On 7 May, at 01:05 a.m. local time, the Indian Armed Forces carried out a limited strike operation, named Sindoor, targeting a total of 21 sites located mainly beyond the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, in Pakistan’s Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.

The operation, which lasted approximately 25 minutes in total, primarily involved the use of Indian Air Force aircraft operating within national airspace, from which long-range precision stand-off strike munitions were launched. These targeted only selected camps and infrastructure reportedly linked, according to Indian authorities, to the militant groups “Jaish-e-Mohammed “(JeM) and” Lashkar-e-Taib”a (LeT), which New Delhi holds responsible for the 22 April terrorist attack on Hindu tourists in Baisaran Valley, Jammu and Kashmir.

Specifically, Indian security services have attributed the Pahalgam attack, which resulted in 26 fatalities, to “The Resistance Front” (TRF), a proxy linked to LeT and also implicated in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Among the sites targeted by Indian forces was the city of Muridke in Punjab province, where Indian intelligence identified the presence of JeM leader Masood Azhar. However, he may have escaped the strike, while some members of his family are believed to have been killed.

The highly limited nature of the bombing campaign, both in terms of duration and magnitude, despite at least 25 reported fatalities and about twice as many wounded, and the absence of any Pakistani military facilities among the targets, indicate a carefully calibrated operation aimed at minimising the immediate risk of escalation.

The current flow of information concerning the operation is subject to the rules of the “fog of war”, with both sides engaging in a large-scale campaign of misinformation and disinformation, seeking, on the one hand, to downplay the adversary’s capabilities and, on the other hand, to amplify their own.

Against this background, India’s use of advanced stand-off munitions with minimal collateral damage, along with the deployment of unspecified unmanned aerial systems, is countered by Islamabad’s progressive claims of having downed an increasing number of Indian aircraft during the operation.

The probable loss of some fixed-wing assets, particularly if not due to technical malfunctions, would have occurred within Indian airspace, suggesting a plausible Pakistani cross-border defensive counter-air action using air-to-air missiles.

Notwithstanding the assertiveness in the strategic communication adopted by Islamabad and the artillery exchanges along the entire LoC in Kashmir, which remain consistent with a mere intensification of the recurring positional engagements that have characterised the period since the 22 April attack, a retaliation from Pakistan seems inevitable, though not imminent.

However, the realisation of such retaliation presents a dilemma, not so much regarding the methods, but the nature of the selected targets, as New Delhi did not strike military infrastructures, thus negating the grounds for a symmetrical response.

The current scenario, therefore, reproduces at least in part some elements that have already emerged during the rather limited clashes, in terms of scope and duration, that took place between India and Pakistan in 2016 and especially in 2019.

In the latter case, the two countries focused on achieving outcomes that could be leveraged on their respective domestic fronts, a dynamic that may recur in this instance. At that time, the Indian response took the form of a limited-strike operation in Balakot, which did not lead to large-scale conflict between the two nations.

In the current context, Operation Sindoor, although relatively more extensive in scope than in 2019, nonetheless served to confirm India’s intention to respond militarily to terrorist attacks, thereby attempting to re-establish deterrence and underscoring the absence of a distinction between actions carried out by Kashmiri groups and conventional operations attributed to Pakistani forces.

Contextually, a counter-response occurred on 10 May when Pakistan launched an operation codenamed Operation Bunyan al-Marsus, targeting several Indian military bases. In retaliation, India continued Operation Sindoor, expanding its scope to target Pakistani military installations. This conflict marked the first drone battle between the two nuclear-armed nations.

Barring the risk of an extended incident, it will also depend largely on the pressure exerted by external actors, notably the United States, China, Iran, and the Gulf States. In 2019, it was precisely Washington’s intervention that proved crucial in keeping the confrontation contained. Not coincidentally, after signalling discreet support for its Indian partner, the U.S. administration, through Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio, has initiated intensive talks with both sides, urging restraint.

On Saturday evening, 10 May, the Trump administration announced a ‘full and immediate’ ceasefire between India and Pakistan.  However, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that India had only ‘paused’ its military action against Pakistan and would ‘retaliate on its own terms’ in the event of any further attacks.

Military developments aside, relations between India and Pakistan after what happened are likely to enter a new phase in which hypotheses of dialogue and rapprochement seem unthinkable. Prolonged tension, moreover, risks turning South Asia, more than it already is, into one of the privileged theatres of the broader confrontation between the United States and China.

While the former, in fact, could face increasing difficulty in building a relatively balanced relationship between the two sides, the latter could exploit the circumstances to impose ever-increasing pressure
on its Indian rival.

At the regional level, the confrontation calls into question the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, whose leadership may try to take advantage of the Pakistani “distraction” to strengthen direct and indirect support for active militancy against Islamabad along the shared border. The security situation in Pakistani province of Balochistan, already very precarious at present, could also be further aggravated if the parties fail to de-escalate tensions in the short to medium term, a scenario that looks highly likely. (Photo: 123rf)

Tiziano Marino and Emmanuele Panero/CeSI