Latest Posts Page

Iraq. Parliamentary Elections. A Crucial Moment.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

The parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2025 represent a crucial moment for Iraq, amid profound political transformations, intra-Shiite tensions, regional pressures, and a growing disconnect between the ruling elite and the population.

As Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani seeks to consolidate his position in pursuit of a second term, the political landscape remains fragmented and unpredictable, with potential repercussions
for regional equilibrium.

Sudani, who took office in 2022 with the support of the Shia Coordination Framework (a coalition of Shia parties, some of which are pro-Iranian), is aiming for a second term. His government has distinguished itself by its emphasis on infrastructure reforms, the fight against corruption, and a certain regional diplomatic activism, culminating in the organization of the 34th Arab League Summit in Baghdad (May 17, 2025). Nonetheless, tensions with some longtime Shiite allies, primarily former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Qais al-Khazali (leader of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia party), call into question his future tenure as prime minister.

Corruption allegations against some members of his coalition, including key figures such as Faleh al-Fayyadh and Nassif al-Khattabi, as well as reports of alleged vote-buying abuses by the Shiite militia of the Popular Mobilization Forces, undermine the Prime Minister’s reformist narrative. Furthermore, the decision to invite interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to the Baghdad summit has fuelled internal controversy, especially among pro-Iranian factions who consider the former jihadist leader a threat to the historical memory of the victims of terrorism.

From an institutional perspective, the November 2025 elections will once again be held under a proportional system based on the Sainte-Laguë method, abandoning the SNTV (Single Non-Transferable Vote) system introduced after the Tishreen protests in 2019.

This return to proportional representation usually tends to favour consolidated or at least more structured political forces, penalizing the independent and local lists that had found space at the polls during the similar round in 2021.

In any event, the provincial elections of December 2023 highlighted the emergence of a new local political class, represented by governors and administrators who, capitalizing on growing local budgets and promises of services, managed to prevail against the old elites. A case in point is that of Nassif al-Khattabi in Karbala, a former ally of Maliki,
now close to Sudani.

The new “Reconstruction and Development” coalition launched by Sudani, which brings together the Euphrates Current, the National Pact Alliance, the National Coalition, the Creative Alliance of Karbala, the Sumerian Rally, the Generations Rally, and the Alliance of National Solutions, aims to integrate these local figures to strengthen
its territorial roots.

However, the fragmentation of the Shiite camp, with the decision of the Shiite Coordination Framework to present itself united in some provinces and divided in others (such as Baghdad), foreshadows internal (intra-Shiite) competition that could jeopardize post-electoral stability.

The other major element of uncertainty is the position of the Sadrist Movement (al-Tayyār al-Sadri). After the withdrawal of leader Muqtada al-Sadr from political life in 2022, the Movement boycotted the 2023 elections and announced it would not participate in the 2025 elections either. Nonetheless, recent calls for its supporters to update their voter registration cards have sparked speculation about a possible
indirect return of the Sadrists, through lists of “independent”
or affiliated candidates.

The Shiite Coordination Framework appears to be pursuing an ambivalent strategy: on the one hand, attempting to attract Sadrist voters with populist rhetoric and campaigns in the suburbs; on the other, spreading the narrative that Sadr could return to the polls in an attempt to reduce abstention rates, especially in Shiite strongholds
in the south.

According to preliminary data, over 9 million Iraqi voters may choose not to vote: an alarming sign for the legitimacy of the system, adding to the criticism already levelled at the Electoral Commission for its use of opaque criteria in calculating turnout.

The pre-electoral framework also includes three strategic issues: oil management, internal security, and the role of militias.

On the energy front, the conflict between Baghdad and Erbil over the management of Kurdish oil remains unresolved: the failure to implement Federal Court rulings and the blockade of exports through Turkey (with which negotiations to resume flows remain stalled) are compromising state revenues and creating friction with OPEC.

In a ruling issued in 2022, the Iraqi Federal Court declared an oil and gas law regulating the extraction industry in Iraqi Kurdistan unconstitutional and ordered the Kurdish authorities to hand over crude oil supplies to the central government.

The Iraqi Ministry of Oil believes that the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) failure to comply with the law has damaged both oil exports and public revenues, forcing Baghdad to adjust production from other fields to meet OPEC quotas. Recently, the Ministry itself stated that it holds the KRG legally responsible for the continued smuggling of oil from the Kurdish region out of the country.

Recently, the Iraqi Ministry of Finance announced (May 29) that the Iraqi federal government will stop transferring funds to the KRG due to the failure to transfer oil and non-oil revenues to Baghdad, following the KRG’s May 20 signing of a multi-billion-dollar oil and gas deal
with two US companies.

Furthermore, with a view to diversifying its economic dependence on the oil and gas sectors, Baghdad is planning to develop its mining sector, signing memoranda of understanding with international companies to explore and develop resources such as phosphate, sulphur, lithium, and copper. According to government estimates, the mining sector is expected to contribute at least 10% of Iraq’s GDP during its initial development phase.

On the security front, the progressive reduction of the US military presence, expected by 2026, raises questions about Baghdad’s ability to address the threat of Daesh (ISIS) on its own, especially in light of the parallel US disengagement from Syria. Some sectors of the Iraqi government are reportedly considering postponing the withdrawal of Washington’s troops, while pro-Iranian militias, starting with Kataib Hezbollah, are threatening to resume attacks against US troops in the event of delays.

Regarding militias, the Popular Mobilization Forces remain an ambivalent actor. On the one hand, they are an integral part of the security system; on the other, recent incidents suggest political use of these paramilitary structures, with arbitrary detentions and pressure for votes, in clear violation of the 2016 law prohibiting their association
with political parties.

On the international level, the Sudani government has sought to revitalize Baghdad’s role as a regional mediator, to the point that the dual hosting of the 34th Arab League Summit and the Economic and Social Council Ministerial Meeting (held in Baghdad in mid-May 2025, as part of preparations for the 5th Arab Summit on Economic and Social Development) has been presented as the consecration of the “new Iraq.”

On the other hand, the absence of 16 Heads of State and internal controversy over the invitation to Syria’s al-Sharaa have exposed the fragility of the state apparatus and the difficulty of building a genuine regional consensus, highlighting how Iraqi foreign policy is still subject to internal balances.

Furthermore, criticism of Iraq’s “grain diplomacy” (a donation of 50,000 tons to Tunis to incentivize participation in the Baghdad summit) has reinforced the perception that Iraq is attempting to gain diplomatic legitimacy without first addressing its structural vulnerabilities.

In conclusion, the November 2025 elections will be a test of the stability of the institutional system and Iraq’s ability to overcome sectarianism. Should Prime Minister Sudani succeed in retaining his mandate and maintaining the support of a stable coalition, he will be able to consolidate a pragmatic approach based on development, security, and diplomatic openness in a regional context where new balances have emerged following the events of October 7, 2023.

However, the persistence of intra-Shiite divisions, the dispute with the Kurdish Regional Government, Iranian interference, and the role of militias represent significant obstacles. The great unknown remains voter turnout: a large abstention would risk undermining the new Parliament’s legitimacy, with repercussions for internal stability and external relations. (Photo: Iraq. Election Day. Shutterstock/Sadik Gulec)

Alessio Stilo/CeSI

Argentina at the Crossroads.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

Situated in the southern cone of Latin America, Argentina holds a position of significant strategic importance. With an area exceeding 2.7 million square kilometres, it is the second-largest country on the continent after Brazil.

