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Moldova. Difficult Balances.

Geographically located on the very outskirts of southeastern Europe, Moldova is a small state nestled between Romania and Ukraine. It shares the western border with Romania, while Ukraine envelops it to the north, east and south.

The territory, mostly flat, coincides roughly with the Bessarabia region, an area situated between the Prut and Nistru rivers. The latter, in addition to marking a portion of the border with Ukraine in the north-east area, flows from north to south in the eastern part of the country separating the Bessarabia region from the autonomous one of Transnistria, constituting, in fact, a geopolitical limes. The actual Republic of Moldova has developed in an area that, due to its geographical position and its proximity to the Black Sea, has always been disputed by the great powers present in the area. Only Stephen the Great (1457 -1504) managed to ensure its stability and to keep Polish, Hungarian and Turkish expansionist ambitions at bay.

Subsequently that area continued to suffer the tensions and claims of the great actors present on that chessboard. In this regard, it suffices to recall the long dispute for Bessarabia between the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For Russia, in particular, Bessarabia, then as today, represents an outpost from which to exercise its influence on Central Europe, the Balkans and Turkey. These situations, replicating themselves over the centuries through a sort of constant geopolitics, determined the country’s modest size, its irrelevance on the international level and its lack of development.
In 1812, the area was annexed by the Tsarist Empire and this annexation constituted a milestone for the country’s history. The Tsars, in fact, developed an action of Russification of the territory through demographic and colonial policies, with very real population transfers. But despite Russian efforts, the Romanian identity of Bessarabia always remained alive and tried to assert itself on several occasions. However, the real geographic and anthropological upheaval occurred in the Soviet era during which, also the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, like the Central Asian Republics, underwent the collectivization, the deportations, the destruction of the churches and a forced industrialization that led to social mobilization with relative upheaval
of local customs.

In the summer of 1989, following the riots that undermined the Soviet Empire, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova also began to take the path that would lead it to independence through the implementation of important changes such as the adoption of the Latin alphabet and replacement of the official Russian language with Romanian, later renamed Moldovan. In addition to the official one, there are four languages spoken in Moldova today: Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian and Gagauzic. This latter is spoken by the inhabitants of the region of Gagauzia, an autonomous territorial entity located in the south of the country, inhabited by a population of Turkic origin, but of orthodox Christian religion. For 11% of the population, spoken Russian remained, however, as the first language and, obviously, being known by almost all inhabitants, it is often used as a lingua franca even if the disagreements caused by the forced Russification of the Soviet period have not entirely died away. However, full independence was achieved in August 1991 and was managed by the Moldovan Popular Front’s politicizing of Christian Democrat culture, which was in favor of the country’s annexation to Romania. This new situation determined, as is obvious, the reactions of the Russian speakers of Transnistria and Gagauzia, in detonating the new civil war following which Transnistria, thanks also to the support of the Russian military forces, was established in a de facto independent state but was never internationally recognized.

After the fall of the USSR, the subjects who guided the transition applied universal political recipes, with western standards and models that did not take into account the various cultural and territorial differences. Thus, the new international players present on the scene – through the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the State Department and the EU – began to dictate to the country new lines of development that included liberalization, opening to the capital, goods and services of the West, but which did not in fact lead to the state of well-being and proclaimed development.
Even today, the geopolitical constant does not spare the country from the bitter contention of two large blocs, the Russian and the western ones, as well as from Romanian irredentism that has always perceived Moldova, and in particular the area of Bessarabia, as its province which was stolen by Turkish ambitions.

The inadequate development model, together with the geopolitical tensions, have not allowed Moldova to emerge from its condition as a rural country. In fact, its population, which has 3,547,539 people, made up of 78% of Moldovans (in the territory controlled by the central government), 8% of Ukrainians and 6% of Russians, lives mainly in the countryside and, given the absence of adequate working conditions, exists in a condition of widespread poverty. The combination of these elements has, for years, been fuelling the migratory phenomenon towards the countries of Western Europe by the younger members of society. A process which, as is obvious, is producing a strong population decrease at home and which in the long run could have devastating effects. (F.R.)

Europe/Africa. Migration and Security.

Migration from Africa to Europe is increasingly being framed as a security threat to states and societies. The result is tighter border controls and visa policies. These efforts have led to fewer African migrants reaching Europe, but have also had several unintended negative consequences.

European Union (EU) policies to deter Europe-bound African migration include the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Joint Valletta Action Plan. Related operational mechanisms are the EU Emergency Trust Fund and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). In Africa, upper-middle-income countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco also apply strict visa rules to African travellers to limit the entry of migrants from low-income countries.

Agadez in Niger is a typical example of a place that has experienced the increased securitisation of migration, and suffered unintended consequences. Located on a key route between West Africa, the Sahel and the Maghreb regions, it’s estimated that a third of all migrants travelling through Agadez eventually end up on a boat to Europe. As a result, EU policymakers have since 2015 focused on Agadez to stem migration to Europe.

The EU’s securitised intervention in Agadez includes extending the mandate of the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP-Niger) to help the security forces control migration and associated criminal activities. Frontex has also appointed a liaison officer in Niger. The intervention resulted in a 75% decline in northbound migration flows via Agadez in 2017. This has contributed to the overall drop in arrivals in Europe through the various Mediterranean routes. In 2018 there were 116 647 arrivals recorded – 89% less than 2015, leading to the European Commission declaring in 2019 that the migration crisis was over.

Beyond the decline in numbers however, the securitised approach has led to five negative consequences, according to new research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). These are the disruption of livelihoods, increased regional destabilisation, continued smuggling, increased violation of migrants’ human rights and the erosion of citizen-government relations.

In terms of livelihoods, Agadez’s major economic sectors such as tourism, mining and agriculture have declined over the past decade, so income from the migration industry served as a substitute. Many Agadez residents made a living through providing food, water and call shops to migrants. Alternative means of income should have been put in place before the migration industry was dismantled. The EU seemingly anticipated this consequence, reserving considerable development funding including €243 million from 2016 to 2020 to support agricultural projects. But the implementation of these projects has been too slow to keep up with people’s loss of income.

The disruption of residents’ livelihoods has led to destabilisation not only in Niger, but in the wider Sahel region. Many young men have taken to banditry to respond to their immediate economic needs. Worse still is the expansion of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the Sahel region, including in Niger. Thousands of youth whose livelihoods have been disrupted could become radicalised, creating a fertile recruitment ground for extremists.

The human smuggling industry has also adapted to the changing circumstances. Sudanese smugglers have taken the place of Nigerien smugglers, and new routes have been found to Libya through Chad and Sudan. The emergence of new routes has exposed migrants to more human rights abuses and hardships.
Securitised approaches increase migrants’ vulnerability, leading to violations of their fundamental rights in transit and destination countries. Recent reports about a rise in fatalities at Europe’s borders are linked to reinforced border control measures.

The securitisation of migration has also led to an erosion of public trust in government in Agadez. According to research by the Clingendael Institute, officials in Agadez said citizens questioned why they worked for the EU ‘rather than for them, the people who got us elected.’ Any African government’s cooperation with a foreign force to stem migration is likely to be viewed negatively by citizens, as millions rely on remittances from migrants. This money also contributes significantly to national economies. In 2018, African countries received $46 billion in remittances. In a nutshell, framing migration as a security issue tends to result in reactive and short-term strategies to stem departures from Africa to Europe. Two approaches can help better manage migration.

First, the Africa-to-Europe migration narrative should be based on evidence not incorrect perceptions as is currently the case. For example, 53.2% of African migration is intra-continental. Sub-Saharan African migrants make up only 12.9% of Europe’s migrant population. Despite this, the dominant narrative has us believe that Africans are on the move to the West, especially to Europe.

Second, the EU and African countries should reconcile their priorities and interests. The EU wants to stem African migration, and seeks better cooperation with African countries on the return of irregular migrants, and better border control. This is increasingly reflected in Europe’s developmental support to Africa. African states’ cooperation on migration management is becoming central in determining how this support is allocated. However African countries are interested in exploring opportunities for legal migration channels to the EU.

