The slums surrounding the centre of Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, can be classified by their level of degradation. They are located just a few kilometres from the central shops and street stalls. Dirty roads and houses without drinking water: this is what one can see in the suburbs of George and Lilanda, and the high population density makes coexistence even more difficult.

An intense wind lifts up reddish soil grains and passers-by have to cover their eyes while advancing along the familiar roads. The chaotic structure of the streets causes the formation of small eddies at some street corners, which complicate visibility even more. “This wind can sometimes be rather annoying and besides, it covers everything with dust”, says Chareoes, an electrician who has been working on his own since the country’s official company stopped hiring a few years ago.
We start our walk through the slum early in the morning. The people living in this place start their activities at dawn. “You have to take advantage of daylight hours to consume as little electricity as possible. Daily tasks such as going to the public fountains to fill water tanks, because there is no drinking water in the houses, or making craft beer or exchanging products, are all activities that are done in the morning, there is no time to lose”, Chareoes adds.

The shop owners sprinkle water on the ground so that dust does not enter their stores. Almost no one wears masks to protect themselves from COVID-19 in the neighbourhoods of Lilanda and George – only 3% of the population of Zambia have been vaccinated – but the wind forces them to put any random piece of cloth or the upper part of a t-shirt over their nose and mouth.
Chareoes, a father of four, explains that one can see many children in the streets of these slums because they cannot attend school since their families cannot afford the monthly tuition fee of 60 kuachas (about three and a half euros) required by public or community schools. “People, here, live day by day and with what they manage to scrape up, they can hardly get any other thing that is not food”. For this reason, the presence of ubuntu, the traditional philosophy of Zulu and Xhosa origin that carries a fairly broad English definition of ‘a quality that includes the essential human virtues of compassion and humanity’, is still widely referenced in these realities. Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s first democratically elected president, encapsulated the many interpretations of this word by calling ubuntu an African concept that means “the profound sense that we are human only through the humanity of others; that if we are to accomplish anything in this world, it will in equal measure be due to the work and achievements of others”.

The ubuntu concept, which is an alternative to individualistic and utilitarian philosophies that tend to dominate in the West, and which could be briefly sum up with a short sentence: ‘I am because we are’, is a real necessity in the townships or poor suburbs of Lusaka. Here, everybody tries to contribute by putting together the little they have when there is one of them who needs to buy something or pay off a debt. The people here are committed to helping each other.
Women are usually in charge of the rudimentary machines to make craft beer which is obtained by mashing corn. This process requires time since the machines do not work properly and sometimes you must wait for hours before obtaining the liquid which is then left to ferment. Alcoholic beverages are sold in large quantities in these suburbs, stores are packed with bottles of beer and spirits, and posters on the walls invite customers to drink. The prices of alcoholic beverages are much more affordable than basic food products on the market. The easy access to alcohol, which is cheap, has favoured alcohol abuse. Alcoholism has become a serious social problem, which has also a major impact on the increase in domestic violence against women. “Men often start drinking early in the morning, they drink to relax and forget their problems, and when they get drunk they often become extremely aggressive”, continues Chareoes.

The abandoned objects littering the streets become the toys with which the children of the slums play during the day. Nobody watches them, they take care of each other. The one who is five years old feels responsible for the younger ones; for instance, he makes sure that there are no cars when the younger ones cross a street, or that they do not move too far from the door of their house. The apparent carelessness of mothers is justified by the daily tasks they must accomplish in order to ensure at least one meal a day. Everything is more difficult when you are poor. You have to ration the little food available: small quantities of fruit, vegetables, and dried fish.
The traffic in the streets increases throughout the morning. The vans transporting people from one suburb to another clog the main streets and cause traffic jams. Nevertheless, nobody loses their temper; after a long wait you may see a driver berating another because he is blocking the street, but nothing more than this, as the patience of the inhabitants of these slums is immense.

“There are different levels of poverty in the suburbs or townships of Zambia”, says Chareoes. For instance, there are significant differences between the neighbourhoods of Lilanda and George, though they are just separated by a paved street. The streets of Lilanda, where most of the inhabitants can afford paying basic services such as garbage collection, are relatively clean and there are no deep holes that turn into quagmires when it rains; while in the George neighbourhood, where its small houses are attached to each other, there are piles of garbage at street corners. There have been several cholera outbreaks in the area.
“We try to live our lives the best we can, but the cost of living is very high in Zambia, and with the little money we make we cannot afford to buy basic products. Survival here is difficult, but we try to go on”, says Chareoes. He tries not to lose hope and is convinced that education is the only way out of poverty.  Those families like that of Chareoes, who are aware that a better life can be achieved thanks to education, do their best in order to afford tuition for their children, whose only fault was being born in a place without resources.

Carla Fibla Garcia-Sala

This year there will be different hotspots in Africa. But two of them will have a deep impact on the security of their regions, due to the dimensions of the concerned states and the complexity of the threats. If Nigeria has long been considered a hotspot, the situation in Ethiopia worsened rapidly in the last two years.

The Ethiopian civil war broke out in November 2020 when militias belonging to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) preventively attacked Ethiopian security forces that were gearing up to intervene in the Tigray region. The TPLF, led by Debretsion Gebremichael, basically ruled Ethiopia’s politics and economy until 2018, when Abiy Ahmed (a member of Oromo, the main ethnic group) became Prime Minister. Ahmed gradually but resolutely is dismantling the Tigrayan monopoly over the governance of the country.

Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy Ahmed.

