harmony. That which existed before the City (the granite area) was not demolished, or cut, but the city itself was integrated with it. It is a metaphor for African culture, in which the old is a heritage to be preserved and not a burden to be discarded.

In Grand Zimbabwe, in the small museum at the foot of the Acropolis, visitors can observe seven of the eight so-called ‘Zimbabwe birds’ or ‘Zimbabwe hawks’, a series of stele carved in soapstone representing the howling eagle or the juggling hawk. Both are thought to link the world of the living with that of the ancestors. These were probably placed on the top of the Acropolis walls. Each of these commemorates a new ruler, and the image of the last hawk recurs in national iconography from the period when thr country was known as Rhodesia to the present. They appear on flags, banknotes, coats of arms and friezes. And the ruling political Party, Zanu-Pf, has adopted the conical tower, on whose sides two tall trees have grown, as a symbol.

Contested Origins
Adam Render, a German hunter, was the first European to discover the ruins of Grand Zimbabwe. He told his friend Karl Mauch, an explorer and geographer, and they visited the site together. They took credit for the discovery attributing the site’s origins to King Solomon. For a long time, it was believed that Phoenician populations, who managed to reach southern Africa, built Grand Zimbabwe.

Cecil John Rhodes was the first to understand the political significance of the ruins: attruibuting the erection of the City to black African populations would have falsified the notion that Africans were culturally inferior to whites. Thus, the Phoenician origin of the site would remain in vogue until 1905, when the archaeologist David Randall Maclver established, after careful study, that there were no signs of European or Near Eastern influence to be observed at Grand Zimbabwe.
However, the authenticity of the existence of a purely African medieval archaeological site was censored until the late 1970s. When Rhodesian archaeologist Peter Garlake definitively established Grand Zimbabwe’s African origins, he was forced into exile.
Weeks would fail to provide enough time to talk about the mysterious Lost City, whose thousands of corners and millenary walls seem to whisper history while the massive granite boulders appear to guard its secrets. In 1986, UNESCO included the archaeological site of Grand Zimbabwe in its list of World Heritage Sites. (S.T.)

A Polarized Policy.

Friday, 1 May 2020 8:00

The Moldovan political situation is extremely complicated. It reflects the clashes between the West and Russia, but also between internal power groups that escape the great logic of international relations.

In fact, it is self-centred interests that determine every balance, at the expense of the collective well-being, in the light of the significant influence played in politics by oligarchic groups linked to the media, energy, and finance.
The political climate that reigns in the country is that of a constant election campaign determined also by the fact that the presidency, parliament, local governments were all formed at different times, between 1989 and 1991, and the new elections at various levels, national and local, have never been coordinated. Therefore, the context made it difficult for the politicians who followed each other over the years to make bold choices, the effects of which would have been realised in the medium to long term.

The formation of the new state, which began in 1991 with the passage of customs and KGB bodies under the control of the Moldovan government, continued with the establishment of the national army and the initiation of extensive reforms in the cultural, economic, scientific and educational fields. Internationally, after consolidating its independence, the country joined the UN in 1992 and in 1994 joined both the NATO Partnership for Peace (in 1997 it would also join the Euro-Atlantic Partnership) and also the Community of Independent States (CIS). These years have also been strongly animated by the confrontation between political and thought groups that clamoured for unification with Romania, those who fought for independence from any other country whatsoever, and those who still wanted some form of reintegration with Russia and the other former socialist republics. These contrasting positions have strongly fuelled the undermining of the very delicate balances between the different linguistic communities present on the national territory.

The diverse logic that animated the politics of the new republic also manifested itself during the course of the most recent events. Last February the population returned to the polls to elect the new parliament confirming the country’s deep polarization between pro-Russian and pro-European. To the three parties, the spokesman for these occasions, the electorate had assigned more than 80% of the votes, namely: the Socialist Party (31.15%), ACUM (26.84%) and the Democratic Party (23.62%). After several months of negotiations for the formation of the new government, thanks to the consent of the President of the Republic, Igor Dodon (the representative of the socialist partnership), an agreement was reached between the filo-Russians and the filo-Europeans, the PS and ACUM. ACUM is a coalition made up of centre-right, Europeanist and anti-corruption parties, led by former World Bank consultant Maia Sandu. The new alliance, which had surprised many, also because of the strong political rivalry existing between Sandu of the ACUM Bloc and Igor Dodon, was formed with the aim of carrying out some important reforms, but essentially to exclude the oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc from power. He was the leading exponent of the Democratic Party, which had indirectly controlled Moldovan politics in previous years. Vladimir Plahotniuc, in this period a fugitive abroad due to an international arrest warrant in Moldova, is considered the most powerful man in the country, despite never having held government positions. He is a mysterious man, the origin of whose wealth is unknown, and even less his real nationality.

Former Prime Minister Maia Sandu.

The new government, led by Maia Sandu, received consensus from Brussels, Moscow and Washington on the international front, while internally it was called the ‘anti-oligarch government’. But, despite the climate of hope and renewal on which the new government was born, its term in office was really short, since in November 2019 it underwent a vote of no-confidence, thus inaugurating a new political crisis. The motion of no-confidence officially came following the lack of approval of the reform relating to the appointment of the attorney general.
However, according to some analysts, the real reasons should be sought in the result of the recent administrative elections which saw the socialist team triumph for the first time in the capital Chisinau – which, on the strength of this result, would have liked to review the government balance – but also in the new project of justice reform that the Sandu government was working on.

Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Ion Chicu.

Regarding the reform of justice, the government’s aim was to create the conditions for dismantling the oligarchic system that had trapped state institutions in the hands of Plahotniuc over the past five years. A reform that, if it had been launched, could certainly have also harmed the Socialists.
A few days after the fall of the Sandu-led government, Parliament voted confidence in a new government in which the alliance between Socialists and Democrats was reconstituted. The current executive, which was presented as a technical executive, is led by Ion Chicu, a former finance minister in a government led by Pavel Filip, current PDM leader, and recently a close adviser to Dodon. This constitutes a mixture useful for shoring up the oligarchic system. (F.R.)

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