As a result, Europe’s short-term priorities (deterring migration) risk undermining Africa’s longer-term objectives (development). The two continents should find ways to align their common interests.
The ongoing negotiation on the EU’s strategy with Africa, which is expected to be adopted in October 2020, provides an excellent opportunity. Migration and mobility make up one of the strategy’s five key focus areas.

Tsion Tadesse Abebe,
Senior Researcher, Migration,
ISS Addis Ababa

The African Youth Survey 2020. Vibrant Afro-optimism rises.

A comprehensive survey of Africa’s youth – the African Youth Survey 2020 –has just revealed a rising Afro-Optimism among the continent’s youth driven by a strong sense of individual responsibility, a post-colonial mind set, entrepreneurship, and confidence in a shared African identity.

Africa’s youth believe they can solve problems collaboratively, and are hopeful of fighting corruption, achieving peace and improving their personal living conditions. The survey findings, which are in stark contrast to global stereotypes and outdated narratives of a hopeless continent, were unveiled by the Ichikowitz Family Foundation, a leading African foundation encouraging active citizenship across the continent.

The African Youth Survey 2020 was conducted across 14 African countries in an unprecedented attempt to pulse the aspirations, motivations and viewpoints of one of the world’s key demographics. Transatlantic polling firm, PSB Research, conducted interviews in Congo Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe – a total of 4200 in-depth, face-to-face interviews.

The African Youth Survey reveals young people who are self-starters, pan-African, digital and media savvy, tolerant but mindful of the challenges that could blight their ‘African Century’, such as corruption, the lack of jobs, limited start-up capital, water scarcity, fake news, terrorism and poor educational systems.

They were asked their opinions on their identity as Africans; on social cohesion in their communities, on the environment; on political stability and democracy; on foreign relations; on entrepreneurship; technology and the media; and, about their views of the future.

Ichikowitz Family Foundation Chairman, Ivor Ichikowitz said: “The results of the African Youth Survey are a loud wake-up call to all the Afro-sceptics. We have found that youth in Africa are imbued with optimism about the future – and want to shape their own destiny. We have found a youth that refuses to shy away from the very real challenges of Africa, that is honest about what needs to be done and what their role has to be to achieve this – and they are  keen to make that difference.”

“The Afro-optimism that’s flourishing among young Africans does not rest on hope, but on their ability to seize the opportunities provided by the modern world. The findings underscore entrepreneurship as the greatest aspiration of African youth, who are embracing digital technologies to shape their futures.
If there were ever doubt in the ‘Africa-Rise’ narrative, this research provides us with strong evidence that Africa’s time is here, and that it will continue to rise – carried forward by a new generation of innovative, responsible and confident leaders.”

Afro-optimism, underscored by a belief in Afro-capability:

Optimism: African youth are overwhelmingly positive about their personal future and the African Century: 65% believe that the 21st century will be the African Century, 72% are confident about their financial future, they feel more optimistic about the future of the continent than their country’s future (63% unhappy with own country, 49% unhappy with Africa).

Entrepreneurship: The next African generation are entrepreneurs and self-starters who are resolute in their goals and ambitions: 76% want to start a business in the next five years, over 60% have an idea for a business or social enterprise, and 75% feel they positively change their communities through their work.

Technology: African youth are well-connected and technology and media savvy with a great interest in current affairs: 79% believe that Wi-Fi access should be a fundamental human right, 81% believe that technology will change the fortunes of Africa, 59% use their smart phones for more than three hours per day, 89% use it for social media.

Media: Social media is the second biggest source of news (54%) after television (72%). The least trusted sources of news are Facebook (53%) and WhatsApp (50%). ‘Fake News’ is viewed as problematic: 67% says it is impacting their ability to stay informed; 25% know someone or have personally been victims of online bullying.

Environment: African youth are not concerned by climate change as such, but rather about more specific environmental challenges like water scarcity (86%), plastic waste (79%) and poaching of wildlife (69%).

Climate Change: 57% of African youth believes that developing countries have equal responsibility to address climate change – their Afro-optimism is grounded in a belief in Afro-capability.

African Identity: The nation state remains a strong source for collective identity but 76% of African youth overwhelmingly agrees that a shared African Identity exists, brought forth by common culture and the values epitomised by Nelson Mandela (86% believe Mandela’s values are still relevant today).

African Unity: Many young Africans say the continent is headed in the wrong direction and 63% call for unity to bring Africa forward, 72% believe the AU can unite Africa.

Community Cohesion: Young people in Africa are deeply embedded in their local communities, which many describe as ethnically, religiously and economically diverse.

Democratic Values: While African youth are divided on whether democracy (48%) or stability (48%) is more important for the continent, most believe in the democratic values of participation, tolerance and freedom, although critically, very few see a political career as a key aspiration to improving their own lives.

Foreign Relations: African youth are conflicted in regard to foreign influence: on the one hand, many are wary of new forms of economic colonialism but at the same time most consider the influence of specific countries to be positive; the USA, China and EU have the greatest influence and Donald Trump, Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg are the leaders who will have the greatest impact over the next five years.

Challenges: Young Africans see infectious disease and terrorism as the continent’s two biggest threats of the last five years, but the future being defined by job opportunities, innovation and entrepreneurship, and bedevilled by corruption.

On the results of the survey overall, Ichikowitz commented: “Africa’s youth, measured just in sheer numbers, will be the world’s most important demographic in 30 years. The purpose of this study is to provide a roadmap for governments, policymakers, investors and young people across the continent, who will be the world’s largest source of human capital, consumers, entrepreneurs and innovators of tomorrow. Ignoring their voices would be a catastrophe for the world.”

Africa. Coronavirus and the Missionaries.

The Coronavirus pandemic is spreading across Africa. The virus has gradually attacked almost all its countries.
To date, thousands of victims have been claimed by this emergency which may move from being a matter of health to a social matter. How missionaries are involved.

“Closing the South Sudan borders would mean condemning thousands of people to a state of hunger: this is because food security still depends on imports from nearby countries as well as humanitarian aid. For this reason, the government has asked Uganda to allow free passage to trucks carrying food and fuel,” says Father Christian Carlassare, an Italian Comboni missionary who lives in Juba, speaking of precautionary measures taken by the young African state in response to the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic. In recent days, the Minister for Health announced the closure of all airports in the country and the prohibition of all international flights as well as the closure of the borders.

According to data furnished by the UN, around 6 million people, 60% of the population, are in urgent need of humanitarian aid, an increase of 20% compared to last year. “The country will be at a great disadvantage if it has to tackle a pandemic of this sort”, notes Father Christian. During February and the first weeks of March, there was a lot of movement across the borders with contiguous countries: “It is therefore feared that the virus has spread also here in South Sudan – the Comboni priest explains – but it is hoped that the hot climate may limit its spread; however, we will not be sure until after a couple of weeks”. As a precaution, the schools have been closed for a month and all gatherings, even for religious services, have been prohibited.  “While community celebrations are suspended – Fr. Carlassare informs us – we need to find other ways of being close to the people who are suffering. For the present, we are not obliged to stay at home. There is just a curfew from six in the evening to six in the morning. During the day we may still visit the families. The small basic communities can continue being active and say their prayers in their families”.

However important, the measures taken seem to fall short of tackling the complex situation in a country like South Sudan, stricken by hunger, poverty and disease: “The first challenge – Fr. Carlassare believes – regards the extremely limited possibility, confined to the capital – of testing people suspected of being infected. Furthermore – he continues – the public health system is not properly equipped: the patients may be isolated but there are no intensive care units with ventilators. We Comboni missionaries are responsible for running the diocesan hospital in Mapuordit where the only ventilator is in the operating theatre”. The second challenge is that of prevention: in Fr. Christian’s opinion “it is very difficult to implement isolation and quarantine in a country like South Sudan, for many reasons, especially – he clarifies – since many families live in huts or houses with only one room that is shared, on average, by five or six persons. Daily life takes place mostly out of doors”. No food is kept in the house except some flour and very little else: “the hygienic conditions in the markets, with their stalls often located in dusty and overcrowded places, leave much to be desired”.
“This pandemic – he concludes – struck us while in a state of weakness and confusion but, at the same time, it has taught us how important and necessary it is to recognise that we all need to comfort one another and that we are all called to pull together since we are all in the same boat”.
In Africa people live in the streets, especially the poorest strata of the population. “Huts are only for sleeping – explains Father Piergiorgio Gamba, an Italian Montfort missionary who has worked in Malawi for more than forty years – the rest of the day is spent outdoors trying to earn just enough to survive by doing odd jobs. How can we even think of making these people stay inside? Making them stay in their houses would mean depriving them of the minimum necessary for survival”.