It overlooks the South Atlantic Ocean for almost five thousand kilometres and borders Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay, thus being a natural crossroads between the Atlantic, the Pacific and Antarctica. This position has made Argentina a significant geopolitical player in the South American region and has fuelled over time a strong territorial claim to the Antarctic continent, to which it is connected not only by geographical proximity but also by scientific, military and diplomatic history.
Argentine history has its roots in the colonial period, when, in the 16th century, the Spanish conquistadors founded the first settlements along the Río de la Plata, including Buenos Aires, which quickly became a strategic commercial hub. For centuries, the area belonged to the Viceroyalty of Peru and later to the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, but already at the end of the eighteenth century, independence movements began to spread, accelerated by the influences of the American and French revolutions and the crisis of the Spanish empire.

Italian immigrants arrived at the port of Buenos Aires. Archivo General de la Nación Argentina

Formal independence was proclaimed on 9 July 1816, but the consolidation of the Argentine state was long and troubled, marked by civil wars, conflicts between federalists and unitarians and rivalries between regional caudillos. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century did the country manage to establish a centralised state, extending its effective control over peripheral territories, often to the detriment of indigenous populations, and starting a process of modernisation that attracted millions of European immigrants,
especially Italians and Spaniards.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina was experiencing an era of extraordinary prosperity. It was one of the ten richest countries in the world, thanks to the fertility of its pampas, which made it a major exporter of grain and meat, and the stability of its liberal institutions.
Buenos Aires, cosmopolitan and opulent, was called the Paris of the South, and the agro-exporting model seemed to guarantee lasting development. However, during the twentieth century, the country experienced a continuous alternation of hopes and crises. The coup d’état of 1930 marked the beginning of a long period of political instability, with frequent military interventions and a growing polarisation between different visions of the country.

The President of Argentina, Juan Domingo Perón. Perón was one of the most important and controversial Argentine politicians of the 20th century, and his influence continues to be felt to this day. National Archive

In the 1940s, the rise of Juan Domingo Perón, an emblematically central figure in the nation’s history, whose movement – Peronism – combined elements of economic nationalism, social justice and populism. Peronist ideology was structured around a so-called “Third Position,” which rejected both Anglo-Saxon capitalism and Soviet communism, and instead promoted an autonomous path for the development of Latin American nations.
In this framework, Perón also formulated a vision of regional cooperation based on the idea of a South American bloc capable of asserting its sovereignty in the face of the great powers. One of the pillars of this strategy was the attempt to strengthen relations with Brazil which Perón considered a strategic partner to create a form of continental alliance, based on shared interests, economic complementarity and political affinities.
Despite many difficulties and with limited results in the short term, these initiatives anticipated some dynamics of regional integration that would develop in the following decades, helping to lay the conceptual foundations for future projects such as Mercosur, Unasur, ALBA, and Celac.Although Perón was deposed several times, his political legacy has survived to this day, making Peronism a transversal and still influential axis on the Argentine party landscape.
The 1970s were marked by an escalation of political violence, culminating in the military coup of 1976. The dictatorship that followed was one of the bloodiest in Latin America, responsible for the forced disappearance of around thirty thousand people, including political opponents, students, trade unionists and activists. Only in 1983, with the return to democracy, did Argentina begin a long and difficult process of civil and legal reconstruction, in which the symbolic role of the trial of the military juntas stands out, one of the first attempts in Latin America to achieve justice after a dictatorship.

Buenos Aires. Monument in tribute to the soldier veterans and fallen in the Malvinas war. Shutterstock/Carolina Jaramillo

One of the events that marked the end of the regime was the defeat in the Falkland Islands War – called Malvinas in Argentina – in 1982. This conflict, triggered by the attempt of the military junta to reconquer the islands controlled by the United Kingdom since 1833, ended with a rapid British victory and a strong national trauma.
The Malvinas issue is still a sensitive point in Argentine diplomacy, which continues to claim sovereignty in international forums, although without concrete progress. The dispute with London is a symbol of Argentine nationalism and a recurring element in political discourse, transversal to all parliamentary forces.
In parallel with this claim, Argentina has strengthened its presence on the Antarctic continent over time. The link with Antarctica is deep and historic. Argentina was among the first countries to establish permanent bases on the frozen continent and has been an active participant, since its signature in 1959, in the Antarctic Treaty that regulates the peaceful and scientific use of the area.

Argentine scientific base in Antarctica. Pixabay

The recent relaunch of the Antarctic Logistics Hub in the city of Ushuaia, the capital of Tierra del Fuego, fits into this context.
This project aims to transform Ushuaia into the main operational base for scientific and logistical missions in Antarctica, making Argentina a point of reference for the international community. The Hub includes the development of advanced port infrastructure, material depots, maintenance services for icebreakers and climatological and geological research laboratories.
The Argentine government has placed great emphasis on this initiative, both to strengthen its geopolitical projection in the global south and to ensure an active role in the future exploitation of Antarctic natural resources, currently bound by international treaties but increasingly at the centre of global strategic interests. Competition with Chile, which has similar facilities in Punta Arenas, is significant, but Argentina has the advantage of greater geographic proximity and a consolidated tradition in the region. (open Photo: Sunset sky over the Monument to the Bicentenary of Argentina, located in Andacollo, Neuquen. 123rf)
(F.R.)

Comboni Missionaries, 70 years in Ecuador.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

Seventy years ago, the Comboni presence in Ecuador began in Esmeraldas, in the north of the country, on the border with Colombia. Since then, three bishops and about 60 missionaries, priests and brothers have dedicated their lives to announcing the Gospel to a population mostly of African and indigenous origin.

The first group of missionaries arrived in Esmeraldas on April 13, 1955. The pioneers of the Comboni presence were Fr. Angelo Barbisotti, who was soon after consecrated the first bishop of the apostolic vicariate (1958), Fr. Luis Marro and Brother Ángel Fusetto.This was the first step in responding to the desire of Pope Pius XII, who entrusted the pastoral care of Esmeraldas, with a majority of Afro-descendant, to the Comboni Missionaries, by their experience in Africa and the situation of extreme social and religious poverty of this population.

Due to their experience in Africa, Pope Pius XII entrusted the pastoral care of Esmeraldas, with a majority Afro-descendant population, to the Comboni Missionaries. File swm

At first, there was much reluctance on the part of the Congregation. The Comboni Missionaries considered themselves “special envoys” in the missions of Africa, both for the charism of the founder, St. Daniel Comboni, the first bishop of Central Africa, and for the work carried out for a hundred years in the countries of the African continent. Some objections were raised at the Holy See, insisting on the lack of missionaries and the urgency of the missions in Uganda and Sudan, nations close to political independence. However, the Vatican did not change its decision, having already entrusted two missions in Peru to the Comboni Missionaries of the German branch and two others in Brazil and Mexico to those of the Italian branch.The province of Esmeraldas was then in a marginal situation compared to the rest of the country: there were no roads or electricity; health centres and educational facilities were minimal. From a spiritual point of view, the lack of personnel had led to the almost total abandonment of the population.

The three Comboni Bishops who served in the Vicariate of Esmeraldas. From left: Mons. Angelo Barbisotti, Mons. Enrique Bartolucci and Mons. Arellano Fernández Eugenio.

Shortly after his arrival, Father Barbisotti wrote about this: “In our first missionary journeys, we met many people endowed with genuine natural goodness, but who, through no fault of their own, are devoid of any doctrinal knowledge. They ignore the plan of salvation, grace, the richness of the faith and of Catholic morality. For the great majority, the Gospel is an unknown book, religion is reduced to a vague confusion of superstitious practices, formulas and objects with no Christian content.”
The first stage of the Comboni Missionaries’ presence in Esmeraldas was characterised by a great pastoral impulse and saw the implementation of numerous activities (catechesis, visits to families, training of leaders, etc.) in the regional capital and in other cities, especially San Lorenzo, Limones, Quinindé, Muisne and in the villages along the rivers. In that period, numerous missionaries, priests and brothers, as well as Comboni Missionary Sisters, arrived, and the province experienced a period of great expansion and construction of important works: parishes, schools, dispensaries, social promotion centres, technical schools, etc.