TPLF militias took the control of most of Tigray in June 2021 and sneaked into Afar and Amhara regions. They also coordinated with another militia (the Oromo Liberation Army), occupied some major urban centres, and arrived relatively close to Addis Ababa. Due to the conflict, a humanitarian crisis is ongoing in Tigray. In August 2021, according to UN data, 400,000 people were at risk of starving and 2,000,000 had been displaced. The blockade imposed by Ethiopian authorities to Tigray is having a deep impact on Tigrayans, creating problems to the provision of fuel and power, and preventing farmers to work freely. According to UN, both enemies are responsible for the sufferance of the local population since they stop the intervention of aid organizations. Social media became echo chambers for the propaganda of both sides and spread hatred and racism.On 17 December 2021 the UN Human Rights Council created a commission to investigate on the abuses committed by the two belligerents.

The crisis is spilling over not only in Ethiopia and but also in the Horn of Africa. Militias and refugees flow to neighbouring countries such as Somalia and Sudan (both already in trouble), or Kenya and Djibouti. Road and rail links to other parts of Ethiopia and Djibouti have been blocked by protesters. The conflict is also having heavy consequences on the economy. In July 2021 Addis Ababa declared that the cost of damages inflicted to infrastructures reached 2.3 billion of USD.
The crisis has an impact also on the relationship between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Eritrea, which borders Ethiopia and fought a war with it, is now allied with the former enemy and is supporting Ethiopian security forces in their offensive against Tigray militias. According to some observers, Eritrean troops are committing widespread abuses against the local population.

 The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

The international community is putting pressure on the two fronts to stop the fighting and reach an agreement. But at this moment there are few signs of hope, due to the determination of both Addis Ababa and TPLF. According to Murithi Mutiga, project director for the Horn of Africa at International Crisis Group (a think tank), “This is a war about blood and soil, about power and survival, about ethnic nationalism. And, normally, these wars are very difficult to end.”
Another thorny issue for Ethiopia concerns the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). In this dispute Addis Ababa must confront both Egypt and Sudan who feel threatened by the dam that Ethiopia built on the Nile River. Ethiopia built the GERD to become an energy-exporting country. Egypt sees the dam as a potential threat to its survival, since in theory it could be used to reduce its water reserves. According to some estimates, 80% of Egyptians depend on Nile River for the provision of water. In reality, GERD will have an impact only on the Blue Nile, which merges with White Nile near Khartoum. In July 2021 Ethiopia completed the second filling of the dam and stated that the plant is now ready to produce power in any moment. The UN is pushing the three states to reach an agreement, but Ethiopia is refusing. Due to the sensitivity of the matter, an Egyptian military intervention cannot be ruled out, even if at the moment it seems not feasible.

Disorder in Nigeria
Nigeria will also remain a hotspot in 2022 due to its growing security issues. In the northeast of the country Jihadist groups linked (even if to a different degree) to the Islamic State such as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram, continue to attack both the institutions and the population and covertly enter Cameroon and other countries of the Lake Chad region. But, since May 2021 (when the leader of Boko Haram died in a clash with the rivals of ISWAP) the militant groups are going through a phase of reorganization that will likely continue in 2022. Different scenarios are possible: the extremist groups could merge peacefully; one of them could defeat the other; the security forces could take advantage of the divisions to neutralize or at least marginalize the Jihadists. In any case, there is a window of opportunity for the Nigerian government to manage a major threat.

If there are some positive signs in north-eastern states, in the centre and in the south of the country (but also in the northwest) violence and instability are increasing. And this trend will continue in 2022. Ethnic tensions linked to the use of land and water sources, especially between Fulani nomadic herders and farmers, are more and more the cause of clashes between armed groups and violence against unarmed civilians. These groups are usually called “bandits” by the local press, but their scope and dimensions are different from those of “normal” criminal gangs. Even if they do steal cattle or ransack villages, they are not behaving like the usual suspects, since they attack military bases.
In southern regions , the secessionist movements inspired by the Biafra war (fought between 1967 and 1970) are increasing their activities. Among them, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) led by Nnamdi Kanu occupies the centre stage. IPOB is organizing protests and strikes against the federal government that is replying with the use of force.

IPOB became a sort of transnational threat since 2021 when it reached an agreement with the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF), a separatist group active in the western regions of Cameroon where (together with other militias) it wages war against the Cameroonian government. The leaders of the two groups, Kanu and Cho Ayaba, declared their intention to “work to secure their common border and ensure an open exchange of arms, intelligence and personnel.” In the Niger Delta, there are other militant groups with a different agenda that could join IPOB in its fight.
A smaller but far from negligible confrontation is ongoing between a Shiite movement, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), and the government not only in the north of the country (where Muslims are the majority) but also in the capital Abuja. The rift is also between the Sunni majority of Nigerian Muslims and IMN.
The growing discontent among the population leads to bitter accusations against the government and to protests that can degenerate into clashes. The security forces can use maximum force (e.g. use live ammunition) to deal with these protests.

The bigger they are…
According to an old saying, “The bigger they are, the harder they fall”. The hypothetic fall of two giants like Nigeria and Ethiopia would produce big shockwaves in their respective regions. Many analysts believe that Nigeria is already a failed state or is on the border of collapse due to multiple security problems and issues like widespread poverty, rampant corruption, growing organized crime, etc. At this stage, these judgments are pessimistic since the state is still capable of providing some sort of internal order and security in Nigeria. And it will probably be able to do so also in 2022. But the threats described above are real and evolving and they could prevail if not properly managed. Emboldened by success in Nigeria, Jihadists and separatists could export violence in the surrounding countries.
As Murithi Mutiga noted, before the start of its internal conflict Ethiopia was an exporter of stability in the region, one of the biggest contributors to peacekeeping around the world and in Somalia. Its crisis deprived the Horn of Africa of a much-needed element of stability; its hypothetic collapse could spill over into violence in its already problematic neighbours.

Innocent Pond