In South Africa, shortages of food, water and electricity could even cause serious social disorder. The decrees of President Cyril Ramaphosa have obliged schools to close and people to remain in their houses. “The well-off classes – comments Father Pablo Velasquez, a Scalabrini Missionary in Johannesburg – have economic resources and security of employment that protect them and enable them to follow the directives. It is different for the poorer people. For them, not working for days on end means they will have no income. For this reason, the regulations have not been welcomed in the townships”.
Consequently, while the police patrol the residential areas, the shanty towns are surrounded by the military on a war footing. “Closing a township – explains Father Filippo Ferraro, a Scalabrini Missionary in Cape Town – is like sealing a boiling pot: with no outlet, it is in danger of exploding. The migrants (7.5% of the population) are also suffering as it is difficult for them to renew their residence permits and they risk ending up as illegals. They not only cannot work but they have not even enough money to buy food”.
From Ethiopia, Father Nicola de Guio, a Fidei Donum missionary in Adaba, in the Apostolic Prefecture of Robe remarks:  “Our missions are small numerically but right from the start we followed the instructions given by the public and religious institutions concerning Covid-19. For some weeks we have been celebrating Mass only at the mission of Adaba where we live, but we can no longer go out to the other two missions at Dodola and Kokossa, at distances of 25Km and 95Km respectively.
We feel very concerned for the whole of the population who have no means of protecting themselves and are living in very precarious
human conditions. ”

In the Central African republic, Father Aurelio Gazzera, a Carmelite missionary, parish priest of Bozoum and head of the diocesan Caritas office, decided to organise a trip to meet those in charge of ten parishes to explain to them how to handle a possible Covid-19 epidemic. “In each parish – Father Aurelio explains – we held a meeting (observing social distancing and the numerical regulations), during which we explained the disease (symptoms, precautions, contagion and risks), encouraging everyone to take this problem seriously. We then got organised, as Christians and members of Caritas, to ensure that the weakest (the elderly, the poor, the sick and the disabled) were provided with assistance and food. Unfortunately, it will not be easy to stop this virus. People here live outdoors. It is necessary for them to go outside to get what they need for their families.“The Central African Republic is a country on its knees. For seven years it has been in the throes of a civil war which, despite peace accords, continues causing violence and political instability. In this already precarious context, the spread of the virus can only bring civil society down even more, claiming many victims and causing price rises for basic foodstuffs (rice, cooking oil, tomatoes) and other necessities (soap, gloves, masks and bleach).
However, it is not possible to carry out such sensitisation action everywhere. In some countries, COVID-19 is not even mentioned. “In Eritrea, officially, there are no cases – notes Abba Mussie Zerai, a priest of Asmara eparchy – In truth, we are not sure whether the virus has reached this country or not. We fear an epidemic. There is the danger that it may spread in the overcrowded prisons and military training camps.  The public health structures would not be able to manage the situation if the virus were to spread. The private hospitals and clinics, the only ones that are efficient, were commandeered in recent months by the authorities. What sort of assistance can they offer the citizens?”.

“The fear of dying of hunger is greater than the fear of the virus and my community is in danger of succumbing”. Sister Enza Guccione, an Italian missionary in Nigeria, lives on a small island in the middle of the River Niger. “ We are in the middle of the river, suspended between life and death, subject to events we cannot control », says the religious, foundress of the Emmanuelle Family community, who has decided to dedicate her life to the least of the world.
“If death does not come through Covid-19, hunger will be the enemy number one to be defeated », Sister Enza declares.  “The slogan ‘I am staying at home’ in places like Nigeria takes on another meaning. With the Covid-19 alert and the precautionary measures introduced by the local governments, we have entered a high-risk humanitarian phase. All the borders of the country are closed, and we are all too often forcibly told to stay inside our homes. The village is also closed within itself and we cannot go to the other bank of the river as the police there do not allow the boats to dock there and disembark their passengers. The whole market, including the part selling foodstuffs, lies beyond the river”, Sr. Enza says.
“ Here we cannot afford to keep reserves of food – the religious continues – there is no electricity and no refrigerators but, most of all, the people live each day by earning something in the markets so whatever extra they had at home has been used up during the past three weeks of lockdown. Even medicine is becoming a problem. Medicine in the market beyond the river and in reserves is running out. What can we do? The police will not let us in, not even the Sisters. Nobody can go to the city from here. Yesterday, disturbances broke out in the surrounding villages causing some deaths and many injuries. Prices are sky-high. We are fighting an invisible enemy but another more dangerous enemy is on the loose: hunger! The lockdown, to be truthful, can only be tackled by those who have the economic resources to do so, a tiny minority. At this time, the only thing we can do is to pray harder to God.”

Missionary activity is seriously affected by the Covid-19 crisis.  “ How can we be missionaries when we can no longer go out to meet people or even establish social contact with the population, as we have done in the past, to announce the Good News?” asks Father Donald Zagore, an Ivorian priest of the Society of African Missions. “It is a challenge we are facing and we have as yet no clear answer. The challenge of finding new ways of evangelising in this context today is the subject of deep reflection among missionaries, especially in rural areas “.
The Ivorian priest emphasises: “In this time of the coronavirus crisis, the family becomes the sacred place par excellence, where the mystery of God is received and lived. Christ became incarnate in a family, making the Holy Family the first domestic church”. “The African pastoral model today – the missionary explains – is still that of the small Christian community. “The tragedy of Covid-19 ought to make us more united with one another. Humanity will win this struggle only by involving itself in a strong dynamic of solidarity between scientific research, and material and spiritual support”, Fr. Zagore continues. “The isolation measures established by the government which include, among other things, the closure of the borders, must be strictly measures of medical prevention – the missionary emphasises – and they must not become methods that promote exclusion or stigmatisation. The Covid-19 pandemic must not become an area in which living together means the sacrifice of one’s identity, social breaks-up or increasingly exclusive nationalism. Today, we must concentrate on the essence of the problem which consists essentially in working and praying for a solution which can save humanity from this tragedy.
In the name of our faith, we must not allow evil to win out in the lives of people. God is more powerful than that”.

Concluding his reflection, the theologian repeats: “For Christianity without churches, the ecclesiological model of the family as a domestic church is still fundamental. A family built upon rock, upon Christ, is a precious gift to the universal Church and to all humanity. Everything has to be rebuilt according to the principle of the family itself”.
Meanwhile, many sisters  are working in small rural hospitals in Africa as well as medical clinics, healthcare centres and mobile clinics providing education and medical assistance to those in need. (C.C.)

 

 

Malawi. Between Health and Political Crisis.

One year after the General Election, the country still remains in a political crisis. The combination of a health crisis (Coronavirus) and a political dispute could be extremely dangerous for the country.

The Malawi’s five High Court Judges sitting in Lilongwe as Constitutional Court on 3 February  2020 delivered a landmark ruling that annulled the country’s May 19, 2019 presidential elections. The presidential elections case was brought to the Court by the Opposition Malawi Congress Party’s (MCP) president, Lazarus Chakwera, and the United Transformation Movement (UTM) president, Saulos Chilima, who came in second and third in the polls respectively.
The ruling which was highly welcomed and praised by many analysts including millions of voters, means that President Peter Mutharika is not an elected leader but is in the position in an acting capacity until fresh elections are held.
This ruling, however, has not only changed the political landscape but has also plunged the country into a political and constitutional crisis with the incumbent president Mutharika and the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) refusing to accept the Constitutional Court orders.

Among other things the Court ordered Parliament to amend the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Act and that fresh elections be held within 150 days from the day of the ruling, and that a fresh presidential election be held on 2 July). It also ordered Parliament to assess the MEC Commissioners whom the court found to be incompetent and accused of mishandling the elections. The Court discovered that it was wrong for the MEC to tamper with the presidential tally sheets with Tipp Ex, a correctional fluid, in many polling centers, especially where Mutharika was not popular.
In line with the Constitutional Court orders, Parliament passed four bills one of which is a bill that sets a date for the fresh elections and another one that allows for the 50+1, in which a winning party is supposed to get 50%+1 of the votes.
“This ruling will completely change the political landscape”, said Mustafa Hussein, Political Lecturer at the University of Malawi, Chancellor College. Hussein said the country will “now see political parties forming alliances so that they meet the Court order that any party in future must get 50%+ 1 of the votes”.