Esmeraldas’ province was one of the poorest in the country at the time. File swm

The pillars of this impressive missionary activity were the spiritual accompaniment and human promotion of the population of Esmeraldas. The task was not easy”, wrote the first missionaries, “especially because of the dispersion of the inhabitants in a territory that was vast and often difficult to access. It was routine to become familiar with travelling long distances by canoe, despite the strong river currents – on horseback or on foot; prepared for all the breakdowns and the unforeseen and unforeseeable difficulties”.
On June 14, 1973, Pope Paul VI appointed the Comboni missionary Enrique Bartolucci as bishop of the vicariate of Esmeraldas, replacing the deceased Monsignor Angel Barbisotti. In the following years, priests, religious and lay people, both local and foreign, arrived in the diocese to collaborate in the work of evangelisation of the Church of Esmeraldas. At the same time, the Comboni Missionaries were asked to support the Afro-Ecuadorian population and to engage in the missionary animation of the local Church.
Starting in 1976, the Comboni Missionaries took on new pastoral commitments in the dioceses of Manabí, Quito and Guayaquil. In 1982, the Comboni presence also extended to Colombia, with communities in Cali, Bogotá and Medellín. In 1995, the Spanish Comboni priest Eugenio Arellano was appointed the third bishop of Esmeraldas.

A Comboni Missionary, Fr. Enzo Balasso, with youth from the St. Lorenzo community.

Over time, the presence of the Comboni Missionaries diminished. In 2021, Monsignor Arellano, bishop and apostolic vicar of Esmeraldas, reached the age of retirement and resigned. He was replaced by Monsignor Antonio Crameri, of the priestly society of Saint Giuseppe Benedetto Cottolengo. The Comboni Missionaries are still present in Esmeraldas, in the parish of La Merced, and in the cities of San Lorenzo and Borbón. They left behind a local Church full of vitality and evangelising zeal, undoubtedly infected by the missionary spirit
of Saint Daniel Comboni.
On the occasion of the celebration of 70 years of Comboni presence in Esmeraldas, a wreath of flowers has been placed on the tombs of Monsignor Angel Barbisotti and Monsignor Enrique Bartolucci at the entrance of the cathedral, in memory of the approximately 60 Comboni missionaries who passed away in Esmeraldas. Others have taken up the baton, and, thanks to this testimony, several Comboni missionaries of Ecuadorian origin proclaim the Gospel in other parts of the world. (Open Photo: The Esmeraldas Province in the ’60s. Archive)

Francisco Carrera

Adenike Oladosu. Climate Change: Time to Act.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

Nigerian ecofeminist Adenike Titilope Oladosu is the founder of I Lead Climate Action, an initiative aimed at empowering women and youth to combat climate change. Furthermore, she provides expertise on sustainable agriculture in areas where desertification directly impacts food security. We talked with her.

She has represented Nigerian youth at numerous international conferences. She participated in COP25 in Madrid (2019) and the summits that followed it up to the present day. Next November, she will be present at COP 30 in Belem (Brazil).

Adenike Oladosu studied Agricultural Economics at the Federal University of Makurdi. She began her activism in 2018 after observing how climate change was intensifying conflicts between farmers and herders in her homeland.

Her commitment to combating the climate crisis centres on protecting Lake Chad, which has lost 90% of its size since the 1960s and whose situation impacts over 40 million people across four countries. Her activism centres on teaching sustainable practices in local communities, while also emphasising the importance of ecosystems and the vital role of women in environmental struggles.

In 2019, she founded ‘I Lead Climate Action’, an initiative that not only promotes climate education but also seeks to empower women. In 2024, she was included in the prestigious BBC 100 list of inspiring and influential women from around the world.

How does climate change affect women and girls?
Climate change disproportionately affects women and girls. A clear example is access to water. In many regions, women have to walk up to six hours a day to collect water, unpaid work that prevents them from receiving an education or engaging in economic and environmental activities. Another example is the increase in child marriage.

Environmental degradation and loss of livelihoods push some families to use their daughters as a survival strategy, marrying them off for money. As a result, many girls are forced to drop out of school, losing their right to an education and to decide their own future. In addition, women often face difficulties in accessing resources and land. In many communities, they do not have the right to inherit land, which prevents them from fully participating in agricultural activities and obtaining finance.

Without land, they cannot access loans or the resources needed to grow their crops. One of the initiatives we are working on is to provide women with tools, organic fertilisers and seeds, so that they can improve their agricultural production and earn an income. By integrating their traditional knowledge with these resources, many have been able to improve their economic situation, send their children to school and become agents of change in their communities.

What role do young Africans have in the fight against climate change?
When I started the Fridays for Future movement in Nigeria, many young people realised that they could get involved in this cause and help find solutions for their communities. Young people are creating initiatives and looking for innovative solutions, becoming solar technicians, data analysts, environmentalists or sustainable agriculture specialists, exploring smart ways to reduce water use in agriculture or working with international organisations to get funding to develop climate projects in their communities. Musicians can also raise awareness through their songs. Imagine the impact if influential artists like Davido released a song about climate injustice. Young Africans have no limits in taking action against the climate crisis

How does the fight against climate change affect the economic development of African countries?
It has a direct impact. It is often thought that economic growth is only possible through the exploitation of more natural resources, but fossil fuel extraction generates significant losses due to the environmental disasters it causes.

For example, in Nigeria, floods cost us millions of dollars every year and affect agriculture every season. Many farmers work hard on their land, but when their crops are destroyed by climate disasters, their efforts are reduced to nothing and ultimately result in poverty. It is not that people do not want to work; it is that environmental factors are undermining their economic opportunities.

Taking action now is far cheaper than doing nothing. We cannot wait until 2050 or 2080 to reach carbon neutrality. Delaying climate action is a hidden way of denying the problem and shifting responsibility to future generations who did not contribute to the crisis.

We must stop prioritising short-term profits from resource exploitation and focus on sustainable solutions that strengthen our economies and protect our communities. There is also a non-economic aspect to this crisis: the loss of human lives and entire cultures. We are already seeing rising sea levels threaten sites of great cultural heritage in Africa, displacing communities and, with them, their identity and history.

How much power do social media have?
Social media has enormous power in the fight against climate change. I use them to demand concrete actions, raise awareness, push for more political action and convince young people to join the movement.

For example, I created the platform womenandcrisis.com, where I have published more than 100 articles on the climate crisis and its effects on vulnerable communities, especially women living in rural areas.

The fight against climate change is not a problem that only affects the South of the world, but everyone. The countries that have contributed the least to the crisis are the ones that suffer the most, so those with the most resources must take responsibility and contribute their share. (Photo: CC BY-SA 4.0/Dtaichwomsimlooa)

Gonzalo Vitón

China. The new frontiers of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is expanding its scope of action in strategic areas such as the Arctic and Panama, creating a network of interconnections that support its rise as a global superpower. These projects should allow the Beijing government
to increase its economic and political influence and access
strategic resources essential to redraw the current
global geostrategic structure.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has now branched out across all continents and represents a significant geostrategic achievement for China, functional to its global rise, focused on the two directions evoked, in particular, by the new American presidency: the Arctic and Panama.
The huge project, called ‘One Belt, One Road’ and inspired by the ancient Silk Roads, was launched by Xi Jinping in 2013. In just over two decades, it has become one of the most impressive plans in the globalised world. It has produced new strategic and geographical opportunities for world trade, but also new geopolitical, economic and environmental challenges. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), when it was at the peak of its economic growth, tried to connect in this way a large number of states, which in 2025 will reach 149, in an extensive network of routes that wind from Asia through Europe and Africa and reach
the American continent.

A container ship of the Chinese Cosco Shipping Lines. To create an extensive network of routes. Shutterstock/Wolfgang Jargstorff

Through these corridors, several resources have been allocated that guarantee the expansion of Chinese global trade, which has produced a notable degree of control of large geographical areas, strategically fundamental to ferry the Middle Country towards new horizons. Faced with the blockage of some of the main corridors, in a time characterised by the closure of national borders and the “militarisation” of cybersecurity, the Beijing government has increasingly made its presence felt in the Arctic, and then pushed as far as the Panama Canal, a crossroads of world trade, to ensure a place in the new great game
that is emerging in 2025.
China’s attention has been focused on the Arctic since 2017, when the Polar Belt and Road was launched, which branches into two directions: the Northeast Passage, along the Russian coast, and the Northwest Passage through Canada. These corridors allow the seizure of opportunities linked to global warming, which has changed the environmental and atmospheric conditions of the Arctic ice cap, which has gone from 7 million km2 to 4.6 million, a value destined to decrease even further. The retreat of the ice is making previously impassable maritime routes navigable, which now allow the passage of the most important global trade flows with a saving of a number of days compared to traditional routes.

Icebreaking vessel in the Arctic. China’s attention has been focused on the Arctic since 2017, when the Polar Belt and Road was launched. Shutterstock/maks_ph

For this reason, China has launched several icebreakers in just a few years: the Xue Long 2, the Zhong Shan Da Xue, the Ji Di and the new-generation Tan Suo San Hao, which will enter service in 2025, making clear China’s ambitions at a commercial, scientific, diplomatic and military level. This dense network of new connections allows the PRC to invest significant resources in maritime infrastructure and scientific research projects, seeking connections with the eight countries of the Arctic Council (Russia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States) since 2018, when it defined itself as a Near Arctic State, despite the 1,500 kilometres that separate the
Middle Country from the Pole.
The Beijing government, in view of global competition and in addition to logistical and commercial considerations, is mainly targeting communication infrastructures, since the submarine fibre optic cables positioned in the Arctic allow for an increase in transmission speed and lower latency (total round-trip data transmission time). The strategic partnership with Russia, especially after the invasion of Ukraine, has accelerated this path, allowing the PRC to conclude a large number of military, trade and technological cooperation agreements and gain access to rich natural resources, especially oil, gas and rare minerals, essential to support the country’s economic growth.

A convoy in the Arctic Ocean. The retreat of the ice is making maritime routes navigable. Shutterstock/knyazev Vasily

With other modalities, Xi Jinping has turned towards Central America, with a diplomatic offensive supported by significant investments that, between 2005 and 2020, have reached 130 billion dollars in important projects, acquiring strategic and geopolitical advantages, diversifying its energy basket, in an area rich in resources and of vital importance for world trade. The Beijing government has contributed to the development of logistics infrastructure, in particular dams and ports, imposing the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, still officially recognised by Guatemala and Belize, as well as by some Caribbean states. Beijing’s offensive led to the entry of Panama, a crossroads of world traffic, into the Belt and Road Initiative in 2017, followed by Uruguay, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, Bolivia, Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Barbados.

Container ship Cosco is passing through Gatun Locks, part of the Panama Canal. 123rf

The growing Chinese presence in the Canal has raised concerns for American national security and has accelerated the strengthening of containment policies, leading to Panama’s withdrawal from the BRI in February 2025, made official by President José Raul Mulino, despite lively Chinese protests. The grand new game reaching Central America from the Arctic is destined to intensify, making competition between medium and large powers increasingly harsh, in a difficult historical moment, due to systemic opposition, in which the rules of international coexistence seem to be crumbling. In this context, China must deal with increasingly widespread environmental problems linked to the often-devastating impact that infrastructure linked to the BRI has on local ecosystems.
The future prospects of the Belt and Road Initiative, in continuous evolution, are therefore linked to a delicate balance between economic expansion and geopolitical responsibility, which will allow China, having overcome its status as a hybrid superpower, to navigate the complex dynamics that will define the new strategic spaces. (Open Photo: Chinese flag and container ship. Shutterstock/FOTOGRIN)

Elisabetta Esposito Martino/CgP

Herbs & Plants. The Hypoxis genus. The Miracle Plant.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

This plant comprises eight genera and around 130 species. It plays a significant role in traditional medicine.

The Hypoxis genus, which includes various species such as Hypoxis interjecta, Hypoxis multiceps, Hypoxis nyasica, Hypoxis obtuse, Hypoxis sobolifera, and the prominent Hypoxis hemerocallidea, holds substantial importance in traditional medicine throughout Southern Africa. As part of the larger Hypoxidaceae family, encompassing eight genera and approximately 130 species, these plants have long been celebrated for their medicinal properties.
Taxonomically classified within the Hypoxidaceae family, its name derives from the Greek words “hypo” (below) and “oxy” (sharp), referring to the pointed base of its ovary. Recently, this plant has attracted increasing research interest due to its promising medicinal benefits.

Hypoxis hemerocallidea is commercially recognised as the African Potato. CC BY-SA 4.0/Eric Polk

Commercially recognised as the African Potato and often called the “miracle plant,” Hypoxis hemerocallidea features distinctive characteristics, including strap-shaped leaves arranged on thick green hairy stems, which remain unbranched. These stems support stalks bearing 2–12 striking yellow, star-shaped flowers, enhancing the plant’s appeal. Thriving in the wild, the African Potato is most common in Southern Africa, spanning regions from South Africa to Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and extending into East Africa. Its easily recognisable features – bright yellow flowers and green strap-like leaves – make it a familiar and valued plant in its native habitats.
The tuberous part of Hypoxis hemerocallidea is believed to contain bioactive compounds, making it a focal point in traditional medicine. For centuries, the African Potato has been used across folk medicine practices to treat a wide range of ailments.

The African Potato is popular in herbal remedies and commercial products. CC BY-SA 4.0/Krzysztof Ziarnek, Kenraiz

From arthritis to diabetes, high blood pressure, and cancer, this plant has been revered for its supposed therapeutic properties. Beyond traditional uses, modern research continues to explore its potential medicinal benefits. Its bioactive compounds have caught the attention of scientists and health enthusiasts alike, prompting further investigation into its pharmacological properties and therapeutic possibilities. The tuberous rootstock, or corm, of the African Potato is highly regarded in traditional medicine for its claimed therapeutic effects. The leaves are neatly arranged in three ranks, with a broad and stiff structure tapering towards the tips. The underside of the leaves is covered with dense white hairs, giving the plant its distinctive appearance. Hypoxis hemerocallidea has been deeply embedded in traditional medicinal practices for centuries. As awareness of the value of traditional medicine grows, herbs like the African Potato have attracted considerable interest from both commercial and scientific perspectives.The tuberous part of the plant, especially the corm, is highly valued for its bioactive compounds that form the basis of its medicinal use. In folk medicine, the African Potato has been employed to treat numerous ailments, including arthritis, diabetes, high blood pressure, and cancer.

The African potato is highly regarded in traditional medicine due to its alleged therapeutic properties. CC BY-SA 4.0/ SAplants

Aside from its traditional role, the African Potato has gained popularity in modern herbal remedies and commercial products. Various products derived from Hypoxis hemerocallidea, such as creams, capsules, tinctures, and tonics, cater to diverse health needs. Extracts from the corm are used to prepare decoctions that serve as tonics for wasting diseases, tuberculosis, testicular tumours, various cancers, and HIV/AIDS. In some cultures, the African Potato is used to treat ailments like insanity, barrenness, bad dreams, intestinal parasites, urinary infections, and heart conditions. Today, it is valued for its immune-boosting properties, especially in managing conditions like HIV/AIDS and cancer. Indeed, the African Potato is renowned for its ability to strengthen the immune system in individuals affected by these diseases.
Additionally, it is employed to alleviate headaches, dizziness, prostate hypertrophy, burns, and ulcers. Its widespread recognition in South Africa under the misapplied name ‘African Potato’ highlights its prominence in traditional medicine.