But Mutharika and his MEC Chairperson Jane Ansah are having none of this. Ansah is refusing to resign despite the fact that the Court found that her and the MEC failed to manage the elections properly.
The president and the MEC appealed to the Supreme Court to have a stay order and also to have the whole ruling overturned but the Court quashed the stay order appeal which would have allowed the MEC not to conduct fresh elections.
To plunge the country further into a deep political crisis, Mutharika has refused to assent to the four Bills that Parliament sent him towards the end of February. He has also refused to sack the Commissioners as recommended by the Public Appointments Committee (PAC) of Parliament, who the Court found to be incompetent. Speaking through his spokesperson, Mgeme Kalirani, Mutharika said he has not assented to the bills “because they are in conflict with the Constitution”. And on the failure to fire the MEC commissioners as recommended by the Public Appointments Committee of Parliament, Mutharika argued that he would not fire the commissioners because they were not given ample time to defend themselves.

But some legal analysts have observed that the refusal by the president not to assent to the bills is ‘just a tactical move to buy time so that he remains in office for longer’. Others have hinted that Mutharika is putting this country into a Constitutional and political crisis. “Mutharika’s rejection of the Bills might be throwing this country into a Constitutional crisis”, said John Mwakhwawa, a private practicing lawyer. He said the legislature made the laws in accordance with what the Constitutional Court ordered them to do.
If Mutharika is rejecting the Bills it means that the Court and Parliament are in conflict with the Head of State.
Professor Danwood Chirwa, a Constitutional Law Scholar, at the University of Cape Town said the main reason why President Mutharika refused to assent to the Bills was both ‘grotesque and incoherent’. He said Mutharika who was holding office on an interim basis, violates the Constitution and that he (Mutharika) had an option of seeking an advisory opinion of the Constitutional Court if he was not sure. “But Mutharika was not seeking that Constitutional Court advice because he knows his position is untenable”, he said. “The truth is that the bills try to operationalize the decision of the Constitutional Court, which the interim president does not like. By refusing to assent to the bills, the interim president is disobeying that court’s decision and is acting in contempt of it, and he is not upholding the Constitution as he claims”, said Chirwa. He also said the president was stifling the law-making process of the legislature by advancing “dubious and irrational reasons for withholding consent”.

The University of Malawi’s Chancellor College Dean of Law, Sunduzwayo Madise, told the media that the Parliament can table the bills and have them be sent back to the president for the second time. But before they do that they can discuss the reasons given by the president not to assent to the Bills.He said however that Court orders must be respected and that “Parliament has the power to take the matter back to the court for more orders in the event that the elections fails to take place within the stated 150 days as ordered by the Court”. Ironically, Mutharika and his ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are preparing for the fresh elections and have already started campaigning. His party has entered into an electoral alliance with the former ruling party the United Democratic Front (UDF) whose leader is Atupele Muluzi, a son to Bakili Muluzi, former president of the party and State. Behind the scenes so many things are happening aimed at how parties can maneuver each other in the coming elections. Mutharika would like to see the same MEC commissioners organize the elections while the opposition and millions of Malawian voters are opposed to the move.

The main opposition parties, the MCP and UTM have also formed their own electoral alliance and they have been joined by five other opposition parties aimed at defeating the DPP/UDF alliance in the coming fresh polls.Since May last year the country has been witnessing nationwide demonstrations demanding the resignations of the MEC chair and commissioners. The demonstrations were and are still being organized by the Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC) whose leaders are currently on bail on charges against overthrowing the government.
But the three HRDC leaders, Timothy Mtambo, Gift Trapence and MacDonald Sembereka are all denying the charges and have vowed to carry their demonstrations further to State Residences, should Mutharika continue refusing to sign the Bills, which he has, and failing to fire the MEC chair and Commissioners. It now remains to be seen what Parliament will do in the wake of the President’s refusal to sign the bills.

Meanwhile, at the beginning the April the government has declared the first cases of Coronavirus in the country. The health system is very weak and poorly resourced. Only 20 people a day can be tested for the virus, and there are just 25 intensive care unit beds and seven ventilators in the country of more than 18 million people. Since February, however, the government has been racing to curb Covid’s arrival. It has wheeled out a £24m preparedness plan, suspended international flights, banned weddings and gatherings of more than 100 people, closed schools and universities, and is making people arriving from Europe, China, or the US to self-isolate. According to the Ministry of Health, 4,603 people who have entered the country in the past few weeks are ‘under surveillance’.

Raphael Mweninguwe

 

A Dependent Economy.

From an economic point of view, Moldova is considered one of the poorest countries in Europe. The average net monthly income slightly exceeds 250 euros, the agricultural sector represents about 21% of the GDP, industry 15.1% and services 63.9%.

Following independence, the country touched economic collapse due to the interruption of commercial ties with the ex-motherland and the suspension of the preferential tariffs on energy that were guaranteed, as well as the loss of direct control over Transnistria, whose territory hosted most of the Moldovan heavy industry. Today Moldova, heavily dependent on the production and export of agricultural products (wheat, corn, oats, tobacco, sugar beets, soy, barley, sunflowers, hazelnuts, apples and other fruit), represents the classic poor country to which the principles of economic liberalism have been applied that led it into the interior of a tunnel with no way out.

The country’s economy is not a productive economy but a consumer economy based largely on the remittances of Moldovan workers. In addition to the production of agricultural products, there are large farms aimed at the production of meat and milk products, and beekeeping is also widespread. The secondary sector is developing with the few existing industries in the textile, mechanical, iron and steel and chemical sectors concentrated in the capital.
In agriculture, one of the country’s strengths is wine production. Moldova, in fact, boasts the largest wine cellars in the world – well over 120 km in extent underground which guarantee a perfect microclimate – and exports over 400 million bottles a year, among which the ‘Negru de Purcari’ stands out, which has always been drunk by Queen Elizabeth and by the Court of England.

Local entrepreneurs are severely penalized by the difference in production capacity, ‘know-how’ and access to credit compared to entrepreneurs from other countries. In addition, the ‘free trade agreements’ signed with both Europe and Turkey have not proved to be development drivers. Economic relations with Moscow, on which it depends as an export market, with the former Soviet political space and with the Caucasian area, are very intense because of their geographical position and historical ties. Moscow, in particular, represents one of Moldova’s main trading partners with which it has a strong dependence because of the energy supplies.

Moldova is also becoming an attractive destination for investors from Arab countries. This phenomenon, which developed in 2009, could be fatal eventually, according to some analysts. Since that date, which coincides with the rise to power of the liberal democratic party block, there has been an increase in contacts and meetings between the institutional representatives of the country and those of the Arab countries (Qatar, Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia). These relationships have also fostered a circle of dirty business between influential Gulf personages and the local mafia. Relationships that have often been facilitated and covered by a series of government laws and decisions that guarantee both local and foreign investors the same rights to invest in the local economy. The only exception is the agricultural land which can be sold only to Moldovan citizens.
Again according to analysts, among these laws, one stands out which provides the possibility for five thousand foreign or stateless citizens, plus their families, to receive citizenship in exchange for an investment in loco. The money could be transferred either to a state fund, or to individuals and invested in real estate and for the development of the financial and public investment sector that is maintaining government bonds. It should be noted that the investment in both these sectors must be maintained for at least 60 months, that is five years, following which the beneficiaries of these investments are free to sell what they have acquired at a low price, for a rather higher one.
These processes, in addition to influencing the country’s precarious economic balances, could also affect the political ones, since the new arrivals could also engage in the establishment of new parties, as well as acquire control of the media.