Research interest in the plant is growing, as its medicinal benefits are promising.CC BY-SA 4 .0/ Peter A. Mansfeld

Weak infusions and decoctions of the corm are used as strengthening tonics during recovery, or to combat tuberculosis, cancer, prostate enlargement, urinary infections, testicular tumours, and intestinal worms. Furthermore, it is used to manage anxiety, palpitations, depression, and rheumatoid arthritis. It is often promoted as an alternative treatment for benign prostatic hyperplasia due to its purported effectiveness in managing the condition. In conclusion, Hypoxis hemerocallidea, or the African Potato, embodies a rich source of traditional medicinal knowledge and botanical diversity. Its long-standing use in folk medicine, combined with ongoing scientific research, highlights its importance in supporting health and well-being. From its tuberous roots to its bright yellow flowers, the African Potato continues to inspire and offers hope for holistic healing across Africa and beyond. (Open Photo: CC BY-SA 3.0/BotBln)
Richard Komakech

Angola and Mozambique. Strategic allies for the UAE.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

Angola, located on the Atlantic Ocean, and Mozambique, on the Indian Ocean, are becoming increasingly important partners for the United Arab Emirates in Africa.

In the case of Angola, the United Arab Emirates is deepening economic ties, promising significant investments in crucial sectors such as energy, technology and maritime logistics. This is written by Albert Vidal Ribe, a military and defence analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a think-tank based in London.

The capital city of Luanda and its seaside at night

In return, Luanda offers them “greater food security, a growing market and the opportunity to strengthen their regional influence in a context of declining Chinese investment”. Bilateral relations have been consolidating since 2021, thanks to the investment potential of Angola, the sixth largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, with rapid population growth and in “frank recovery” after having faced a severe recession in the late 2010s, the IISS analyst emphasises. Nothing seems to discourage Angolan leaders, not even the fact that the emirate of Dubai, synonymous with luxury and opulence, where Isabel dos Santos has been living on an artificial island since 2020, refuses to extradite the daughter of a former president for whom an arrest warrant has been issued after the seizure of her bank accounts.

Angola has “fertile soil and a favourable climate”. Photo Fao

In agricultural terms, Angola has “fertile soil and a favourable climate”, which allows the Emirates to diversify their food imports. In the field of mineral resources, Angola is not only one of the world’s largest diamond exporters (78%, or more than two-thirds, are sold to the United Arab Emirates), but also has “vast untapped reserves of critical minerals and rare earths, including copper, cobalt, manganese and lithium, all essential to the technological ambitions” of the country, which is described as “a new superpower in Africa”.
Regional infrastructure projects that pass through Angola, Albert Ribe said, should also “maximise the economic opportunities of the United Arab Emirates,” whose companies have been trying, not always successfully, to gain interests in the mines of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)” since 2022. The Lobito rail corridor, which links Angola to the former Zaire, could become “a primary export route” for Zambian and Congolese minerals.

Corvettes and ports
Other sectors in which the UAE has invested in Angola include telecommunications, public infrastructure, renewable energy and an innovative development project that, covering 2,000 hectares, will be “the continent’s first integrated industrial, commercial and residential hub”, according to Dubai Investments. This is facilitated by “personal relationships at the elite level”, Ribe points out, and a bilateral treaty signed in 2021.In the maritime sector, Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB), part of the state-owned conglomerate EDGE, has won a contract worth more than a billion dollars to build a fleet of three R71 MKII corvettes at a UAE shipyard for the Angolan Navy, intending to protect the country’s 1,600 kilometres of coastline.

The first of three BR71 Mk II light corvettes for the Angolan Navy is seen at the CMN – Constructions Mécaniques de Normandie – shipyard in Cherbourg. Two will be manufactured in Cherbourg and one in Abu Dhabi. Courtesy of CMN

The order for the 71-meter vessels, capable of taking down targets at sea and in the air, was placed in 2023, the same year that two financing agreements were signed with the Abu Dhabi Export Credit Agency (ADEX). The first, worth more than $89 million, will support a data storage and analysis project; the second aims to restore and maintain street lighting in Luanda, Malanje, N’dalatando and Uíje, for a value of more than $33.6 million. In the port of Luanda, the largest and most important maritime infrastructure in the region, the UAE will control two terminals after Abu Dhabi-based AD Ports Group was awarded two concessions, each lasting 20 years. AD Ports Group will also be responsible for managing container movements in the African country’s giant logistics market. The UAE is also said to be interested in participating in the modernisation project underway at the Caio deep-water terminal, located in the port of Cabinda, the province where much of Angola’s oil comes from and where FLEC/FAC has been waging an armed struggle for independence for years.

The UAE will control two terminals in Luanda’s port. File swm

The Chinese construction company CRBX is responsible for the work, worth more than $830 million. Angola’s goal may be to free itself from its “over-dependence” on Beijing (to which it owes between $17 billion and $42 billion, or 40% of its total debt), but the “overreliance” on the UAE, as Albert Ribe points out, “also entails risks”.
Since Angola is a country with “numerous socio-economic challenges”, where extreme poverty has increased by 82% in the last eight years and multidimensional poverty affects around 51.2% of the population, “there is no guarantee that the investments will be profitable”.

Gas, ports and solar energy
Like Angola, Mozambique is also one of the African states that attracts the interest of the United Arab Emirates and not even the installation of a new President of the Republic in Maputo has changed the situation.
In March, the new President Daniel Chapo, who replaced Filipe Nyusi, received the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates to confirm the desire to continue a strategic partnership that has lasted
for over twenty years.

President of Mozambique, Daniel Francisco Chapo, Photo: Pres. Office.

The exploration of LNG in the Rovuma basin, operational from 2022 (first phase, Coral South) and in which the Emirati state oil company will participate, received a major boost in April, after the government of Maputo gave the green light to the development plan of the Coral North field, located in Area 4, which will allow the annual production of 3.5 million tons per year (Mtpa) of liquefied natural gas.
With a budget of $7.2 billion, the floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) platform could start production (from six wells) in the second quarter of 2028 and is expected to operate for 30 years, the Mozambique Information Agency reported. The Coral Sul project, which is the second led by Italy’s ENI, involves US-based Exxon Mobil, China National Petroleum Corporation, Empresa Moçambicana de Hidrocarbonetos (KOGAS) and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), which paid $880 million for Galp Energia’s 10% stake. In Cabo Delgado province, where the Rovuma River flows, Abu Dhabi authorities are also assisting in Mozambique in its fight against a jihadist rebellion that began in 2017.

Road bridge over Rio Lúrio, the border between Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces. Abu Dhabi will assist Mozambique in its fight against jihadist rebels.CC BY-SA 2.0/F Mira

The military aid was a result of a memorandum of understanding signed in 2022 to “cooperate in the fight against terrorism”, and took the form of armoured vehicles and trucks for transporting troops.
In the port sector, DP World, the multinational logistics company based in Dubai, which is expanding the container terminal at the port of Maputo (a concession valid until 2058, with an investment of 600 million dollars), intends to develop ports in other cities and create industrial parks in various regions to strengthen ties with neighbouring countries. It also plans to build a 125 MW photovoltaic plant in the Changara and Marara districts of Tete province, which will light up the homes of 150,000 families. This $150 million investment will involve the public company Hydropower of Maputo and the private company Amea Power of Dubai. With a series of projects ranging from agriculture to tourism, the UAE has become one of the five largest economic partners of Mozambique and Mozambique has become one of the priority markets of the UAE. (Open Photo: Dubai, United Arab Emirates and the national flag of Angola and Mozambique. 123rf)

Margarida Santos Lopes

Cameroon. Offering a smile.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

Located on the hills of Mvolyé, in Yaoundé, the capital of Cameroon, the Foyer de l’Espérance is a diocesan work that deals with the reception, protection and family and social reintegration of street children and young people, as well as prisoners of the city.
We visited the centre.

We met the Jesuit Father Alfonso Ruiz, 80, at the Foyer de l’Espérance children’s college, a diocesan institution dedicated to the protection of children in difficulty, where he had coordinated the centre for 22 years. Last year, the leadership passed to another Jesuit, Father Tobian Noubaïssem. The college is one of four Foyer centres located in the Mvolyé neighbourhood of the Cameroonian capital, Yaoundé.
From the beginning, the main objective of the Foyer de l’Espérance has been the family and social reintegration of street children, girls and young people from the youth prison of Yaoundé. The first step is always to “go and meet them on the street”: several times a week, the Foyer’s educators go to meet the children and invite them to go to the day and listening centre, where they can wash, do their laundry, have some food, watch television, play and participate in educational discussions.

Two street girls. About 140 children attend the centre each week. Pixabay

About 140 children attend the centre each week. Some come and some go, until they gain the trust of someone to whom, one day, they tell their story, which is sometimes very difficult, especially if they are children who have suffered sexual abuse in the family. It takes time and patience,” says the Jesuit.
It is only when, in a spirit of trust, young people open up and sincerely express their desire to change their path that they are accepted into the college, enrolled in school, and their families or other host families are contacted for reintegration. According to the Jesuit, this “can last two days or ten years” because no two children are the same: each has their own personal story.It is difficult to find children under the age of six or seven on the streets, because when they are that young, “someone usually goes to pick them up and collect them”, but from the age of eight onwards, it is possible to find them. In the college, the children are on average 14 years old and their number is limited to about thirty to ensure a personalised education. “Each child is assigned a reference educator, which is essential for children who have lived on the margins of their family, so that they feel valued and can recover their dignity and self-esteem”, the Jesuit explains.

A growing phenomenon
The Foyer de l’Espérance was founded in 1977 by Brother Yves Lescanne, a member of the congregation of the Brothers of Jesus, who was then chaplain of the juvenile section of the central prison of Yaoundé. This follower of Charles de Foucauld realised that many boys who were leaving prison ended up sleeping on the streets and asked the Archbishop of Yaoundé, Monsignor Jean Zoa, for a place to house them. It all started very simply, with a small house made of clay and wattles on the site where the college stands today.

One of the boys at the Foyer de l’Espérance alphabetisation program. Photo E. Bayo

Speaking of the causes that lead children to live on the streets, Father Alfonso recalls that “80% of cases are due to the disintegration of the family in an urban environment where the values of solidarity and hospitality are gradually being lost. If a young person does not feel loved and lives in a violent context, one day they will leave. Extreme poverty does not necessarily lead them to run away. If a child feels loved, they can spend the whole day on the street looking for something to give to their family, but in the evening, they go back home.”
In addition to the boarding school for minors and the day centre, where the initial reception and listening process for young people takes place, the Foyer de l’Espérance includes a girls’ house and a boarding school for young people over the age of 16 in vocational training. The latter houses about 15 children, who are offered technical training appropriate to their level of education, which can last a maximum of four years.
Father Alfonso does not hide his pessimism: “These older children come directly from the streets or prison and, in some way, their process of family reintegration has failed.
Some of them leave early because they struggle to respect the rules. Those who manage to complete their training have a lot of difficulty finding work, especially in a country where corruption is rampant and where it is difficult to find a job if you don’t have someone who opens the doors for you.”

Sister Sophie, in pink, with a group of girls at the girls’ home. Photo E. Bayo

The girls’ house is a boarding school and a day centre for reception and listening. On Wednesdays, groups of girls aged between 15 and 30, depending on the day, come to the centre directly from the street to have a wash and a meal. Those who wish to do so can talk to the educators. In the house, on the ground floor and the first floor, about twenty girls live, looked after by specialised educators, including two nuns from the Sisters of Compassion. All the girls in the college, like the boys of Frère Yves, are enrolled in public schools that know their reality and accept them even when their course is advanced.
The Foyer runs literacy courses to help those who have fallen behind and a school for about 130 primary and secondary school students in the juvenile wing of the central prison of Yaoundé. However, it did not want to create its own external educational centres because, according to Father Alfonso, “it is much better for them to share the school with other children.” Accustomed to seeing people passing by and insulting them, going to school and, sometimes, getting better grades than their classmates is an important act of socialisation.

Father Alfonso Ruiz, has coordinated the centre for 22 years. “This work is difficult, but for me it has been a blessing from God”. Photo E. Bayo

Father Alfonso continues: “The street kids form a separate society, with a very strong sociological but not physical border, which you have to cross even if you don’t have a visa. This means going out on the streets and talking to them. At first, they look at you strangely, but you have to consider the operation of “becoming part of the landscape”, just like street vendors or security guards in shops.
Today, there is no longer anyone who is surprised to see an old, white and bald man walking around the streets of Yaoundé. Father Alfonso concludes: “This work is difficult, but for me it has been a blessing from God. It has been the work of my maturity and my old age, wonderful for me in human, Christian and social terms”. (Open Photo: Father Alfonso Ruiz at the Foyer de l’Espérance children’s college. Photo: E. Bayo)

Enrique Bayo

Zimbabwe. Chinese plunder.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

Investors from the Asian country control a large part of the country’s subsoil, conniving with powerful local people. The consequences for the communities are grave. Isolated from the West, the alternative chosen years ago by Harare still appears problematic

Zimbabwe faces a myriad of challenges: from political unrest to prolonged social instability. A climate that discourages investment. And that makes the country another piece of the great, well-known contradiction of Africa: the subsoil is rich and yet the communities are poor and without work. One fact above all that gives substance to the abundance we write about: Zimbabwe is the first producer in Africa and among the first ten in the world of lithium, the essential “white gold” of the energy transition.

President of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa. Photo: Mqondisi Dube / VOA

The beginning of the crisis gripping Harare can be found in the late 1990s, in the midst of the thirty-year government of the then-president Robert Mugabe. The former head of state, dismissed in 2017, died in 2019, but his Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu, now Zanu-PF) still governs the country. Since the end of the last century, accusations against Mugabe date back to repressing opposition and illegally and violently confiscating lands that were owned by white farmers during the colonial period. Accusations that have led the international community to isolate the country economically and politically, with serious consequences for the population.

Chinese Crutches
And this is where a new, important player in Zimbabwe’s recent history comes into play. With its roads to the West blocked, Harare has sought salvation in China. Recently, former opposition leader and MP Eddie Cross has highlighted some of the most dysfunctional elements in the relationship between Harare and Beijing.
Cross has been investigating Chinese activities in Zimbabwe since 2012, when he was still a member of parliament.

A Chinese worker at the Dinson Iron and Steel Company (DISCO) in Manhize, Midlands Province. The Chinese companies control 90% of Zimbabwe’s extractive sector. Photo: Xinhua

In an editorial on the news portal Bulawayo24, he reconstructs a story of collusion between Beijing companies and government companies and military leaders, as in the complex case of the diamond mines of Marange, in the east of the country. More generally, Cross describes a panorama in which Chinese companies are carrying out the “plunder” of resources in Zimbabwe that has so far brought very few benefits to the local population. In exchange, environmental devastation, infrastructure investments that ignore the needs of the population and only serve the exploitation of the subsoil, and unfavourable contractual terms.
As well as a “classic” model based on mere export, without the creation of on-site added value.

Made for China
The operations of Beijing companies in Zimbabwe are explored in depth in a report published last year by the civil society organisation Centre for Natural Resources Governance (CNRG), entitled Investments or Plunder: An Analysis of Chinese Investments in Zimbabwe’s Extractive Sector. The premise is that Chinese companies control 90% of Zimbabwe’s extractive sector, with a presence in all 64 districts of the country. In 2023, 121 different Chinese players in the sector invested $2.79 billion. According to the director of the Tracy Mafa Centre, “many Chinese companies do not have proper registration documents”.
The findings, the activist continues, speaking about the report, “suggest that these companies are protected by political actors who make it difficult for regulators to enforce the rules.