Moldova, like many other countries subject to ‘structural reforms’ and neo-liberal adjustments, had for a long time given up the management of its own economy: foreign financing in exchange for market liberalization, adjustment of domestic legislation to the detriment of the local market, and in the interest of global corporations. Monetary, fiscal and budget cuts for social policies have substantially reduced the state’s ability to promote independent economic policies. These circumstances have led to the government of the country alternating between corrupt parties and coalitions, or barely adequate parties, thus making corruption flourish without working to strengthen institutions and the reform of the judicial system.
Relations with the world of the Caucasus are also strong. The first intergovernmental cooperation project in the CIS ambience, focused on economic and security issues, prepared outside the Russian initiative and influence, was the birth of the GUAM (acronym for Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). This initiative had as a logical presupposition two dynamics produced at the turn of the mid-nineties and translated into an expansion of diplomatic margins for the GUAM countries.

The first of these was Russia’s first Chechen campaign (1996), the failure of which marked a sharp fall in Moscow’s neighbourhood positions. The second factor that contributed to creating the conditions for a deepening of sub-regional cooperation was the breakdown of the international isolation of the post-Soviet space determined by the preparation of regional strategies by the European Union and NATO. These strategies focused significantly on those areas of cooperation (infrastructural security and economic development) in which the attempt by Azerbaijan and the newly independent states to pursue autonomous foreign policy lines had resulted in being unrealistic. The institutionalization of the quadrilateral agreement through the creation of the GUAM represented, first of all, a tool to deepen the horizontal vector of cooperation within the CIS, offering a regional point of reference for the protagonists of the post-Soviet space, who shared with the four a specific interest in the areas of action of security and development. (F.R.)

The Covid-19 Pandemic Advocacy.

Advocacy is Re-active while “forcing” us because problems or issues are already there. Then we use advocacy to respond, seeking to address or reducing their impact.

The best Re-active Advocacies are those brought about by reality strengths who “are forced” to act together because no one can avoid them, because they go beyond individuals, organizations and even states’ power. Covid-19’s pandemic is surely one of the most strong reality strengths.

Any advocacy should have the poor and marginalized at its centre and carried out For, With, By the poor and marginalized. We can see, therefore, as a “gift” coming from actual human suffering advocacy blossoming everywhere on behalf of the neglected and discarded parts of our global society.

On  March 23rd,  the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appealed for a global ceasefire. He urged all parties in conflict to lay down arms and allow war-torn countries to fight the common enemy instead, namely the corona-virus pandemic. He renewed his call on April 2 because “The worst is yet to come. The Covid-19 storm is now coming to all these theatres of conflict,” and “the fury of the virus illustrates the folly of war.”

Echoing his words, Pope Francis sent a message in a live streamed address from Rome to a quarantined world (See the videoed address here) saying, “I join all those that have listened to this appeal and I invite all to follow it up, putting an end to all forms of warlike hostility, fostering the creation of corridors for humanitarian aid, openness to diplomacy and attention to those that find themselves in a situation of greatest vulnerability.”

We need, ” to reinforce fraternal bonds”, he went on, hoping that the Covid-19 may awaken ” in nations’ leaders and other parties involved a renewed commitment to overcome rivalries” through the “joint commitment against the pandemic. Conflicts aren’t resolved through war! It’s necessary to overcome antagonisms and oppositions through dialogue and a constructive search for peace.”

Covid-19 “knows no borders.” Consequently, Pope Francis went on advocating also for those whose housing makes them susceptible to risk, such as nursing homes and shared houses, barracks, overcrowded prisons, and the homeless. He asked authorities “to be sensitive to this problem and to take the necessary measures” to avoid further tragedies.

Such as a pandemic of good-will, everywhere during the corona-virus crisis, there is unfolding a wide range of advocacy initiatives both through actions and appeals. Young people organize teams to bring treatments and food to old people. In a rapidly changing life in New York City (NYC), to help connect  community members in food need, the Hunter College NYC created COVID-19 NYC Food Resource Guides.

The NYC Department of Health, using the 2018 Community Health Profiles of already organized 59 community districts of its neighborhoods, sends out guide lines and zip codes containing over fifty measures, health statistics, and information related to food access within the community, such as meals for students and seniors, delivery services for people with disabilities, and resources for immigrants.

On April 5, the Nuclear Disarmament Task Force at the Unitarian Church of All Souls, the All Souls Peace and Justice Task Force both of NYC, and the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security organized via Zoom an advocacy meeting asking to Move the Money – from Threatening the Planet with Nuclear Weapons to Defending it Against Catastrophic Climate Change. Resources needed to avert climate disaster should not be squandered on nuclear weapons, is the appeal, since any use of nuclear weapons would be suicidal.

Advice to stay at home to slow the spread of COVID-19, proclaimed and even imposed everywhere and from every social entity, it is not, nevertheless, of much help to homeless New Yorkers. Even if they’re in a shelter, they are particularly vulnerable to a widespread health crisis. They are more likely to contract the virus: the close proximity to one another in the shelters, the lack of access to soap and hand sanitizer for the unsheltered, the challenges in obtaining medical care expose them to the virus, and therefore to get sicker or die.

Many of them can have already been infected and become all the more threatening for people with or without permanent homes. New York City, with its more than 60,000 homeless people in shelters and thousands on the street, released guidance for homeless shelter operators on the best practices for cleaning facilities and dispatched outreach teams to inform the city’s homeless about COVID-19. The city has also set up a system to send meals to those in quarantine in response to their lack of funds or access to food at grocery stores (Read more here).

Hopefully these experiences of Re-active advocacy through concrete actions and appeals to address the main social issues and problems, would open the mind, hearts and way of public authorities and world-wide organizations to Pro-Active advocacy for these same peoples when the virus emergency ends. You can support this advocacy campaign here https://www.avaaz.org/campaign/en/global_ceasefire_3bshare/

John Paul Pezzi, mccj
VIVAT International NGO
with consultative special status at UN

 

 

Ethiopia. Postponed national elections over coronavirus fears.

The national elections that were scheduled for August have been postponed sine die because of the coronavirus outbreak. Some analysts fear that such decision could exacerbate the tense political situation in Ethiopia.

On the last 1st April, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) announced the postponement of the national legislative elections which were initially scheduled on the 29 August 2020. The Board justified its decision with the existing condition in the country, meaning the Covid 19 pandemics which prompted the government to declare the state of emergency on the following 8 April, after it had registered 52 confirmed cases, with two deaths. Indeed, the fight against the spread of coronavirus and the organization for the forthcoming election was hardly compatible since the government had already banned mass gatherings at the end of March, while regional states have suspended local transportation services and banned movements of people.  Such actions have delayed pre-election tasks, including the training over 150,000 election attendants, explained the NEBE.

The initial expectations were that these elections pushed by the wind of reform, following Prime Minister Abyi Ahmed’s election in April 2018, would be the first free and fair ones since the fall of the dreaded regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991 (except one, none was competitive). But analysts fear that the postponement of the election can increase an already tense situation characterized by protests, repression and censorship.  Abiy, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 as a reward for Ethiopia’s reconciliation with Eritrea, had promised that this year’s vote will be free. His reputation of reformist after he granted amnesty to thousands of political prisoners, allowed the return of exiles and lifted a ban on opposition parties, has given him a widespread popularity in the country But over the last months, the prospects are becoming gloom. The forthcoming campaign could be very tense in a climate that prompted the parliament to pass law punishing “hate speech” and “disinformation” on the 13 February.

The forthcoming elections have been indeed exacerbating ethnic tensions in many parts of the country. The Tigray region, the stronghold of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) which de facto ran the country as leader of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), finds itself in a state of near secession. On the 3 February, the Prime Ministre acknowledged the problem and said that there could not be two armies in the same country. Nevertheless, on the 7 February, the forces of the Tigray National Regional state defied him and made a parade in the regional capital, Mekelle. And after the announcement of the postponement of the election, the leadership of Tigray warned that this measure would pose a danger to the federation.
Ethno-regionalism is spreading throughout the country, including in Abiy Ahmed’s Oromo region, the most populated of the nine Ethiopian states. The Prime Minister is facing there the opposition of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) whose slogan is “make Oromia great again” and which boasts from the support of the popular leader and media-baron Jawar Mohammed. Like opponents in Tigray, he criticized the decision to postpone the election.
“The Board was already behind the schedule by weeks before the coronavirus outbreak became an issue. There was no way they could have held the election as scheduled. The pandemic just gave them justifiable excuses”, accused Jawar Mohammed.

The OFC which absorbed the Oromo Liberation Front of Dawad Ibsa Ayana, is convinced it can win. It has set up a large coalition of other regionalists groups including the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which is the likely winner in the Somali region, the Afar People’s Liberation Party (APLP), the Sidama People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the Agew National Council (ANC), the Benishangul Gumuz People’s Liberation Movemnt (BGLM), the Kimant Democratic Party (KDP), the Gambella People’s Liberation Movement (GPLM) and the Mocha Domocratic Party (MDP).
Besides, in the Amhara National Regional  State, Abiy’s Prosperity Party which replaces the former ruling EPRDF which was dissolved in January 2020, will be challenged by the National Movement of Amhara (NAMA) and the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (ECSJ). Yet, the dissolution of the EPRDF is considered as premature even within the government, by the Defence Minister, Lemma Megersa, a former president of the Oromo region, who fell out with Abyi over the issue.
The opposition takes sometimes a violent form. On the 23 February, 29 people were injured in a bomb attack in the town of Ambo, at 100 km west of the capital, Addis Ababa against a rally of Abiy’s unitarist Prosperity Party. The police suspects the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) – the breakaway armed wing of the OLF- for the attack and for the assassination of a top security official two days before in Burayu, a town on the outskirts of Addis Ababa.  The OLA is also blamed for bombings, bank robberies and kidnappings in Oromia.

Political violence could jeopardize the implementation of economic reforms which attracted billions of dollars of foreign investments. Over the last two decades, Ethiopia made huge progress in health, education and poverty reduction. Life expectancy increased from 52 years in 2000 to 67 in 2020. The economy grew more than 10-fold during this period. Nevertheless, free and fair elections, as promised Abiy may provoke his defeat. The way Abiy is confronting the challenges is raising lots of concern among human rights activists who deplore that in order to clamp down on protests, secession threats and hatred speech, the government is denying the opposition space to campaign openly.
Abyi’s staunchest opposition comes from his own region of Oromia, which celebrated in 2018 his election as a victory.
The PM is blamed for restricting the press and association freedoms. The OLF and the Oromo Federalist Congress complain that their offices have been closed lots of times.
On the 9 March 2020, the New York-based NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged the Ethiopian government to lift the two-month shutdown of internet and phone communications in Oromia which was justified by the government as necessary during counterinsurgency operations there. Under Abiy Ahmed’s administration, communication blackouts have become routine, deplores HRW.  In January 2020, the Ethiopian government introduced a hate speech and disinformation law that could restrict free expression and access to internet, warns HRW.
According to the Addis Standard magazine, Abiy’s government is filling up the jails again with political prisoners. By end February, nine OLF members and leaders were arrested in Addis Ababa. One of them, former Commander of Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Abdi Regassa now member of OLF’s Executive Committee, remains in prison. But the government’s refusal to reveal his whereabouts prompted Amnesty International to appeal for his release.

Some areas of Oromia look like an occupied territory. In the market town of Nekemte, residents complain that the presence of the army reminds them of the authoritarian regime which ruled the country from 1991 to 2018. Many local inhabitants see the military, not the OLA rebels, as the main source of instability.
The Oromos who had hoped that they would benefit from Abiy’s election as prime minister, are extremely disappointed.
The repression has become very harsh. Human rights organisations mention dozens of deaths. “Killings are occurring on a daily basis in rural areas,” says Asebe Regassa, a lecturer at Wollega University. Accordingly, farmers are afraid of harvesting because they fear that soldiers may accuse them of growing food for the OLA.  On the 10 January 2020, at Bule Hora University, security forces opened fire on a crowd of protesting students, killing one and injuring more than a dozen.  The bitterness is widespread. Opposition leader, Jawar Mohammed says that Abyi is trying to replace the one-party dominated system by a “one man-dominated system”. Critics are even saying that Abiy Ahmed got the Nobel Prize too soon. (F.M.)

 

SIPRI. World arms exports continued to increase over the last five years.

International arms exports increased by 5% between 2015 and 2019 compared to the previous five years, according to new data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which also noted that Africa’s arms exports declined during this period.

SIPRI has just revealed that the largest exporters of arms during the past five years were the United States, Russia, France, Germany and China. The new data shows that the flow of arms to the Middle East has increased, with Saudi Arabia clearly being the world’s largest importer.
Arms imports by African states decreased by 16% between 2010–14 and 2015–19, SIPRI data shows. North Africa accounted for the vast majority (74%) of African arms imports in 2015–19, with Algeria alone accounting for 79% of North African arms imports.
Algeria’s arms imports were up by 71% on 2010–14, making it the sixth-largest arms importer in the world in 2015–19.

The increase occurred in the context of Algeria’s long-standing tensions with Morocco, internal tensions and concerns about the conflicts in neighbouring Mali and Libya. As in 2010–14, Russia remained the largest arms supplier to Algeria in 2015–19, accounting for 67% of Algerian arms imports, followed by China (13%) and Germany (11%).Egypt’s arms imports tripled between 2010–14 and 2015–19, making it the world’s third-largest arms importer, according to SIPRI, with the acquisition of attack helicopters, fighter jets, naval vessels and other hardware. Egypt’s arms imports accounted for 5.8% of the global total and were 212% higher than in 2010–14. The upward trend in Egypt’s arms imports coincides with its military involvement in Libya and in Yemen, and fighting with rebel groups in the Sinai Peninsula.It might also be linked to Egypt’s concerns over the security of gas fields in the Mediterranean and water supply from the Nile Basin, SIPRI said.The USA, which has been giving military aid to Egypt since 1978, was the largest arms exporter to Egypt for any five-year period between 1980 and 2014. Although US arms exports to Egypt remained stable in 2015–19, the USA was only the third-largest arms supplier to Egypt in the period and accounted for 15% of its arms imports, down from 47% in 2010–14.

Because of frictions with the USA related to the military coup in Egypt in 2013, Egypt has intensified its efforts to procure arms from other suppliers. In 2015–19 a total of 35% of Egyptian arms imports came from France, up from 2.3% in 2010–14; Russia accounted for 34% of Egyptian arms imports in 2015–19.
States in sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 26% of African arms imports in 2015–19. Taken together, the arms imports by states in the sub region were 49% lower in 2015–19 than in 2010–14 and at the lowest level since 1995–99. In 2015–19 Russia accounted for 36% of arms imports by states in the sub region, China for 19% and France for 7.6%.
The five largest arms importers in sub-Saharan Africa – Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Senegal and Zambia – accounted for 63% of all arms imports to the sub region. Angola accounted for 27% of arms imports to sub-Saharan Africa and was the 42nd largest arms importer globally. Even though Angola’s economy was in recession, its arms imports were 2120% higher in 2015–19 than in 2010–14.SIPRI pointed out that South Africa, the largest arms importer in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005–2009, imported almost no major arms in 2015–19. South Africa’s imports of submarines, frigates, light helicopters, fighter jets and combat trainers came after the 1998 arms deal but have tapered off significantly since then as the defence budget has declined.

Between 2010–14 and 2015–19, exports of major arms from the USA grew by 23%, raising its share of total global arms exports to 36%. In 2015-19 total US arms exports were 76% higher than those of the second-largest arms exporter in the world, Russia. Major arms transferred from the USA went to a total of 96 countries.
“Half of US arms exports in the past five years went to the Middle East, and half of those went to Saudi Arabia,” said Pieter D. Wezeman, Senior Researcher at SIPRI. “At the same time, demand for the USA’s advanced military aircraft increased, particularly in Europe, Australia, Japan and Taiwan.”French arms exports reached their highest level for any five-year period since 1990 and accounted for 7.9% of total global arms exports in 2015-19, a 72% increase on 2010–14. “The French arms industry has benefited from the demand for arms in Egypt, Qatar and India,” said Diego Lopes Da Silva, SIPRI Researcher.