A bird’s eye view of Harare. Chinese companies’ unscrupulous practices have consequences. Corruption is widespread and used to influence politicians and local and traditional authorities. 123rf

These companies appear to operate above the law and under the shield of influential figures in the local government.” The unscrupulous operations of Chinese companies have consequences in all fields. The report shows that corruption is a widespread practice and is used as a means to influence politicians, local and traditional authorities. In the latter two cases, bribes replace the effective participation of communities in decision-making processes, with enormous consequences. The environmental impact is also more than significant: while impact assessments are systematically bypassed, the extractive model chosen by Chinese companies causes deforestation, the destruction of agricultural land, and the pollution of water sources. And here too, the substantial “alignment” between government elites and Beijing’s investors returns: the authorities do not intervene, or when they do, they end up favouring the interests of entrepreneurs. In the words of the director of the CNRG, Farai Maguwu, recommendations and fears already heard many times in Africa return: “We support policies that give priority to community rights, environmental sustainability and transparent commitment,” says the director. “Without them, we risk turning our natural resources into a curse rather than a blessing.”

Questionable dismissals
The complicity of Zimbabwean politicians with Chinese companies, denounced in the CNRG report, can help us understand a recent decision by President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who last April fired Environment Minister Sithembiso Nyoni, who had been in government positions since 1995. Shortly before, ZimParks, the state agency for the management of national parks that answers to Nyoni’s ministry, had urged the executive not to approve a Chinese project for mining operations in Hwange Park, the country’s largest protected area and a sanctuary for black rhinos. There is also a rift everywhere between Chinese companies and local communities. In a recent case, about 20,000 inhabitants of the town of Domboshava, not far from the capital Harare, risk being evicted by the Aihua Jianye company.

Harare. Longcheng Plaza shopping mall. Shutterstock/VV Shots

The Chinese company wants to open a quarry on 225 hectares of land that belongs to the community. Aihua Jianye has already fenced off the area and dug three small dams as sources of water supply for its future plants without first consulting the inhabitants. Citizens’ committees and traditional village authorities have already taken action to block the development of the project. But cases of exploitation and illegal behaviour are reported throughout the country. Bindura is the capital of the province of Mashonaland Central, in the north of the country, and is the epicentre of various mining activities, from nickel to gold. A resident of the city who preferred to remain anonymous reported: “I know of several cases of people dying while they were underground due to poor working conditions. Chinese entrepreneurs do not care about fairness or safety. I do not blame them,” the resident of Bindura comments, “but rather the government that allows them to operate in this way.” Environmental devastation and exploitation are back in a complaint relaunched last April by investigative journalist Hopewell Chinono, in self-exile abroad after facing several arrests and legal problems in his homeland. In a testimony from Goromonzi, a province in eastern Mashonaland, still in the north of Zimbabwe and in an area where the extraction sites are all owned by the Chinese, there is talk of dozens of trucks loaded with lithium per day while all around “there is not a clinic, a hospital, a decent road and much less work for those who live in the area”. Zimbabwe, Chinono comments, “is being plundered for the benefit of the Chinese and the corrupt elites of Zanu-PF. The sooner we understand that Beijing is our colonial master, the better”. (Open Photo: Shutterstock/Dwiangga)

Joseph Chirume

Madagascar. The Vezo, the Guardians of the Sea.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

The Vezo of Madagascar spend their lives sailing in their pirogues, following the wind and currents in search of fish schools. They live in harmony with the ocean and are committed to protecting it.

Their small, light outrigger canoes, carved from a tree trunk, caress the waters of the Indian Ocean, driven by the southern trade winds that blow in the Mozambique Channel. They move continuously along the southwestern coasts of Madagascar, taking advantage of the alternating winds and tides that stir the waters of the Tropic of Capricorn.
For over a thousand years, they have been part of the superb landscape of this remote region of the Big Island. They live by fishing, following schools of tuna, barracuda, and marlin for days on end. When they touch land in the evening, they transform the square sails of the boats into makeshift tents under which to spend the night. And the next day they return to sailing. They lead an existence in perpetual movement that has earned them the reputation of “nomads of the sea”.

Fishing scene of Malagasy fishermen of the Vezo ethnic group. 123rf

They are called Vezo, a name that does not indicate a true ethnic group but rather a way of life: in symbiosis with the sea. Unable to move away from the water, they inhabit a thin coastal strip between the cities of Itampolo (south) and Morondava (north), between the turquoise waters of the ocean and soft white beaches that resemble talcum powder.
Legend has it that they were born from the encounter between a fisherman and a mermaid so beautiful that the man, madly in love, tried in every way to keep her at home. But she could not live outside the sea. One day, she convinced him to take a boat ride and, when they were out at sea, she dived into the water never to return. The fisherman’s despair was alleviated only by the presence of his children. They were the first Vezo. Growing up, they would take the road to the sea to try, in every way possible, to meet their mother.

One becomes a Vezo
Like most of the populations of Madagascar, the Vezo have Asian origins. Their language is similar to a dialect widespread in southern Borneo. However, the Vezo are not formally considered a people: according to ethnologists, they are a subgroup of the Sakalava family (a people of shepherds and farmers with whom they also exchange seafood for rice and manioc).

Vezo fisherman. CC BY-SA 2.0/Jean-Louis Vandevivère

It is not difficult to recognize a Vezo. In fact, one can recognize one by the signs that time has left on his body. First of all, fishing marks the hands: the lines, as soon as a fish bites, cut the skin into characteristic signs; the chest is also involved, since, while paddling, the lines are wrapped around the waist so as not to lose them; if a fish bites, the friction directly affects the chest. The reddish scratches heal into white streaks to show to those who want to understand the “vezosity” of a person. In contrast, the women show their feet wounded by the collection of shellfish on the coral reef or wild plants on the dunes, but they also indicate their quality of Vezo because they do not have calluses on their hands like the Masikoro farmers.
What is surprising about this group is the extraordinary wealth of knowledge about the environment preserved by the fishermen and passed down through the families for centuries. The great ability of the Vezo to live in close relationship with the ocean, enjoying its fruits, deeply respecting the rhythms of nature, without in the least affecting the delicate balances of the marine habitat.

The Vezo village of Salary in the south of Madagascar. 123rf

While in other parts of the world the ocean waters are plundered by over-exploitation of fish, the Vezo continue to fish and collect from the sea only what is strictly necessary to live.
They do not know greed or gluttony.They strictly respect a series of taboos – fady -, prohibitions of a magical-religious nature that enable them to preserve the environment.
For example, do not fish certain fish species during the breeding season, and do not step on the parts of the beach where eggs laid by sea turtles are found. According to local beliefs, transgressing a prohibition, breaking a fady, would produce severe punishments generated by forces that control human destinies.

Vezo boatman on his outrigger canoe. 123rf

Therefore, all Vezos respect the traditional code of behaviours and prohibitions – most of which refer to the preservation of nature – drawn up in ancient times, well before modern international laws and conventions for the protection of the seas were ratified.
They provide a valuable lesson, especially today when even the waters of Madagascar are threatened by progressive impoverishment due to industrial fishing and climate change. The Vezo, however, are aware that only by protecting the marine biodiversity of these waters will they be able to guarantee food security and maintain their lifestyle unchanged, passing on knowledge from one generation to the next. “We fish and dive to earn a living,” says Symphorien Soa, a Vezo fisherman. The sea is the first thing we think of when we wake up in the morning. And it is what we dream of when we go to sleep”. They live day by day until the end of their existence, when they are buried in tombs surrounded by poles with exotic and marine representations: when they fall to the ground, the soul of the deceased will be able to free itself definitively. (Open Photo: Malagasy fishing sailboats of the Vezo ethnic group)

Irene Fornasiero/Africa

Art. The Traumas of Infancy.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

His expressive force and naive style have made the Ivorian artist, born Abdoulaye Diarrassouba, one of the world’s best-selling. In his paintings, we see the streets of Abidjan, the inequalities, the reaction to social unease.