Major arms exports by Russia decreased by 18% between 2010-14 and 2015-19. “Russia has lost traction in India – the main long-term recipient of Russian major arms – which has led to a sharp reduction in arms exports,” said Alexandra Kuimova, SIPRI Researcher. “This decrease was not offset by the increase in Russian arms exports to Egypt and Iraq in 2015 -19.” Arms imports by countries in the Middle East increased by 61% between 2010 -14 and 2015 -19, and accounted for 35% of total global arms imports over the past five years. Saudi Arabia was the world’s largest arms importer in 2015 -19. Its imports of major arms increased by 130% compared with the previous five-year period and it accounted for 12% of global arms imports in 2015–19. Despite the wide-ranging concerns in the USA and the United Kingdom about Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen, both the USA and the UK continued to export arms to Saudi Arabia in 2015-19. A total of 73% of Saudi Arabia’s arms imports came from the USA and 13% from the UK, SIPRI reports.India was the second-largest arms importer in the world over the past five years, with its neighbour Pakistan ranking 11th. “As in previous years, in 2019 India and Pakistan -which are nuclear-armed states-attacked each other using an array of imported major arms,” said Siemon T. Wezeman, Senior Researcher at SIPRI. “Many of the world’s largest arms exporters have supplied these two states for decades, often exporting arms to both sides.”

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been militarily involved in Libya as well as Yemen over the past five years and was the eighth-largest arms importer in the world in 2015–19. Two-thirds of its arms imports came from the USA during this period. In 2019, when foreign military involvement in Libya was condemned by the United Nations Security Council, the UAE had major arms import deals ongoing with Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the UK and the USA.
In 2015–19 Turkish arms imports were 48% lower than in the previous five-year period, even though its military was fighting Kurdish rebels and was involved in the conflicts in Libya and Syria. This decrease in imports can be explained by delays in deliveries of some major arms, the cancellation of a large deal with the USA for combat aircraft, and developments in the capability of the Turkish arms industry.(D.N.)

 

Has People Action Any Meaning?

It is given as a fact that any advocacy cannot have success without some sort of campaign. A campaign “is the process of mobilizing people to join together in taking action and challenging the powerful to make decisions that help and benefit the powerless.”

It is a way of bringing about improvements or changes for a particular group in the community by identifying a problem, making the target audience aware of the problem, mobilizing other actors to support the intervention, persuading them to take action to resolve the problem or change a certain behavior.
In one word, it is about tackling the causes of injustice, inequality, unfair treatment and marginalization by challenging those structures, policies, and practices which serve to keep the poor in poverty.

Beyond the good intentions, and always laudable efforts, how consistent, effective, and successful are mass mobilization to move forth towards a social justice? This seems the aims of Mass Mobilization Project (MMP) https://massmobilization.github.io/

The Mass Mobilization Project is, therefore, an effort to understand citizen movements against governments. The Mass Mobilization (MM) data shows what citizens want when they demonstrate against governments, and how governments respond to citizens.

The MM data cover 162 countries between 1990 and 2018. MMP Data gathers events where 50 or more protesters publicly demonstrate against government, resulting in more than 10,000 protest events. Each event records location, protest size, protester demands, and government responses. It has three main sections: Data, Visualization, Models.

Data offers texts for research. Its Dataverse is an open source web application to share, preserve, cite, explore, and analyze research data. It facilitates making data available to others, and allows you to replicate others’ work more easily. Researchers, journals, data authors, publishers, data distributors, and affiliated institutions all receive academic credit and web visibility.

Actually, every Dataverse repository is the software installation, which then hosts multiple virtual archives called Dataverses. Each Dataverse contains datasets, and each dataset contains descriptive metadata and data files (including documentation and code that accompany the data). As an organizing method, Dataverses may also contain other Dataverses.

Visualization analyzes Regional Protest Behavior, Country Protests Over Time, Yearly Change in Protests through tables, graphics and pictures. Here you can choose your country of interest with information on violent protests, and the trend of the country compared with the violence
trend of the world.

Finally, Yearly Change in Protests analyses Protest behavior year by year, starting from 1991 through 2018. Blue bars represent an increase in total protests between that year and the previous year; red bars represent a decrease in total protests between that year and the previous year; grey line represents the trend in yearly change in total protests. About one country, Burundi for instance, in Change in Yearly Protest behavior the graphic shows an increase from 1991 through 2013 and then a decrease bringing the trend lower than the average.

For each event, the MM data itemizes what protesters demand across as many as seven categories, including labor/wages, land, police brutality, political process, prices/taxes, removal of a politician, and social restrictions. The dataset also records up to seven types of government responses, including accommodation, arrests, beatings, crowd dispersion, killings, and shootings.

The Mass Mobilization project is sponsored by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). The PITF is funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. The views expressed herein are the Principal Investigators’ alone and do not represent the views of the US Government.
See an example of MMP application in The Impact Of Mass Mobilization And Citizens Participation In Community Development (A Case Of Umuerim Community Of Owerri West, Imo State)

John Paul Pezzi, mccj
VIVAT International NGO
with consultative special status at UN

 

The Nubian People: between Egypt and Sudan.

The legacy of the time of the Pharaohs of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty is being ransomed after the silence caused by intentionally misrepresented history. Now, researchers and institutions are recovering the splendor of the Nubian civilization.

The fascinating culture, history, monuments and religion of Egypt have often overshadowed another not less remarkable and surprising civilization that developed along with the Egyptian one, the civilization of the Black African people of Nubia: the biblical Kush, which due to geographical, climatic and historical circumstances remained forgotten and buried in the burning sands of the Nubian desert for thousands of years. Today the Nubian civilization is coming to light again, revealing its admirable secrets, thanks to the enormous work and efforts of archaeologists and organizations such as the UNESCO, which seek to save it from the water flow behind the Aswan Dam.

Nubia is an ancient region in north eastern Africa, extending approximately from the Nile River valley (near the first cataract, in Aswan, Upper Egypt) eastward to the shores of the Red Sea, southward to about Khartoum (in what is now Sudan), and westward to the Libyan Desert. Nubia lies in the south of Egypt and the north of Sudan. Although it was split between two countries during the European colonization of Africa, it has a distinct culture and language. Ancient Nubia was a homogeneous and independent state. It was the seat of one of the earliest civilizations of ancient Africa with its own rulers, customs, religion and culture.Nubians were a people of artisans, merchants, goldsmiths, very skilled archers and fierce warriors who were able to compete with their powerful neighbour to the north. At one point, the Nubian Pharaohs of the 25th Dynasty even ruled over Egypt for 75 years. Egyptians did, however, conquer Nubian territory at various times, and over centuries their influence, customs and culture overshadowed and absorbed the Nubian civilization.

To the south of the Third Cataract on the east bank of the Nile River, is the city of Kerma, which was a very important centre for trade located between northern Egypt and the kingdom of Kush, where Egyptian merchants went mainly in search of the coveted gold. Kush was known by the Egyptians as the land of gold, which was so appreciated by pharaohs. But the kingdom of Kush was also a thriving centre for the trade of other metals, livestock, all kinds of wood, aromatic plants, incense, pottery and slaves. The city of Kerma was surrounded by walls and is home to one of the oldest and most enigmatic structure in the world and, undoubtedly in Africa: the Deffufa, a mud brick temple where ceremonies were performed on top.
This complex structure is 50m by 25m, and 18 meters tall. It is interesting to note that the Deffufa dates back to around 4,500 years ago, just like the first Egyptian pyramids. So, the time of the beginning of the Nubian and Egypt civilization apparently coincides.

Misinterpretations of Nubian Civilization
The forgotten Kingdom of Kerma was re-discovered by the American archaeologist, George Reisner, during the early 20th century. Fascinated by the site’s wealth, he could not imagine it to be the work of an indigenous Nubian civilisation. Kerma was thus considered a faraway post administered by the Egyptians, who had known how to stimulate the development of the region.

This interpretation nonetheless prevailed for several decades until numerous studies and new findings proved and recognized the historical value of the Nubian African kingdom of Kush.
Like everything related to the people and kingdom of Kush, also the Black Pharaohs remained an unknown chapter in history, since the same Egyptian Pharaohs were responsible for erasing their names from monuments and writings. All these misinterpretations and omissions made the Nubian civilization remained unknown until archaeologists brought it back to light.

The Libyan presence in Egypt
Egypt suffered a great political, religious and moral crisis around 730 B.C. Each city or region of the kingdom had its own ruler. This fragmentation of power favoured the settlement of communities of Libyan origin, which over time, took control of the north of the country. When the influential priests of Ammon in Karnak, started to feel threatened by the presence of the Lybian communities, they urged Pharaoh Kushita Piye – or Pianji – to save the Egyptian civilization from its ultimate destruction and disappearance. Acclaimed by the priests as the son of the god Amun, the Pharaoh quickly assembled an army to invade Egypt. As ruler of Nubia and Upper Egypt, Piye took advantage of the squabbling of Egypt’s rulers by expanding Nubia’s power beyond Thebes into Lower Egypt. Piye considered himself the legitimate successor of great Egyptian Pharaohs such as Thutmose III and Ramses II. Piye viewed his campaign as a Holy War, commanding his soldiers to cleanse themselves ritually before beginning battle.

In just over a year, all the rulers of the north were defeated and the long-awaited political and religious union of Egypt was restored. Once he had consolidated his power and restored the unity of the country, Pianji returned to Kush, his homeland. Under his mandate Egypt regained sovereignty, and the cult of Ammon, of the other gods and the Egyptian religious culture were restored. When he died in 715 B.C. he was buried with four of his horses, in an Egyptian-style pyramid.
Pianji was the initiator of the XXV Dynasty, known as that of the Black Pharaohs in the history of Egypt.Upon his death, his brother Shabaka assumed power and chose Memphis as his residence. During his rule he had to face several uprisings by Libyans, and he had also to confront with the Assyrian king Sennacherib who attacked the fortified cities of the Kingdom of Judah. Instead of ordering the execution of his enemies, Shabaka generally ordered that they dig irrigation canals and dikes in order to protect villages from the various floodings of the Nile. He was succeeded by his nephew Taharca, son of Pianji.

One of the great Pharaohs
By reading the inscriptions on some steles, it is clear that Taharca was remembered as one of the great Pharaohs of Egypt. In 690 B.C., he was crowned in Memphis and acclaimed as the chosen one of Amón. During his twenty-six year rule, Pharaoh Taharca was able to guarantee peace and prosperity to the kingdoms of Egypt and Nubia.
Taharca, following the path of the great Pharaohs, commissioned the building of several monuments, including two temples in the Nubian city of Napata, where the sacred mountain of Jebel Barkal, birthplace and residence of the god Amun, is located.
Taharca was the most important Black Pharaoh of the XXV Dynasty and his influence in Egypt was so great and important that neither his enemies nor time have been able to erase his memory.

His successor, Tanutamani, tried to reunify the Egyptian kingdoms again. He remained on the throne in Thebes for eight years, then the Assyrians defeated him and forced him to return to Nubia, where the Kushite kings continued to reign for a millennium, first in Napata and then in Meroe.
The Black Pharaohs of the XXV Dynasty were considered the saviours and unifiers of the religious and cultural values of Egypt at a critical time in its history. Being considered as the sons of Ammon, they were guarantors of the continuity of the Egyptian divine dynasty, of all its traditions and principles. That is why they fought against invaders that endangered both unity and culture. They ruled as authentic Egyptian Pharaohs controlling the administration, religion, priests and commissioning imposing buildings. They considered themselves fully Egyptian because of their culture and religion, although they came from a different ethnic environment. They were never seen as invaders but as an integral part of the same kingdom, Upper and Lower Egypt and, also very important, that of Kush.

Luis Casado

Bangladesh. The mission of dialogue.

After 45 years of missionary work in Bangladesh, Fr Bob McCahill still continues pedaling to find and bring help to rural disadvantaged people. His energy comes from prayer and a sober diet of veggies. He tells us his story.

After my ordination in 1964, I was assigned to the Philippines. During 11 years, I lived in remote areas, traveling often by motorcycle where there were roads or on foot in the hills, to be with farmers in their barrios and at their fiestas. It was a busy and satisfying life of service to the poor people.  In 1975, an invitation for priests to work in Bangladesh was given to my missionary institute, the Maryknoll Society. We were five who volunteered, arriving on December 2, 1975 in Dhaka in Bangladesh. After a few months of our language studies we asked, the Archbishop of Dhaka, mons. Theotonious Amal Ganguly, to give us permission to live among the Muslims.

At the beginning of our eighth year in Bangladesh, the community of five was reduced to two. Fr Douglas Venne and I decided to leave Tangail, the place where we had lived for the previous eight years, to go to places we felt the need to be, as witnesses of our brotherhood with Muslims and Hindus. Doug chose to be a village-based farmer; I chose to be a seeker-helper of the disabled.
Thus, began my programme of spending three years in a town and them transferring to another town and district. Often a curious Bengalis wanted to know why I had come to live among them. To be a Christian among Muslims is my purpose. To illustrate our feelings of Christian brotherhood with all people has been my effort. Searching for and finding persons in great need of medical attention or surgery has helped folks understand my name: Bob Bhai (Bob Brother).

A simple lifestyle
I go around villages and bazaars, between one and thirty kilometres from where I dwell, searching for persons in need of a brother’s help. As the years have passed, I have limited the service I offer to young persons and children having these three characteristics: they are young—up to age fifteen years; they are poor—and cannot imagine seeking professional help; and they have serious conditions—medical, surgical, or therapeutic. I hope to make the disabled poor more able. I am pleased to be recognised as their brother.
Every town I go to live and serve in is a new experience. The first days find me prone to anxiety, especially on day number one. Will I find a place to stay for a few days while I search for a more permanent place? Refusals to rent to me, brush-offs, and exorbitant rental demands: I meet with them all. God inspires me to trust during those days. “Trust Me!” urges me to hang on, to keep seeking, to refuse discouragement.

God has always arranged living conditions for me which demonstrate how important it is that a missionary among Muslims and Hindus regards has a simple lifestyle. It must be a quite simple lifestyle. Simplicity refers also to cooking for myself on a single burner kerosene stove. It feels good to fix my own food. Before leaving my shelter every morning to bicycle to villages I have a boiled egg and a large banana. Then, on the road, perhaps an hour later, I stop for parata dipped in lentils. At noonday, I eat a snack named shingara and drink lots of water to replenish the fluids I lose through biking. Then, in the afternoon, at 4, I enjoy my daily cooked meal, always like the meal from the previous day: rice and lentils mixed with veggies such as potatoes, string beans, okra, small squash, seasoned with a five takas packet of spices. All are cooked together in one pot for 12 minutes and of it I do not tire. Neither meat nor fish are necessary. Vegetable kichuri satisfies.

“You are an angel”
To accept the Christian’s witness of service without any expectation of a reward is difficult for many Muslims to believe, unless they experience that stringless service. The openness of Bangladesh Muslims and Hindus to accept and appreciate the Christian servant is, in itself, proof of a converted heart. Suspicion is relegated along with hatred for the distant past, opening the door to brotherhood. Occasionally, I cross paths, by accident, with persons I had known in other towns and times.

Recently in Dhaka, on a bus, the young man beside me—whom I did not recognise—reminded me of the services I had offered to the poor and disabled in his town and district. Finally, he summarized his feelings for his once-upon-a-time neighbour: “People there say you are a feresta” (in Arabic, an angel). I know quite well that I am no angel, so I replied to him: “You mean people say I am a feringi” (in Arabic, a foreigner). “No!”, he protested gravely. “You are an angel because you do what angels do: you come as a stranger and bring benefits to persons in need.” Thus, I am no mere foreigner. I am their brother, indeed.

Sometimes, church persons ask me, “What is the result of your lifestyle and service among Muslims?” My answer will have no exactness. Nor am I expecting positive feedback in order to continue this apostolate. All apostolates depend on God and I feel that what I am doing is God’s will for me. I reckon that God has prepared me by my early life and environment for just such an apostolate. The happiness and peace I experience is surely God-given and is a sign I should continue on this path for as long as stamina—physical, mental and spiritual—remain. Am I practising a form of dialogue that the Church approves? Surely so, because each and every Christian is readied by God, guided by the Spirit, led by our Model in life, Jesus, to fulfil mission in multiple ways. My way happens to be a way of dialogue with persons of other faiths. We pray for the courage to place ourselves wherever dialogue and trust can blossom and flourish. Tea stalls, the ubiquitous tea stalls of the sub-continent, are suggested to us as dens of dialogue.

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