There are not many adults who can look at the world through the eyes of a child. There are even fewer who can represent that world, as a child probably would, but with the awareness of the message they are transmitting. This is the artistic mystery, the stylistic figure of Aboudia, stage name of Abdoulaye Diarrassouba, an Ivorian born in 1983.
The style of his paintings, which he defines as “naïve”, has made him one of the best-selling painters in the world.
They are works inspired mostly by street children, by the street culture of his hometown, Abidjan and his country. “Brutally energetic paintings”, as someone has defined them, that blend innocence and spontaneity with a dark and painful interior world.

The artistic mystery, the stylistic figure of Aboudia, stage name of Abdoulaye Diarrassouba. Instagram

His works are tormented by traumas, starting with the Ivorian civil wars (2002-2011), resulting in soldiers, weapons, skulls, a threatened and frightened population, dark colours and strong brush strokes.
Aboudia’s works have an impact and attract; you seem to see an angry and traumatised child, precisely, who has been asked by a teacher/psychologist to throw out what is inside him. But there are also details, hidden references, even to spirituality and local culture, and each time you seem to catch a new one. His work today continues to address the theme of social discomfort, street life, inequalities, showing at the same time the strength and ability of his people to react.

“Brutally energetic paintings” that blend innocence and spontaneity with a dark interior world. Courtesy of African Contemporary

They are works that someone, at first glance, might define as “elementary”, that even a child could create. But it is in this sort of apparent naivety that the artist’s whole peculiarity lies. Making comparisons with Western artists who have made apparent simplicity their style would be a form of arrogance, the inability to recognise that view of the world and that unique brushstroke.
Aboudia himself states: “What makes my style recognisable, I can say, is this naive side: being an adult but working like a child”.
The art market, after all, recognised the power and singularity of his work. According to Artprice, Aboudia is currently ranked 1,311th in the ranking of the 5,000 best-selling artists at auction in the world, and in 2022, he was the contemporary artist who sold the most paintings (75) according to the Hiscox Top 100.

Aboudia says: “What makes my style recognisable, I can say, is this naive side: being an adult but working like a child”. Courtesy of African Contemporary

Aboudia studied art both at the Conservatory of Arts and Crafts in Abengourou, in eastern Côte d’Ivoire, and at the Technical Arts Centre in Bingerville, a suburb of Abidjan. But few took him seriously at first. Neither his father, who did not take his son’s inclinations seriously, nor other artists to whom he tried to submit his works, nor society, which probably saw him as strange as his art.
Aboudia remembers these difficulties well. And this is probably one of the reasons that pushed him to create a foundation that bears his name. The aim is to convey to children a taste for art, to give them the opportunity to paint their inner world.
Art is something natural, as a field of human expression, but also as a way to create relationships and avoid feeling alone. We would define him as a committed artist, a sort of activist with brushes and colours who sends deep messages without shouting and who, no one would have imagined, has contributed to removing from a sort of marginalising ghetto, a work ultimately signed “Africa”. (Open Photo: Courtesy of African Contemporary)

Antonella Sinopoli

Fen Xiang. Sharing with the Church in China.

Monday, 1 September 2025 8:00

The arrival of the Comboni Missionaries in Macau soon raised a question: What about mainland China? Consequently, a project was established to support the Church in China: Fen Xiang. The aim is to encourage the sharing of resources and means with the dioceses through the formation of clergy, religious, and laity. The Comboni Missionaries explain.

The establishment of a community in Macau and, later, another in Taiwan laid the foundations for launching the Comboni presence in the Chinese context. However, we were still focused on mainland China, where we wanted to establish a presence.
Although the task was complex, by the end of 1998, a plan had been drawn up to make this dream come true. It was called the Fen Xiang project, which underlined the vision of sharing and mutual help between churches, of which the Comboni Missionaries wanted to become instruments and animators.

Young priests of Yuci diocese attending a formation course. The Fen Xiang team gives formation courses and spiritual exercises. File swm

It aimed to promote a type of presence that was not fully developed at that time but would allow the Comboni Missionaries to be in contact and, in some way, share the concerns of the Church in China. It also fostered a social dimension, which included the promotion of integral human development through involvement in projects to support poor children, orphanages with physically disabled children, AIDS patients,
and homes for the elderly.
From the outset, having a presence on the Chinese mainland was a strategy that, in its form and application, slowly developed into what we call the “itinerant Comboni mission.”
The Comboni itinerancy in China began in October 1998, with trips, contacts and interactions with Church leaders in China.
In its twenty-seven years of existence, the Fen Xiang project has opened up new fronts and places in its insertion and collaboration with the Church in China. Its objectives have centred on spreading the missionary spirit of the Church, an unquestioning commitment to the poorest in society, and an itinerant mission that takes the form of trips
from Macau to mainland China.

Specific initiatives
Fen Xiang’s general objective is to grow and strengthen the local Church so that the local Church can grow and carry out specific initiatives and projects. There is good collaboration with the Church in China in the field of formation through scholarships for priests, seminary professors, and religious who are preparing themselves in the religious, theological, and pastoral fields, as well as in the social sciences or health, by specializing in areas that enable them to better serve society.

Members of Caritas of Yuci diocese. File swm

The Fen Xiang team, which periodically visits China, gives formation courses and spiritual exercises and shares the concerns of religious and missionary life with seminarians, religious, priests and lay people, mainly in the north of China, in the provinces of Gansu, Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Henan, Sichuan and Shenyang; it also animates the local Church and makes St. Daniel Comboni and the Comboni missionary spirit known; in this way, the project serves as a bridge between Churches; Fen Xiang is also involved in human promotion projects to express the social dimension of faith, something that is inseparable from the missionary vocation to the poorest.

Children in the rural school. File swm

What was clear from the start, and remains so today, is that God inspired the Fen Xiang project and was in tune with the basic characteristics of the Comboni charism: concern for the marginalized in society (setting up orphanages, aid centres, scholarships for poor students from the countryside); the need to share the missionary spirit with the local Church (through courses, newsletters, personal contacts and contributions through retreats); the religious formation of the local Church (annual retreats for priests, sisters, seminarians and lay people, training courses for Church personnel, summer and winter camps for young people), to reaffirm that the Chinese are the missionaries of their people.In these years of Fen Xiang’s journey, we can say that the results have been very satisfactory. Priests, seminary teachers, and religious people have been trained in different places through Fen Xiang’s help, and back home, they have taken up positions of responsibility to continue helping in their respective areas in Christian formation.

Challenges
Fen Xiang’s tangible and obvious challenges are not without difficulties when they take place in the context of insecurity. Visits to China depend on many circumstances, including obtaining a visa.

Orphanage in the Xiliulin village in Shanxi province, North China. The Project’s involvement in supporting poor children. File swm

This makes this project typically missionary and Comboni. It has been and continues to be a hidden work, where prudence prevails, and all the leading roles must be left in the hands of the local Church. For this reason, we continue to invest in the integral formation of its pastoral agents, including the human, spiritual, intellectual and pastoral formation of the laity. They take responsibility for charitable activities, catechesis, and the missionary impulse.
The fruits will come as and when God wills. Still, there is no doubt that the witness of the Church in China and its pastoral workers, who have suffered persecution and continue to suffer government control, helps us to put into practice what we maintain: that we make common cause with the people to whom we are sent, that we learn from people, and that we live together with the local Church with whom we share our lives. (Open Photo: 123rf – Pixabay)

Elzoiz M.

Photo Gallery – Comboni Youth Movement at World Youth Day

Advocacy

Baobab

Youth & Mission